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ABSTRACT 
 
Although the insurance industry demonstrates a growing concern about 
the severe rise in losses from natural disasters, only about one third of all 
potential victims have in fact purchased first-party catastrophe insurance. 
Although first-party insurance has several advantages, we find that there is 
indeed actually no demand for and supply of first-party insurance against 
natural catastrophes. Therefore, the central question we examine from a 
behavioral law and economics perspective is why so little use is made of 
the possibilities of first-party insurance and why first-party insurance can 
constitute a viable alternative to government compensation. Further, we 
consider whether compulsory first-party disaster coverage may be a 
solution. To conclude, we consider under which circumstances the further 
introduction of first-party catastrophe insurance should be applauded as a 
means to encourage potential victims to take control over their 
compensatory means while also benefiting from preventative incentives.  
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The scope and frequency of catastrophes, natural or technological, is 
increasing. Moreover, recent studies suggest that global warming has 
resulted in the intensification of floods, draughts, tropical cyclones and 
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destructive hurricanes, one example being Katrina in the United States.1 
Further, earthquakes and floods are being covered more frequently in the 
media, which emphasizes the number of victims who lost their lives, their 
home and their family members, as well as the survivors remaining in the 
devastated areas. Apart from natural catastrophes, man-made disasters are 
also on the rise as the unavoidable price of technological progress and as a 
consequence of the so-called terrorism era. Depending upon the specific 
characteristics of the country, natural disasters such as earthquakes, 
hurricanes, volcanic eruptions, may be more common than technological 
disasters such as fires or explosions.  Nevertheless, catastrophes threaten all 
countries. This is especially true for risks regarding weather conditions, 
like exceptional rainfall and flooding. The rise of catastrophes generates an 
increasing number of victims, who require assistance and compensation for 
their losses.  
Various perspectives regarding compensation for catastrophe victims 
exist.  Often the insurance industry is included, to some extent, as part of 
the proposed compensation scheme. Thus, a great deal of attention is 
increasingly paid to the role of insurance in providing compensation for 
victims of catastrophes. A key consideration in utilizing insurance as a 
compensatory tool turns on how catastrophe is defined in the insurance 
policies.  Though the everyday meaning of catastrophe or disaster may 
seem clear, developing a formal definition can be much more difficult.  In 
some cases, catastrophe is defined statutorily.  Such statutes typically 
define an event as a catastrophe based upon its scale and the damage 
incurred both in terms of property as well as loss of life.  These definitions 
are necessary to determine the obligations of public authorities as well as 
                                                                                                                 
1  One of the expected effects of global warming is, as predicted by theory and 
modeling, an increase in hurricane intensity. This is not to say that there is consensus among 
scientists regarding the correlation between hurricane activity and climate change. See 
Alicia Rivera, Katrina y Rita son hijos del azar. Entrevista con Kerry A. Emanuel, cientifico 
del MIT y experto en huracanes, EL PAÍS, Sept. 25, 2005 (Colom.); Quirin Schiermeier, 
Hurricane link  to climate change  is hazy, 437 NATURE, Sept. 22, 2005 at 461 available at 
http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v437/n7058/pdf/437461a.pdf.   See generally reports 
from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, available at 
http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/assessments-reports.htm; NICHOLAS STERN, THE ECONOMICS 
OF CLIMATE CHANGE: THE STERN REVIEW xvi, 3 (Cambridge University Press 2008) (2007); 
P.J. Webster et al., Changes in Tropical Cyclone Number, Duration, and Intensity in a 
Warming Environment, 309 SCIENCE, Sept. 16, 2005 at 1844;   Johnny C.L. Chan et al., 
Comment on “Changes in Tropical Cyclone Number, Duration, and Intensity in a Warming 
Environment,”, 311 SCIENCE, Mar. 24, 2006 at 1713b; P.J. Webster et al., Response to 
Comment on “Changes in Tropical Cyclone Number, Duration, and Intensity in a Warming 
Environment”, 311 SCIENCE, Mar. 24, 2006 at 1713c. 
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the amount of financing required.  When financial loss is the focal point, 
the number of victims is usually the most important factor. It is this 
financial aspect of catastrophes that result in a large number of victims that 
will be the focus of this paper.2 
It may be interesting to provide some more concrete facts and figures. 
The following charts show the increasing number of catastrophic events 
and of victims from 1970 until 2007. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  3   
                                                                                                                 
2  Because of the large number of victims, the financial effect of catastrophes can be 
distinguished from the example of traffic accidents. The total number of victims on a yearly 
basis in traffic can be large as well, but that is usually not considered “catastrophic”. For a 
criticism, see Ulrich Magnus, Germany, in FINANCIAL COMPENSATION FOR VICTIMS OF 
CATASTROPHES: A COMPARATIVE LEGAL APPROACH, 119 (Michael Faure et al. eds.,  
Springer-Verlag/Wien 2006) who argues that it is strange to qualify the flooding of the Elbe 
where only a few people died as a catastrophe, whereas all the hundreds of victims dying 
yearly in traffic accidents are apparently not considered “catastrophic”.  
3  Swiss Re, Sigma: Natural catastrophes and man-made disasters in 2007: high 
losses in Europe, 5 fig.1 (2008). 
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  4 
Focusing only on natural catastrophes, the following figure again 
demonstrates a marked increase in occurrences: 
                                                                                                                 
4  Id at 6 fig.2. 
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  5 
  
In 2007, more than 21,500 people lost their lives, due to approximately 
335 natural catastrophes and man-made disasters. The corresponding 
property damage totaled more than $ 70 billion, of which about one third, $ 
27.6 billion was covered by insurance.6 Of the latter amount, $ 23.3 billion 
was attributable to natural catastrophes, while the remaining $ 4.3 billion 
was due to major man-made disasters.7 This insurance coverage is 
represented in the following figure: 
                                                                                                                 
5 Munich Re, Topics Geo 2007, 45,  available at 
http://www.munichre.com/publications/302-05699_en.pdf.  
6  Swiss Re, Sigma: Natural catastrophes and man-made disasters in 2007: high 
losses in Europe, 3 (2008). 
7  Id. 
2008]  CATASTROPHIC RISKS 7 
 
 8  and 
                                                                                                                 
8 Munich Re, Topics Geo 2007, 45, available at http://www.munichre.com/publications/ 
302-05699_en.pdf.  
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  9 
 
Or: 
  10 
                                                                                                                 
9  Swiss Re, Sigma: Natural catastrophes and man-made disasters in 2007: high 
losses in Europe, 7 fig.3 (2008). 
10  Munich Re, Topics Geo 2007, 49 (2008) available at http://www.munichre.com/ 
publications/302-05699_en.pdf.  
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These figures demonstrate surprisingly low levels of insurance 
coverage, most notably for geophysical, climatological and hydrological 
events.  Accordingly, the figures raise the question of whether first-party 
insurance can play a greater and more influential role in the compensation 
of catastrophe victims.  This question is particularly relevant, especially in 
Western society, where insurance techniques are broadly developed.  
Therefore, this paper only focuses on catastrophe insurance coverage for 
potential victims and does not address man-made or technological disasters 
for which a person, group, or company may be liable as tortfeasors. 
Consequently, third party liability insurance, which is available for possible 
tortfeasors, is not discussed. Moreover, most natural catastrophes do not 
involve a third party who can be held liable as many natural catastrophes 
are considered “acts of God.” The only potential liable party in case of 
natural catastrophes is the government (e.g. for failure to warn or to take 
adequate measures in case of e.g. flooding). Cases of government liability 
for natural catastrophes are, however, rare. Hence, the role of third party 
insurance plays a limited role in natural catastrophes and accordingly, this 
paper focuses solely on first-party insurance. 
As noted this paper will address the use of first party insurance in 
Western societies, where insurance techniques are well developed but have 
not fully been utilized as a response to catastrophic losses.  Instead, there 
seems to be a preference for either no compensatory solution or for 
government provided compensation. Indeed, empirical evidence, discussed 
below, demonstrates that even where first-party insurance is widely 
available, potential victims only use it to a limited extent. This of course 
raises the question whether catastrophic risks have specific features that 
make the problem difficult to treat.  
Addressing the role of first-party insurance is also interesting in light of 
governments’ increasing attempts to provide financial solutions when the 
number of catastrophe victims is high.11 These types of government 
funding are, however, heavily criticized in current law and economics 
                                                                                                                 
11  Hirshleifer can be regarded as one of the first to address this issue. He had the 
insight that providing compensation after the occurrence of a disaster is so politically 
attractive that the government will invariably find it impossible to resist. See Jack 
Hirshleifer, War Damage Insurance, 35 THE REV. OF ECON & STAT. 144, 146-47 (1953), 
reprinted in 9 CONN. INS. L.J.1 (2002).  See also Peter Siegelman, A New Old Look at 
Terrorism Insurance: Jack Hirshleifer’s War Damage Insurance After Fifty Years, 9 CONN. 
INS. L.J. 19 (2002). 
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literature.12 The question therefore arises whether first-party insurance can 
constitute a viable alternative to government compensation.13  First-party 
insurance is indeed only one of the many approaches regarding 
compensation for catastrophe victims.14 It is intriguing to analyze this 
particular solution from an economic perspective: on the one hand we can 
rely on the broad law and economics literature on liability and insurance,15 
and on the other hand on literature on the demand for insurance protection 
against catastrophes.16 This traditional law and economics literature starts 
from the assumption that the human race consists of all rational human 
beings. However, cognitive psychology research regarding patterns of 
human decision-making illustrates deviation from the pure rational thinking 
model. In other words, human behavioral patterns provide added and 
essential analyses that complement the traditional law and economics 
perspectives. Moreover, a comparative analysis will be adopted as well, by 
inter alia focusing on solutions adopted by various (Western) countries.17 
Of course, this analysis is mostly applicable in societies where well-
organized insurance markets exist. Thus, the question can be asked why 
disaster insurance, in these countries and societies, are relatively 
                                                                                                                 
12  See Louis Kaplow, Incentives and Government Relief for Risk, 4 J. RISK & 
UNCERTAINTY 167 (1991); George L. Priest, The Government, the Market, and the Problem 
of Catastrophic Loss, 12 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 219 (1996); Richard A. Epstein, 
Catastrophic Responses to Catastrophic Risks, 12 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 287 (1996).  
13  Of course, the main sources of pressure on the government concerning 
catastrophes are probably other than the mere claim for the loss of some definite goods. 
People indeed usually prefer not being flooded at all over being flooded and compensated, 
which is fully consistent with the common assumption that compensation, as a matter of 
fact, is always insufficient to put the victim back to her utility level prior to the catastrophe. 
14  For other compensation mechanisms, see TRANSBOUNDARY RISK MANAGEMENT 
(Joanne Linnerooth-Bayer et al., eds., Earthscan Publications 2001); Organization for 
Economic Co-Operation and Development, CATASTROPHIC RISKS AND INSURANCE 25 
(OECD Publishing 2005). 
15  See, e.g., STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW (Harvard 
University Press 1987). 
16  Howard Kunreuther et al., DISASTER INSURANCE PROTECTION: PUBLIC POLICY 
LESSONS  (John Wiley & Sons Inc. 1978); Howard Kunreuther, Mitigating Disaster Losses 
through Insurance, 12 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 171 (1996); Paul J.H. Schoemaker & 
Howard Kunreuther, An Experimental Study of Insurance Decisions, 46 J. RISK & INS. 603 
(1979).  
17  For a more general comparative approach to the financial compensation for 
victims of catastrophes, see MICHAEL FAURE & TON HARTLIEF, FINANCIAL COMPENSATION 
FOR VICTIMS OF CATASTROPHES (Springer 2006). 
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underutilized.18  First-party disaster insurance, however, is not a viable 
alternative in many developing countries where either insurance markets 
are underdeveloped or consumers lack resources to pay a premium ex 
ante.19  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: first, we will 
address the potential of first-party insurance in covering catastrophic losses 
(Section II). Second, the question arises whether prospective victims 
actually seek ex ante protection through first-party insurance coverage 
(Section III). Next, after considering the demand side of the equation this 
paper will discuss the supply side of first-party insurance coverage (Section 
IV). Then the paper will critically review the phenomenon of compulsory 
disaster coverage as a reaction to the lack of both supply and demand 
(Section V). Lastly, concrete examples from France and Belgium will be 
used to analyze the theoretical solutions put forth (Section VI). The paper 
concludes with a few final remarks (Section VII). 
II. FIRST-PARTY INSURANCE 
 
First-party insurance is a system whereby insurance coverage is 
provided and compensation is awarded directly by the insurer to the victim. 
It is thus the prospective victim himself who buys this type of insurance 
coverage, with the eye on possible future harm and corresponding 
damages. The underlying principle in first-party insurance is that the 
insurance company – in principle – pays as soon as damage occurs, 
provided that it can be proven that the particular damage is an insured risk 
                                                                                                                 
18  As was the case in the Netherlands, for example, supply of disaster insurance was 
lacking due to a cartel agreement not to provide coverage. 
19  The insurance market for catastrophic risk in the Caribbean Region, for example, 
remains a thin market characterized by high prices and low transfer of risks. Philippe 
Auffret, Catastrophe Insurance Market in the Caribbean Region: Market Failures and 
Recommendations for Public Sector Intervention (The World Bank, Policy Research 
Working Paper 2963, January 2003) offers an overview of the existing market failures, 
followed by recommendations for public sector interventions. See also, John D. Pollner, 
MANAGING CATASTROPHIC DISASTER RISKS USING ALTERNATIVE RISK FINANCING AND 
POOLED INSURANCE STRUCTURES (World Bank 2001).  Non-life (i.e. property/casualty) 
insurance penetration rates were (and still are) low in those countries affected by the Asian 
tsunami in 2004. In Indonesia, for example, just $8 per capita was spent on non-life 
insurance in 2003.  
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covered by the insurance policy. Contrary to third party insurance, payment 
by the insurance company occurs irrespective of whether there is liability.20  
Accordingly, insurance protection trends away from tort law and third 
party insurance and towards insurance schemes whereby victims ex ante 
seek coverage on a first-party basis where possible. For example, in the 
area of environmental insurance there is a movement toward environmental 
damage insurance operating as a form of first party insurance.21 There is a 
similar movement toward first-party insurance in some legal systems in 
medical malpractice insurance22 and when compensating traffic accident 
victims.23  The benefits of various first-party insurance schemes are 
accordingly being used to address a range of societal issues. Indeed, Priest 
suggested that the shift towards first-party insurance would have been an 
appropriate remedy to the American insurance crisis that occurred in the 
eighties.24  Priest reasoned that: 
[I]n comparison to first-party insurance, third party tort law insurance 
provides coverage in excessive amounts, in a manner that substantially 
restricts risk segregation, and at costs that far exceed the costs of first-party 
insurance. For both consumer and provider risk pools, these differences 
will increase the correlation of risks within existing pools and, as a 
consequence, increase the extent of adverse selection, leading to the 
breakdown of the pools.25  
Other commentators, such as Bishop and Epstein, also favor first-party 
insurance.26  It has particularly been argued that first-party insurance 
                                                                                                                 
20  MICHAEL FAURE & TON HARTLIEF, INSURANCE AND EXPANDING SYSTEMATIC RISKS 
149 (OECD 2003).  
21 Michael Faure, Environmental Damage Insurance in the Netherlands, 10 ENVTL. 
LIAB. 31, 37 (2002). 
22  See, e.g., Lotta Wendel, Compensation in the Swedish Health Care Sector, in NO-
FAULT COMPENSATION IN THE HEALTH CARE SECTOR 367, 367 (J. Dute et al. eds., 2004) 
(showing Swedish system of patient insurance).  
23  Michael Faure, Tort Liability in France: An Introductory Economic Analysis, in 6 
LAW AND ECONOMICS IN CIVIL LAW COUNTRIES 169, 177-79 (Bruno Deffains et al. eds., 
2001);  and A. Tunc, The ‘Loi Badinter’, Ten Years of Experience, 4 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & 
COMP. L. 3 (1996). 
24  George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 968 YALE 
L.J. 1521, 1552 (1987).  
25  Id. at 1552-53. 
26  William Bishop, The Contract-Tort Boundary and the Economics of Insurance, 12 
J. LEGAL STUD. 241 (1983); Richard A. Epstein, Products Liability as  an  Insurance 
Market, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 645 (1985); RICHARD EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX 
WORLD 33 (Harvard University Press 1996). 
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schemes have the advantage of low administrative costs27 as well as the 
ability to better adapt premiums and policy conditions to specific risks.28 
The latter enables first party insurance to engage in easy risk 
differentiation, which is advantageous for insurers. Under this arrangement 
it is possible for the insurer to assess ex ante the risk and consequently 
damage that a particular victim would suffer.29  This ex ante analysis is not 
available with third party insurance because assessment of risk is to a third 
party not known at the time of contracting and potential liability that may 
or may not follow.30 Lower administrative costs are due to the fact that 
under a first-party insurance policy the insurer covers the risk of damage to 
a particular victim or a particular site.31 It is therefore much easier for the 
insured to signal particular circumstances, which may influence the risk to 
the insurer.32  The reason for the trend away from third party insurance and 
towards first-party coverage thus becomes clear.  
First-party insurances can be divided into two main groups: (1) 
insurance, which compensates for personal injuries; and (2) insurance, 
which takes the form of coverage for specific property damage.33 The 
schemes, which focus on personal injury compensation usually, do not vary 
coverage based on the source of the injury, i.e. whether the cause was a 
catastrophe or not.34  Accordingly, it takes the form of generalized accident 
insurance coverage. As a result, coverage depends on the specific costs that 
a victim would incur as a result of an accident, such as lost income, 
coverage of (additional) medical expenses, and in some cases even pain 
and suffering.35  Most European countries cover a majority of personal 
                                                                                                                 
27  Indeed, one will not spend time nor money looking for a liable tortfeasor and 
bringing liability claims. RICHARD EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 31 
(Harvard University Press 1996). 
28  Ronen Perry, Relational Economic Loss: An Integrated Economic Justification for 
the Exclusionary Rule, 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 711, 771-78 (2004). 
29  See Bishop, supra note 26, at 246. 
30  See Richard A. Epstein, Product Liability  as  an  Insurance Market, 14 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 645, 648-50 (1985). 
31  See  Bishop, supra note 26, at 249. 
32  Id. 
33  Elizabeth Medaglia et al., The ‘Concurrent Cause’ Theory: Inapplicable to 
Environmental Liability Coverage Disputes, 30 TORT & INS. L.J. 823, 829 (Spring 1995).  
34  Id. at 829-30. 
35  This is more particularly the case in the French policy referred to as “Garantie 
contre les accidents de la vie”. This new insurance policy provides broad (first-party) 
compensation against accidents and compensates as if tort law were applicable, therefore 
including compensation for pain and suffering. See also The French GAV® Accident 
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injury expenses through a social security system.36 Consequently, well-
informed potential victims can purchase additional or complimentary 
coverage according to their individual degree of risk aversion and 
corresponding need for insurance.37  
The second type of first-party insurance schemes applies (only) to 
property damage, for example housing insurance. In many countries, 
however, first-party insurance for property damage excludes damages 
caused by a natural disaster.38 In the Netherlands, for example, property 
damage caused by flooding is excluded.39 Therefore, this paper analyzes 
the demand for disaster coverage (Section III), whether competitive 
insurance markets are supplying such coverage (Section IV) and whether 
regulatory intervention is necessary to provide access to disaster insurance 
(Section V). Lastly, this paper will look at general legal practices 
surrounding the issue (Section VI).  
III. DEMAND FOR FIRST-PARTY INSURANCE AGAINST 
NATURAL DISASTERS 
A. THE DECISION TO PURCHASE FIRST-PARTY INSURANCE: 
EXPECTED UTILITY HYPOTHESIS 
 
The first issue that arises is whether there is demand by the public for 
coverage against damage caused by catastrophes. According to the 
expected utility model, an individual is assumed to behave as if he engaged 
in a detailed analysis of the costs and benefits associated with the purchase 
of an insurance policy.40 As a result, a potential victim residing in a hazard-
prone area will voluntarily purchase first-party insurance if he perceives the 
                                                                                                                          
Compensation, SCOR Technical Newsl. (SCOR Group, Paris, France), Oct. 2003, at 2, available 
at http://scor.com/www/fileadmin/uploads/publics/NTNV2003_05_en_tuknv05.pdf. 
36  Arye Miller, Should Social Insurance Pay Compensation for Pain and Suffering?, 
31 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 550, 554-56 (1982). 
37  This assumes that competitive insurance markets offer applicable policies. 
38  The Demand for Flood Insurance: Statement before the Comm. On Banking, 
Housing, and Urban Affairs 2 (Oct. 18, 2005) (Statement of Mark Browne, Gerard D. 
Stephens CPCU Chair in Risk Management and Insurance).  
39  Id. 
40  This utilitarian approach on insurance has, among others, been described by Nobel 
Prize winner Kenneth J. Arrow. See generally, Kenneth Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare 
Economics of Medical Care: Reply (The Implications of Transaction Costs and Adjustment 
Lags), 55 AM. ECON. REV. 154 (1963); Kenneth Arrow, The Economics of Moral Hazard: 
Further Comment, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 537 (1968). 
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premium to be sufficiently low in comparison to the risks (and if he is 
convinced that ex post governmental disaster relief will not be 
forthcoming).41  
Doherty and others, however argue that financial considerations are 
only one of the reasons why homeowners would purchase first-party 
insurance.42 Decisions regarding the purchase of insurance coverage may 
also be driven by emotion-related goals (either worry or regret), the need to 
satisfy legal or other official requirements, the need to satisfy social and/or 
cognitive norms, and the need to maintain a relationship with a trusted 
agent/advisor.43  Indeed, regarding the emotion-related goals, there is a 
growing literature on how emotional goals impact individuals’ decision 
making regarding risk.44 Three main emotional goals pertaining to 
catastrophe coverage are: (1) reduction of anxiety (i.e. peace of mind); (2) 
avoidance of anticipated regret45; and (3) disappointment.46 Thus, reasons 
for purchasing insurance are complicated and take into account an 
individual’s need to feel justified and avoid anxiety.  Sunstein also 
indicated that people focus on the unpleasantness of the outcome rather 
than on its probability when they have strong sentimental attachment to the 
catastrophe.47 Moreover, Hsee and Kunreuther found that individuals are 
willing to pay higher premiums for the same amount of coverage for 
objects they love than for ordinary non-sentimental property.48 Further, 
regarding the need to satisfy social and/or cognitive norms, there is 
                                                                                                                 
41  Kunreuther and Pauly adhere to the expected utility theory to explain the failure of 
individuals to purchase insurance against low-probability large-loss events, but agree that 
implicit or explicit costs discovering the true probability of these events may inhibit 
insurance purchase. See Howard Kunreuther & Mark Pauly, Neglecting Disaster: Why 
Don’t People Insure Against Large Losses?, 28 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 5 (2004). 
42  NEIL A. DOHERTY ET AL., MANAGING LARGE-SCALE RISKS IN A NEW ERA OF 
CATASTROPHES 137 (Wharton Risk Management and Decision Processes Center in 
conjunction with the Georgia State University and the Insurance Information Institute 
March 2008). 
43  Id. at 137-38.  
44  George F. Loewenstein et al., Risk as Feelings, 127 PSYCHOL. BULL. 267 (2001).  
45  See, e.g., Michael Braun & Alexander Muermann, The Impact of Regret on the 
Demand for Insurance, 71 J. RISK & INS. 737 (2004); David E. Bell, Regret in Decision 
Making Under Uncertainty, 30 OPERATIONS RES. 961 (1982). 
46   See David E. Bell, Disappointment in Decision Making Under Uncertainty, 33 
OPERATIONS RES. 1 (1985).  
47   Cass R. Sunstein, Terrorism and Probability Neglect, 26 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 
121, 122 (2003).  
48  Christopher K. Hsee & Howard Kunreuther, The Affection Effect in Insurance 
Decisions, 20 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 141 (2000). 
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empirical evidence that the purchase of insurance is based on knowledge of 
what friends and neighbors have done.49  Additionally, the decision to 
purchase insurance can be influenced by the pursuit of happiness. One can 
argue that an ex post injury will make victims seek ex ante protection. 
Human and economic decisions thus reflect and contribute to human 
happiness.50  
Whether potential victims need insurance for losses resulting from a 
particular catastrophe will to a large extent depend on whether they can 
rely on other sources, such as government, to provide compensation or not.  
For example, in Europe most potential victims will not have a large 
incentive to purchase insurance against the risks of personal injury.51  This 
is because coverage is mainly provided by a social security system.52  If, 
however, there is not an alternative source of compensation, it is logical 
that there would be an increased demand for coverage against personal and 
property loss generally and specifically that caused by catastrophe.  
 
B. EXAMPLES 
 
Contrary to our expectations, empirical evidence, reported inter alia by 
both Kunreuther53 and Zeckhauser,54 amongst others, suggests that there is 
generally no adequate interest in and thus no demand for voluntary 
insurance protecting against natural catastrophes.  Consequently, this 
evidence suggests that most homeowners do not buy adequate levels of 
insurance coverage.  
One example concerns the financial compensation system for natural 
catastrophes utilized in Germany generally, and specifically existing 
                                                                                                                 
49  For more on the importance of friends and neighbors in providing information, see 
Mark A. Satterthwaite, Consumer Information, Equilibrium Industry Price, and the Number 
of Sellers, 10 BELL J. ECON. 483 (1979).  
50  For a study on the importance of happiness in economic analysis, see BRUNO S. 
FREY & ALOIS W. STRUZER, HAPPINESS & ECONOMICS (Princeton University Press 2002); 
Bruno S. Frey & Alois W. Stutzer, Happiness Research: State and Prospects, 62 REV. SOC. 
ECON. 207 (2005); Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Happiness Research and Cost-
Benefit Analysis (UNIV. PA. INST. LAW & ECONOMICS  Research Paper No. 07-15), available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=999928. 
51  Comité Europeen des Assurances, Reducing the Social and Economic Impact of 
Climate Change and Natural Catastrophes 27-28 (2007). 
52  Id. 
53  Howard Kunreuther, Mitigating Disaster, supra note 16, at 174. 
54  Richard Zeckhauser, The Economics of Catastrophes, 12 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 
113, 115 (1996).  
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insurance arrangements. As a general rule, most first-party insurance 
policies exclude catastrophic risks which result from natural disasters such 
as floods and earthquakes.55  Coverage therefore depends on the specific 
terms of the respective insurance policy.  In practice, only a small 
percentage of German citizens have catastrophe insurance coverage: only 
about 50% of those households hit by the 2002 Elbe flooding were insured 
against the risk of property damage caused by natural resources. Endres, 
Ohl & Rundshagen have recently held that this lack of adequate insurance 
coverage may be the result of a lacking demand because of a lack of risk 
aversion.56  Although this last topic should be subject of further empirical 
research, they already stress that it is too easily accepted (at the policy 
level) that there is risk aversion, whereby this may not always be the case.  
Especially since the lack in demand could just as easily be explained by the 
lack of flood insurances on the German market.  
There are examples of this in the American market as well. Indeed, 
although the United States has several (government supported) initiatives to 
stimulate natural hazard insurance, relatively little progress has been made.  
The standard U.S. homeowners’ insurance policy offered by private 
insurance carriers is an “all risk” policy and therefore covers damage to a 
home by fire, windstorms, hail, riots and explosions. Flood and earthquake 
damage receive, however, different treatment. Coverage for flood damage 
due to rising water is explicitly excluded in homeowners’ insurance 
policies, but coverage for these losses is voluntarily available through the 
federal government’s National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP).57 
Earthquake coverage on the other hand can be a separate policy or an 
endorsement to the homeowners or renters policy and is voluntarily 
available from most insurance companies.  In California, it is also available 
through the California Earthquake Authority.58 Although U.S. citizens are 
                                                                                                                 
55  Magnus, supra note 2, at 129. 
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not obliged to purchase homeowners insurance by law, the process of 
obtaining a mortgage often requires it. In addition, the Flood disaster 
Protection Act of 1973 and the National Flood Insurance Reform Act of 
1994 mandate the purchase of flood insurance as a condition for federal or 
federally-related financial mortgages for acquisition and or construction of 
buildings in Special Flood Hazard Areas.59 In general, there is however 
substantial evidence that most individuals in flood-prone areas do not 
voluntarily purchase insurance despite highly subsidized rates.60 For 
example, less than 3,000 out of 21,000 flood-prone communities entered 
the NFIP during its first four years of operation (since 1968) and less than 
275,000 homeowners voluntarily bought an insurance policy.61  Only 
through excessive publicity and information campaigns has knowledge of 
flood risks among the population increased. By 1992, a conservative 
estimate of coverage suggests that less than 20 percent of the homes 
located in the floodplain were covered by flood insurance.62 The Federal 
Insurance Administration estimates that as of 1997 about 27 percent of 
households living in high-risk flood areas had insurance.63 This is 
consistent with the findings of a study where FEMA examined 1549 
disaster relief applications from victims of the 1998 flood in Northern 
Vermont. There, almost 84 percent of Northern Vermonters residing in the 
Special Flood Hazard Areas did not have flood insurance coverage at the 
time; 45 percent of whom were required to purchase it.64  
The famous example of hurricane Katrina also deserves our attention as 
well. The victims of Katrina complained, rather vociferously, that the 
received compensation was substantially less than the actual costs of 
repairing or rebuilding their destroyed houses.65 Even those covered who 
suffered large losses from rising water were only able to recover a portion 
of their losses because the maximum coverage limit on residential 
                                                                                                                          
unpublished manuscript prepared for the National Bureau of Economic Research Insurance 
Conference, Feb. 2000), available at: http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/jaffee/papers/nber00.pdf. 
59  See Pham, supra note 57, at 632-33, 641-43. 
60  See id. at 641-42. 
61  Risa Palm, Demand for Disaster Insurance: Residential Coverage, in PAYING THE 
PRICE. THE STATUS AND ROLE OF INSURANCE AGAINST NATURAL DISASTERS IN THE UNITED 
STATES 51, 55 (Howard Kunreuther & Richard J. Roth, Sr. eds., Joseph Henry Press 1998). 
62  Id. 
63  Id. 
64  Howard Kunreuther, Has the Time Come for Comprehensive Natural Disaster 
Insurance?, in ON RISK AND DISASTER: LESSONS FROM HURRICANE KATRINA 175, 179 
(Ronald J. Daniels et al. ed., Univ. of Pa. Press 2005). 
65  Id. at 175. 
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buildings (not including contents) under NFIP was $250,000 and these 
homeowners did not purchase excess flood coverage from private 
carriers.66 However, this is not to suggest that the coverage itself was 
inadequate rather as we have seen repeatedly people were not purchasing 
necessary coverage. In the Louisiana parishes affected by Katrina the 
percentage of homeowners with flood insurance ranged from 57.7 percent 
in St. Bernard’s parish to 7.3 percent in Tangipahoa parish.67  Only 40 
percent of the residents in New Orleans had flood insurance, although they 
were eligible to purchase such a policy through the NFIP.68 The Economist 
reported similar numbers: in Mississippi’s coastal areas, less than one in 
five households had flood insurance and in New Orleans it was less than 
fifty percent.69  
Even in less recent history, very few people had acquired coverage 
prior to flooding caused by tropical storm Agnes. Agnes wreaked havoc on 
many areas in the Northeastern United States in June 1972.70  Again, a 
number of the communities in the affected regions qualified for the federal 
government’s subsidized National Flood Insurance Program but had not 
taken advantage of it.71  In fact, only 1,580 claims – totaling $5 million – 
were paid under this Program. Consequently Congress responded to the 
plight of the (uninsured) victims with liberal relief through its Small 
Business Administration Disaster loan program.72 
Another example is the Northridge Earthquake in California in 1994 
which caused more than $ 19.6 billion (in 2007 dollars) in insured losses.73  
Immediately after this catastrophic event, a high number of citizens decided 
to buy first-party disaster insurance, as a reaction to the suffered damages. 
Soon, however, this reactionary behavior dissipated and Californians began 
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to let those policies lapse or cancelled them.74  Indeed, eight years after the 
creation of the California Earthquake Authority, the acquisition rate of 
coverage has decreased from thirty to seventeen percent.75  
The empirical evidence, however, does not clearly support a pure lack 
of demand for the lack or inadequacies of catastrophe insurance. A recent 
study by the Wharton Risk Management and Decision Processes Center76 
reports that after Florida went through several flooding episodes in 2004, 
people effectively purchased more flood insurance. They found that in 
2000 there were 973,444 flood insurance policies in place versus 1,143,844 
in 2005 (which represents a 17% increase, while the costs of flood 
insurance remained virtually the same between 2000 and 2005).77 The 
authors indicate several explanations for these changes. First, regret: people 
living in devastated areas, who had coverage, wished they had purchased 
the better and larger policies that would have provided more adequate 
coverage. Second, flood insurance began to look like a sound financial 
investment. Third, the floods were a vivid experience not only for those 
affected but also for their neighbors and family members who were not 
directly affected by property loss.78  As loss due to flooding became a 
reality in these people’s lives purchasing flood insurance seemed more 
appealing and more purposeful. 
Therefore, even though there is some evidence of serious under 
demand for catastrophe insurance, there are also cases (like in the Florida 
example) where (at least in the short term) the insurance purchase has 
increased. It is unclear whether these policies purchased in Florida in 2005 
(after the 2004 flooding) will be maintained after a few flood-free years. 
The example of the California earthquake indeed illustrates that once the 
memory of the disaster is forgotten, a large quantity of the new insurance 
coverages were cancelled. 
                                                                                                                 
74  Id.; Paul Slovic, Howard Kunreuther & Gilbert White, Decision Processes, 
Rationality and Adjustment to Natural Hazards, in NATURAL HAZARDS: LOCAL, NATIONAL, 
GLOBAL 14 (Gilbert White ed., Oxford University Press 1974). 
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CALIFORNIA EARTHQUAKE: RMS 10-YEAR RETROSPECTIVE 11 (2004), available at 
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C. BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS AND THE DEMAND FOR 
FIRST-PARTY INSURANCE AGAINST NATURAL CATASTROPHES 
 
Economics and behavioral law provide insight into several phenomena 
which may explain this lack of catastrophe insurance demand.  A low 
demand may be caused by problems on the supply side as well, more 
particularly if premiums would be inefficiently high either as a result of 
distorted estimations of probabilities by insurers or as a result of high 
loading. These problems on the supply side will be discussed separately in 
the next section. For now, focus will be on the reasons why, even if 
catastrophe coverage is offered at actuarially fair premiums in competitive 
markets,79 demand for coverage remains low.  
First, it seems that those with a higher perceived vulnerability to future 
catastrophic losses are more likely to acquire first-party insurance than 
those who believe that a catastrophe is unlikely to affect their home or their 
community. Slovic concluded that a perceived probability of loss was a 
critical factor in triggering the purchase of catastrophe insurance.80  
Potential victims who do not purchase coverage do not deem the risk of 
loss to be sufficient to require such protection. They tend to take an “it will 
not happen to me” attitude.  
Perceived vulnerability, however, constitutes a problem in the case of 
low-probability high-consequence events like natural disasters.  
Overwhelming evidence from psychologists and behavioral law and 
economics indicates that those events are systematically misjudged. 
Experiments showed that the “affect heuristic” is a large factor in this 
misconception. As a consequence, the characteristic most correlative to 
perceived risk was fear, i.e. the degree to which a hazard evoked feelings of 
dread.81 Risk perception is thus highly dependent upon intuitive and 
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experimental thinking, guided by emotional and affective processes.82  The 
affect heuristic further suggests that, if a general affective view guides 
perceptions of risk and benefit, providing information about benefit should 
change the perception of risk.83  These ‘heuristics and biases’ thus may 
explain why only those who are directly affected by the risk demand 
insurance, whereas others who are exposed to the risk as well may wrongly 
estimate their exposure. This analysis fits into classic information 
deficiencies which lead to an under demand for catastrophe insurance. 
Apart from the mentioned affect heuristic, other behavioral attitudes may 
also explain the misjudgment of exposure and consequently need. 
Experimental studies have observed behavior contrary to the expected 
utility theory.84 Consequently, Kahneman and Tversky proposed an 
alternative theory, called “prospect theory.”85 Under prospect theory, an 
insurance policy that covers fire but not flood can be presented either as 
full protection against the specific risk of fire or as a reduction in the 
overall probability of property loss.86  Prospect theory predicts that the 
policy will appear more attractive in the former perspective, in which it 
offers unconditional protection against a restricted set of problems.87  The 
two authors further found empirically that low probability events generally 
are overweighted and high ones generally underweighted in policies.88  
Risk-averse people hence will, both under utility theory as under prospect 
theory, prefer insurance against low-probability high-loss events rather than 
against high-probability low-loss events.89  This seems, at first, contrary to 
the above analysis.  By taking into account, however, the “probability 
threshold,” which says that potential victims ignore those events for which 
the probability of a loss is too low to constitute a threat, the theory in fact 
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supports the lack of demand we have seen.90 This suggests that if the 
chances of an event are sufficiently low, people do not even reflect on its 
consequences. Potential victims thus have a tendency to insure only if they 
feel the probability of a disaster is high enough that they will suffer damage 
and accordingly receive a return on their investment in the policy. More 
research, however, is needed to establish a solid theory regarding the 
perceived risks of natural hazards.  
Another alternative to utility theory, “bounded rationality,” was 
introduced by Simon.91 This concept asserts that the cognitive limitations 
of the potential victim, the decision-maker, force him to construct a 
simplified model of the world.92 A person thus does not strive for 
maximization of his utility but for some satisfactory level of achievement.93  
Potential victims consequently are too limited in their cognitive capacity to 
adjust to natural hazards via insurance. Therefore, an individual will 
neglect to purchase insurance because his knowledge of the subject is 
limited – not because he has studied the matter carefully and concluded that 
the cost-benefit ratio is unattractive. Potential victims must consequently be 
made graphically aware of the potential losses from the disaster before 
considering the purchase of insurance coverage.94  
Finally, other theories emphasizing people’s limited capabilities of 
judging the probabilities of natural hazards include, inter alia, “the 
gambler’s fallacy” (or “negative recency effect”), which means that people 
have a very poor conception of randomness and thus e.g. expect that a 
flood which occurred in year x will not occur again in year x+1,95 and the 
“availability heuristic,” as proposed by Kahneman and Tversky,96 
according to which the frequency of some event is estimated by judging 
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how easy it is to recall other instances of this type.97 The availability 
heuristic implies that past experience may be necessary to raise an 
individual’s awareness of the risks and prompt the purchase of insurance. 
So, while the financial losses could be significant should an event within 
the range of 1-in-50 to 1-in-50098 occur, the great majority of people will 
not purchase insurance because they have never been exposed to the 
consequences of such an event.99  Evidence in these low probability cases 
suggests that many individuals do not use an expected utility model such as 
the one characterized above to determine how much insurance coverage to 
purchase.100 
A second argument explaining the limited interest in voluntary first-
party insurance is the knowledge of potential victims that the state or the 
government will provide them with ex post disaster assistance irrespective 
of insurance coverage.101  The intuitive appeal of this argument is clear: if 
victims could count on state- provided ex post compensation after disasters, 
then their incentives to purchase first-party insurance coverage may be 
diminished.  It refers to the argument made by Hirshleifer that in the 
absence of insurance, the government may find it difficult to resist the 
political pressure to provide compensation.102 This is the so-called 
“Samaritan’s dilemma.”103 Why pay for this coverage via insurance 
premiums if the government would provide compensation regardless?104 
The empirical evidence concerning this argument, however, provides little 
clarity.  Kunreuther found that “there does not appear to be any evidence 
suggesting that individuals refuse to purchase property insurance because 
they feel that they will be bailed out by the government should they suffer 
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damage.”105 Nevertheless, a recent comparative overview of compensation 
systems in a variety of European countries showed that in countries where 
state compensation was generously (and almost automatically) provided 
after a disaster (such as Germany or Italy), the degree of insurance 
coverage was low, whereas in countries where the state takes a principal 
attitude of not providing any compensation after a disaster (like in the 
United Kingdom), the degree of insurance coverage was substantially 
higher.106 This anecdotal evidence indicates that there is some relationship, 
tenuous or not, between government provided compensation and the 
willingness of potential victims to obtain insurance coverage. 
Third, psychological experiments show that people may ex ante prefer 
uncertain losses rather than the certain loss of paying the premium.107  
Kunreuther discussed this concept concerning decisions to purchase 
insurance against the risk of flooding.108  Insurance is an investment.109  
People prefer to insure against high-probability, low-damage events since a 
monetary return is more likely.110  The problem, according to this literature, 
is that with ex ante, the potential victim (like a house owner) is confronted 
with the certain loss of a premium, whereby the expected damage in the 
case of flooding can only be estimated and therefore constitutes an 
uncertain loss. There is, in other words a low expectation of a return on the 
“investment” during a lifetime and hence a low demand with catastrophe 
insurance. Consequently, potential victims who did buy first-party 
insurance against the risk of catastrophic losses and did not experience 
losses that allowed them to make claims will, within a few years, cancel 
their insurance coverage or allow it to lapse.111  This reasoning can be 
correlated to the emotional goals mentioned earlier of peace of mind and 
anxiety avoidance.  A similar line of reasoning applies to those who are 
underinsured. If one is underinsured at the time of a catastrophe, the losses 
are not, generally, large enough to provide incentives to buy an insurance 
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policy. This is because once a catastrophe has happened, people consider it 
unlikely that a similar disaster will affect them in the future.112  
Fourth, the lack of demand is attributed to ineffective information 
filtering, particularly with probabilistic information regarding catastrophes.  
Slovic and Monahan demonstrated that risk assessments in terms of relative 
frequency (“of every 100 neighbors similar to you, 10 are estimated to 
suffer catastrophic damages”) created more frightening images of 
catastrophic events than statistically represented frequencies (“neighbors 
similar to you are estimated to have a 10% chance of suffering catastrophic 
damages”).113 Moreover, according to Dake, people have “worldviews,” 
which influence individual judgments and actions.114  Consequently, the 
available information has little effect on individuals’ attitudes towards 
‘normal’ hazards, as they are part of who we are and of how we see the 
world.115  
Fifth, some families also face budget constraints which limit their 
interest and/or ability to voluntarily purchase adequate insurance coverage 
in case of a major loss.  Such behavior is likely in areas where property 
values have increased rapidly. An increase in premium will typically then 
cause people to buy less insurance due to budgetary constraints. In contrast 
to the expected utility model where the demand for insurance depends on 
the premium relative to the expected loss,116 demand under this scenario 
depends only on the premium for a given amount of coverage. 
Therefore, numerous reasons explain the failure of potential victims to 
purchase first-party insurance coverage and correspondingly necessary 
protection against catastrophic losses. One final remark should still be 
made: low demand for insurance coverage is often confused with adverse 
selection.117  For example, suppose that the only parties who wish to buy 
flood insurance are those with material exposure to damage. Low-risk 
parties thus may rationally decide not to insure.  Regardless of this being 
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true, it would not imply adverse selection. Adverse selection after all 
requires asymmetric information: insurers must be unable to identify high-
risk buyers.118  Generally, it is hard to see how insured could have an 
informational advantage over insurers in predicting catastrophes.119  The 
reverse is more likely to be true.120  Insured might, however, know their 
own potential loss better than insurers do,121 but that could be solved 
through inspection measures imposed by the insurer. The fact that adverse 
selection is not a serious problem is also confirmed in recent studies 
concerning hurricane insurance.122  Indeed, there is no evidence that those 
at risk have an informational advantage over the insurer. In fact, the 
opposite might be true: if insurance companies spend a lot of resources 
estimating the risk (which they do today) they might gain an informational 
advantage over their policyholders who cannot afford or do not want to do 
such research.123  In recent years, there has been growing literature on the 
impact of insurers’ knowledge advantage regarding risks.  Research in this 
field reveals that insurers might want to exploit this reverse information 
asymmetry, which results in low risk agents being optimally covered, while 
high risks are not.124  Low insurance demand even for high-risk parties can 
then simply stem from the high cost of coverage, the availability of 
alternative compensation mechanisms or from any of the other above 
mentioned reasons. 
IV. SUPPLY OF FIRST-PARTY DISASTER INSURANCE 
A. CORRELATION, UNCERTAINTY AND LIMITED CAPACITY 
 
Even though it is – as just indicated – questionable whether there is a 
high demand for catastrophe insurance, there are definitely problems on the 
supply side. A number of insurers exclude coverage for property damage 
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caused by (natural) catastrophes and argue that those losses are 
uninsurable. The three principal reasons for this attitude are the fear of 
catastrophic losses, the uncertainty of the risk, and the lack of insurance 
capacity.125  
First, natural hazards normally occur within one specified area and are 
highly correlative. Past disasters indicate that a significant number of 
(especially non-geographically diverse) insurance companies became 
insolvent as a result of such catastrophic losses. Consequently, property 
insurance became increasingly difficult to obtain in hazard-prone areas.  
Second, the absence of historical data and the present imperfect 
scientific knowledge contributes to the supply deficiencies of first party 
catastrophe coverage.126 However, this point needs to put into perspective 
due to the new insights into catastrophe modeling.127 The lack of 
predictability regarding both the probability of an extreme event occurring 
and of the outcomes of such an event results in ambiguity.  This ambiguity 
may lead to uninsurability of a specific catastrophic event or in a specific 
hazard-prone area.128  Insurers can, however, take account of this 
uncertainty regarding the probability of catastrophic damage by charging a 
so-called risk premium.129 Nevertheless, two problems still exist: (1) a 
higher insurance premium can in turn decrease demand for insurance 
against catastrophic risks; and (2) insurance regulation might limit insurers’ 
ability to apply high premiums to catastrophic risks.130  Regulated rates are 
in fact a major problem in some countries and may be, in certain high-risk 
areas, the main obstacle to an effective voluntary insurance market for 
                                                                                                                 
125  See Kunreuther, Mitigating Disaster Losses Through Insurance, supra note 16, at 
178-79; See Gollier, supra note 116, at 28.  
126  See MICHAEL FAURE & TON HARTLIEF, INSURANCE AND EXPANDING SYSTEMATIC 
RISKS 84-85 (OECD 2003).  
127  See generally, TONY HARTINGTON ET AL., CATASTROPHE MODELING (1997).  
(Discussing scientific issues associated with catastrophes).  
128  See Howard Kunreuther, Robin Hogarth & Jacqueline Meszaros, Insurer 
Ambiguity and Market Failure, 7 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 71,83 (1993); Louis Kaplow & 
Steven Shavell, Fairness versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961 (2002). 
129  Howard Kunreuther et al., Ambiguity and Underwriter Decision Processes, 26 J. 
ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 337, 338 (1995). Doherty et al. recently found that, under a 1-year 
contract, mean annual premiums are 25 percent higher when the probability of the event is 
ambiguous than when it is given precisely. Under the 20-year contract, aversion to 
ambiguity is even stronger. See supra, note 42,at 147. The source of the uncertainty does not 
affect the insurers, contrary to Cabantous’ beliefs.  Laure Cabantous, Ambiguity Aversion in 
the Field of Insurance: Insurers’ Attitude to Imprecise and Conflicting Probability 
Estimates, 62 THEORY & DECISION 219, 220, 235 (2007).  
130  See FAURE & HARTLIEF, supra note 89, at 83, 86 (2003).  
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catastrophic risks.  Therefore, these additional risk premiums are rarely 
charged in practice. Gollier adds that an insurability problem may occur 
only if insurers are systematically more ambiguity-averse than 
consumers.131  
Third, insurance companies need sufficient financial reserves to cover 
the particular catastrophic risk.132  In many cases, however, and especially 
with catastrophic events, the expected loss may exceed the capacity of the 
individual insurer.  The insurer can use various traditional insurance 
techniques to cope with this capacity problem, such as co-insurance, 
reinsurance, pooling of capacity by insurers, and alternative risk transfer 
(ART) mechanisms.133 As a consequence, the supply of insurance is largely 
conditioned by the price and availability of reinsurance and other 
alternative risk transfer mechanisms. For the most part, investors who 
supply capital for the insurance companies control this price since they 
want to realize a profitable rate of return.  Even these solutions, however, 
have their limits. 
 
B. LIMITS OF REINSURANCE AND ART 
 
Reinsurance helps insurance companies underwrite large risks, limits 
liability on specific risks, increases capacity, and shares liability when 
claims overwhelm the primary insurer’s resources.134 In reinsurance 
transactions, one or more insurers (the reinsurers) agree, for a premium, to 
indemnify a primary insurer against all or part of the loss that that primary 
insurer may sustain under its policies.135  The contractual and business 
relationships between insurers and reinsurers facilitate relatively low 
transaction costs. However, in the case of extremely large or multiple 
catastrophic events, insurers might not have purchased sufficient 
reinsurance, or reinsurance providers might not have sufficient capital to 
                                                                                                                 
131  See Gollier, supra note 116, at 24.   
132  Doherty accurately draws the attention upon the fact that the importance of capital 
as a requisite to secure an adequate rate of return is often not fully understood. After all, the 
capital needed by the insurance firm to be able to cope with catastrophic losses must be high 
enough to cover 1) the expected claims costs and other expenses, and 2) the costs of 
allocating risk capital to underwrite this risk. See DOHERTY, supra note 42, at 149. 
133  See FAURE & HARTLIEF, supra note 126, at 88-97 . 
134  Matthew Rodermund, Four Points of Confusion about Reinsurance: Comment, 32 
J. RISK & INS. 133, 134 (1965). 
135  Reinsurance is thus generally indemnity-based, since the insurer is compensated 
for part or all of his losses from insured claims.  Id. at 133-34. 
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meet their existing obligations.136  In any event, after a catastrophic loss, 
reinsurance capacity may be diminished and reinsurers might limit 
availability of future catastrophic reinsurance coverage.  In contrast, after a 
catastrophic event, the demand of potential victims only increases. This 
simultaneous occurrence of shrinking supply and rising demand naturally 
leads to a sharp increase in reinsurance pricing. High reinsurance prices 
induce investment in the reinsurance business (e.g. new reinsurance 
companies may be formed, investors may be willing to purchase new 
tranches of equity issued by existing reinsurers). This, in turn, increases the 
supply of catastrophe coverage and causes prices to stabilize again. 
Additionally, if no major catastrophe occurs in a close time frame to 
another, reinsurers offer premiums at prices below expected loss and costs, 
while primary insurers have excess supply of capital and are therefore 
capable of supporting new risk exposures. In order to win or retain market 
share, reinsurers lower their underwriting criteria and may accept marginal 
risks or liberalize policy conditions.  This ushers in a period of low 
premium rates.  Reinsurance is thus clearly influenced by price cycles, 
which are particularly pronounced in catastrophe insurance.137  Given the 
cyclic nature of the reinsurance market, investors have incentives to look 
for alternative capital sources to add financial capacity. After all, these 
instruments have the ability to absorb the effects of a hard market and to 
manage complex or difficult risk exposures, which are often hard to insure 
in the traditional insurance market. The emergence of catastrophe bonds, 
catastrophe derivatives, sidecars, and industry loss warranties, already 
complement the catastrophe reinsurance market.  Therefore, many more 
alternative capital sources are being developed.138 Nevertheless, capital 
market instruments should be characterized as a supplement, rather than an 
                                                                                                                 
136  See, e.g., Anne Gron, Insurer Demand for Catastrophe Reinsurance, in THE 
FINANCING OF CATASTROPHE RISK 23 (Kenneth A. Froot ed., 1999). 
137  Reinsurance markets experience regular cycles driven by supply of, and demand 
for, insurance protection. These cycles are heavily related to both insurance loss experience 
and general investment market experience. Reinsurance then will be in a ‘hard market’ or in 
a ‘soft market’. A hard market occurs when supply of risk capacity declines. A soft market 
occurs when the supply of risk capacity expands. See ERIK BANKS, CATASTROPHIC RISK: 
ANALYSIS AND MANAGEMENT 98-101 (2005); see also PETER ZIMMERLI, SWISS RE, NATURAL 
CATASTROPHES AND REINSURANCE 44 (2003), available at http://www.ct.gov/cid/lib/cid/ 
app4_natcaten2006.pdf (last visited November 4, 2008). 
138  Recent reports by brokers and companies have described developing alternative 
capital sources.  See, e.g., Guy Carpenter, http://www.guycarp.com (last visited October 22, 
2008); Benfield Group, http://www.benfieldgroup.com (last visited October 22, 2008).  See 
generally DOHERTY, supra note 42. 
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alternative, to catastrophe (re)insurance, especially since most of these 
tools are still in their infancy.139  
 
C. LIMITS OF POOLING 
 
There are also negatives regarding the pooling capacity of insurers.  
One risk is that pooling may lead to welfare losses as a result of cartel 
agreements. For example, in the Netherlands during the 1950s, the Dutch 
Insurers’ Association issued a so-called “binding decision” on all of its 
members, prohibiting them from insuring flood and earthquake risks (the 
latter being a relatively small risk in the Netherlands with the exception of 
the area around Southern Limburg). Their argument was that these risks 
were technically not insurable since the flooding and earthquake risks were 
uncertain in their nature and hence, difficult to calculate.  Moreover, these 
types of insurance would only be attractive to high-risk individuals (e.g. 
those living in flood prone areas) and this would result in incurable adverse 
selection.  As a consequence, it was determined that the members of the 
Dutch Insurers’ Association should all refrain from covering these risks.   
The arguments concerning the uninsurability seemed highly doubtful, 
but the Association’s binding decisions also clearly violated competition 
law. At the time European Commission Regulation 3932/92 of December 
21, 1992140 exempted many cartel agreements in the insurance world from 
the prohibition under the old article 85(3) of the EC Treaty.141  The 
Regulation provided that certain strict conditions were met. Law and 
economics scholars, who argued that competition policy should be fully 
applied to insurance markets, heavily criticized this exemption.142 The 
                                                                                                                 
139  Isabel M. Torre-Enciso & John E. Laye, Financing Catastrophe Risk in the 
Capital Markets, 1 INT’L REV. SOC. SCI J. EMERGENCY MGMT. 61 (2001). 
140  1992 O.J. (L 398) 7-14, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/RECH_celex.do 
(enter Cylex number 31992R3932) (last visited October 22, 2008). 
141  Pursuant to old Article 85 (3) of the EC Treaty, agreements, decisions by 
associations of undertakings and concerted practices in the insurance sector which seek 
cooperation with respect to: (a) the establishment of common risk-premium tariffs based on 
collectively ascertained statistics or on the number of claims; (b) the establishment of standard 
policy conditions; (c) the common coverage of certain types of risks; or (d) the establishment of 
common rules on the testing and acceptance of security devices, shall not be prohibited as 
incompatible with the common market.  EC Treaty art. 85 (as in effect 1985) (now article 81), 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/legislation/treaties/ec/art81_en.html (last 
visited October 22, 2008). 
142  Michael Faure & Roger Van den Bergh, Restrictions of Competition on Insurance 
Markets and the Applicability of EC Antitrust Law, 48 KYKLOS 65 (1995). 
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binding decisions not to insure flood and earthquake risks not only clearly 
limited supply (it effectively excludes it as a result of a cartel agreement), 
but it also violated the conditions of Regulation 3932/92. Consideration 
8,143 preceding the Regulation, states that standard policy conditions may 
not contain any systematic exclusion of specific types of risk without 
providing for the express possibility of including that coverage by 
agreement. This is repeated in article 7(1)(a) of the exemption. The 
European Commission also issued a report to the European Parliament and 
to the Council on May 12, 1999 concerning the functioning of the 
exemption in Regulation No. 3932/92.144  In this report, the Commission 
explicitly discusses these binding decisions. The report states that as a 
result of the questions asked by the Commission, the Dutch Association of 
Insurers decided to bring its binding decision in line with Article 7.1, 
Subsection a, by simply converting it into a non-binding recommendation, 
which left each insurer free to extend coverage to flood risks. This example 
demonstrates that a minimal supply of insurance coverage may well be the 
result of anti-competitive behavior by insurers, who mutually agree not to 
cover particular catastrophic risks.  
At a policy level, this demonstrates that a necessary condition of 
insuring catastrophic risks is a competitive insurance market that offers a 
wide variety of differentiated insurance policies and responds to the 
demand of the market. Instead of direct government intervention, 
government should guarantee an adequate competition policy with respect 
                                                                                                                 
143  Consideration 8:  
 
Standard policy conditions may in particular not 
contain any systematic exclusion of specific types of risk 
without providing for the express possibility of including 
that cover by agreement and may not provide for the 
contractual relationship with the policyholder to be 
maintained for an excessive period or go beyond the initial 
object to the policy. This is without prejudice to obligations 
arising from Community or national law.   
 
 1992 O.J. (L 398) 7-14, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/RECH_celex.do 
(enter Cylex number 31992R3932) (last visited October 22, 2008). 
144  Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the 
operation of Commission Regulation No 3932/92 concerning the application of Article 81 
(ex-Article 85), paragraph 3, of the Treaty to certain categories of agreements, decisions and 
concerted practices in the field of insurance, COM 1999, 192 final. 
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to insurance markets. Otherwise uninsurability may, as the Dutch example 
shows, simply be the result of a cartel agreement.145   
Therefore, as long as insurers are able to estimate the frequency and 
magnitude of potential catastrophic losses, catastrophic first-party 
insurance is and should be available. Due to problems of ambiguity, 
adverse selection, moral hazard, and highly correlated losses, insurance 
companies will want to charge a risk premium that considerably exceeds 
the expected loss. This premium can, however, be so high that there would 
be very little demand for coverage at that rate. In such cases, the insurer 
will not want to invest the time and money necessary to develop the 
product.  If the insurer is convinced that there is sufficient demand, he will 
try to raise sufficient capacity to survive possible catastrophic losses.  
 V. COMPULSORY DISASTER COVERAGE? 
 A. CORRECTING MARKET FAILURE? 
 
The question of whether compulsory first-party disaster coverage could 
solve the above mentioned problems regarding the lack of demand and/or 
supply at the insurance market has often been addressed. With compulsory 
first-party insurance, we refer to both first-party insurances against natural 
disasters that potential victims have to take in all countries where these are 
available on the insurance market, and to regulatory interventions, as a 
result of which voluntary coverage is mandatorily extended to include 
natural disasters. The latter refers more specifically to a duty on persons 
who voluntarily subscribed a property insurance policy to purchase a 
catastrophe extension. A distinction between both types of compulsory 
first-party insurance will only be made where necessary.  
The classic economic rationale behind compulsory liability insurance is 
the externality argument: in the absence of adequate insurance, injurers 
could, through their insolvency, externalize risk. That indeed may be an 
argument in favor of compulsory liability insurance, but it is not very 
                                                                                                                 
145  We do not argue, however, that competition necessarily provides better results 
than (state) monopolies. See Winand Emons, Imperfect Tests and Natural Insurance 
Monopolies, 49 J. INDUSTRIAL. ECON. 247, 247-48 (2001) (empirical researched showed that 
under specific circumstances, particularly when insurers are unable to differentiate risks 
adequately, a natural monopoly with one (state) insurer may provide better results than a 
competitive environment); see also Thomas Von Ungern-Sternberg, The Limits of 
Competition: Housing Insurance in Switzerland, 40 EUROPEAN EUR.. ECON. REV. 1111 
(1996). 
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convincing in the case of first-party insurance. An argument could still be 
made that the victims who would not be adequately insured for personal 
injury would then extensively call upon the healthcare system and thus 
“externalize” that risk. However, given the fact that most European legal 
systems provide, through social security, wide coverage for healthcare 
(precisely through mandatory healthcare insurances), one cannot see why 
that should be supplemented with an additional compulsory accident 
insurance. The same is true for the property damage that victims may suffer 
as a result of a natural disaster. Of course, the absence of insurance may 
lead those victims to make additional calls for government relief (and as a 
result to political pressure caused through the large number involved), but 
there is as such no direct issue of externalization of their harm. Of course, 
an argument in favor of compulsory insurance could be made if the disaster 
were to occur in a country (e.g. a developing country) where no social 
security system existed and the disaster did not merely cause property 
damage, but also personal injury.  This increase in personal injury would 
then lead to an increasing call on state provided health care services. 
However, this would instead be an argument in favor of a compulsory 
social security system rather than for a mandatory insurance system merely 
focused on damage caused by disasters. However, an argument could be 
made that the availability of mandatory disaster insurance would reduce the 
pressure to provide government bailouts. This again is based on 
Hirshleifer’s argument that, in the absence of insurance, governments may 
not be able to resist the political pressure to compensate.146 Compulsory 
insurance could thus be seen as a way of reducing pressure on the 
government.  
The second traditional economic argument in favor of compulsory 
insurance would be the presence of information problems. Indeed, 
compulsory insurance may improve all agents’ welfare due to the problem 
of asymmetric information.147 Information problems might arise in cases 
where the potential victim cannot accurately assess the catastrophic risk he 
is exposed to or the benefits of the purchase of first-party insurance. An 
                                                                                                                 
146  See generally Hirshleifer, supra note 11, at 146.  See also Siegelman, supra note 
11. 
147  Alvaro Sandroni & Francesco Squintani, Overconfidence, Insurance, and 
Paternalism, 97 AM. ECON. REV. 1994 (2007).  This argument has been demonstrated by 
Charles A. Wilson, A Model of Insurance Markets with Incomplete Information, 16 J. ECON. 
THEORY 167 (1977) and Bev G. Dahlby, Adverse Selection and & Pareto Improvements 
through Compulsory Insurance, 37 PUB. CHOICE 547, 547 (1981).  
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underestimation of the risk would, in that case, lead to the wrongful 
decision of the potential victim not to buy first-party insurance.  
In other words, this would assume that citizens are averse against the 
risk of large damage as a consequence of catastrophes and would be willing 
to pay a premium to have that risk removed from them, but simply do not 
purchase insurance because they lack information e.g. on the probability 
and magnitude of the risk and/or on the availability of insurance. Also, 
given the result of psychological experiments it could easily be argued that, 
because of imperfect information, individuals are not fully informed about 
their own preferences.148 Regulation would then be the classic remedy to 
cure an information deficiency: the legislator could remedy the information 
problem by introducing a general duty to insure.149 Information problems 
thus could constitute an argument in favor of compulsory first-party 
insurance. An example of this would be for property damage caused as a 
result of natural disasters if empirical evidence showed that victims would 
greatly underestimate these risks and would, being well informed, 
definitely have a demand for insurance.  
Alternatively, one could again take into account the results of 
happiness research and argue that people might experience a higher life 
satisfaction or subjective well-being if ex ante arrangements could be made 
guaranteeing financial compensation after disasters. Whether that is the 
case is of course an empirical question. A weakness is that, as we showed 
above, behavioral research seems to indicate that it is not poor information 
that causes the low demand, but rather a lack of willingness to insure 
against probability events. Moreover, if there were really poor information, 
the remedy could consist of a mandatory disclosure of information to the 
public rather than in making insurance compulsory. 
A third rationale for compulsory insurance is behavioral. Individuals 
may, as was shown above, underinsure because they are overconfident.150 
In that situation, compulsory insurance does not harm unbiased agents 
because they want to be insured, and should be imposed on overconfident 
individuals for their own benefit. However, Sandroni and Squintani found 
that the asymmetric-information rationale and the behavioral rationale for 
compulsory insurance do not reinforce each other. After all, compulsory 
insurance ceases to improve all agents’ welfare when there is a significant 
                                                                                                                 
148  See Kaplow and Shavell, supra note 128, at 1332-33.  
149  See generally Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the 
Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630, 
633-34 (1979).  
150  See Sandroni, supra note 147, at 1994.  
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fraction of overconfident agents because it makes low-risk agents worse 
off. As a result, behavioral biases may weaken asymmetric-information 
rationales for government intervention in the insurance sector because they 
may turn policies beneficial to all insured into wealth transfers between the 
insured. High-risk citizens benefit from compulsory insurance because they 
obtain insurance coverage at lower prices. Compulsory insurance also 
benefits low-risk citizens because it relaxes the incentive compatibility 
constraint. However, when the economy has a significant fraction of 
overconfident agents, the incentive compatibility constraint no longer 
binds. Compulsory insurance then becomes a transfer of wealth from low-
risk to high-risk agents. The previously-referenced study by Sandroni and 
Squintani hence shows that one has to be very careful with introducing 
mandatory insurance to off-set information deficiencies resulting from 
behavioral shortcomings. Sandroni and Squintani show that in particular 
circumstances (in the presence of overconfident consumers) such a 
regulatory mechanism may lead to a decrease in social welfare. 
  
 B. MANDATORY ADDITIONAL COVERAGE? 
 
Slovic, Fischhoff, and others, wondered if, as people prefer to insure 
against high-probability low-loss events, they would also insure against 
unlikely disasters if such insurance were sold at a reasonable extra cost 
along with insurance against likely losses.151  Their behavioral experiments 
showed that adding protection against a small but likely loss might help 
accomplish the purpose of also being insured against low-probability 
losses. A compound insurance will thus lead to more people being insured 
against catastrophic losses.  
At the side of the insurers, such a comprehensive insurance policy also 
has several advantages. After all, it is likely that the chances that an insurer 
will become insolvent are reduced due to a larger premium base and the 
diversification of risks across a wider area.152 Moreover, if the extra 
premium to be paid for the mandatory additional coverage would be based 
on risk, then the policyholder would be charged only for the hazard that he 
faces. One would need to highlight this idea of all-hazards coverage to the 
general public, who may otherwise feel that they are paying for risks that 
                                                                                                                 
151  See Paul Slovic et al., supra note 84, 246. 
152  An all-hazards insurance policy moreover avoids discussions between the insurer 
and the insured. For example, a serious amount of disputes arises after a hurricane, namely 
whether the losses were caused by water or by wind. 
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they do not face. To conclude, support for a regulatory duty to insure 
against disasters, in addition to voluntary housing insurances (like this is 
the case in France) can be received from behavioral experiments.  
However, here we should recall that recent studies showed that one has 
to be very careful with regulatory interventions (like mandatory insurance) 
to cure behavioral shortcomings since, in particular market situations (more 
particularly in the presence of overconfident consumers), this may lead to a 
reduction in welfare.153 Thus, whether such a compound insurance will 
have beneficial effects may well depend upon the particular market and is 
largely an empirical matter. 
 
 C. DRAWBACKS 
 
However, there are various drawbacks to a duty to purchase first-party 
insurance against (natural) catastrophes. 
First, let’s turn back to the basic principles of insurance as developed 
by the expected utility theory on insurance.  One of the most important 
benefits of insurance is that it removes the risk from risk-averse persons 
and thus increases their utility.  Are those benefits now large enough to 
warrant the introduction of compulsory insurance?154  A problem with this 
argument is that the degree of risk aversion varies.  The introduction of a 
generalized duty to insure might be inefficient in as far as it forces some 
people that would normally not have a demand for insurance to purchase 
insurance. Insurance does not increase these people’s expected utility.  A 
generalized duty to insure might therefore create a social loss. This means 
that the simple fact that insurance increases utility can as such not justify 
the introduction of a duty to insure, as long as it is assumed that all 
individuals are informed about the risk to which they are exposed and the 
availability of insurance.  
This argument also rather paternalistically assumes that insurance is 
under all circumstances beneficial to potential victims. The argument 
neglects the fact that the insured has to pay a price to have the risk removed 
from him. This price will unavoidably be a lot higher than the actuarially 
fair premium, as insurer’s ambiguity increases the price with a risk 
                                                                                                                 
153  See Sandroni and Squintani, supra note 14, at 1999-2000. 
154  Michael Faure & David Grimeaud, Financial Assurance Issues of Environmental 
Liability, in TORT AND INSURANCE LAW 5, 180 (European Centre for Tort and Insurance Law 
ed., 2003). 
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premium. For some potential victims this premium will still be attractive, 
but for others it may not.  
Compulsory insurance generally neglects the fact that the demand for 
insurance may vary according to the individual risk situation (and financial 
possibility) of every possible victim. Of course one could rebut that, as 
shown above individuals often do not buy insurance for reasons that are not 
consistent with standard economic theory.155 There are indeed behavioral 
shortcomings that are a main argument advanced in favor of 
comprehensive disaster insurance. Still, the danger exists that behavioral 
shortcomings are then used as an argument for a regulatory intervention, 
the effects of which on social welfare are not always clear.  
A second drawback is not related to the insights of the utilitarian 
approach.  This drawback relates to the fact that it is not only the lack of 
information on the risk that causes the low demand for insurance, but a 
bounded rationality linked to the idea that “it will not happen to me,” 
combined with the unwillingness to pay the premium for a highly unlikely 
hazard.  The question thus arises whether forcing people to take out disaster 
coverage should not be considered as a paternalistic intervention which 
would have unclear effects on social welfare. 
Third, if, to the contrary, one would assume that potential victims are 
poorly informed on their potential exposure to disasters and on the benefits 
of first-party insurance, then a regulatory intervention should aim at a 
mandatory disclosure of such information to potential victims rather than at 
a mandatory coverage. Again, this is supported by behavioral experiments 
which show that graphic presentations may – to some extent – increase the 
perceived risk of that hazard.156  
A fourth disadvantage relates to cross-subsidization. A general duty to 
purchase disaster coverage may be disadvantageous for those victims who 
do not run any risk. Take the example of flood insurance: one can imagine 
that a person living in a house close to a river might have a demand for 
flood insurance, but the same is probably not true for someone living in an 
apartment in a city on the 20th floor. A generalized duty to purchase 
insurance coverage would therefore force all individuals to take insurance 
coverage, even those that run no risk at all and therefore have no demand 
for insurance. This could thus create inefficiencies and lead to cross-
subsidization or negative redistribution whereby those who run no risk 
                                                                                                                 
155  See supra section III. 
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would have to contribute to the premium of those who may actually benefit 
from the insurance coverage.157  
A more efficient (and fairer) solution may therefore be the one 
whereby the compulsory coverage (e.g. for flood risks) is limited to those 
individuals who actually are exposed to the particular risk. This result can 
of course be reached when risk-based premiums are used. The extra risk 
premium can in other words vary according to the individual risk situation 
of each insured. Moreover, if the premiums were based on risk, then 
insurance would provide information on ways that individuals could protect 
themselves against a disaster.158 However, it could be very costly to 
develop premiums, which would differentiate between types of structures 
and location. Additionally, the complexity of the rate schedule would be 
very confusing to the homeowner. There is also no easy way to make sure 
that the homeowner has met the standards upon which his premium is 
based. Thus, there would have to be a cost of checking reflected in the rate 
structure. If this cost were incorporated into the rates, then the premium 
might be considerably higher than the actuarial figure. It might then 
unnecessarily discourage some individuals and businesses from locating in 
a particular area where it might have been profitable for them to do so 
Moreover, the question arises whether lower income residents would be 
able to pay these risk-based premiums and hence whether politicians would 
allow insurers to relate premiums to risk.159 
Fifth, compulsory insurance against disasters may be necessary to 
avoid the risk of adverse selection, wherein only bad risks purchase 
coverage.  Thus, some argue that, in order to make the risk insurable, good 
risks should also be covered and disaster insurance (for instance, flooding 
insurance) made compulsory. As we have argued above, this argument is a 
bit odd given that the adverse selection problem is unlikely in the of 
disaster insurance context. If the insured knew his potential loss exposures 
better than insurers, the insurer could easily impose inspection measures.160 
But, the adverse selection argument is in fact wrongly presented by some 
                                                                                                                 
157  See Harrington, supra note 101, at 41. 
158  Howard Kunreuther, Disaster Insurance: A Tool for Hazard Mitigation, 41 J. RISK 
& INS. 287, 299 (1974). 
159  See DOHERTY, supra note 42, at 137-38 (discussing other disadvantages of a risk-
based premium in an all-hazards policy). 
160  See supra Part III. 
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(e.g. Dutch) insurers,161 who suggest that disaster risk would only be 
insurable if everyone, even those who run no risk at all, were forced to 
purchase insurance coverage.162 Adverse selection can also be avoided if 
only those who are exposed to the risk are forced to take the mandatory 
coverage. Otherwise, people would be forced to pay for insurance that they 
do not need.163 Fortunately, within risk-prone groups, insurers can 
adequately differentiate risks and premiums, as a remedy to adverse 
selection.164 This is again an argument in favor of risk-based premiums.  
Further, the second type of compulsory disaster insurance schemes 
involves a tie-in agreement, whereby a potential buyer of property 
insurance is forced to purchase insurance against catastrophic loss. Tie-in 
agreements limit competition because consumers cannot opt to include 
catastrophe insurance and because separate markets for both types of 
insurance cannot develop. Consequently, a compulsory catastrophe 
extension of first-party property insurance potentially generates effects that 
competition law tries to avoid. Introducing a duty to insure may only be 
efficient if sufficient competition on the particular insurance market exists. 
Obviously, in a monopolistic market compulsory insurance will create 
inefficiencies. Hence, the additional premium for the disaster coverage 
should not be fixed by law but should be the result of competition between 
insurers.165  
Of course, the concern about tying disaster coverage to ordinary 
insurance limiting competition assumes the development and existence of a 
full-blown disaster insurance market.  This paper began by noting that 
people do not widely purchase first-party disaster insurance. Therefore, a 
large degree of competition is unlikely in current insurance markets 
offering disaster coverage.  In that respect the tie-in argument may not be 
very strong in the early development of a market for disaster coverage. 
                                                                                                                 
161  Reimund Schwarze & Gert G. Wagner, In the Aftermath of Dresden: New 
Directions in German Flood Insurance, 29 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK AND INS. 154, 162 
(2004). 
162  Priest, supra note 12, at 225-26. 
163  One can of course understand why some insurers advance this argument in policy 
discussions with the government. With mandatory insurance coverage for everyone 
(including those who incur no risk) insurers will have more insured individuals paying 
premiums, thereby increasing their income and reducing their overall risk exposure. 
164  This argument confuses a lack supply with adverse selection.  
165  See Roger Van den Bergh & Michael Faure, Compulsory Insurance of Loss to 
Property Caused by Natural Disasters: Competition or Solidarity? 29 WORLD 
COMPETITION: LAW & ECON. REV. 25, 33-35 (2006) (describing the effects of additional 
premiums for disaster coverage on competition law). 
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Finally, some particular catastrophic risks may be so “new” that 
insurance markets may not yet have developed. One could question 
whether it makes sense to introduce mandatory insurance if coverage is 
limited (or not subject to sufficient competition) on private insurance 
markets. 
 D. COMPREHENSIVE INSURANCE OR THE PUBLIC PURSE? 
 
Notwithstanding these objections, there is an important advantage to 
mandatory disaster insurance: if a comprehensive first-party insurance 
system exists, it will remove pressure on governments to provide disaster 
relief.  Though politicians may always have the tendency to provide 
compensation when a large number of victims are affected by a disaster,166 
randomly using public means to compensate disaster victims has been 
highly criticized.167 First-party insurance at least guarantees that victims 
pay themselves for the compensation they will afterwards obtain. And, with 
adequate risk differentiation, first-party insurance can have preventive 
effects which are usually absent in government relief programs.168 Indeed, 
insurance can encourage risk mitigation prior to a disaster through 
premium reductions and/or lower deductibles while providing financial 
assistance after a disaster through claim payments.169 If insurance is to play 
a central role in a hazard management program, then rates need to be based 
on risk so that those in disaster-prone areas are responsible for the losses 
after a disaster occurs.  
A limitation of any government insurance program is that premiums 
are not likely to be risk-based because of political pressure to make 
coverage affordable to those residing in high-hazard areas. One way to 
encourage adoption of cost-effective mitigation measures is to have banks 
provide long-term mitigation loans that could be tied to the property. The 
bank holding the mortgage on the property could offer a home 
improvement loan with a payback period identical to the life of the 
mortgage.170 
                                                                                                                 
166  See Hirshleifer, supra note 11, at 145.  
167  See Priest, supra note 12, at 221, 228; see also Kaplow, supra note 12, at 168. 
168  See Epstein, supra note 12, at 296-97. 
169  Kunreuther, supra note 64.  See also Pierre Picard, Natural Disaster Insurance 
and the Equity – Efficiency Trade-Off, 75 J. RISK & INS. 17, 18 (2008).  
170  See Kunreuther et al., Disaster Mitigation and Insurance: Learning from Katrina, 
supra note 105, at 221. 
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Nevertheless, government assistance in protection against natural 
disasters may not be optimal ex ante, but it may be optimal ex post. 
Suppose that an uninhabited area is likely to be affected by tropical storms, 
and that this risk is so high that it is not socially desirable from an ex ante 
perspective for the population to settle there. The necessary protective 
assistance, which only the government can undertake, is too costly. The 
question then is what action the government would undertake if the area is 
in fact settled: either it assists settlers in constructing protective devices to 
limit losses in the event of a storm, or it refrains. When it is socially 
desirable to provide protection ex post, there is a time consistency 
problem.171 If the government can commit to not providing such assistance 
in the event the area is settled, the citizens will simply not settle there and 
the socially desirable outcome is attained. If, on the other hand, the 
government cannot commit, there will be settlement, since the citizens then 
know that they will receive assistance and protection, and a socially less 
desirable outcome is obtained. 
In sum, from an ex ante perspective, there are strong arguments in 
favor of a comprehensive disaster insurance program where disaster 
coverage is made mandatory in addition to insurance for more likely 
events, provided that premiums can sufficiently reflect risks.172  Such an 
insurance program can avoid the negative redistribution resulting from 
government intervention, while still providing incentives for risk 
                                                                                                                 
171  Finn E. Kydland & Edward C. Prescott, Rules Rather than Discretion: The 
Inconsistency of Optimal Plans, 85 J. POL. ECON. 473, 473-74 (1977). The essence of the 
time consistency problem is as follows: a policy which economic policymakers regard as the 
best option in advance, when it can influence households’ and firms’ expectations about 
policy, will often not be implemented later on, when these expectations have already been 
formed and shaped private behavior. Economic policymakers will therefore revise their 
decision, so that the policy they ultimately conduct will be worse than if they had had less 
discretion in policy choice. This result does not hinge on policymakers being guided by 
objectives different than those of citizens at large; rather, the difference appears in the 
constraints on the economic policy problem at different points in time. 
(http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/ laureates/2004/public.html) Indeed, a time 
consistency problem can arise the moment the government has discretionary powers to 
pursue a policy. A credibility problem is threatening to exist when citizens realize that the 
government can make ex post a new consideration that can turn out differently than 
announced ex ante. 
172  There is an optimal trade-off to be respected since a too detailed differentiation of 
risks can be extremely costly. See FAURE, supra note 154, at 127.  
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mitigation. This conclusion is supported by law, economic scholarship, and 
most particularly in the many Kunreuther publications.173   
 VI. EXAMPLES 
  
One can now notice a European-wide tendency towards an increasing 
use of partially mandatory catastrophe insurance. This tendency can partly 
be explained by the fact that government-provided compensation is, 
because of increasing pressure on public budgets, losing popularity.174  
Mandatory insurance is thus seen as a way to avoid “catastrophic responses 
to catastrophic risks” referring to the negative incentives for prevention and 
the development of insurance markets resulting from government-provided 
compensation.175 We will summarize the compulsory insurance programs 
in France and Belgium, which raise a set of points that suggest why such 
coverage may be a good idea and why it may not.176 
A. FRANCE 
 
France is probably the most well known example of a country, which 
for many years has had compulsory first-party insurance against 
catastrophes.177  The French model indeed introduced mandatory first-party 
insurance, where all individuals whom have taken out first-party property 
damage insurance policies have to pay a supplementary premium for a 
mandatory coverage for natural disasters.  Hence, France does not have a 
generalized duty to insure, but a compulsory complementary coverage on 
voluntary property damage contracts.  However, those property damage 
                                                                                                                 
173  Since 1968 Kunreuther argued for mandatory comprehensive disaster insurance.  
Howard Kunreuther, The Case for Comprehensive Disaster Insurance, 11 J. LAW & ECON. 
133, 150 (1968).  Kunreuther later repeated his argument with added theoretical and 
empirical data.  Kunreuther, supra note 16, at 182-83.  
174  For a comparison of government provided compensation and insurance: see 
Michael Faure, Financial Compensation for Victims of Catastrophes: A Law and Economics 
Perspective, 29 LAW & POL’Y 339, 356 (2007).  
175  See Epstein, supra note 12, at 296. For further examples see FAURE & HARTLIEF, 
supra note 17, at 406-15.  
176  But further examples could be provided as well.  See FAURE & HARTLIEF supra 
note 17.  
177  Michel Cannarsa, Fabien Lafay & Olivier Moréteau, France, in FINANCIAL 
COMPENSATION FOR VICTIMS OF CATASTROPHES: A COMPARATIVE LEGAL APPROACH 81, 85-
90 (Michael Faure & Ton Hartlief eds., Springer 2006). 
44 CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 15:1 
 
policies are widespread and all individuals who purchase such a policy 
have to pay for the additional coverage for natural disasters.  
This system is apparently accepted in France because the risk of cross 
subsidization may be small: France seems to be confronted with many 
types of natural disasters.  This means that if one is presumably (as e.g. 
inhabitant of an apartment on the 12th floor) not exposed to the risk of 
flooding, one may be exposed to other natural disasters, such as 
earthquakes or heavy storms.  
The system is financed with a fixed premium on property insurance 
contracts.  The initial rate was 5.5% when the system started in 1982; it 
was raised to 9% the following year and to 12% in 2000.  The insurer 
compensates, within three months as from the date of the submission of the 
estimate of damaged property or losses sustained, on the basis of the 
scheme when an event is declared a “natural catastrophe” through an 
administrative decision.  The insured must bear a share of the loss (a so-
called deductible or franchise), which is higher in municipalities that have 
not adopted a “prevention of risk plan.”  This should provide incentives for 
the municipality and for the local population to adopt such a prevention 
plan or to move to safer places.178  Economic loss is not compensated in 
case of a natural catastrophe except where expressly provided for in the 
insurance policy. 
Note, moreover, that in France, as a result of the explosion in Toulouse 
on 21 September 2001, a legislative change was effectuated in July 2003.  
As a result of this change, victims now also have additional compulsory 
coverage for damage caused by technological risks (such as the explosion 
in Toulouse).  This system is financed by an additional premium of € 5 per 
year and per contract.  On the basis of the € 50 million contracts existing in 
2005, this means there is € 250 million in anticipation of the coverage of 
this risk.  
That latter solution is, however, debated (also in France).  It is not so 
clear why in this case of technological disasters, where a liable wrongdoer 
can be identified, a mandatory coverage for victims was introduced rather 
than examining the introduction of solvency guarantees on the side of the 
wrongdoer, such as compulsory liability insurance.  Insurance coverage 
will be excluded in special areas recognized in a “prevention plan of 
                                                                                                                 
178  Olivier Moréteau, Policing the Compensation of Victims of Catastrophes: 
Combining Solidarity and Self-Responsibility, in SHIFTS IN COMPENSATION BETWEEN 
PRIVATE AND PUBLIC SYSTEMS 199, 217 (Willem H. Van Boom & Michael Faure eds., 
2007). 
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technological risks” as causing a serious risk to human life, for all buildings 
erected in this area after the plan has been published, and where a building 
is erected in violation of administrative rules. 
Reinsurance is provided through the “Caisse Centrale de Réassurance,” 
(CCR) which is state-controlled.  Half the premiums levied to cover the 
consequences of catastrophes go to the CCR, which will always cover half 
the damage insured.  This way, the CCR is acting as a mutual fund, which 
balances the risk of catastrophes among all insurance companies.  The CCR 
is itself covered by the State, which provides an unlimited guarantee. 
Further, the French initiative in the field of reinsurance against risks of 
terrorism should be mentioned.  In 2002, the French insurance companies 
and the companies authorized to carry on direct insurance business on 
French territory created a pool called GAREAT (“Gestion de l’assurance et 
de la reassurance des risques attentats et actes de terrorisme”).  This pool 
was originally created for one year, but it was renewed in 2003 and it is 
still in force today.  GAREAT reinsures damage to the property of 
enterprises, local authorities and large buildings caused by terrorist attacks 
where the insured capital exceeds € 6 million.  Reinsurance is also provided 
by CCR, with unlimited State cover.  The premium ceded to the pool is 
determined in relation to the premium currently charged for the natural 
catastrophe cover.  Meanwhile, France accepted a new Terrorism Act in 
2007.  Prior to the new Terrorism Act, all property contracts were to 
include terrorism cover. Following the introduction of the new Act, only 
contracts with a fire guarantee must cover terrorism.  Therefore, GAREAT 
will no longer accept risks where there is no fire guarantee. 
 
B. BELGIUM 
 
Belgium had a compensatory Disaster Fund since 1976.  As a result of 
a legislative change in May 2003 compulsory flood coverage, in addition to 
the voluntary fire insurance contract, was introduced.  It looks like the 
French system, but the major difference is that this mandatory 
supplementary coverage would only apply for specific flood-prone areas.  
This would hence avoid a negative redistribution because those who are not 
exposed to the risk are not forced to take out the coverage.  Due to 
disagreement, however, regarding the demarcation of those risk areas, the 
act could not enter into force.  Thus recently, the system has been changed 
again: since September 2005, the compulsory first-party coverage includes 
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not only flooding but natural catastrophes in general, regardless of whether 
the catastrophe happened in a risk area.179 
The Belgian legislature thus created the 17 September 2005 Act 
establishing a general solidarity between all citizens who have fire 
insurance coverage for the so-called simple risks – comprising 90 to 95% 
of the Belgian population – by introducing a mandatory extension to 
natural disaster coverage.  The natural catastrophe insurance coverage 
comprises four perils: flooding, earthquake, the flowing over or the 
impoundment of public sewers, and landslide or subsidence.  The insurer 
can investigate the natural hazard risk for every individual case and will 
adjust the extra premium accordingly.  As a result, an inhabitant of the 10th 
floor of an apartment building in the centre of the city will normally pay a 
lower extra premium than the average premium increase, which is expected 
to be € 3 to 4 per € 25.000 insured.   The final premium will hence differ in 
function of the real risk.  
However, Colle found that insurers operate with two different systems: 
half of the insurance companies charge the same extra premium for all its 
insured, namely between € 2,60 and € 3,76 per € 25.000 insured good (plus 
a tax of 15,75%), while the other insurance companies vary their premiums 
according to the location of the ground, past damage, and deductibles.180  
The maximum indexed deductible for the disaster coverage amounts to € 
610 per claim.  Further, every individual insurer has been given some limits 
regarding the monetary burden he can carry, since the disaster coverage 
concerns catastrophic risks, which can take extraordinary proportions.  The 
ratio legis is to avoid the financial downfall of the insurance companies.  
The law sets up an intervention limit on the basis of a formula by event and 
by individual insurer according to his premium income for the coverage for 
fire as concerns the simple risks: € 8 million for earthquakes, decreased to 
€ 3 million for other natural catastrophes. When this limit is attained, the 
Disaster Fund makes up the amount with a general upper limit of € 280 
million (€ 700 million for earthquakes).  In case these amounts would not 
be sufficient to compensate the victims, then the intervention of the 
Disaster Fund will be reduced in proportion.   
Thus, to conclude, a public-private partnership has now been created in 
the Act of 17 September 2005: the government created the conditions under 
                                                                                                                 
179  For this recent legislative change: see Philippe Colle, De wet van 17 september 
2005 betreffende de verzekering van natuurrampen, 23 RECHTSKUNDIG WEEKBLAD, Feb. 4, 
2006, at 881-885. 
180  Colle as interviewed by Verhaeghe in DE STANDAARD (October 18, 2006).  
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which the natural catastrophe risk became insurable thanks to the solidarity 
between all the holders of a fire insurance agreement for simple risks, and 
the insurers will fully play their social role.  Every family can insure itself 
against the direct damages to their goods which are a consequence of a 
natural catastrophe for a reasonable price and will receive full 
compensation, apart from the freely stipulated, but maximum franchise of € 
610. 
Further, the Belgian State created very recently a system of mandatory 
insurance against damage caused by terrorist attacks.  The Act of 1 April 
2007 extends the life insurance policy, hospitalization insurance policy, 
accident insurance policy and health insurance policy to mandatorily 
include terrorism cover – apart from the already existing compulsory 
coverage in the workers’ compensation insurance policy, the motor liability 
insurance policy and in the fire insurance policy for simple risks.  
Moreover a Committee has been set up to judge whether concrete events 
can be considered to be terrorist actions and to decide on the amounts of 
compensation.  The total compensated amount will be set for the first time 
after six months and a revision of this amount is possible every six months.  
The final decision with respect to this amount will be set after three years.  
The Act of 1 April 2007 guarantees the cover of terrorism claims during a 
calendar year up to a global annual limit of € 1 billion.  Hereto, a solidarity-
based pooling arrangement has been established, which is financed by the 
Belgian State, the insurers and reinsurers, and other legal persons who are 
active in the performance of duties.  Participation at the Fund is not 
compulsory, but the liability of the participants is capped at € 1 billion, 
which will not be the case for possible non-participants.  If no other 
agreement has been made between the Belgian State and the participants to 
the Fund or by the King, then the Fund will pay the first € 700 million to 
the victims of terrorism,181 while the Belgian government will pay a 
maximum of € 300 million.  The part payable by the State should be 
considered as a reinsurance against which the government receives a 
reimbursement.   
 
                                                                                                                 
181  Of this € 700 million, the intention is for the insurers to keep the first € 300 
million (this amount is not yet fixed – amounts from € 280 million up to € 350 million are 
mentioned) in retention and distribute this according to market share.  The next € 400 
million or so will be reinsured.  See the thesis of Evy Nolman, entitled “Terrorisme: nieuwe 
uitdagingen voor de verzekeringswereld en de overheid” (2007) at the Economics Faculty of 
the Catholic University of Leuven, 30. 
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C. COMPARATIVE AND POLICY CONCLUSIONS ON FRANCE AND 
BELGIUM 
 
The French system undoubtedly has the advantage that it provides 
comprehensive disaster insurance for a large part of the population, all of 
those who already have voluntarily purchased first-party property damage 
insurance.  The problematic aspect is that all insured have to take the 
disaster coverage mandatorily.  Theoretically, those who are never exposed 
to the risk of natural disasters may thus be forced to purchase coverage 
even though they have no demand.  The seriousness of this danger of cross-
subsidization depends on the extent to which some are forced into the 
system even though they have no risk at all.  Belgium originally had a new 
Act adopted in 2003, which provided that the mandatory supplementary 
coverage would only apply for specific flood-prone areas.  Hence, this 
would completely avoid any negative risk distribution since only those 
exposed to the risk would be forced to purchase the coverage.  However, 
the political costs to identify those areas seemed so large that it was 
impossible to identify those risk zones as a result of which the Act 
remained a dead letter.  The new 2005 Act has enlarged the coverage to 
include (in addition to flooding) also other risks, such as earthquake, 
damage due to flowing-over of public sewers and landslide.  This 
enlargement may, like in the case of France, reduce the danger of cross-
subsidization: even if an insured is not exposed to the risk of flooding he 
may be exposed to another covered natural disaster risk, such as e.g. 
earthquake.  
However, a major difference between the French and the Belgian 
system is that premiums in France are fixed by the regulator, whereas in 
Belgium insurers fix the premiums on a risk-based basis.  In France, 
premiums are not at all related to the risk and moreover, the regulatory 
intervention may limit competition.  Competition is still possible as far as 
the basis, for example, housing insurance, is concerned.182  The Belgian 
system seems preferable to the extent that it incorporates risk-related 
premiums.  However, the French system has also incorporated some 
incentives for prevention by providing that compensation will be lower if a 
community has adopted a “prevention of risk plan”.  This should provide 
incentives to voters to demand the adoption of such a plan within their 
community.  
                                                                                                                 
182   See Van den Bergh & Faure, supra note 165, at 26-36. 
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In addition, in both countries, the governments largely intervene by 
providing reinsurance (in the case of France) and by intervening above 
certain limits (in the case of Belgium).  Insurers don’t have to pay any 
contribution for this state intervention; as a result of this, it effectively 
constitutes a subsidy.183  This idea of states being able to intervene in 
providing intervention without market distortive effects certainly deserves 
more attention. 
 
 VII.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this paper, we merely dealt with one aspect of the compensation for 
victims of catastrophes.  We more specifically addressed the question 
whether potential victims can and do purchase first-party insurance to 
obtain ex ante protection against the damage they could be exposed to as a 
result of natural catastrophes.  Of course, many other questions also related 
to catastrophe insurance could be tackled.184  Moreover, although our paper 
specifically focused on natural catastrophes, the results may have 
consequences for man-made disasters (like terrorism) as well, even though 
more difficulties might arise in that respect with the insurability of the 
terrorism risk.  We therefore focused on the question of why, in the case of 
natural catastrophes (where often coverage is available on commercial 
insurance markets), victims often do not use the existing possibilities.  
Indeed, a general finding as far as the use of first-party insurance by 
potential victims of catastrophes is concerned was that there is a 
remarkably low degree of coverage.  This could be supported by examples 
from a flooding in Germany, but also by reference to the number of 
available first-party insurances.  After earthquakes in California, and 
recently after Hurricane Katrina, it was again established that the number 
of insured victims was relatively low.  
The question why victims seek so little ex ante protection through first-
party insurance has been addressed in the literature from various angles.  
The traditional neo-classic answer would be that victims apparently lack 
information on the catastrophe risk and that the lacking demand for 
catastrophe coverage is thus a classic example of market failure.  However, 
                                                                                                                 
183  At least as concerns the natural catastrophes; a reinsurance premium should 
indeed be paid in Belgium for state intervention in the terrorism risk.  
184  For instance, the scope of liability insurance on the side of liable operators might 
be addressed as well.  However, since our focus was on natural catastrophes we assumed 
that liability insurance will mostly not play a role, except in the rather exceptional cases that 
public authorities can be held liable for failure to prevent natural catastrophes. 
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more recent literature resulting from psychological experiments in the field 
of behavioral law and economics showed that even in cases where victims 
were well informed, they did not seek coverage or only to a limited extent.  
The explanation by behavioral law and economics is that victims 
apparently have no demand for insurance against low-probability high-
damage events.  To some extent, it has to do with the well known 
“heuristics and biases” that decision-making concerning the purchase of 
insurance is subjected to.  The most important problem in that respect is 
apparently the fact that many consider insurance as a type of investment 
and hence expect some return over a lifetime.  With low-probability events, 
there is a large likelihood of merely paying a premium and never receiving 
any return. 
A more difficult question is, however, whether these heuristics and 
biases are an argument at the policy level to introduce mandatory cover for 
catastrophic risks.  The classic counterargument would be that such a 
paternalistic duty might be inefficient since people may be forced to 
purchase insurance coverage even if it does not match with their 
preferences.  However, an alternative model (instead of outright mandatory 
cover for catastrophes), which is increasingly popular in many countries, is 
the introduction of a mandatory cover for natural catastrophes in addition to 
voluntarily purchased insurances, like e.g. a home insurance.  This model, 
which has worked in France for a long time and which has been recently 
introduced in Belgium, seems to have various attractions.185  It offers 
victims at least some guarantee that ex post compensation will be available. 
This construction can moreover decrease the pressure for government 
relief. Law and economics scholars have often criticized government-
provided compensation after catastrophes since it does not provide any 
incentives to those exposed to catastrophic risks to make efficient 
preventive efforts.  Insurance is traditionally much better able to cope with 
this moral hazard problem.  
Moreover, since potential victims pay ex ante for the protection they 
will receive, this model also has benefits compared to government relief in 
the sense that a negative redistribution from the general taxpayer towards 
particular victims exposed to catastrophic risks is avoided.  The mandatory 
catastrophe cover in addition to voluntary insurances against more likely 
losses also received support from behavioral law and economics.  The 
traditional disadvantage also with this construction is still that insurance 
                                                                                                                 
185  The model of comprehensive natural disaster insurance was also proposed by 
Kunreuther after Hurricane Katrina. See Kunreuther, supra note 64, at 176. 
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cover is forced upon some individuals who would perhaps have no demand 
for coverage.  This problem can to some extent be limited if at least the 
additional duty to obtain catastrophe coverage is limited to those 
individuals who are actually exposed to the specific risk (e.g. those living 
in flood-prone areas).  Thus, the cross subsidization inherent in a 
generalized duty could be avoided.  However, the administrative costs of a 
differentiation between individuals exposed to natural catastrophes and 
those who are not may be high, taking also into account the fact that there 
may be considerable political costs involved with such a differentiation.  
The Belgian example showed that the political costs to introduce such a 
differentiated comprehensive insurance (limited to specific risk areas) were 
apparently too high.  
This particular model of additional mandatory catastrophe coverage, 
supplementing voluntary housing insurances was first introduced in France, 
but seems to become increasingly popular in many other European 
countries as well.  It was recently introduced in Belgium, is the subject of a 
bill in Italy and has been proposed in the literature in Germany as well.  
The most important motivation for these institutional arrangements is that 
this structural solution can take away some of the pressure on governments 
to provide ex post relief to victims of catastrophes, the latter often being 
arbitrary and of course leading to cross-subsidization.186  However, we do 
not claim here that the Belgian or French solutions are necessarily the most 
efficient ones.  One could also envisage other solutions whereby a 
combination of limited government funding and insurance would be 
introduced.  It is beyond the scope of this paper to examine all of these 
alternative arrangements.  Moreover, it should be repeated that the 
insurance solution of course is only possible within the institutional context 
of a country where a well functioning insurance market is available and 
where potential consumers have sufficient financial capacity to buy the 
insurance products that have been developed. In many developing 
countries, these conditions will often not be fulfilled and in those situations 
disaster insurance can of course not be the panacea for victims of 
catastrophes.  Other mechanisms, like ex post government compensation, 
will then still be necessary.  
                                                                                                                 
186  We do not argue here that (mandatory) first-party insurance is generally more 
effective in providing compensation than government provided compensation since this was 
not the focus of this paper.  However, generally law and economics scholars are very critical 
of government provided compensation.  See, e.g., Kaplow, supra note 12; Priest, supra note 
12; Epstein, supra note 12. 
52 CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 15:1 
 
In addition, there are many other problems related to the insurance 
against damage caused by catastrophes than merely the problems with 
demand discussed in this paper.  As we briefly indicated, there may be 
serious problems on the supply side as well.  Also in that respect, one can 
notice a variety of regulatory solutions whereby governments intervene to 
facilitate the functioning of insurance markets.187  
Finally we would like to make a few recommendations as to what next 
steps can be taken to deal with the problem here discussed.  First of all, 
natural catastrophe insurance, and especially flood and earthquake 
insurance, should be made more attractive by presenting information on the 
probability of a disaster on a different time interval than the traditional one-
year period through normal channels to increase the concern of potential 
victims.  Homeowners should moreover be better educated in order to see 
insurance as an investment with a big return.  Homeowners insurance could 
further be expanded with flood and earthquake coverage so that this forms 
a package, with the extra premiums on the compulsory coverage reflecting 
the hazard risk of each individual.  Second, the example of flooding 
insurance in the Netherlands188 shows that government policy should also 
be addressed to stimulate insurers to provide attractive products for disaster 
coverage at actuarially fair prices.  If insurers would collectively decide 
(like it was the case in the Netherlands) not to cover e.g. flooding and 
earthquake risks a de facto uninsurability is of course reached.  Finally, it 
should be examined whether in case where problems on the supply side 
exist, government support can be provided (eventually at a temporary 
basis) to stimulate the development of efficient insurance markets.  This 
type of government intervention, stimulating market solutions, may be 
preferred to the traditional ex post government relief which de facto only 
inhibits the development of market solutions to the compensation for 
victims of catastrophes.  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
187  These facilitative strategies have especially been developed in the United States, 
e.g. as far as earthquake and hurricane insurance is concerned.  An interesting example is 
also provided by the California earthquake authority. For a detailed description of these 
models: see Rabin & Bratis, supra note 73, at 327-30. 
188  See discussion supra section IV. 
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ABSTRACT 
 
Medical malpractice insurance is a highly specialized and risky 
business. Over the past three decades, the market has experienced three 
dramatic periods of rising prices and shrinking supply. For medical care 
providers subject to such market volatility, a response has been the 
development of physician-owned and physician-run entities as their 
insurance providers. Yet regulators and rating agencies demonstrate 
concern over geographic and business risk concentration of these entities, 
encouraging them to diversify across state lines as well as across lines of 
business. We hypothesize that physician-directed insurers are inherently 
more conservative and better informed than non-physician directed 
insurers, calling into question the value of such diversification, which we 
believe reduces their informational advantage. We test this hypothesis 
through analysis of insurer loss reserving practices and find that physician-
directed insurers are more likely to over reserve and less likely to under 
reserve than are non-physician-directed insurers. We also find that 
physician-directed insurers that do under-reserve have smaller relative 
errors than their non-physician-directed counterparts. Importantly, we also 
observe that rapidly growing insurers have demonstrated risky reserving 
practices. We consider these results as relevant to regulators and rating 
agencies in assessing medical malpractice insurer riskiness. 
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INTRODUCTION  
 
Medical Malpractice insurance is a highly volatile product in terms of 
price and supply. It also provides coverage against liabilities that are often 
specific to location and medical specialty. A natural outgrowth of these 
underlying conditions is that the majority of premiums written in medical 
malpractice are earned by insurers that focus on this particular line of 
coverage, that operate in only one or a few states, and that are owned by 
health care providers themselves.  Yet from a risk standpoint, such 
specialization should lead to increased volatility because of lack of 
diversification. Indeed, we have observed that regulators and rating 
agencies encourage such insurers to expand their geographic market as well 
as the lines of coverage offered.1 We believe that such encouragement may 
be counter-productive; we test our belief in the research reported here. Our 
purpose is to analyze differences in reserving practices between medical 
malpractice insurers defined as physician-directed versus those that are not.  
Since reserving practices provide an indication of an insurer’s stability and 
strength, we hypothesize that specialized physician-directed insurers will 
be more conservative in their liability estimates than will less specialized 
widely-owned insurers. 
Many readers will think of “bed-pan mutuals” in our discussion of 
physician-directed insurers. These readers are correct in their thinking, yet 
the list of physician-directed insurers extends beyond bed-pan mutuals.  
Bed-pan mutuals began in the 1970s in response to the initial “crisis” in 
medical malpractice insurance. They are small mutual insurers owned by 
health care providers to offer medical malpractice insurance to their 
members. These insurers will be included in our group of physician 
directed insurers. In addition to the bed-pan mutuals, risk retention groups, 
which became possible in the 1980s following the passage of the Federal 
Liability Risk Retention Act of 1986,2 also will be considered “physician-
directed insurers” in our analysis if they focus on medical malpractice 
insurance and are owned by health care providers. Importantly, some stock 
insurers also fit within our definition of “physician directed.” These are 
insurers formed by medical societies or others for the purpose of offering 
their members and owners medical malpractice coverage. They differ from 
mutuals, however, in that they are organized as corporations with 
ownership distributed through corporate stock.  Importantly, not all mutual 
                                                                                                                 
1  A review of Best’s Insurance Reports demonstrates this practice. 
2  Federal Liability Risk Rention Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 3901-3906 (2000). 
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insurers selling medical malpractice insurance are considered “physician 
directed.” Large, diversified entities, such as Liberty Mutual, which 
participate in the medical malpractice market but which are not managed 
by nor focused on health care providers will not be considered physician 
directed. Because of their special characteristics, physician-directed 
insurers have formed their own industry trade group, the Physician Insurers 
Association of America (PIAA).3 The PIAA has created a listing of 
physician-directed versus non-physician directed insurers. We use this 
listing as generously provided by Patricia Danzon, Andrew Epstein and 
Scott Johnson. We supplement this listing with information from the Risk 
Retention Reporter. 
Our underlying premise is that physician-directed insurers provide a 
significant service to the market, one not typically observed in mutual 
insurers, which usually provide coverage on less-complex risks. We 
anticipate that physician-directed insurers will operate differently from 
non-physician directed insurers for two reasons: they have differing 
organizational goals; and they have differing informational opportunities. 
While non-physician-directed insurers can be expected to set their primary 
organizational goal as maximization of the firm’s value or profit, physician 
directed insurers are generally formed with the purpose of offering a stable 
insurance environment and even to try to alter the underlying tort system. A 
personal review of numerous physician-directed insurer Web pages 
indicates that their mission statements generally focus on supporting the 
health care community through legal advocacy, strong loss-control support, 
and other mechanisms designed to alter the underlying loss conditions 
rather than simply to finance those losses.4 As stated above, physician-
directed insurers are often owned by or at least initiated by state medical 
societies. Their objective tends not to be profit maximization. Moreover, in 
many instances, these two types of insurers are subject to different levels of 
                                                                                                                 
3  See generally Patricia Danzon, Andrew J. Epstien, & Scott J. Johnson, The Crisis in 
Medical Malpractice Insurance, BROOKINGS-WHARTON PAPERS ON FIN. SERVICES, 2004, at 56, 
68.  See also Medical Liability Insurers—U.S.,  http://www.piaa.us/directory/public/ 
results.asp?st=member&mt=primary&loc=usa (last visited Nov. 9, 2008); Directory of RRGs and 
PGs, http://www.rrr.com/rrgspgs/advancedSearchResults.cfm (last visted Nov. 9, 2008). 
4  A review of numerous physician-directed insurer websites reveals these priorities.  See, 
e.g., The Applied Medico-Legal Risk Retention Group available at, http://www.amsrrg.com/ 
(last visited Nov. 9, 2008); Centurion Medical Liability Protective http://www.cmlpins.com/ 
over_history.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2008); The Emergency Physicians Insurance Company, 
http://www.epicrrg.com/index.asp (last visited Nov. 9, 2008); Novus Insurance Company Risk 
Retention Group, http://www.novusrrg.com/ (last visited Nov. 9, 2008); Premier Physicians 
Insurance Company,  http://www.ppicdocs.com/about_history.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2008). 
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regulation. For instance, medical malpractice risk retention groups, which 
usually are physician-directed, are established under the Federal Liability 
Risk Retention Act of 1986, which preempts certain aspects of state laws 
regulating the activities of risk retention groups.5 As a result, operating 
practices are likely to differ between the two types of organizations. 
One possible variation comes in the area of loss reserve practice. Prior 
research has hypothesized that insurers may manage loss reserve estimates 
to achieve organizational goals, including reducing taxes, enhancing 
apparent financial strength to avoid regulatory actions, and smoothing 
income for the benefit of investor preferences.6 Managers of physician-
directed insurers, however, generally do not face the same pressure to 
maximize profits because they do not have to answer to investors 
preoccupied with maximizing profits.  Additionally, these insurers tend to 
be subject to less stringent regulation than are most non-physician-directed 
insurers. We anticipate, therefore, that physician-directed insurers will 
approach operational decisions such as loss reserving practices differently 
from non-physician-directed insurers.  
Moreover, physician-directed insurers may have informational or risk-
sharing advantages over other insurers in writing medical malpractice 
insurance, which makes it more plausible that physician-directed insurers 
differ from non-physician-directed insurers in loss reserving accuracy.7 
This informational advantage is generated from the insurer’s strong 
connection to the medical community, and by its focus on the medical 
malpractice line of business. While some physician-directed insurers offer 
general liability coverage to their participating insureds, it is rare for those 
insurers to sell property coverage or other major lines of liability insurance, 
unlike many non-physician directed medical malpractice carriers, whether 
stock or mutual. Certainly non-physician-directed insurers can hire health 
care providers to close some of this informational gap, but we contend that 
physician-directed insurers possess such informational advantage 
throughout the entity because of their focus on affecting the underlying 
                                                                                                                 
5  15 U.S.C. § 3603 (2000). 
6  See, e.g., Kathy R. Petroni, Stephen G. Ryan & James M. Wahlen, Discretionary 
and Non-discretionary Revisions of Loss Reserves by Property-Casualty Insurers: 
Differential Implications for Future Profitability, Risk and Market Value, 5 REV. OF ACCT. 
STUD. 95, 96 (2000). 
7  See Danzon Rule 15 supra note 3, at 56; Neil A. Doherty & Georges Dionne, 
Insurance with Undiversifiable Risk: Contract Structure and Organizational Form of 
Insurance Firms, 6 J. OF RISK AND UNCERTAINTY 187, 197 (1993). 
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exposure itself. In short, physician-directed insurers have a different 
underlying purpose. 
To test our hypothesis that physician-directed insurers are more 
conservative in their business practices, and therefore more financially 
secure, than non-physician-directed insurers, we test for differences in loss 
reserving across physician-directed and non-physician directed insurers. 
We also consider the influence of geographic and business specialization. 
In the following section of the paper, we review the literature on loss 
reserve development, and follow with a discussion of organizational form. 
With this background as a foundation, we present our data and 
methodology, leading to results. The last section concludes the paper with a 
summary of our findings and suggestions for future research.  
 
LITERATURE ON LOSS RESERVE DEVELOPMENT  
 
Insurance companies are required to hold loss reserves to account for 
all unpaid losses and loss adjustment expenses. These reserves are first 
established in the year of coverage and then updated with new information 
as time passes. Because many years may pass between an initial 
malpractice event or claim and ultimate payment for the underlying injury, 
and because not all events are known when they occur, insurers must 
estimate their future liabilities with quite a bit of uncertainty. This 
requirement leads to inevitable errors along the way. The difference 
between the initially reported estimate of ultimate loss payments (the “loss 
reserve”) for any given coverage year and the ultimate realized paid losses 
for that coverage year is known as the loss reserve error (or loss reserve 
development), which reflects the estimation error in the originally reported 
reserve. This amount can be positive or negative. Loss reserves are 
important representations of insurance company financial performance, 
directly affecting current profits. How they are estimated, therefore, creates 
significant implications for insurers. 
Two major theories have been proposed in the rich literature regarding 
the underlying influences on the size and direction of reserve errors. The 
first theory is that reserve errors simply represent mistakes in original loss 
estimates due to uncertainty regarding future claims.8 As new information 
about claims becomes available, loss reserves are frequently revised until 
all claims are settled. Differences between the original estimates and 
                                                                                                                 
8  Mary Weiss, A Multivariate Analysis of Loss Reserving Estimates in Property-
Liability Insurance Companies, 52 J. OF RISK & INS. 199, 204 (1985).  
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ultimate payments represent the reserve error. Grace and Leverty conclude 
that mis-estimation is the dominant cause of reserve errors in the long run.9 
The second major theory regarding causes of reserve errors is that 
management consciously manipulates them to  manage earnings.  
Three sub-categories of theories or propositions have been developed 
to explain the practice of earnings management using reserve errors. The 
first proposition is the income-smoothing theory. According to the income-
smoothing theory, management may be encouraged to set reserves in a way 
that minimizes earnings variability from period to period. Prior research 
indicates that indeed reserve errors are not random and tend to stabilize 
underwriting income, 10 including evidence that the firms in the left tail of 
the earnings distribution understate reserve errors while those in the right 
tail overstate reserve errors.11  
The second proposition associated with reserve management is the tax-
reducing theory. As noted above, early efforts to understand reserving 
practices focused on income smoothing. Such focus was due in part to 
regulatory concern with transparency and the concern that manipulating an 
insurer’s financial status could harm shareholders and consumers alike. A 
full understanding of reserve management, however, required development 
of an overall theory about insurer reserving practices. An early approach to 
a full-picture analysis of reserve management assumes insurers follow a 
cash flow maximization objective, with income smoothing constraints. In 
such a model, tax deferral can become significant.12 Empirical examination 
of property-liability insurers is supportive, finding that the examined 
insurers’ reserving practices aided in reduction of tax liabilities.13  
The third proposition associated with reserve management is the 
regulatory constraint theory which holds that insurers may revise loss 
                                                                                                                 
9   Martin Grace & J. Tyler Leverty, Property-Liability Insurer Reserve Errors-
Motive, Manipulation, or Mistake, SOC. SCI. RES. NETWORK, May 31, 2007, at 25-26, 
available at  http://ssrn.com/abstract=964635 (The authors also test rate regulation 
incentives, but given that we are considering a single line of insurance, this issue is not 
relevant in the current study). 
10  See Barry D. Smith, An Analysis of Auto Liability Loss Reserves and 
Underwriting Results, 47 J. OF RISK & INS.  305, 317 (1980); Weiss, supra note 8, at 203. 
11   William H. Beaver, Maureen F. McNichols & Karen K. Nelson, Management of 
the Loss Reserve Accrual and the Distribution of Earnings in the Property-Casualty 
Insurance Industry, SOC. SCI. RES. NETWORK, October 2000, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=247702 or DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.247702. 
12  Elizabeth Grace, Property-Liability Insurer Reserve Errors: A Theoretical and 
Empirical Analysis, 57 J. OF RISK & INS. 28, 33 (1990). 
13  Grace, supra note 12, at 42. 
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reserves to enhance financial strength to avoid regulatory actions. 
According to the theory, financially weak insurers may tend to understate 
their reserves more than other insurers. Empirical study supports the theory 
with findings that insurers “close to” receiving regulatory review do 
underestimate their reserves considerably. 14  Furthermore, Beaver, 
McNichols, and Nelson show that both financially healthy and distressed 
firms manage earnings to avoid financial losses, and that both types of 
firms contribute to an overall appearance of income smoothing and 
opportunistic regulatory reporting.15  
 
INFLUENCE OF PHYSICIAN-DIRECTED INSURERS 
 
Insurance industry organizational form has been the subject of 
numerous studies, likely spurred by the strong presence of both mutual and 
stock insurers.16 Most of the literature to date has focused on conditions 
appropriate for each form to dominate the market. The majority of these 
studies conclude that the mutual form tends to dominate insurance lines 
that require limited managerial control, given the absence of shareholder 
pressure on performance. Mutuals, therefore, are expected to be more 
common in the standardized personal insurance products such as 
homeowners, while commercial liability lines are considered better suited 
to the stock insurance form. Generally these expectations are met in the 
market. 
The medical malpractice insurance industry, however, presents an 
anomaly to the underlying theory, with mutual and mutual-like physician-
directed insurers representing a large portion of the premium volume. We 
are interested in understanding this situation better. Our expectation is that 
the owners of physician-directed medical malpractice insurers differ from 
policyholder owners of the traditional mutual insurers in other lines 
because as physicians themselves they are in a better position to understand 
the potential for loss, to underwrite business and adjust claims, and 
                                                                                                                 
14  See Kathy R. Petroni, Optimistic Reporting in the Property-Casualty Insurance 
Industry, 15 J. ACCT. & ECON. 485, 486 (1992). 
15  Beaver et al., supra note 11 at 1, 2, 4, 21-22 .  
16  Paul Joskow, Cartels, Competition and Regulation in the Property-Liability 
Insurance Industry, 4 BELL J. OF ECON. &  MGMT. SCI. 375, 377-79, 391 (1973).  Joskow 
offers an early discussion of organizational form, with Mayers and Smith providing the 
impetus for much of the research that followed. See also David Mayers & Clifford W. 
Smith, Jr., Contractual Provisions, Organizational Structure, and Conflict Control in 
Insurance Markets, 54 J. OF BUS 407, 412 (1981). 
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generally to manage the coverage. Whether or not this position is true is 
quite important for regulatory and rating agency review. Regulators and 
rating agencies tend to recommend that small physician-directed insurers 
expand their book of business for diversification purposes. If we find, 
however, that physician-directed, specialized, and geographically 
concentrated medical malpractice insurers tend to show greater levels of 
conservatism (i.e., more likely to over reserve) with their reserving 
practices, as we hypothesize, such encouragement may be counter to its 
purpose. 
Recent work by Harrington, Danzon, and Epstein17 highlights the 
importance of our research. They consider whether or not under-reserving 
in medical malpractice markets during the 1990s led to under-pricing, 
which in turn led to a market “crisis.” Their intent is to discern the effects 
of under-pricing versus actual increases in underlying losses on later 
periods of rapidly rising prices (i.e., “crises” periods). They discover that 
insurers who specialize in medical malpractice insurance grew less rapidly 
in soft markets than did non-specialists. They also observe that specialists 
tended to experience better loss development than did the non-specialists. 
Consistent with these results, Danzon, Epstein, and Johnson find that 
physician-directed firms tend to be less likely to exit the market than are 
non-physician directed firms, particularly in comparing small insurers. 
They conclude that the physician-directed insurers appear to help stabilize 
the medical malpractice market.18 These empirical investigations are 
consistent with Baker’s explanation for the underwriting cycle in medical 
malpractice.19 Baker outlines the importance of uncertainty due to the long 
tail quality of medical malpractice claims, as well as behavioral elements of 
decision makers within this market. 
As stated supra, therefore, the loss reserving practices of physician-
directed insurers are likely to be different from those of non-physician 
directed insurers. The informational or risk-sharing advantages of 
physician-directed insurers along with organizational objectives associated 
with market stability may lead them to report more accurate loss reserve 
than non-physician-directed insurers. Therefore, we hypothesize that 
physician-directed insurers are more likely to over-reserve and less likely 
                                                                                                                 
17  Scott Harrington, Patricia M. Danzon, & Andrew J. Epstein, ‘Crises’ in Medical 
Malpractice Insurance: Evidence of Excessive Price-Cutting in the Preceding Soft Market, 
32 J. BANKING & FIN. 157, 168-169 (2008).  
18  See Danzon et al., supra note 3, at 87. 
19  Tom Baker, Medical Malpractice and the Insurance Underwriting Cycle, 54 
DEPAUL LAW REV. 393, 436 (2005).  
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to under-reserve than non-physician-directed insurers. We further 
hypothesize that physician-directed insurers are more likely to have smaller 
absolute reserve errors than are non-physician-directed insurers. 
 
DATA AND MODEL 
  
From the above, we anticipate that medical malpractice insurer reserves 
will be affected by: organizational form, geographic and business 
specialization, incentives to smooth income, opportunities to minimize tax 
liabilities, and a desire to limit regulatory intervention. To test our 
hypotheses, we rely primarily on the National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners (NAIC) database which contains information reported on 
insurers’ annual statements. As discussed in the prior literature, a limitation 
of the NAIC database is that it does not include all medical malpractice 
insurers. Despite these limitations, the NAIC database remains the single 
best source of insurer financial information available. We use data from 
1994 to 2006. 
 
 DEFINITION OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURERS 
 
Our focus in this study is on the medical malpractice insurance market, 
primarily on organizational form of insurers in that market. To conduct our 
analyses, we first need to define a “medical malpractice insurer.” One 
possible definition of a medical malpractice insurer for inclusion in our 
study is any insurer with positive direct premiums written (DPW) in the 
medical malpractice line. Using this definition would yield 491 insurers for 
our sample period; however, as pointed out by Nordman, Cermak and 
McDaniel,20 this sample selection criterion may pose difficulty. 
Specifically, the NAIC database does not distinguish between active and 
inactive insurers, resulting in unrepresentative observations from very 
small insurers that may not be seeking new business. 
To address this problem, we follow Danzon, Epstein and Johnson21 by 
defining a medical malpractice insurer as one with at least $100,000 in 
direct premiums written in medical malpractice (in 2001 dollars) in at least 
one state. This definition gives us data from 324 insurers over the sample 
                                                                                                                 
20  ERIC NORDMAN, DAVIN CERMAK, AND KENNETH MCDANIEL, MEDICAL 
MALPRACTICE INSURANCE REPORT: A STUDY OF MARKET CONDITIONS AND POTENTIAL 
SOLUTIONS TO THE RECENT CRISIS 17 (2004). 
21  See Danzon et al., supra note 3, at 60. 
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period, although not all insurers have observations from each year. When 
missing data are considered, the sample involves 230 insurers, 59 of which 
are physician-directed. 
 
 RESERVE ERROR 
 
In order to examine differences in loss reserving practices between 
physician-directed and non-physician directed insurers, we conduct our 
analysis at the firm-year level.  We follow the literature by measuring 
reserve error as the difference between the total incurred losses as 
estimated in the year of coverage and the total incurred losses as estimated 
in some future period t+j:22 
Errori,t = Incurred Losses i,t - Incurred Losses i,t+j 
where  
Error i,t = insurer i’s medical malpractice loss reserve error for losses 
incurred in year t;   
Incurred Lossi,t = insurer i’s medical malpractice reserve for losses 
incurred in year t and reported in year t; that is, insurer i’s incurred losses 
as estimated in the year associated with coverage for those losses; 
Incurred Lossesi,t+j = insurer i’s revised estimate of the year t medical 
malpractice loss reserve as reported in year t+j; that is, the updated value of 
losses covered by policies in year t but updated in year t+j as additional 
information is available, including most of the claims being closed by the 
time of our ultimate evaluation.  
In the above equation, estimated incurred losses are obtained from Part 
2F of Schedule P of insurers’ financial statements. A positive (negative) 
Error indicates that the originally reported loss reserve was overstated 
(understated).  
In order to calculate loss reserve errors, we need to specify the 
development period j. In this study, we use a five-year development period 
(j=5) which we apply to all the sample years. Due to data availability 
issues, some researchers have used shorter time periods; the shorter 
development period, however leaves the value less certain. Therefore, we 
employ the longer five year development period, which others argue is a 
                                                                                                                 
22  In Grace and Leverty, supra note 9, this measure is referred to as the “P” estimate 
for Petroni.  Petroni proposed this measure in Petroni, supra note 14. An alternative is to 
compare the original estimate with cumulative developed losses paid at some future date, 
known as the Weiss , or “W,” error for Mary Weiss.  See Weiss, supra note 8. Both 
measures have benefits and detriments. We found similar results for both P and W errors 
and report only the P error analyses. 
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sufficient development period for analyses such as ours.23 The most recent 
NAIC data currently available is for year 2006; hence, the initial 
observation period examined in our study is 1994 through 2001.  
Based on the variable Error, we construct four dependent variables for 
four distinct analyses. The first is an indicator variable Over, which takes 
the value of 1 if Error is positive and 0 otherwise. The second dependent 
variable is an indicator Under, which takes the value of 1 if Error is 
negative and 0 otherwise. We conduct these two tests to observe whether 
physician-directed insurers are more or less likely than non-physician-
directed insurers to err in the positive or negative direction.  
Yet, this kind of analysis is incomplete because it does not account for 
the size of error; therefore, we conduct two additional tests with the 
dependent variable log (Abserror/Assets), which is the logarithm of the 
absolute value of the error variable divided by net admitted assets.24 We 
create two tests with this dependent variable in order to separate positive 
errors from negative errors. Other literature on reserve error has suggested 
that behavior may differ for positive and negative errors, leading us to 
conduct two distinct tests, one for positive errors, and the second for 
negative errors.25 Our results support the suggestion that positive and 
negative errors are influenced by differing factors. 
We now have four equations to test. For each, the dependent variable is 
assumed to be a function of two sets of independent variables. The first set 
of independent variables reflects the difference between physician-directed 
                                                                                                                 
23  See Smith, supra note 6, at 308; and Paul M. Kazenski, William R. Feldhaus and  
Howard C. Schneider, Empirical Evidence for Alternative Loss Development Horizons and 
the Measurement of Reserve Error, 59 J. OF RISK & AND INS. 668-69, 675 (1992). While 
final claim value is not yet known after 5 years, evidence presented in these papers indicates 
that reserve error has developed sufficiently to be able to test the sorts of theories considered 
in here. We know of no prior study that uses a longer development period to study reserve 
error. 
24  Other scaling measures associated with revenue volume such as net premium 
written (NPW) or direct premium written (DPW) were also employed. Differences were not 
significant. We scale the value of the error because it is relevant only in relation to the 
overall size of the insurer. 
25  We would have liked to be able to run a fixed effects and/or random effects 
model, but were unable to estimate the coefficient of Physician Direct. The reason is that 
firm-specific intercepts have absorbed the effect of Physician Direct (PD), which is also 
firm-specific and does not vary with time. The model takes the form: Log (Abserror/assets) 
= ai + b(PDi) + cXi,t , where ai are the firm-specific intercepts. Since our PD variable is also 
firm-specific and does not change with time (t), when we run regression, ai and PD will be 
combined, producing just one set of coefficients. There is no value for b generated from 
regressions. 
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and non-physician-directed malpractice insurers in terms of organizational 
form, geographic focus, medical malpractice concentration and riskiness. 
The second set of independent variables represents factors that are linked to 
other theories about reserve errors in the literature:  income-smoothing 
theory, tax-reducing theory, and regulatory constraint theory. Table 1 lists 
all the dependent and independent variables used in the study, along with a 
detailed description of each variable and its expected relationship with the 
dependent variable.  Our discussion below indicates that some of the 
variables appear relevant in one or two of the models but not all four. We 
report the results with the selected control variables within the manuscript. 
In the Appendix, we also show results with the full model for each analysis. 
The reader will note that results are substantially the same. 
 
Table 1: Variable Definitions and Anticipated Sign
Variables Description 
Expected Sign 
Over Under log(Abserror/Assets) Positivea Negativeb 
LOG(ABSERROR/ 
ASSETS)i,t 
Logarithm of the 
absolute value of 
firm i’s medical 
malpractice loss 
reserve error 
assessed as of year 
t+j for the reserve 
reported in year t, 
divided by its net 
admitted assets in 
year t 
N/A 
OVERi,t 
Dummy variable 
equals 1 if 
ERROR>0; 0 
otherwise 
N/A 
UNDERi,t 
Dummy variable 
equals 1 if 
ERROR<0; 0 
otherwise 
N/A 
PHYSICIAN DIRECTi 
Dummy variable 
equals 1 if firm i is 
physician-directed; 
0 otherwise 
+ - - - 
GeographicConcentration i,t 
Firm-level 
Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index 
for firm i in year t 
+ - - - 
2008]  INFLUENCES OF ORGANIZATIONAL FORM 65 
 
SPECIALIZATIONi,t 
Firm i’s premiums 
written in medical 
malpractice divided 
by total premiums 
written 
+ - - - 
REINSi,t 
reinsurance ceded 
in medical 
malpractice/(direct 
business written in 
medical malpractice 
+ reinsurance 
assumed in medical 
malpractice) for 
insurer i in year t. 
- * * * 
GROWTHi,t 
[DPW in med mal 
at (t) – DPW in 
med mal at (t-1)]/ 
DPW in med mal at 
(t-1) 
- + * + 
GROUPi 
Dummy variable 
equals 1 if firm i 
belongs to a group; 
0 otherwise 
- + - + 
TAXi,t 
(net income + prior 
year’s loss 
reserve)/assets  
+ - + * 
SMOOTHi,t 
Pre-managed 
earnings – target 
earnings 
+ - + - 
RBCLowi,t 
Dummy variable 
equals 1 if firm i’s 
risk-based capital 
ratio in year t is less 
than 2. 
* + * + 
RBCClosei,t 
Dummy variable 
equals 1 if firm i’s 
risk-based capital 
ratio in year t is 
within [2, 2.5] 
- + * * 
NPWi,t 
Firm i’s net 
premiums written 
in year t 
- + - + 
Yi (i=1995,…,2001) Year dummy if year=i +/- 
a: for firms that have positive reserve errors; b: for firms that have negative reserve errors 
*Not included in given equation 
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 FACTORS AFFECTING THE SIZE AND DIRECTION OF RESERVE  
 ERRORS 
  
The variable of primary interest to our study is organizational form. We 
differentiate between medical malpractice insurers considered Physician 
directed or not, using a dummy variable equal to 1 if considered physician 
directed. While the NAIC database classifies insurers as stock, reciprocal, 
mutual, risk retention group, or “other,” we consider this categorization 
insufficient. For example, a number of physician-directed medical 
malpractice insurers are stock companies, with the stock held by the state 
Medical Society and/or health care providers. Alternatively, some mutual 
insurers clearly are not physician directed, such as Boston-based, multi-line 
insurer, Liberty Mutual. We take the conservative approach of designating 
as physician directed only those insurers identified as physician directed by 
the Physician Insurers Association of America (PIAA),26 or for which we 
have other clear evidence of such status (for example, a review of Best’s 
Reports or firm web page). The resulting sample includes 59 insurers 
designated as Physician directed. We anticipate that physician-directed 
insurers will be more likely to over-reserve, less likely to under-reserve, 
and to have smaller absolute value of reserves either positive or negative. 
 
 MARKET SPECIALIZATION 
 
Our hypotheses regarding physician-directed insurers rest on the notion 
that these insurers have differing organizational objectives. They also may 
possess better information than their counter-parts, a possibility we account 
for with several variables. Superior information may generate from market 
specialization, both in terms of knowledge of the specific legal context for 
their exposure and in terms of the medical malpractice line of insurance 
itself. To capture these factors, we include measures of geographic 
concentration and business focus. The majority of physician-directed 
insurers focuses on medical malpractice insurance rather than sell a full 
range of coverage. Additionally, these insurers tend to focus their business 
in one or a few states. We incorporate measures of these qualities in order 
to separate the effect of specialization from the effect of organizational 
ownership. Without including these variables, we might see an effect of 
                                                                                                                 
26  We thank Patricia Danzon, Andrew Epstein and Scott Johnson for generously 
sharing this PIAA list. 
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physician-directed insurers, when the real effect is due to market 
specialization. 
Given the state basis of medical malpractice law, both in terms of the 
legal doctrines as well as medical practices, we use geographic 
concentration as one measure of superior knowledge. Specifically, we use 
the firm-level geographic Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, defined as the sum 
of the squares of the percentage direct premiums written (DPW) market 
share in each state by each firm, to measure GeographicConcentration. A 
higher value of GeographicConcentration implies more concentration; that 
is, the firm operates in fewer states. More geographically concentrated 
insurers could be riskier because they are exposed to the systematic risk of 
all of their exposures affected simultaneously to expansions of liability, 
such as when a new precedent is set through plaintiff success with a novel 
legal theory. Rating agencies comment on their concern over such risk in 
their company discussions, and often recommend expansion to additional 
states.27 We anticipate, however, that such insurers will compensate for 
such potential riskiness by over-reserving more often and under-reserving 
less often. We also anticipate that the superior knowledge we hypothesize 
these insurers possess will lead to more accurate reserves in absolute value 
of their error. Hence, they will have smaller relative over- and under-
reserve errors. 
We also measure an insurer’s superior knowledge by the extent to 
which an insurer focuses on medical malpractice or offers a wide range of 
coverage. Specifically, Specialization equals the dollar value of an 
insurer’s premiums written in medical malpractice divided by total 
premiums written. The higher the value, the larger the percent of business 
devoted to medical malpractice insurance. We anticipate a very similar 
effect and for the same reasons as for geographic concentration. That is, we 
anticipate that Specialization will be positively associated with over-
reserving and negatively associated with under-reserving and the size of 
their reserve errors. 
 
 RISK PROFILE 
 
Reserving practices in effect represent part of an insurer’s risk 
management. Higher reserves generally yield lower risk, all else equal. 
Another important aspect of insurer risk management is its use of 
                                                                                                                 
27  See, e.g., the discussion of any single-state medical malpractice insurer in the 
A.M. Best’s Ratings Reports. 
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reinsurance. We incorporate a Reinsurance variable equal to reinsurance 
DPW ceded in medical malpractice divided by the sum of all direct 
premiums written (DPW) in medical malpractice plus reinsurance DPW 
assumed in medical malpractice. We anticipate that use of reinsurance will 
mitigate the need to be conservative with reserving practices; hence, the 
greater the relative level of Reinsurance, the less likely is an insurer to 
over-reserve. We do not anticipate an effect either on under- or over-
reserving in absolute relative value. 
Harrington, Danzon and Epstein observe that rapidly growing medical 
malpractice insurers likely do so at the expense of taking greater risk in 
their underwriting decisions.28 We therefore include a Growth variable to 
account for this condition. We define Growth as the relative change in 
medical malpractice direct premiums written (DPW) from year t-1 to t.29 
Our expectation is that firms with rapid growth will be more likely to 
under- and less likely to over-reserve. We further expect higher levels of 
under-reserving with greater growth but no necessary effect on over-
reserving. 
Two additional variables associated with firm risk are included: size 
and whether or not the insurer is a member of a group of companies. We 
consider reserving practice a form of risk management. Over (under) 
reserving is a method to reduce (increase) risks, and would be included 
within an insurer’s overall risk strategy. Large firms and those affiliated 
with a group generally have a variety of risk management techniques 
available to them; hence, we would anticipate that they could take more 
risk in their reserving practices. For both, therefore, we would anticipate 
greater (lesser) frequency of under (over) reserving, and larger (smaller) 
under (over) reserves when they do occur. Our size variable is net 
premiums written (NPW)30 and we designate Group for those firms with 
group affiliation. 
 
 TAX, SMOOTHING, REGULATORY THEORIES 
 
In addition to these measures of anticipated superior knowledge 
(organizational form, geographic concentration, and business 
                                                                                                                 
28   See  Harrington et al., supra note 17, at 167.  
29  We also conducted the analysis standardizing for overall market growth. Results 
are substantially the same in either analysis. We thank an anonymous reviewer for 
suggesting this addition. 
30  Conducting the analysis with total assets as our size variable instead does not alter 
the basic results. 
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specialization) and risk (reinsurance purchases, growth, size, and group 
affiliation), we anticipate a variety of other factors may affect reserve 
errors. These factors relate to the loss reserving theories discussed above. 
Tax issues, income smoothing, and regulatory concerns represent the bulk 
of the literature on hypothesized opportunities for managerial discretion to 
influence loss reserving practices. We do not anticipate that these 
incentives will differ between physician-directed insurers and non-
physician-directed insurers, and include control variables in order to try to 
highlight the effect of ownership form on differences in reserve estimation 
practices. 
Regarding taxes, we expect to observe over-reserving more often 
among firms with large tax liabilities, which can be deferred through 
current reserves. We further anticipate a positive relationship between Tax 
and the size of over-reserving, given that the larger the tax benefit, the 
larger would be the likely reserve. We anticipate no relationship between 
taxes and the size of under reserving. The tax variable is defined as31:  
Tax = (net income + prior year’s loss reserve)/assets  
In addition to tax benefits, reserving management may be desirable in 
order to smooth out income for the debt and equity markets. According to 
the smoothing hypotheses, if a firm’s current year’s earnings are 
unexpectedly higher (lower) than target earnings, then it tends to over 
(under) reserve. Following Baker, Collins and Reigenga,32 we define the 
smoothing variable as: 
Smooth = pre-managed earnings – target earnings 
Where pre-managed earnings are the earnings purged of estimated 
reserves.  
=  (net income + loss reserve)/assets; 
Target earning uses a historical growth model to estimate next period’s 
earnings: 
= [Net incomet-1+ (Net incomet-1- Net incomet-4)/4]/assets if Net 
incomet-1> Net incomet-4  otherwise Net incomet-1/assets   
                                                                                                                 
31  We use the prior year’s loss reserve because of possible endogeneity issues; 
however, we conducted the analysis using the current year’s loss reserve as used by 
Elizabeth Grace.  Grace, supra note 12, at 37. We found no major differences in regression 
results. 
32  Terry Baker, Denton Collins, & Austin Reitenga, Stock Option Compensation and 
Earnings Management Incentives, 18 J. OF ACCT. AUDITING & FIN. 557, 580 (2003). We also 
conducted the analysis with two alternative smoothing variables previously used in the 
literature, ROA (return on assets) as employed by Petroni, et al., supra note 6, and the 
average value of net income adjusted by assets as used by Grace and Leverty, supra note 9. 
Our results are substantially the same with each of these measures. 
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Our expectation is that Smooth will be positively (negatively) related to 
the likelihood of over- (under-) reserving. We also anticipate that the 
larger (smaller) the value of Smooth, the greater will be the value of over- 
(under-) reserving errors. 
In addition to preferences for smooth earnings and lower (or deferred) 
taxes, managers are also believed to prefer less regulatory oversight and 
therefore may be encouraged to pursue a particular loss reserving strategy 
consistent with minimizing regulatory attention. To capture this incentive, 
we use a dummy variable derived from the NAIC risk-based capital (RBC) 
ratio, which is total adjusted capital divided by authorized control level 
risk-based capital. Our variable, RBCClose, takes the value of 1 if the risk-
based capital ratio is no less than two (below which is the first level of 
regulatory action) and no greater than 2.5, considering this region “close 
to” regulatory action, indicating firms which might have incentive to find 
means to limit regulatory attention. The risk-based capital ratio is used by 
regulators to indicate whether or not a firm should be subject to a certain 
level of regulatory action.33 We anticipate greater likelihood of under-
reserving and less over-reserving in this region for the appearance of 
greater surplus. We do not anticipate a relationship with size of error. 
We also anticipate that firms below 2.0 may differ from those above, 
perhaps signaling that the state regulator is scrutinizing their actions. We 
use a second dummy variable, RBCLow for all firms with RBC below 2 to 
designate these insurers, and expect it to be positively related to under-
reserving. Assuming financial difficulty for these firms, we also expect 
larger size of under-reserving errors. 
In addition to the firm-specific characteristics considered this far, 
economic conditions have also been shown to affect reserve errors.34 We 
believe that a variety of economic conditions, including inflation, the 
                                                                                                                 
33  The NAIC recommends five different levels of actions against a company 
depending on the value of its risk-based capital ratio, as shown in the following table.  
 
risk-based capital ratio >=2 OK, no action taken 
2> risk-based capital ratio >=1.5 Company action level 
1.5> risk-based capital ratio >=1 Regulatory action level 
1> risk-based capital ratio >=0.7 Authorized control level  
0.7>= risk-based capital ratio Mandatory control level 
 
34  Both Weiss, supra note 8, at 212, and Grace, supra note 12, at 42 provide 
empirical evidence that reserve errors are associated with unanticipated inflation. 
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underwriting cycle, and other factors, are likely to affect reserve errors over 
time; hence, we include year dummy variables for each year of analysis. 
For firms to be included in our sample, they first must be identified as 
medical malpractice insurers according to our definition mentioned earlier. 
They also must have complete information to calculate all the dependent 
and independent variables. After applying these screens, 1142 firm-year 
observations remain in our final sample. 
 
 SUMMARY STATISTICS 
 
Summary statistics for the entire sample are shown in Table 2. The 
entire sample is used to test whether or not physician-directed insurers are 
more likely to over-reserve and less likely to under-reserve. We also 
created two sub-samples to test the size of any error as related to insurer 
organizational structure. The first sub-sample consists of observations that 
have positive reserve errors (i.e., over-stated errors), and we call it Positive. 
The second sub-sample includes those that have negative reserve errors 
(i.e., under-stated errors), and we call it Negative. We anticipate differences 
between insurers that over-reserve- from those that under-reserve, which is 
the purpose of using the two samples. Summary statistics for the sub-
samples of Positive and Negative are shown in Tables 3 and 4 respectively, 
and as discussed below we do observe differences between them.  
As shown in Table 2, insurers in our sample are far more likely (65% 
to 35% approximately) to over reserve than under reserve. They also tend 
to be specialized in the medical malpractice line, with an average of 
55.52% of total direct premiums written going toward this specific line. 
Our sample insurers are also geographically concentrated, with a 
geographic Herfindahl of almost .60. In terms of premium growth, we see 
notable variability among insurers, with the mean being 0.7043 and the 
median only at 0.0579. Most insurers seem to have a very healthy RBC 
ratio. Only 6.83% of the observations report RBC ratio below 2 and 5.43% 
of them fall within 2 and 2.5. Also we notice 66.73% of the observations 
belong to a group. Approximately one-third (33.19%) of the observations 
are from physician-directed insurers. 
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As can be seen from Tables 3 and 4, sample Positive has a different 
profile from sample Negative. About 40% of the observations in sample 
Positive are associated with physician-directed insurers, whereas in sample 
Negative the percentage is only 20%. We also see higher average values of 
geographic concentration and specialization in sample Positive. It is 
interesting to note that on average insurers in sample Negative experienced 
higher premium growth and are more likely to belong to a group. They also 
have a larger size in terms of net premiums written. 
Table 2: Summary Statistics of Full Sample (N = 1142)
Variables MIN MAX MEAN MEDIAN STD 
LOG(ABSERROR/ASSETS) -12.5251 0.7243 -4.0818 -3.6760 2.2738 
OVER 0 1 0.6480 1 0.4778 
UNDER 0 1 0.3520 0 0.4778 
PHYDIRECT 0 1 0.3319 0 0.4711 
GEOGRAPHIC 
CONCENTRATION 0.0359 1 0.5935 0.6426 0.3693 
SPECIALIZATION 0 1 0.5552 0.7782 0.4455 
REINS -178.7576 1.2001 0.2495 0.3180 5.3134 
GROWTH -106.9752 84.82778 0.7043 0.0579 6.2976 
GROUP 0 1 0.6673 1 0.4714 
TAX 0 7.9982 0.3101 0.2226 0.4611 
SMOOTH -147.653 123.0438 -4.0948 0.0017 16.7344 
RBCLow 0 1 0.0683 0 0.2524 
RBCClose 0 1 0.0543 0 0.2267 
NPW (X108) -0.0847 55.4442 2.4756 0.3375 6.9149 
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Table 4: Summary Statistics of Sample Negative (N = 402)
Variables MIN MAX MEAN MEDIAN STD 
LOG(ABSERROR/ASSETS) -11.8255 0.2805 -4.3474 -4.2258 2.1539 
OVER 0 0 0 0 0 
UNDER 1 1 1 1 0 
PHYDIRECT 0 1 0.2040 0 0.4035 
GEOGRAPHIC 
CONCENTRATION 0.0359 1 0.5381 
0.5158 0.3530 
SPECIALIZATION 0.0000 1 0.4732 0.4467 0.4413 
REINS -0.2429 1.2001 0.4612 0.3970 0.3127 
GROWTH -18.1491 84.8278 1.3203 0.0952 8.0515 
GROUP 0 1 0.7413 1 0.4385 
TAX 0 6.7555 0.2637 0.0884 0.5519 
SMOOTH -101.279 58.9131 -1.8385 -0.0363 10.1874 
RBCLow 0 1 0.0697 0 0.2549 
RBCClose 0 1 0.0746 0 0.2631 
NPW (X108) -0.0023 55.4442 3.6037 0.4118 9.0278 
 
Table 3: Summary Statistics of Sample Positive (N = 740)
Variables MIN MAX MEAN MEDIAN STD 
LOG(ABSERROR/ASSETS) -12.5251 0.7243 -3.9375 -3.1419 2.3251 
OVER 1 1 1 1 0 
UNDER 0 0 0 0 0 
PHYDIRECT 0 1 0.4014 0 0.4905 
GEOGRAPHIC 
CONCENTRATION 0.0412 1 0.6236 0.7593 0.3747 
SPECIALIZATION 0.0001 1 0.5998 0.9114 0.4418 
REINS -178.7576 1.0536 0.1344 0.2657 6.5953 
GROWTH -106.9752 56.9746 0.3696 0.0451 5.0734 
GROUP 0 1 0.6270 1 0.4839 
TAX 0 7.9982 0.3353 0.3168 0.4015 
SMOOTH -147.6531 123.0438 -5.3206 0.0243 19.2818 
RBCLow 0 1 0.0676 0 0.2512 
RBCClose 0 1 0.0432 0 0.2035 
NPW (X108) -0.0847 52.1785 1.8627 0.3184 5.3417 
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REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
  
We conducted four separate regression analyses. The first models the 
likelihood of a medical malpractice insurer to over reserve; the second 
models the likelihood to under reserve. For these analyses, we use logistic 
regression.35 The third and fourth dependent variables equal the logarithm 
of the absolute value of loss reserve error divided by net assets, one for 
those instances when insurers over-reserve, and the other when they under-
reserve. We use ordinary least squares (OLS) regression for this model.36 
As indicated in Table 1, we conducted the analyses with differing sets of 
independent variables; however, we also conducted the tests with all 
variables included. Results are substantively the same and are shown for 
the full set of independent variables in the Appendix. For each equation, 
Variance Inflation Factors are all below 2.5, eliminating concern regarding 
overall multi-collinearity. The likelihood ratio tests of the two Logistic 
regression equations reject the null hypothesis that the global regression 
coefficients are zero, indicating a good overall fit. The F-tests of the two 
OLS regression equations also imply a reasonable fit, with an adjusted R-
square of 63.77% and 43.11%, respectively. 
Results of the logistic regression using the dependent variable Over are 
shown in Table 5; those associated with the dependent variable Under are 
shown in Table 6. Both coefficient estimates and marginal effects are 
reported for the two logistic regressions.37 Results of the OLS analyses 
                                                                                                                 
35  Logistic regression is an appropriate statistical tool when the dependent variable 
takes on the value of zero or one, and the intention is to predict the probability of an 
occurrence of an event. In this case, we are interested in predicting the probability of a firm 
over or under reserving. Importantly, in logistic regression, no assumption that the 
relationship between the dependent and independent variables is linear exists. 
36  Ordinary Lease Squares, or OLS, analysis is a statistical technique often used 
when the dependent variable is continuous, as is true for our analyses of the size of positive 
and negative errors. The technique finds the curve which matches the relationship between 
the dependent variable and the group of independent variables with the smallest amount of 
squared error (or “residual,” which is the difference between predicted and observed 
values).  
37  Logistic regression takes the form of log[p/(1-p)]=b’X where p is the probability 
of an event (in our case it’s either over reserving or under reserving), and b is the coefficient 
matrix. The estimated value of b is the coefficient estimate. Because the equation is of the 
logistic form, however, the coefficient estimate does not indicate the size of effect for each 
variable; therefore, we also report marginal effects. Marginal effects represent the change in 
p when the independent variable increases by one unit. For instance, in Table 5, the 
marginal effect for geographic concentration is 0.0969, which means a one unit increase in 
“geographic concentration” increases the probability of over reserving by 0.0969.  
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using the relative absolute error as the dependent variable are shown in 
Tables 7 and 8 for those instances of over- and under-reserving 
respectively.  
 
Table 5: Logistic Regression of OVER (N = 1142)
Variable Estimate Marginal Effects Standard Error 
Intercept 1.0219  0.3134 
PHYSICIAN DIRECT 1.1682 0.2544 0.1931*** 
GEOGRAPHIC 
CONCENTRATION 0.4450 0.0969 0.1966** 
SPECIALIZATION -0.2916 -0.0635 0.2266 
REINS -0.1780 -0.0388 0.2239 
GROWTH -0.0320 -0.0070 0.0134** 
GROUP -0.0661 -0.0144 0.1751 
TAX 0.0629 0.0137 0.1641 
SMOOTH -0.0120 -0.0026 0.0056** 
RBCClose -0.7963 -0.1734 0.2963*** 
NPW (X108) -0.0212 -0.0046 0.0103** 
Y95 0.5049 0.1100 0.2989* 
Y96 -0.4130 -0.0899 0.3169 
Y97 -0.5259 -0.1145 0.2736* 
Y98 -0.9451 -0.2058 0.2703*** 
Y99 -0.9109 -0.1984 0.2714*** 
Y00 -1.3513 -0.2943 0.2729*** 
Y01 -1.6043 -0.3494 0.2761*** 
Likelihood Ratio Test      
Chi-Square        182.1639 
Pr > ChiSq <.0001 
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 LOGISTIC REGRESSION OF OVER 
 
As discussed above, we hypothesize that physician-directed medical 
malpractice insurers are more likely to over-reserve than are non-physician-
directed insurers. Therefore, our primary variable of interest is Physician 
Direct, and results are consistent with our hypothesis that these insurers 
tend to be more conservative than others. As can be seen from the table, the 
marginal effect for Physician Direct is 0.2544, which suggests that a firm 
that is physician directed is 25.44% more likely to over reserve than a firm 
that is non-physician-directed. We had anticipated that more geographically 
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concentrated and specialized insurers also would tend to over-reserve to 
account for the greater risk associated with such lack of diversification, but 
only geographic concentration appears statistically significant.  
As anticipated, fast-growing insurers are less likely to over-reserve 
than are their counterparts. We consider the results on growth to offer 
regulators and rating agencies additional reason to pay close attention when 
medical malpractice insurers show rapid growth.38 
According to income-smoothing theory, if a firm’s current year’s 
earnings are higher than target earnings, it tends to over reserve. The 
negative coefficient on Smooth suggests the other way around. In other 
words, our results do not support the income-smoothing theory. 
We further observe that insurers with RBC ratios close to the 
benchmark for regulatory attention are less likely to over reserve. This 
result is consistent with the literature on reserve management for limiting 
regulatory scrutiny. We also find that size, as measured by net premiums 
written (NPW) is statistically significant in the direction anticipating, 
allowing insurers to take on more risk as the firm grows in size. 
                                                                                                                 
38 These results support those of Harrington, et al., supra note 17, at 169. 
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Table 6: Logistic Regression of UNDER (N = 1142)
Variable Estimate 
Marginal 
Effects 
Standard 
Error 
Intercept -0.9800  0.2940 
PHYSICIAN DIRECT -1.1643 -0.2556 0.1907*** 
GEOGRAPHIC 
CONCENTRATION -0.5097 -0.1119 0.1988** 
SPECIALIZATION 0.2573 0.0565 0.2248 
GROWTH  0.0322 0.0071 0.0133** 
GROUP 0.1530 0.0336 0.1800 
TAX -0.1090 -0.0239 0.1659 
SMOOTH 0.0123 0.0027 0.0056** 
RBCLow 0.4694 0.1031 0.2841 
RBCClose 0.8606 0.1889 0.2997*** 
NPW (X108) 0.0198 0.0043 0.0102* 
Y95 -0.5020 -0.1102 0.2994* 
Y96 0.4310 0.0946 0.3162 
Y97 0.5405 0.1187 0.2738** 
Y98 0.9563 0.2100 0.2706*** 
Y99 0.9000 0.1976 0.2708*** 
Y00 1.3561 0.2977 0.2730*** 
Y01 1.6190 0.3554 0.2765*** 
Likelihood Ratio Test      
Chi-Square        182.8377 
Pr > ChiSq <.0001 
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
 
 LOGISTIC REGRESSION OF UNDER 
 
As already noted, we hypothesize that physician-directed insurers are 
more conservative than are non-physician directed insurers and therefore 
will be less likely to under-reserve. Our variable of interest, therefore, 
remains Physician Direct and here too we see a statistically significant 
relationship between ownership form and reserving practices. In this case, 
there is a negative relationship, consistent with our hypothesis of 
conservative behavior on the part of physician-directed insurers. 
Geographic concentration and business line specialization again are 
included in the analysis to measure superior knowledge of the underlying 
risk, which we anticipate will be negatively related to under-reserving 
practices. As with over-reserving, geographic concentration supports our 
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hypothesis. Specialized insurers, however, show no difference to more 
diverse insurers.  
Consistent with expectations, rapidly growing insurers are more likely 
to under-reserve than are others. As above, this result offers reason for 
regulators and rating agencies to give special scrutiny to high-growth 
insurers. Firms with RBC ratios “close to” regulatory attention also are 
more likely to under-reserve, as we had anticipated. They might be 
attempting to avoid regulatory scrutiny; or perhaps they are already in poor 
financial condition. Firms with low RBC ratios, however, do not show a 
statistically significant tendency to under-reserve more than do others. We 
had anticipated a stronger relationship with this factor. We could be 
picking up unusual results from firms in significantly poor financial 
position. In the analysis of the likelihood of under-reserving, we also find 
that smoothing again has the opposite sign from anticipated, in this case 
showing a positive relationship between smoothing and the likelihood of 
under-reserving. 
 
OLS REGRESSION OF THE LOGARITHM OF THE ABSOLUTE  
VALUE OF ERRORS/ASSETS 
 
We hypothesize that physician-directed insurers are more conservative 
than others and that they have superior knowledge compared with others. 
While this leads to expectations of greater likelihood of over-reserving and 
lesser likelihood of under-reserving, we also anticipate more overall 
accuracy in reserving, based on superior knowledge. To test this 
hypothesis, we conduct OLS analyses on the logged relative size of error 
independently for both those firms that over reserve, and those firms that 
under-reserve. Results, shown in Table 7 for firms that over reserve, and in 
Table 8 for those that under-reserve, are consistent with our hypotheses for 
under-reserving, but show no statistical difference in the OLS on firms that 
over-reserve.  Geographic concentration shows the same pattern. Both 
factors, therefore, can be said to be related to somewhat conservative, but 
mostly stable reserving practices. 
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Table 7: OLS Regression of LOG (ABSPERROR/ASSETS) (N = 740) – 
Sample Positive 
Variable Estimate Standard Error 
Intercept -5.4994 0.2140 
PHYSICIAN DIRECT 0.1212 0.1401 
GEOGRAPHIC CONCENTRATION 0.0242 0.1463 
SPECIALIZATION 3.2896 0.1889*** 
GROUP  -0.5327 0.1273*** 
TAX 0.8225 0.1565*** 
SMOOTH -0.0004 0.0035 
NPW (X108) -0.0058 0.0104 
Y95 -0.2019 0.1816 
Y96 -0.3853 0.2238* 
Y97 -0.3659 0.1957* 
Y98 -0.5847 0.2053*** 
Y99 -0.7869 0.2058*** 
Y00 -0.6907 0.2204*** 
Y01 -0.6587 0.2306*** 
F-Value 93.91     
Pr>F <.0001 
Adjusted R-square 0.6377 
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 
Specialized insurers, however, demonstrate less accuracy in their 
reserve errors, showing larger errors in both samples of over- and under-
reserving insurers. Having already accounted for an insurer’s status as 
physician directed or not, a specialized insurer seems to have some 
disadvantage. We note that specialization did not show significance in the 
likelihood of over- (under-) reserving. 
The extent of growth appears unrelated to an insurer’s  accuracy 
regarding reserving, somewhat contrary to our expectations. Insurers with 
greater opportunities for tax deferral do seem to over-estimate reserves by 
larger amounts, consistent with our hypothesis. 
We did not find the variable of Group to be significant in the likelihood 
of over (under) reserving. However, our results show that in both samples 
of over- and under-reserving insurers, firms that belong to a group report 
smaller absolute value of reserve errors, contrary to our expectation that 
such firms may be less accurate in their reserving practice.  
For firms that under reserved, those that have RBC ratio below 2 report 
larger reserve errors, a result consistent with our hypothesis that firms in 
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financial difficulty tend to under reserve more in order to appear stronger to 
avoid regulatory actions. We have also found that larger size firms in terms 
of net premiums written are able to take more risks, as evidenced by their 
larger reserve errors. 
 
Table 8: OLS Regression of LOG (ABSPERROR/ASSETS) (N=402) – Sample 
Negative
Variable Estimate Standard Error 
Intercept -5.4448 0.3693 
PHYSICIAN DIRECT -0.6216 0.2400** 
GEOGRAPHIC CONCENTRATION -0.5180 0.2555** 
SPECIALIZATION 3.0095 0.2509*** 
GROWTH  -0.0050 0.0103 
GROUP -0.7605 0.2247*** 
SMOOTH 0.0075 0.0096 
RBCLow 1.0173 0.3457*** 
NPW (X108) 0.0248 0.0098** 
Y95 -0.0111 0.4220 
Y96 -0.3110 0.4275 
Y97 0.1819 0.3665 
Y98 0.7176 0.3499** 
Y99 1.0300 0.3507*** 
Y00 0.8737 0.3427** 
Y01 0.6058 0.3388* 
F-Value 21.26 
Pr>F <.0001 
Adjusted R-square 0.4311 
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 
CONCLUSION  
 
Dramatic market structure changes have occurred in the medical 
malpractice insurance market in response to the high cost of medical 
malpractice insurance and the shrinking supply of carriers. Many health 
care providers have formed their own companies to offer malpractice 
coverage. Given that physician-directed firms are likely to have different 
organizational goals than traditional insurers, their loss reserving practices 
are likely to differ as well.  
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We test the hypothesis that physician-directed medical malpractice 
insurers differ in their loss reserving practices, using the NAIC data base 
for the years 1994-2006. Our results show consistent differences between 
physician-directed and non-physician-directed medical malpractice 
insurers. Those which are closely aligned with physicians appear to be 
more conservative and more accurate in their reserving practices. We 
therefore encourage rating agencies and regulators to consider the positive 
influence of these insurers in evaluating their risk profile.  
We also note the importance of rapid premium growth on reserve 
errors. As Harrington, Danzon and Epstein39 already indicated, market 
problems may be due at least in part to insurers who are making poor 
underwriting decisions, thereby growing too rapidly and causing market 
dislocations. Whether these are pure mistakes or intentional decisions is not 
discernable from our analysis, but deserves additional investigation. 
                                                                                                                 
39 Id. at 168-169  
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APPENDIX: REGRESSION RESULTS USING FULL SET OF  
VARIABLES IN ALL EQUATIONS 
 
Logistic Regression of OVER (N = 1142)
Variable Estimate Marginal Effects 
Standard 
Error 
Intercept 1.0545  0.3149 
PHYSICIAN DIRECT 1.1564 0.2522 0.1932*** 
GEOGRAPHIC CONCENTRATION 0.4953 0.1080 0.2001** 
SPECIALIZATION -0.2885 -0.0629 0.2270 
REINS -0.1317 -0.0287 0.2252 
GROWTH -0.0319 -0.0070 0.0133** 
GROUP -0.1422 -0.0310 0.1825 
TAX 0.0973 0.0212 0.1679 
SMOOTH -0.0120 -0.0026 0.0056** 
RBCLow -0.4442 -0.0969 0.2867 
RBCClose -0.8541 -0.1863 0.2998*** 
NPW (X108) -0.0207 -0.0045 0.0103** 
Y95 0.5045 0.1100 0.2994* 
Y96 -0.4202 -0.0916 0.3168 
Y97 -0.5354 -0.1168 0.2739* 
Y98 -0.9537 -0.2080 0.2707*** 
Y99 -0.9090 -0.1983 0.2716*** 
Y00 -1.3491 -0.2942 0.2732*** 
Y01 -1.6133 -0.3519 0.2766*** 
Likelihood Ratio Test      
Chi-Square        184.5209 
Pr > ChiSq <.0001 
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
(Note: We do not show the results for UNDER because they are just 
the opposite of those of OVER, given that we are using the identical set of 
variables in these two analyses. In other words, for each variable, the 
absolute value of the coefficient is still the same, but the sign is just the 
opposite.) 
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OLS Regression of LOG (ABSPERROR/ASSETS) (N = 740) – Sample Positive 
Variable Estimate Standard Error 
Intercept -5.4430 0.2172 
PHYSICIAN DIRECT 0.1041 0.1409 
GEOGRAPHIC CONCENTRATION 0.0513 0.1478 
SPECIALIZATION 3.2762 0.1903*** 
REINS 0.0000 0.0079 
GROWTH -0.0052 0.0102 
GROUP -0.5883 0.1317*** 
TAX 0.8612 0.1583*** 
SMOOTH -0.0003 0.0035 
RBCLow -0.3588 0.2202 
RBCClose -0.1833 0.2557 
NPW (X108) -0.0057 0.0104 
Y95 -0.2012 0.1819 
Y96 -0.3911 0.2240* 
Y97 -0.3718 0.1958* 
Y98 -0.5965 0.2056*** 
Y99 -0.7842 0.2073 
Y00 -0.6872 0.2205*** 
Y01 -0.6578 0.2307*** 
F-Value 73.14 
Pr>F <.0001 
Adjusted R-square 0.6373 
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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OLS Regression of LOG (ABSPERROR/ASSETS) (N=402) – Sample 
Negative 
Variable Estimate Standard Error 
Intercept -5.3772 0.3850 
PHYSICIAN DIRECT -0.6245 0.2427** 
GEOGRAPHIC CONCENTRATION -0.5540 0.2558** 
SPECIALIZATION 2.8556 0.2625*** 
REINS -0.1105 0.2860 
GROWTH -0.0042 0.0103 
GROUP -0.7647 0.2276*** 
TAX 0.2896 0.1732 
SMOOTH 0.0080 0.0096 
RBCLow 1.0039 0.3536*** 
RBCClose 0.1080 0.3341 
NPW (X108) 0.0241 0.0099** 
Y95 -0.0051 0.4219 
Y96 -0.2780 0.4280 
Y97 0.1867 0.3678 
Y98 0.7024 0.3518** 
Y99 1.0000 0.3525*** 
Y00 0.8536 0.3428** 
Y01 0.6275 0.3389* 
F-Value 18.01 
Pr>F <.0001 
Adjusted R-square 0.4330 
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
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ABSTRACT 
  
This article discusses state constitutional problems with the 2002 
Supreme Court decision Rush Prudential HMO v. Moran, which gave the 
power to determine medical services for health organizations not 
preempted by ERISA to an external review entity. Procedural fairness 
issues abound in the procedural impacts of the decision, especially when 
requirements set out in state constitutions are considered. External review 
laws of this nature are perhaps constitutionally infirm, but judicial review 
and ERISA preemption may counter such negative impacts. The article 
extensively discusses state external reviews laws and their categorization 
among the larger questions of appealability and their binding nature. While 
many states have “open courts” provisions in their constitutions, as well as 
embracing a separation of powers doctrine, the decision in question still 
presents concerns. The recent Hawaii Management case seemingly adds to 
the confusion, since judicial review should not be allowed for the external 
review in order to avoid preemption, but not allowing so may violate 
constitutional separation of powers issues. The ultimate decision as to this 
clash may be to either accept the current dichotomy under Rush or to push 
for a system of mandated benefits to avoid the issue altogether.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In Rush Prudential HMO v. Moran,1 the United States Supreme Court 
determined, in a five-to-four decision, that an Illinois law giving an 
external review entity the power to determine the medical necessity of 
services for a health maintenance organization subscriber was not 
preempted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA),2 on 
the grounds that it did not provide an alternative remedy to those exclusive 
remedies set forth in ERISA. When considered in contemplation of state 
constitutional doctrines of separation of powers and of open access to 
courts, that decision gives rise to a major legal conundrum.  
One scholar has identified a fundamental problem with the Rush result 
– that an external review process including rights to judicial appeal in state 
courts may not be preempted, but those without such rights, while not 
preempted, are lacking in procedural fairness - as follows: 
 
[O]ne ironic consequence of the Court’s finding that external 
review systems are not a form of remedy could be to insulate 
them from due process review. The more distant a mechanism is 
from the basic adjudicatory function, the less likely it will be 
scrutinized for procedural fairness, the very motivation for 
external review laws in the first place. Conversely, the presence 
of a more fully developed set of procedures within an external 
review system makes ERISA preemption more likely. 
 
The first signal of weakness created by stronger procedural protections 
for patients came in Hawaii Management Alliance Ass’n v. Insurance 
Commissioner, in which the Hawaii Supreme Court held that ERISA 
preempted that state’s external review law because it “too closely 
resemble[d] adjudication.” In distinguishing Moran, the Hawaii court 
found it “fatal” to that state’s system that it allowed judicial review of 
external review decisions, incorporated portions of the state’s 
Administrative Procedure Act, established procedural requirements for 
hearings, and provided for review by a three-member panel. Numerous 
                                                                                                                 
1  536 U.S. 355 (2002).  
2  Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 
(2008). 
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other state external review schemes include at least some of these same 
features. 3 
This article focuses on how procedural fairness is guaranteed under 
state constitutions and identifies a conundrum: if procedural fairness, with 
all the necessary constitutional safeguards, is provided for in an external 
review law, the law is probably preempted, while if such safeguards are not 
in place, the law is probably unconstitutional. It explains that some external 
review statutes appear to be susceptible to challenge under state 
constitutions as a violation of state separation of powers doctrines and 
constitutional access to courts provisions, because they delegate judicial 
authority to non-judicial entities without the opportunity for subsequent 
court review.  It further suggests that where the external review procedure 
is cloaked with appropriate due process (that is, where it allows for judicial 
review and hence does not violate those constitutional strictures), the 
process becomes an alternative remedy to ERISA and hence is preempted. 
That suggestion is given force by Hawaii Management Alliance 
Association v. Insurance Commissioner,4 which found that the availability 
of judicial review converts the external review process from a 
determination of medical necessity to a state-level adjudication of the 
appropriateness of claims processing under an ERISA plan, i.e., into the 
sort of alternative remedy prohibited under ERISA and the case law that 
has developed around it. 
In Part I below, I provide a brief description of the basis for the Rush 
decision and an overview of the dilemma it poses, i.e., an external review 
law which is not preempted may be constitutionally infirm, and an external 
review law that is not constitutionally infirm may be preempted by ERISA. 
In Part II, I describe external review laws with a focus on the finality of the 
external review decision, noting five categories of such laws: (a) those that 
are binding on the insurer but not the insured with no right of appeal; (b) 
those that are binding on both the insurer and the insured with no right of 
appeal; (c) those that allow for judicial review but still require compliance 
with the decision; (d) those that provide for full judicial review before the 
decision is effective; and (e) those few that fit none of those categories. In 
Part III, I address state constitutional provisions assuring access to courts 
and state separation of powers doctrines, particularly with respect to 
                                                                                                                 
3  Nan D. Hunter, Managed Process, Due Care: Structures of Accountability in 
Health Care, 6 YALE J. HEALTH  POL’Y, L. & ETHICS  93, 127-28 (2006). 
4  See Haw. Mgmt. Alliance Ass’n v. Ins. Comm’r, 100 P.3d 952, 958, 965-967 
(Haw. 2004), discussed infra at 112-118. 
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binding arbitration and to the few cases that have raised constitutional 
concerns about external review laws. I suggest that lack of judicial review 
is constitutionally fatal to external review laws that purport to be binding. 
In Part IV, I more fully describe the potential for ERISA preemption when 
a state external review law authorizes judicial review, discussing the post-
Rush case from Hawaii that specifically addressed that issue. I suggest that 
the availability of judicial review results in preemption of external review 
laws. In Part V, I briefly discuss policy choices that might be adopted in the 
wake of this conundrum.  
 
PART I. OVERVIEW – THE RUSH DECISION AND THE 
RESULTING CONUNDRUM 
 
ERISA preempts any state law creating an alternative remedy that 
duplicates, supplements or supplants ERISA’s exclusive remedial scheme.5 
The concern in Rush was whether the Illinois law created such an 
alternative remedy. The Supreme Court’s conclusion that it did not 
observed that the determination by the reviewing physician was “similar to 
the submission to a second physician, which many health insurers are 
required by law to provide before denying coverage.”6 The Court 
analogized the state law to mandated benefit laws, a law simply calling for 
inclusion of an additional contract term.7 The law is well-settled that a state 
may require specific benefits in an insurance contract, and that such 
requirement will be saved from preemption under ERISA by virtue of the 
                                                                                                                 
5  Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 54 (1987).  
6  Rush, 536 U.S. at 383. It is worth noting that the Court wholly misconstrues the 
nature of the laws relating to second opinions to which it cites in its footnote to the above 
quotation. For example, CAL. INS. CODE § 10123.68 (West 2005) simply requires an insurer 
to pay for a second opinion if requested by the insured when the insured questions the 
medical necessity of a service or the plan of care, a circumstance entirely the reverse of one 
in which the insurer questions the medical necessity of a service; IND. CODE ANN. § 27-13-
37-5 (LexisNexis 1999) calls for payment for a second opinion without elaboration; N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 17B: 26-2.3 (West 2006) requires an insurer to pay for a second opinion for 
elective surgeries that would require an inpatient admission, as does R.I. GEN. LAWS §  27-
39-2 (2002) (both of which arguably are aimed at the same consideration as the California 
statute). In each of these cases, it is not the proposed service that must be covered but rather 
the second opinion, and clearly the statutes are aimed at having an insurer pay for second 
opinions that might avoid the need for the service proposed, not call for coverage of the 
service proposed. The Oklahoma statute cited, OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 365:10-5-4, is simply 
incomprehensible, authorizing exclusion of “cost containment,” with a list following that 
includes second opinions.  
7  Rush, 536 U.S. at 386. 
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“savings clause” which saves from preemption laws regulating insurance.8 
Although even a law that regulates insurance and would appear on its face 
to be saved from preemption would still be preempted under the broader 
sweep of ERISA preemption of alternative remedies, the Court’s view of 
the Illinois law was that it provided the beneficiary nothing more than 
benefits for services under a health plan.9 That is, the Court concluded that 
the statute did not constitute an alternative remedial scheme to that of 
ERISA, providing the beneficiary no different remedial result than the 
beneficiary might obtain in an action for benefits brought under ERISA. A 
remedy of that kind, the Court seemed to suggest, was substantively 
different from other alternative remedial schemes it had condemned, such 
as claims asserting tortious breach of contract,10 wrongful discharge11 and 
emotional distress and punitive damages.12 
The Rush result is bothersome for many reasons, not the least of which 
is that it creates a lack of symmetry in terms of rights of the health plan 
(more specifically, the insurer of the health plan) and of the insured. In 
effect, if the independent physician determined the service was not 
medically necessary, the beneficiary would still have the right under 
ERISA to seek equitable relief in federal court,13 while if the independent 
physician determined the service was medically necessary, the HMO would 
have no further avenue of relief. In essence, the independent reviewer acts 
as a court of last resort when deciding adversely to the HMO. 
The simile of the independent reviewer acting as a court is well-taken, 
for many of the state laws calling for external review of the medical 
necessity determinations of a health insurer, managed care organization, or 
health maintenance organization explicitly provide that the decisions of 
such an external reviewer are binding on the insurer, and some purport to 
be binding on the insurer and the insured. Although some such laws 
describing external review decisions as binding also appear to contemplate 
appeal or even separate federal (i.e., ERISA) actions, several of those laws 
provide that an appeal does not stay the implementation of the external 
                                                                                                                 
8  Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 732-36 (1985). 
9  Id. at 724. 
10  Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 54 (1987). 
11  See Ingersoll-Rand v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133 (1990). 
12  See Mass. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134 (1985). 
13  See Reply Brief for the Petitioner at 6,  Rush Prudential HMO v. Moran, 536 U.S. 
355 (2002) (No. 00-1021) . The Petitioner argued, “[U]nder respondents’ theory, they would 
even be entitled to two bites of the apple: if a claim is denied by the Section 4-10 reviewer, a 
beneficiary could file an ERISA action seeking the same benefits.” Id. 
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review decision. The binding nature of such decisions, when made by a 
private entity or adopted as an order of a regulatory agency, raises state 
constitutional questions specifically relating to separation of powers 
doctrines and (at least in a majority of states) an intertwined concept, the 
constitutional right of access to courts.14  
In addition, where separation of powers or other state constitutional 
concerns are not an issue – where appellate review by a court of the 
determination with respect to a particular service exists – a peculiar 
conundrum is created by the concepts in Rush: the very existence of 
constitutionally-acceptable state-level appeal mechanisms seems to make 
clear that such external review laws are not analogous to a second opinion, 
that they do something more than incorporate an additional contract term 
saved from preemption in insurance contracts. Rather, they arguably create 
mechanisms providing for judicial relief at a state level that duplicates, 
supplements, or supplants the exclusive remedies under ERISA. That is, if 
the course of appeal of an external review decision runs through state 
courts, it would appear to displace use of a 29 U.S.C. 1132(a) claim as the 
“exclusive vehicle for actions by ERISA-plan participants and beneficiaries 
asserting improper processing of a claim for benefits.”15  
The concern, then, is that separation of powers doctrines / “open 
courts” concepts and the Rush decision create a “Catch-22”.16 Simply put, 
                                                                                                                 
14  It is at least arguable, as well, that such laws raise state constitutional questions 
about a right to trial by jury. Martin H. Redish, Legislative Response to the Medical 
Malpractice Insurance Crisis: Constitutional Implications, 55 TEX. L. REV. 759, 797 (1977) 
identifies that 48 states provide for a right to trial by jury. The analysis of whether a right to 
a jury trial exists usually begins with the question of whether such a right was cognizable 
with respect to a claim of the nature at issue under common law at the time the state’s 
constitution was adopted. See, e.g., Smith v. Printup, 866 P.2d 985, 993 (Kan. 1993). 
Although actions under ERISA are characterized as equitable actions, “[C]ases involving 
ERISA benefits are inherently equitable in nature, and not contractual, and…no right to jury 
trial attaches to such claims,” from the perspective of a state-level challenge to denials of 
claims under an insurance contract, they more closely resemble simple contract actions for 
damages yielding a right to a jury trial. Tischmann v. ITT/Sheraton Corp., 145 F.3d 561, 
568 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting DeFelice v. Am. Int’l Life Assurance Co. of N.Y., 112 F.3d 61, 
64 (2d Cir. 1997). 
15  Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 52 (1987). 
16  JOSEPH HELLER, CATCH-22 (1955).The title of Joseph Heller’s novel, Catch-22, 
has become a commonplace way of describing a bifurcated choice system in which neither 
solution yields the result desired.  In the novel, it is captured by this exchange:  
 
There was only one catch and that was Catch-22, 
which specified that a concern for one’s safety in the face 
of dangers that were real and immediate was the process of 
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if the external review law is saved from preemption per Rush, it most likely 
violates the state constitution, and if it does not violate the state 
constitution, it most likely is not saved from preemption.  
 
PART II. EXTERNAL REVIEW LAWS 
 
Health insurers, including health maintenance organizations, typically 
include within their contracts exclusions of services that are not medically 
necessary or that are experimental or investigational. The obvious reason 
for such exclusions is to avoid paying for services that provide no medical 
value, or for services for which the medical value has not yet been 
demonstrated.17 Because someone has to determine what constitutes 
medical necessity, such exclusions have been a source of continuing 
litigation between insurers and their insureds, and challenges to those 
exclusions have resulted in insurers adopting increasingly complex 
definitions of “medical necessity,” “experimental,” and “investigational.”18 
In spite of the efforts of insurers to develop ironclad ways to insulate 
themselves from challenges as to the criteria they use for determining 
medical necessity, there remains concern about the propriety of insurers 
reserving such judgment to themselves, even when the judgmental criteria 
contained within the insurance contract is elaborate. Those concerns are 
prompted both by recognition that by denying benefits, the insurer’s 
financial position is enhanced and by the sense that what services are 
needed should be left solely in the hands of the treating physician. The two 
concerns are necessarily intertwined – that financial motives are the cause 
of insurers looking over the doctor’s shoulder, second-guessing the 
                                                                                                                          
a rational mind. Orr was crazy and could be grounded. All 
he had to do was ask; and as soon as he did, he would no 
longer be crazy and would have to fly more missions. Orr 
would be crazy to fly more missions and sane if he didn’t, 
but if he was sane he had to fly them. If he flew them he 
was crazy and didn’t have to; but if he didn’t want to he 
was sane and had to. Yossarian was moved very deeply by 
the absolute simplicity of this clause of Catch-22 and let 
out a respectful whistle. ‘That’s some catch, that Catch-22,’ 
Yossarian observed. ‘It’s the best there is,’ Doc Daneeka 
agreed. Id. at 52. 
17  See, e.g., Louis S. Reed, Private Health Insurance in the United States: An 
Overview, 28 SOC. SEC. BULL. 3, 7 (1965). 
18  See Mark A. Hall & Gerard F. Anderson, Health Insurers’ Assessment of Medical 
Necessity, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1637, 1639, 1645-1647, 1662-1666 (1991-1992). 
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appropriate course of treatment, and interfering with the physician’s 
delivery of needed, and the patient’s receipt of desired, medical services.  
Those concerns have led many states to adopt laws requiring that when 
an insurer denies a claim based on lack of medical necessity or on the 
service being experimental or investigational, the insured has the right to 
external review by an independent review organization, usually specifying 
the composition of such an entity and requiring that reviews be conducted 
by qualified physicians. The counts of such laws vary – the petitioners in 
Rush assert that thirty-seven states and the District of Columbia had 
enacted such laws as of 2000,19 while another source asserts that forty-two 
states and the District of Columbia had enacted external review laws as of 
2002.20 Some such laws call for the independent review organization to be 
selected by an insurance commissioner, and others provide for qualified 
                                                                                                                 
19  Brief for the Petitioner at 8, Rush Prudential HMO v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355 (2002) 
(No. 00-1021).   
20  Lindsey G. Churchill, Comment, Rush Prudential HMO v. Moran: Federal 
Intervention Looms as Supreme Court Rules That ERISA Does Not Preempt State Laws 
Requiring Independent Review of Medical Necessity Decisions and Lays Groundwork for 
Different Independent Review Provisions From All Fifty States, 19 GA. ST. U. L. REV.535, 
536 (2002). See: ALASKA STAT. § 21.07.050 (2006), ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-2533 
(2002), CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §1374.30 (West 2005), CAL. INS. CODE § 10169.1 
(West 2008), COLO. REV. STAT.  § 10-16-113.5 (2007), CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a226c (West 
2007), 18 DEL. CODE ANN. §§ 332, 6416 (1999), D.C. CODE ANN. § 44-301.07 (LexisNexis 
2006), FLA. STAT. ANN. § 641.511 (West 2005), FLA. STAT. ANN. § 408.7056 (West 2002), 
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 33-20A-31, 33-20A-40 (LexisNexis 2003), HAW. REV. STAT. § 432E-1 
(2005), 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 125/4-10 (West 2000), IND. CODE ANN. §§ 27-8-29-12, 27-
13-10.1-1 (LexisNexis 1999), IOWA CODE ANN. § 514J.1 (West 2007), KAN. STAT. ANN. § 
40-22a13 (2000), KEN. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 304.17A-600, 304-17A-623 (West 2006), LA. 
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 22.3070, 22:3080 (2004), ME. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4301-A (2000), MD. 
CODE ANN. INS. § 15-10A-05 (LexisNexis 2006), MASS. GEN. LAW ANN. ch.  176O § 14 
(West 1998), MICH. COMP. LAWS  SERV. § 62Q.73 (LexisNexis 2001), MINN. STAT. ANN. § 
550.1903 (West 2005), MO. ANN. STAT. § 376.1387 (West 2002), MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-
37-201 (2008), N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 420-J:3 (LexisNexis 2004), N.J. STAT. § 26:2S-12 
(West 2007), N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59A-57-4 (2007), N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4910 
(McKinney 2002), N. C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §58-50-80 (2002), OHIO REV. CODE § 1751.84 
(LexisNexis 2004), OKLA. STAT. TIT. 63, § 2528.6 (2004), OR. REV. STAT. § 743.859 (2007), 
40 PA. STAT. § 991.2162 (West 1999), R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-17.12-10 (2001), S.C. CODE 
ANN. § 38-17-1920 (2002), TENN. CODE. ANN. § 56-32210 (2000), TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 
4201.401 (Vernon Supp. 2008), UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-22-629 (2005), VT. STAT. TIT. 8, § 
4089F (2001), VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-5900 (2007), WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 48.43.535 
(West 2008), W. VA. CODE ANN. § 33-25C-3 (LexisNexis 2006), WIS. STAT. ANN. § 632.835 
(West 2004). 
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organizations to bid for the right to perform such external reviews.21 In any 
event, the reviewing entity is almost uniformly a nongovernmental entity, 
although some have a regulatory official entering an order based on the 
review entity’s conclusions.22  
The various external review laws differ in multiple ways, including at 
least one salient aspect: the finality of a determination by the external 
review organization. Some make clear that both the insurer and the insured 
have recourse to remedies through the courts, some purport to make the 
decision of the external review entity binding on both the insurer and the 
insured without recourse to appeal or other legal remedy, and some make 
the decision binding on the insurer but give the insured the right to pursue 
legal remedies. 
To the extent that some of these statutes create binding results without 
the capacity to seek legal redress, they raise two interrelated state 
constitutional questions: whether the statutes unconstitutionally eliminate a 
right to access to courts for redress of grievances and whether such statutes 
unconstitutionally confer judicial authority on the executive branch or on 
private entities, i.e., whether they violate state separation of powers 
doctrines. 
 
A TAXONOMY OF THE BINDING EFFECT OF EXTERNAL 
REVIEW LAWS 
 
External review laws vary widely in the extent to which they purport to 
make the results of the independent review binding. There are essentially 
four main types of laws, with a few additional variations: 
 
1. Type 1 laws23 indicate they are binding on the insurer, but 
not on the insured, and provide no suggestion of potential court 
review following the decision of the independent review 
organization. 
2. Type 2 laws indicate they are binding on both the insurer 
and the insured, and offer no indication of further court review.  
3. Type 3 laws either explicitly or implicitly anticipate 
additional court review (generally treating the decision of the 
                                                                                                                 
21  See generally Wendy K. Mariner, Independent External Review of Health 
Maintenance Organizations’ Medical-Necessity Decisions, 347 NEW. ENG. J. MED. 2178 
(2002). 
22  Id. 
23  A term used herein solely for convenience. 
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independent review organization as an agency decision and 
following the state’s administrative procedures act), but provide 
that notwithstanding any such court review, the decision of the 
external reviewer must be implemented. 
4. Type 4 laws expressly provide for court review. 
5. There are other statutes that simply do not address the 
effect of external review or are otherwise unclear.  
 
 TYPE 1 LAWS 
 
As noted above, some external review laws purport to make the 
decision of an external review entity binding on the insurer, but not on the 
insured. New Hampshire has a typical such statute, providing: 
The external review decision of the independent review organization 
shall be binding on the health carrier and shall be enforceable by the 
commissioner [of insurance] pursuant to the penalty provisions of RSA 
420-J:14. The external review decision of the independent review 
organization shall be binding on the covered person except to the extent the 
covered person has other remedies available under federal or state law. The 
external review process shall not be considered an adjudicative proceeding 
within the meaning of RSA 541-A [the law providing for judicial review of 
administrative proceedings], and the external review decision of the 
independent review organization shall not be subject to rehearing and 
appeal pursuant to RSA 541.24 
Apparently of similar effect, but less explicit, is the Kentucky external 
review statute: 
 
(9)  The decision of the independent review entity shall 
be binding on the insurer with respect to that covered person. 
Failure of the insurer to provide coverage as required by the 
independent review entity shall: 
(a)  Be a violation of the insurance code of a nature to 
warrant the executive director revoking or suspending the 
insurer’s license or certificate of authority; and  
(b)  Constitute an unfair claims settlement practice as set 
forth in KRS 304.12-230.25 
 
                                                                                                                 
24  N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 420-J: 5-e (LexisNexis 2008).  
25  KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.17A-625 (West 2006).  
2008] “SEZ WHO?” 95 
 
Iowa’s external review law is explicit about the lack of symmetry in 
terms of insurer and insured rights to court review:  
 
1. The review decision by the independent review entity 
conducting the review is binding upon the carrier or organized 
delivery system. The external review process shall not be 
considered a contested case under chapter 17A, the Iowa 
administrative procedure act. 
2. The enrollee or the enrollee’s treating health care provider 
acting on behalf of the enrollee may appeal the review decision by 
the independent review entity conducting the review by filing a 
petition for judicial court either in Polk county district court or in 
the district court in the county in which the enrollee resides... The 
petition for judicial review must be filed within fifteen business 
days after the issuance of the review decision. The petition shall 
name the enrollee or the enrollee’s treating health care provider as 
the petitioner. The respondent shall be the carrier or the organized 
delivery system. The petition shall not name the independent 
review entity as a party. The commissioner shall not be named as a 
respondent unless the petitioner alleges action or inaction by the 
commissioner under the standards articulated in section 17A.19, 
subsection 10. Allegations against the commissioner under section 
17A.19, subsection 10, must be stated with particularity. The 
commissioner may, upon motion, intervene in the judicial review 
proceeding. The findings of fact by the independent review entity 
conducting the review are conclusive and binding on appeal.  
3. The carrier or organized delivery system shall follow and 
comply with the review decision of the independent review entity 
conducting the review, or the decision of the court on appeal. The 
carrier or organized delivery system and the enrollee’s treating 
health care provider shall not be subject to any penalties, sanctions, 
or awards of damages for following and complying in good faith 
with the review decision of the independent review entity 
conducting the review or decision of the court on appeal.  
4. The enrollee or the enrollee’s treating health care provider 
may bring an action in Polk county district court or in the district 
court in which the enrollee resides to enforce the review decision 
96 CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 15:1 
 
of the independent review entity conducting the review or the 
decision of the court on appeal.26 
 
The Illinois law at issue in Rush was not typical of these external 
review laws, in that it does not refer to external review but rather uses in its 
title the phrase, adopted by the majority of the Supreme Court, “second 
opinion”; nonetheless, it falls into this first category: 
 
§ 4-10. (a) Medical Necessity – Dispute Resolution – 
Independent Second Opinion. Each Health Maintenance 
Organization shall provide a mechanism for the timely review by a 
physician holding the same class of license as the primary care 
physician, who is unaffiliated with the Health Maintenance 
Organization, jointly selected by the patient (or the patient’s next 
of kin or legal representative if the patient is unable to act for 
himself), primary care physician and the Health Maintenance 
Organization in the event of a dispute between the primary care 
physician and the Health Maintenance Organization regarding the 
medical necessity of a covered service proposed by a primary care 
physician. In the event that the reviewing physician determines the 
covered service to be medically necessary, the Health Maintenance 
Organization shall provide the covered service. Future contractual 
or employment action by the Health Maintenance Organization 
regarding the primary care physician shall not be based solely on 
the physician’s participation in this procedure.27  
 
California law states, “The Commissioner shall immediately adopt the 
determination of the independent medical review organization, and shall 
promptly issue a written decision to the parties that shall be binding on the 
insurer.”28 Likewise, the Georgia statute provides that “[a] decision of the 
independent review organization in favor of the eligible enrollee shall be 
final and binding on the managed care entity and the appropriate relief shall 
be provided without delay.”29 That statute goes on to reflect the 
asymmetrical position of the parties, contemplating appeal by the insured to 
court of a decision in favor of the managed care entity by providing, “A 
                                                                                                                 
26  IOWA CODE ANN. § 514J.13 (West 2007). 
27  215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 125/4-10 (West 2000 & Supp. 2008).  
28  CAL. INS. CODE § 10169.3 (West 2005). 
29  GA. CODE ANN. § 33-20A-37 (West 2003). 
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determination by the independent review organization in favor of the 
managed care entity shall create a rebuttal presumption in any subsequent 
action that the managed care entity’s prior determination was 
appropriate….”30 Indiana provides simply, “A determination made 
under […] this chapter is binding on the insurer,”31 and Maine, equally 
brief, states, “An external review decision is binding on the carrier.”32 
 
 TYPE 2 LAWS 
 
Some states make the results of external review binding on both the 
insurer and the insured without providing any mechanism for appeal. For 
example, Louisiana statutes provide: 
 
B.  An external review decision made pursuant to this 
Chapter shall be binding on the MNRO and on any health 
insurance issuer or health benefit plan that utilizes the MNRO for 
making medical necessity determinations. 
C.  An external review decision shall be binding on the 
covered person for purposes of determining coverage under a 
health benefit plan that requires a determination of medical 
necessity for a medical service to be covered.33 
 
                                                                                                                 
30  Id. § 33-20A-37(b); presumably the reason for making a decision in favor of the 
managed care entity a rebuttable presumption is to discourage appeal. 
31  IND. CODE ANN. § 27-8-29-16 (Supp 2007) (LexisNexis). 
32  ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A § 4312 (Supp. 2007). For other “Type 1” laws, see 
also N.Y. INS. LAW § 4914 (McKinney 2008) (“[The determination of the external appeal 
agent shall] be binding on the plan and the insured….”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-50-84 (2002) 
(“(a) An external review decision is binding on the insurer. (b) An external review decision 
is binding on the covered person except to the extent the covered person has other remedies 
available under applicable federal or state law.”); S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-71-1990 (2002) 
(“(A) An external review decision is binding on the health carrier. (B) An external review 
decision is binding on the covered person except to the extent the covered person has other 
remedies available under applicable federal or state law.”); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 4089f 
(Supp. 2007) (“The independent review organization shall issue to both parties a written 
review decision that is evidence-based. The decision shall be binding on the health benefit 
plan.”). But see Schulman v. Group Health Inc., 816 N.Y.S.2d 806, 807 (2006), (an insured 
may seek administrative review and judicial review of an external agent’s decision, despite a 
provision in the law describing the decision of an external review agent as binding on both 
the plan and the insured), aff’d 833 N.Y.S.2d 62 (2006); Nenno v. Blue Cross and Blue 
Shield of Western New York, 757 N.Y.S.2d 165, 167 (2003), aff’d 841 N.Y.S.2d 916 
(2007); Vellios v. IPRO, 764 N.Y.S.2d 568, 570, aff’d 765 N.Y.S.2d 222, 225 (2003).  
33  LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:3085 (2004). 
98 CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 15:1 
 
Massachusetts states the bilateral nature of the effect of the external 
review decision simply: “The decision of the review panel shall be binding. 
The superior court shall have jurisdiction to enforce the decision of the 
review panel.”34 Less succinct are statutes in Virginia and Washington. 
Virginia provides, “The Commissioner or his designee, based upon such 
recommendation [of the external review entity], shall issue a written ruling 
affirming, modifying, or reversing the final adverse decision within 10 
working days after his receipt of the recommendation of the impartial 
review entity….”35 Unlike the other statutes mentioned, rather than giving a 
private entity the power to issue a binding determination, this confers such 
power on a regulatory agency, but the statute makes clear that such a 
determination is not treated in the same fashion as an order from an agency 
appealable under the state’s statutes allowing for judicial review of 
administrative agency actions:  
 
Such written ruling shall not be construed as a final finding, 
order or judgment of the Commission, and shall be exempt from 
the application of the Administrative Process Act (§ 2.2-4000 et 
seq.). The written ruling of the Commissioner or his designee shall 
affirm the recommendations of the impartial health entity unless 
the Commissioner or his designee finds in his ruling that the 
impartial health entity exceeded its authority or acted arbitrarily or 
capriciously. The written ruling of the Commissioner or his 
designee shall bind the covered person and the utilization review 
entity to the extent to which each would have been obligated by a 
judgment entered in an action at law or in equity with respect to 
the issues which the impartial review entity may examine when 
reviewing a final adverse decision under this section.36 
 
Although opaque, Washington also appears to make external review 
binding on both parties without providing for appeal: “Carriers must timely 
implement the certified independent review organization’s determination 
and must pay the certified independent review organization’s charges.”37 
North Dakota provides simply, “A determination by the independent 
external reviewer is binding on the parties.”38   
                                                                                                                 
34  MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 176O § 14 (West Supp. 2008). 
35  VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-5902 (2007). 
36  Id. 
37  WASH. REV. CODE ANN, § 48.43.535 (West 2008). 
38  N.D.  CENT. CODE § 26.1-36-44 (2007).  
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 TYPE 3 LAWS 
 
Some states allow for judicial review of the decision of an independent 
review organization, but as a practical matter make that review moot by 
requiring compliance with the decision with respect to the enrollee. For 
example, Kansas statutes provide: 
 
The decision of the external review organization may be 
reviewed directly by the district court at the request of either the 
insured, insurer or health insurance plan. The review by the district 
court shall be de novo. The decision of the external review 
organization shall not preclude the insured, insurer or health 
insurance plan from exercising other available remedies under 
state or federal law. Seeking a review by the district court or any 
other available remedies exercised by the insured, insurer or health 
insurance plan after the decision of the external review 
organization will not stay the external review organization’s 
decision as to the payment or provision of services to be rendered 
during the pendency of the review by the insurer or the health 
plan. (emphasis added)39 
 
While Kansas law calls for adherence to the external review decision 
only during the pendency of an appeal, as a practical matter, if the decision 
called for coverage of a service, in all likelihood the service would be 
provided and paid for before any judicial decision could occur.  
Other states that expressly address judicial review are less coy about 
the effect of such an appeal. For instance, Arizona law provides in pertinent 
part: 
 
The decision by the independent review organization is a final 
administrative decision pursuant to title 41, chapter 6, article 10 
and, except as provided in § 41-1092.08, subsection H, is subject 
to judicial review pursuant to title 12, chapter 7, article 6. The 
health care insurer shall provide any service or pay any claim 
determined to be covered and medically necessary by the 
independent review organization for the case under review 
regardless of whether judicial review is sought.(emphasis 
                                                                                                                 
39  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-22a16 (2000). 
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added).40 
 
Delaware law is to similar effect: 
 
If the arbitrator makes a decision in favor of the carrier, that 
decision shall give rise to a rebuttable presumption to that effect in 
any subsequent action brought by or on behalf of the covered 
person with respect to the decision. Should the decision favor the 
covered person, the carrier shall have the right to appeal the matter 
to the Court, in accordance with Court rules. The outcome of that 
appeal, however, shall have no effect on the covered person, as to 
whom the decision of the arbitrator shall control. (emphasis 
added).41 
 
Likewise, Pennsylvania statutes indicate, “The managed care plan shall 
authorize any health care service or pay a claim determined to be medically 
necessary and appropriate [by an external review entity] whether or not an 
appeal to a court of competent jurisdiction has been filed.”42 
It is unclear why a health plan would appeal a decision by an 
independent reviewer that a service should be covered in cases such as 
these. Independent review organizations are clearly not courts of record; 
there would be no element of precedent, of stare decisis, in their decisions, 
and it would seem unlikely that adherence by a carrier to such decisions 
would be argued in other cases as a basis for estoppel or would form the 
basis for an assertion, when the carrier is resisting a similar claim in the 
future, of arbitrary decision-making. In addition, if the service has already 
been covered, the potential for a court dismissing an appeal as moot would 
seem to be very strong, especially given the relatively unique 
circumstances surrounding many cases of questionable medical necessity. 
The practical effect of this type of law, then, might be no different than 
laws described as Type 1 and 2.  
 
 TYPE 4 LAWS 
 
Some states expressly provide for judicial review of external review 
decisions without giving immediate effect to the decision. Michigan 
                                                                                                                 
40  ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-2537 (2002). 
41  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 332 (1999 & Supp. 2006). 
42  PA. STAT. ANN. § 991.2162 (West 1999). 
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provides a particular example: 
 
An external review decision and an expedited external review 
decision are the final administrative remedies available under this 
act. A person aggrieved by an external review decision or an 
expedited external review decision may seek judicial review no 
later than 60 days from the date of the decision in the circuit court 
for the county where the covered person resides or in the circuit 
court of Ingham county.43 
 
Some statutes are less explicit but of equal effect either by making the 
external review advisory only, allowing for alternative approaches to 
dispute resolution including litigation, or in providing for judicial review of 
external review decisions without giving effect to the decision. The District 
of Columbia provides, “The decision of the independent review 
organization shall be nonbinding on all parties and shall not affect any 
other legal causes of action.”44  
In several cases, the apparent capacity for judicial review or a separate 
contract action is only implicit. Some states provide that the external 
review decision forms a rebuttable presumption in any subsequent 
litigation, or otherwise provides for its admissibility, thereby implying the 
right to a judicial decision.45 Other state laws, while indicating the results 
of the external review are binding on the insurer and insured, provide that 
external review is not the only remedy available to the parties, indicating 
that external review does not eliminate other remedies under state or 
federal law, or specifically indicating that judicial review is available.46 
Several statutes do not speak to appealability or to the binding nature of an 
external review decision, but provide for the decision being an order of the 
insurance regulatory official;47 it seems reasonable to believe that such an 
                                                                                                                 
43  MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 550.1915 (LexisNexis Supp. 2008). 
44  D.C. CODE ANN. § 44301.07 (LexisNexis 2001 & Supp. 2006). 
45  See COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-16-113.5 (2007); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23.17.12-10 
(LexisNexis 2001 & Supp. 2007) (“The decision of the external appeal agency shall be 
binding; however, any person who is aggrieved by a final decision of the external appeal 
agency is entitled to judicial review in a court of competent jurisdiction.”). 
46  See UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-22-629 (Supp. 2005) (“Nothing in this section may 
be construed as….altering the legal rights of any party to seek court or other redress in 
connection with: (i) an adverse decision resulting from an independent review…”). 
47  See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 408.7056 (Supp. 2007) (after issuance of the review 
entity’s recommendation, the regulatory agency may adopt the recommendations or findings 
of fact as a proposed order) HAW. REV. STAT. § 432E-6 (2005) (the commissioner shall issue 
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order, like other orders of an administrative agency, would be appealable 
under the state’s laws regarding judicial review of administrative actions. 
New York, where the external review law states it is binding on the parties, 
has the most fully developed case law on the subject of appeal of external 
review decisions. Section 4914(b)(4)(A)(iv) of the New York Insurance 
Laws provides that the determination of an external appeal agent shall be 
“binding on the plan and the insured,” but part (v) that sections provides 
that the external appeal agent’s determination shall “be admissible in any 
court proceeding.”48 And, the statute introducing external review, section 
4907, provides that “[t]he rights and remedies conferred in this article upon 
insureds and health care providers shall be cumulative and in addition to 
and not in lieu of any other rights or remedies available under law.”49 
Based on this language, in three separate cases in which the effect of the 
“binding” reference was considered, New York courts have concluded the 
legislature intended for appellate review of external review agency’s 
decision.50  
 
 STATUTES OF OTHER KINDS 
 
In addition to the laws captured by the above taxonomy, there are some 
statutes that are either sui generis or are simply unclear about the effect of 
an external review decision. Oregon is the primary representative of the 
former, allowing an insurer to choose between being bound or not by the 
                                                                                                                          
an order affirming, modifying or reversing the decision of the review entity within thirty 
days); MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15-10A-05 (Supp. 2006) (“[T]he Commissioner may select 
and accept and base the final decision [of whether a health care service is medically 
necessary] on the professional judgment of an independent review organization or medical 
expert.”); MO. ANN. STAT. § 376.1387 (West 2002) (the decision of an independent review 
organization, while binding on the enrollee and the carrier, shall be considered a final 
agency decision within the discretion of the director of insurance, subject to a judicial 
review based on the record and involving consideration of whether the action of the director 
is unconstitutional, unlawful, unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious or involves an abuse of 
discretion or is in excess of the authority of the director).  
48  N.Y. INS. LAW § 4914(b)(4)(A)(iv) to (v) (McKinney 2008). 
49  Id. at § 4907. 
50  Schulman v. Group Health Inc., 816 N.Y.S.2d 806, 807, aff’d 833 N.Y.S.2d 62, 
63 (2006); Nenno v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Western New York, 757 N.Y.S.2d 165, 
167 (2003), aff’d 841 N.Y.S.2d 916 (2007); Vellios v. IPRO, 1 Misc.3d 487, 764 N.Y.S.2d 
568, 570 (2003) (where the court concluded that an external review agent functions as an 
agent of the state, thus making the laws governing judicial review of administrative actions 
applicable), aff’d 765 N.Y.S.2d 222, 225 (2003). 
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decisions of independent review organizations.51  Oklahoma52 and 
Wisconsin53 appear to be unclear about the effect of external review. 
 
PART III. RIGHTS TO ACCESS TO COURTS AND SEPARATION 
OF POWERS 
 
A. “OPEN COURTS” PROVISIONS 
 
At least thirty-seven states have an “open courts” provision in their 
constitutions.54 Such constitutional provisions typically provide that all 
courts shall be open and that every person shall have a remedy by due 
process of law for any injury done to him or his property.55 Those 
constitutional provisions have figured prominently in challenges alleging 
that a variety of statutes limit appropriate access to courts, including caps 
on damages in legislation addressing medical malpractice,56 statutes of 
repose in legislation dealing with medical malpractice or products 
liability,57 or the opportunity for voluntary arbitration in consumer 
protection statutes such as “Lemon Laws”,58 among others.   
Given the analogy of the Illinois second opinion statute to arbitration 
offered by Justice Thomas in Rush,59 specific consideration of the 
                                                                                                                 
51  OR. REV. STAT. § 743.859 (2007). 
52  OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 2528.6 (2004). 
53  WIS. STAT. § 632.835 (WEST 2004). 
54  Lankford v. Sullivan et al., 416 So. 2d 996, 999 (Ala. 1982). 
55  See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. I, § 13; IND. CONST. art. I, § 12; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13.   
56  Columbia Rio Grande Reg’l Healthcare, L. P. v. Hawley, 188 S.W.3d 838, 866 
(Tex. App. 2006). 
57  Lankford, 416 So. 2d at 1000. 
58  Motor Vehicle Mfr. Ass’n of the U. S. v. State of New York, 550 N.E.2d 919, 920 
(1990); see generally 1 ADR § 6:16 (3d ed.). 
59  For a keen analysis of the discussion about the arbitral-like nature of the Illinois 
external review law, see Hunter, supra note 3, at 125-27.  Hunter observes that although 
both parties, as well as amici, uniformly described the law as “arbitration-like,” as did the 
four Justices in dissent, the majority’s conclusion of nonpreemption hinged on its rejection 
of the arbitration analogy, thereby changing the framing of the law as a dispute resolution 
procedure. Hunter describes this result as arriving at “the right decision for the wrong 
reason,” suggesting that the Court should instead have reconsidered the provisions of Pilot 
Life v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 56 (1987), which, in her opinion, gave ERISA enforcement 
mechanisms overly-broad reach. Of course, had the Court pursued that path, it might well 
not have decided Rush as it did, for the votes may not have been there for a majority.  See 
Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 220 (2004), a unanimous decision by the Court 
decided shortly after Rush, re-emphasized the exclusive remedies available under ERISA.  
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challenges to the Uniform Arbitration Act60 as foreclosing access to courts 
is worth brief consideration. The statute at issue in Rush was not, of course, 
the UAA; still, consideration of how courts have treated the UAA, and 
more precisely why they have treated it that way, should provide some 
suggestion about how they would treat laws giving a binding effect to 
external review. 
Arbitration agreements are a matter of contract, enforceable according 
to their terms, absent compelling circumstances such as 
unconscionability.61 In fact, the UAA itself, although broadly worded, 
applies to circumstances where there is an agreement to arbitrate, which 
assumes a meeting of the minds and other conditions necessary to satisfy 
the constituent elements of a contract (hence the limited review by courts 
of arbitral decisions, i.e., that there was an agreement and that there was no 
fraud or duress involved in the process).62  
Not all arbitration is the result of an agreement. In some cases, it may 
be mandated by statute rather than agreed upon by the parties to a dispute. 
In such circumstances, there are a few cases in which the claim that 
mandatory arbitration would violate a state’s “open courts” constitutional 
requirement has been recognized. The primary example of this is State v. 
Nebraska Ass’n of Pub. Employees.63 Relying on a history of Nebraska 
                                                                                                                 
60  The Uniform Arbitration Act (“UAA”) was adopted by the National Conference 
of Commissioners on Uniform Laws in August, 1955, and amended August, 1956. UNIF. 
ARBITRATION ACT, INTRODUCTION, http://www.adr.org/si.asp?id=2509 (last visited 
September 21, 2008).  The UAA has been adopted in 35 states, and substantially similar 
arbitration statutes exist in 14 other jurisdictions. Amy J. Schmitz, Refreshing Contractual 
Analysis of ADR Agreements by Curing Bipolar Avoidance of Modern Common Law, 9 
HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 11 (2004).  
61  See, e.g., Iwen v. U.S. West Direct, 977 P.2d 989, 996 (Mont. 1999), where the 
court refused to enforce a contract term, including an agreement to arbitrate, where the 
contract is one of adhesion and where the provision was either not within the weaker party’s 
expectation or where the term was unduly oppressive, unconscionable, or against public 
policy. See also Ticknor v. Choice Hotels Int’l, 265 F.3d 931, 939 (9th Cir. 2001), following 
the Iwen logic.  
62   As a generalization, arbitration involves parties to a dispute voluntarily 
contracting to select an impartial third party to decide the matter based on arguments and 
evidence presented to that third party, primarily to avoid the time, expense and uncertainty 
of litigation. 1 MARTIN DOMKE & GABRIEL M. WILNER, DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION § 1:1 (rev. ed. 2008). As discussed infra p. 20 and n. 66, that voluntary aspect 
does not apply in external review circumstances, but understanding the issues surrounding 
the acceptability of statutorily mandated arbitration is of paramount relevance to the 
weaknesses in such external review laws. 
63  477 N.W.2d 577, 578-79 (1991). The Nebraska constitution was subsequently 
changed to recognize binding arbitration agreements and allow for their enforcement, NEB. 
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cases holding arbitration provisions entered into before a dispute to be 
invalid as ousting courts from their constitutional jurisdiction in violation 
of the open courts provision, the Nebraska Supreme Court declared invalid 
the UAA and, as a result, provisions of state employee contracts calling for 
mandatory binding arbitration.64  
More frequently, courts find no constitutional conflict between 
arbitration agreements and a state constitution’s open courts provision.65 As 
discussed below, if there is a qualitative, constitutional difference between 
voluntary agreements to arbitrate and statutorily mandated arbitration,66 it 
is possible that in the Nebraska case the court, concerned about the 
legislature dictating the source of adjudication (i.e., calling for mandatory 
binding arbitration rather than for arbitration based on voluntary 
agreement), was expressing a concern about separation of powers cloaked 
in the language of access to courts.  
 
B.  SEPARATION OF POWERS 
 
The separation of powers doctrine is, at least in some circumstances, of 
a piece with constitutional requirements for access to courts: when the 
capacity to determine  individual rights with finality is vested in a non-
judicial entity without mutual agreement of the parties to do so, the result is 
both a lack of access to courts and a delegation of complete judicial 
authority to an agency or private entity, resulting in the vesting of power in 
either the executive or in another, nongovernmental agency acting on 
behalf of the state.  
                                                                                                                          
CONST. art. I, § 13. See also Huntington Corp. v. Inwood Construction Co., 348 S.W.2d 442, 
445 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961).  
64  State v. Nebraska Ass’n of Pub. Employees, 477 N.W.2d 577, 580 (Neb. 1991). 
65  See, e.g.  Rollings v. Thermodyne Indus., Inc., 910 P.2d 1030, 1033, 1036 (Okla. 
1996), determining that the open courts provision of the constitution did not bar 
enforcement of arbitration agreements, and noting that most states considering the question 
have upheld arbitration in the face of claims of unconstitutionality.  
66  Nenno v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Western N. Y., 757 N.Y.S.2d 165, 168 
(2003), aff’d 841 N.Y.S.2d 916 (2007),  involved, among other things, a claim that the 
external review process violated New York constitutional requirements relating to access to 
courts and to separation of powers. One defense raised in that case was that the external 
review was not different than binding arbitration, a position with which the court disagreed: 
“Finally, we reject defendant’s contention with respect to appeal No. 2 that the external 
appeal constitutes a binding arbitration to which the parties agreed in the insurance contract. 
The insurance contract does not contain an agreement to arbitrate . . .  in clear, explicit, and 
unequivocal language.” Id. at 168.  
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All state constitutions embrace the concept of separation of powers – 
that there are three branches of government (executive, legislative and 
judicial) and that each has powers vested in it as a separate magistracy, 
preventing another branch from encroaching on the powers of another.67 
Separation of powers calls for courts to possess the entire body of judicial 
power, and their powers may not be assigned to another branch either by it 
nor assumed by another branch. 68 That generality does not mean that such 
creates independent islands, however. It is well-accepted that some overlap 
may occur, e.g., through empowering administrative agencies to make 
quasi-judicial decisions.69  
The conditions surrounding such an overlap were thoughtfully explored 
in Board of Education v. Harrell.70 There, the court considered a statute 
requiring mandated, binding arbitration of teacher disputes regarding 
discharge. The statute restricted judicial review of the arbitrator’s decision 
to issues regarding fraud or corruption of the arbitral process.  In 
considering Harrell’s claim that this limited the power of the judiciary by 
vesting an arbitrator with sole authority to determine all issues of fact and 
law, the New Mexico court considered the rationale underlying the 
separation of powers principle at length.  It observed that the theory of 
separation of powers is derived from concerns that concentrating judicial, 
legislative, and executive power into a single entity would create a system 
with inherent tendencies toward tyranny.71 The court noted that a hermetic 
sealing off of the three branches was not contemplated by separation of 
powers, that the doctrine was not an absolute, that separation of powers 
does not prohibit every exercise of judicial power by persons outside the 
judiciary, and observed that rather than maintaining a strict separation, 
constitutional law requires instead the assurance that adequate checks exist 
to keep each branch free form the control or coercive influence of the other 
branches.72  
Applying that concept to the exercise of judicial power by quasi-
judicial tribunals, the New Mexico court declared that the judiciary must 
                                                                                                                 
67  16 AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 8 (1998); 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional 
Law § 246 (1998). 
68  16 AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 8 (1998); 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional 
Law § 246 (1998). 
69  16 AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 8 (1998); 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional 
Law § 246 (1998). 
70  882 P.2d 511, 524 (N.M. 1994). 
71  Id. at 514-15, 524. 
72  Id. at 524-25. 
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maintain “the power of check” over such tribunals’ exercise of the essential 
attributes of judicial power, defined as “the final authority to render and 
enforce a judgment.”73 That principle of check, the court said, requires that 
courts have an opportunity to review decisions of arbitrators in statutorily 
compelled arbitrations.74 In Harrell, the statute called for the arbitrator’s 
decision to be binding and non-appealable except where the decision was 
procured by corruption, fraud, deception or collusion (and not, the court 
observed, where the decision was arbitrary or capricious). The court 
considered Illinois case law regarding the need for judicial review75 and 
concluded that both due process and separation of powers considerations 
require that parties to statutorily mandated arbitration be offered 
meaningful review of the arbitrator’s decision.76 The court explained that to 
be meaningful, the review must consist of determinations of whether the 
litigant received a fair hearing before an impartial tribunal, whether the 
decision was supported by substantial evidence, and whether the decision is 
in accordance with the law.77 The New Mexico statute at issue, limiting 
                                                                                                                 
73  Id. at 525. 
74  Id., citing to Ky. Comm’n on Human Rights v. Fraser, 625 S.W.2d 852, 855 (Ky. 
1981); Peick v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 724 F.2d 1247, 1277 (7th Cir. 1983); Republic 
Indus. Inc. v. Teamsters Joint Council No. 83, 718 F.2d 628, 640 (4th Cir. 1983); Bayscene 
Resident Negotiators v. Bayscene Mobilehome Park, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 626, 634 (1993), 
among others. 
75  City of Waukegan v. Pollution Control Bd., 311 N.E.2d. 146, 152 (Ill. 1974):  
 
As a general rule, delegation to administrators or 
agencies of the quasi-judicial power to adjudicate rights or 
to revoke privileges such as licenses is not invalid so long 
as there is an opportunity for judicial review of the 
administrative action. Such judicial review normally 
permits an aggrieved party to contest the fairness of the 
procedure used, the constitutionality of the substance of the 
regulatory statute and implementing rules and regulations, 
the correctness of the administrator’s interpretation of the 
statute under which he operates, and whether or not his 
decision was arbitrary. In short, if the judiciary is given an 
adequate opportunity to review what has been done, the 
principle of separation of powers-or due process of law, if 
you will-is generally satisfied. 
 (internal citations omitted).  
76  Bd. of Educ. v. Harrell, 882 P.2d 511, 525-26 (N.M. 1994). 
77  Id. at 526. 
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court review, was thus struck down as both lacking in due process and as 
an unconstitutional delegation of judicial power.78 
The Harrell court’s analysis offers an important distinction about 
arbitration. Consensual agreements between two parties, it says, are 
enforceable according to their terms, and raise no constitutional issues, a 
position consistent with the overwhelming majority of courts that have 
considered whether arbitration “ousts” the judiciary of its authority in an 
unconstitutional manner.79 On the other hand, and critically, the Harrell 
court recognizes that statutorily mandated arbitration is not an agreement at 
all, but a determination by the legislature of the adjudicative structure to 
govern disputes.80 Under such a circumstance, just as in circumstances of 
reference of disputes by the legislature to administrative agencies in the 
first instance, both separation of powers doctrine and due process 
considerations require that there be a meaningful review by a court of 
whether the attributes of due process – a fair hearing involving notice and 
opportunity to be heard, a decision supported by substantial evidence, and a 
decision in accordance with the law – are present.81  
The Harrell decision is not unique in finding that statutory binding 
arbitration without a right of judicial review violates a state separation of 
powers constitutional safeguard. In a Texas case, both landowners and the 
                                                                                                                 
78  Id. 
79  Id. at 516-517. 
80  Id. at 523.  See supra note 66, at 22, regarding the attitude of the court in Nenno v. 
Blue Cross to a claim that an external review law was a form of arbitration; in the same 
way, contra the comparisons of external review laws to arbitration discussed in Rush, 
external review requirements are a determination by the legislature of the adjudicative 
structure to govern disputes regarding medical necessity.  
81  See Harrell, 882 P.2d at 526.  Indeed, as the Harrell Court observes:  
 
The similarity between compulsory arbitration and an 
administrative adjudication thus makes caselaw on the 
constitutional validity of administrative adjudications 
instructive in assessing the validity of Section 22-10-17.1.  
As noted by the New York Court of Appeals, “[T]he device 
of [sic] arbitration is a substitute for a determination of the 
dispute by an administrative or regulatory agency. As a 
substitute device, however, its objective may not be 
accomplished under lower constitutional standards than 
would be required of an administrative or regulatory 
agency.”  
 
 Id. at 518 (quoting Mount St. Mary’s Hosp. v. Catherwood, 260 N.E.2d 508, 516 
(N.Y. 1970)). 
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county were required to accept the result of binding arbitration when there 
was a dispute about valuation of property for tax purposes.82 The law 
provided for such an arbitration award to be enforceable by the district 
court.83 The county asserted the statute not only violated the separation of 
powers doctrine but also the state open courts requirement.84 The court 
agreed, noting that the unconstitutionality consisted of denying the 
reviewing court any meaningful method of ascertaining the lawfulness of 
the arbitration award the court was expected to enforce.85 That expectation 
exists in some external review laws as well, as noted with respect to Iowa 
in Part II.86  
In an extensively-cited article considering the constitutional position of 
binding arbitration, Jean R. Sternlight identifies eight critical factors 
necessary for a state-compelled binding arbitration scheme to meet the fair 
hearing demands of due process.87 Although some of those elements may 
be missing from some external review statutory processes, a discussion of 
each in the context of the multiple state external review laws is beyond the 
scope of this paper. The final element she identifies, however, is critical: 
the right to judicial review. Sternlight observes, “Where arbitration is 
imposed on parties, either by an explicit statute or by a ‘preference’ 
enunciated by the courts, the parties are arguable entitled to judicial review 
of the arbitrator’s decision to ensure that the decision is adequately founded 
in both law and fact.”88  Sternlight notes that while this rule has not been 
explicitly enunciated by the Supreme Court, it is a logical extension of the 
Court’s logic in closely-related issues.89 Moreover, Sternlight argues that 
the minimal appellate review required by the Federal Arbitration Act – 
requiring a court to enforce arbitral awards unless they are shown to be the 
product of corruption, fraud, or arbitrator misconduct - is constitutionally 
insufficient. Sternlight asserts that rather than a cursory review of the 
nonjudicial decision, a more extensive de novo review of the decision 
                                                                                                                 
82  Hays County Appraisal Dist. v. Mayo Kirby Springs, Inc., 903 S.W.2d 394, 394-
395 (Tex. App. 1995). 
83  Id. at 396. 
84  Id. 
85  Id. at 397. 
86  See supra Part II, at 94-97 (discussing Type 1 Laws). 
87  Jean R. Sternlight, Rethinking the Constitutionality of the Supreme Court’s 
Preference for Binding Arbitration: A Fresh Assessment of Jury Trial, Separation of 
Powers, and Due Process Concerns,  72 TUL. L. REV. 1, 87-98 (1997). 
88   Id. at 95.  
89   Id.  
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under a “weight of the evidence” standard should apply.90 Sternlight 
reasons:  “If judicial review is required of decisions by administrative 
agencies, surely it is required of private arbitration decisions as well, to 
ensure that such decisions reflect law and not merely whim or bias.”91  
Although Sternlight’s observations are cast in terms of due process, 
they apply equally, as the Harrell court observes,92 to the constitutional 
doctrine of separation of powers. That is, if separation of powers concerns 
require that a court engage in meaningful review and require that the court 
is also the final authority to render and enforce a judgment in the case of 
statutorily-mandated binding arbitration, then both of those concerns apply 
equally to binding external review processes. There is no principled basis 
for a distinction that would treat the binding result of decisions of an 
external review entity any differently than statutory binding arbitration.  If 
that is so – if an external review agency exercises the same power as an 
administrative agency acting in a quasi-judicial capacity – then the same 
constitutional considerations should apply to the processes and decisions of 
state- required external review, including consideration of separation of 
powers. As one court observed, “[U]nder the separation of powers clause of 
our state constitution, judicial review must be provided for administrative 
agency decisions involving the exercise of quasi-judicial powers.”93    
It appears from the taxonomy of external review laws discussed above 
that only a minority provide for any court involvement, other than the 
ability to enforce the decision of the independent review organization.94 
Some merely describe the decision of the external review entity as binding, 
either on the insurer or on the insurer and insured.95 At least some expressly 
describe external review as not being an administrative decision under the 
state’s particular administrative procedures act,96 which appears to 
foreclose access to courts for subsequent review under state laws governing 
judicial review of administrative decisions. Those external review laws that 
allow for court review of the decision of an independent review 
                                                                                                                 
90   Id. at 95-97.  
91   Id. at 96.  
92   Bd. of Educ. v. Harrell, 882 P.2d 511, 526 (N.M. 1994). 
93  Meath v. Harmful Substances Comp. Bd., 550 N.W.2d 275, 282 (Minn., 1996) 
(Anderson, J., concurring specially). 
94  See supra Part II, at 91-97. 
95  See supra Part II, at 93. 
96  See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 420-J:5e (2004) (“The external review process shall 
not be considered an adjudicative proceeding within the meaning of RSA 541-A, and the 
external review decision of the independent review organization shall not be subject to 
rehearing and appeal pursuant to RSA 541.”). 
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organization, but make that decision binding with respect to the particular 
insured’s benefits, lack any meaningful access to a court. In all three such 
circumstances, an appropriate initial inquiry would be whether placing the 
adjudicative power in the hands of a private entity or in the hands of a 
regulatory official (by calling for an order from the commissioner, for 
example, adopting or rejecting the external review entity’s conclusion) 
without an opportunity for meaningful appellate review violates the 
separation of powers doctrine (or the logical consequence of such a 
violation, the violation of an “open courts” provision). Certainly in such 
cases the rationale applied in Harrell to statutorily-mandated binding 
arbitration would seem readily to apply.97 
Even when an external review statute provides for judicial review, state 
constitutional concerns may still exist, and have been raised in at least one 
instance in which the external review law explicitly provided for appellate 
review. Michigan law provides, “A person aggrieved by an external review 
decision . . . may seek judicial review no later than 60 days from the date of 
the decision in the circuit court for the county where the covered person 
resides or in the circuit court of Ingham county.”98 In English v. Blue Cross 
Blue Shield,99 Blue Cross argued that the independent review act did not 
provide the insurance commissioner or the independent review 
organization with standards for reviewing the adverse determination and 
did not announce a standard for an appellate court to apply to the decision 
when appealed, violating the insurer’s right to substantive due process.100 
The court recharacterized this claim as “one attacking the Legislature’s 
delegation of power to an administrative agency and rooted in the 
separation of powers doctrine.”101 That is, the court understood the heart of 
the complaint to be that overly-broad and unconstrained authority had been 
given to an administrative agency without any judicial check thereon.102  
Reviewing the provisions of the statute, the court concluded that adequate 
                                                                                                                 
97  See supra notes 79-81, at 108 and accompanying text. 
98  Patient’s Right to Independent Review Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 
550.1915(1) (Lexis Supp. 2008). 
99  688 N.W.2d 523 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004). 
100  Id. at 534. 
101  Id. at 534. The court explained, “When a legislative body chooses to vest an 
administrative body with the power to regulate public conduct, the legislative body must 
provide adequate standards to protect the public form the exercise of uncontrolled, arbitrary 
power.” Id. (quoting Natural Aggregates Corp. v. Brighton Twp., 539 N.W.2d 761, 770 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1995)). See also Ross v. Blue Care Network of Michigan, 722 N.W.2d 223 
(Mich. Ct. App. 2006) (elaborating on the standards for judicial review). 
102  English, 688 N.W.2d at 534. 
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standards did, in fact, exist for the exercise of judgment by the 
commissioner and the independent review organization, and that, while the 
act was silent on the standard for judicial review, the Michigan constitution 
adequately specified the standard to be used in review of final agency 
determinations.103 
 
PART IV. THE RUSH CONUNDRUM WHEN APPEAL IS  
AUTHORIZED 
 
In the taxonomy of external review laws noted above, one group would 
appear to be safe from claims of violation of the separation of powers 
doctrine or of “open courts” constitutional provisions, those providing for 
appellate review of the external review decision before it becomes 
effective. As noted above, New York courts have addressed this issue at 
least three times.104 Even though the New York statute described the result 
of an external review to be binding on the insurer and the insured, the 
statute was interpreted to mean that appellate review was proper.105 Under 
such a circumstance, the potential that an external review law runs afoul of 
state constitutional concerns is considerably diminished.106 
On the other hand, when judicial review of an external agency decision 
occurs – when one appeals an external review decision to a state court for 
review – the court is placed in a position of making a determination 
regarding a dispute over a claim for benefits. At least one court has seen 
this as creating a dilemma in light of the Rush decision.  Hawaii 
Management Alliance Association v. Insurance Commissioner107 involved 
                                                                                                                 
103  Id. at 535.  
104  See cases cited supra note 50. 
105  Schulman v. Group Health Inc., 833 N.Y.S.2d 62, 63 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006).  The 
Schulman court described the claim that no appellate review was available thusly: 
“Defendant’s interpretation provides no mechanism for review of either erroneous or 
arbitrary determinations by external review agents, a result that is not only inconsistent with 
the purpose of these statutory provisions, but would be detrimental to both insureds and 
insurers.” Id. 
106  That is not to say that there may not be other state, or even federal, constitutional 
concerns with the external review procedure, depending on the structure of the law. See 
English v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich., 688 N.W.2d 523 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004); see 
also Bd. of Educ. of Carlsbad v. Harrell, 882 P.2d 511 (N.M. 1994) (where issues were 
raised about whether the niceties of due process were met, i.e., whether an in person hearing 
was required, whether the ability to cross-examine witnesses or challenge the fact-finder for 
bias existed, and whether the decision was based on a record and used procedures that 
adequately documented the basis in law and in fact for the decision.)  
107   100 P.3d 952, 966-67 (Haw. 2004).  
2008] “SEZ WHO?” 113 
 
the Hawaii Supreme Court considering a lower court affirmation of orders 
of attorney fees and costs arising out of the successful appeal of the denial 
of a claim under that state’s external review law. In defending, the 
appellants asserted that the law was preempted by ERISA, and that hence, 
the claim for attorney fees and costs was void.108  
The Hawaii statute provided for the insurance commissioner to enter an 
order affirming, modifying or vacating the decision of the external review 
panel and incorporated the Hawaii Administrative Procedure Act, which, 
among other things, provided “[a]ny person aggrieved by a final decision 
and order in a contested case…is entitled to judicial review thereof….”109 
The court found that this access to court review was fatal to a Rush-style 
claim that the statute was not preempted by ERISA. In its analysis, the 
court, mindful of Rush as well as of Aetna v. Davila110 and of Kentucky 
Association of Health Plans v. Miller,111 determined that the statute 
regulated insurance under the test set forth in the latter case and hence was 
saved from express preemption.112 However, the court did not stop there, 
but went on to consider in detail the concepts of field preemption and 
conflict preemption as they related to the Hawaii statutes.113  ERISA, the 
court unremarkably concluded, does not impliedly preempt the entire field 
of HMO regulation – indeed, its express preemption clause coupled with 
the savings clause makes clear that the preemptive reach of ERISA does 
not extend to all state laws affecting employee benefit plans.114 On the 
other hand, merely because Congress did not intend to preempt the entire 
field of state law affecting employee benefit plans does not mean that some 
such laws, otherwise saved from preemption as regulation of insurance, 
may not be preempted if they present a conflict with ERISA’s remedial 
scheme.115 In observing that, the court pointed to Aetna Health in its 
discussion of conflict preemption: 
 
“[U]nder ordinary principles of conflict pre-emption,…even a 
state law that can arguably be characterized as ‘regulating 
insurance’ will be pre-empted if it provides a separate vehicle to 
                                                                                                                 
108  Id. at 954.   
109  Id. at 966, quoting from HAW. REV. STAT. § 91-14 (1993). 
110  542 U.S. 200 (2004).  
111  538 U.S. 329 (2003). 
112  Haw. Mgmt. Alliance Ass’n, 100 P.3d at 959-960. 
113  Id. at 960-67. 
114  Id. at 961. 
115  Id. at 962.  
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assert a claim for benefits outside of, or in addition to, ERISA’s 
remedial scheme.”116 
 
Aetna considered the availability of litigation under a Texas statute 
authorizing claims against health plans for failure to use due care in claims 
processing. Whether such a claim was preempted by ERISA depended on 
the remedial scheme in 29 U.S.C. 1132(a).117  Justice Thomas, writing for a 
unanimous court, emphasized the exclusivity of federal enforcement 
actions: 
 
The pre-emptive force of ERISA § 502(a) is still stronger. In 
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 65-66, 95 
L.Ed.2d 55 (1987), the Court determined that the similarity of the 
language used in the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 
(LMRA), and ERISA, combined with the “clear intention” of 
Congress “to make § 502(a)(1)(B) suits brought by participants or 
beneficiaries federal questions for the purposes of federal court 
jurisdiction in like manner as § 301 of the LMRA,” established that 
ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B)’s pre-emptive force mirrored the pre-
emptive force of LMRA § 301. Since LMRA § 301 converts state 
causes of action into federal ones for purposes of determining the 
propriety of removal, see Avco Corp. v. Machinists, 390 U.S. 557, 
so too does ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B). Thus, the ERISA civil 
enforcement mechanism is one of those provisions with such 
“extraordinary pre-emptive power” that it “converts an ordinary 
state common law complaint into one stating a federal claim for 
purposes of the well-pleaded complaint rule.” Metropolitan Life, 
481 U.S. at 65-66, 107 S.Ct 1542. Hence, “causes of action within 
the scope of the civil enforcement provisions of § 502(a) [are] 
removable to federal court.” Id. at 66.  
It follows that if an individual brings suit complaining of a denial of 
coverage for medical care, where the individual is entitled to such coverage 
only because of the terms of an ERISA-regulated employee benefit plan, 
and where no legal duty (state or federal) independent of ERISA or the plan 
terms is violated, then the suit falls “within the scope of” ERISA § 
502(a)(1)(B). Metropolitan Life, supra, at 66. In other words, if an 
                                                                                                                 
116  Id. 
117  Id.      
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individual, at some point in time, could have brought his claim under 
ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), and where there is no other independent legal duty 
that is implicated by a defendant’s actions, then the individual’s cause of 
action is completely pre-empted by ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B).118 
The Rush court recalled its determination in Metropolitan Life that 
Congress had so completely preempted the field of benefits law that an 
ostensibly state cause of action for benefits was necessarily a creature of 
federal law removable to federal court,119 and indicated that under the 
decision in the instant case, enforcement of the medical necessity 
determination would require a civil action under 29 U.S.C. 1132(a)(1)(B) 
to recover benefits due the beneficiary or to enforce his rights under the 
terms of the plan.120 The concern of the Hawaiian Supreme Court, then, 
was that the structure set up under its state law resulted in an enforcement 
action – an adjudicatory action – not under ERISA but rather in state 
courts. The Rush opinion had considered this: “To be sure, a State might 
provide for a type of ‘review’ that would so resemble an adjudication as to 
fall within Pilot Life’s categorical bar.”121 
The Hawaii Management court considered whether Rush survived the 
strong language of Aetna emphasizing the preemptive power of ERISA, 
concluding that Aetna did not overrule Rush but allowed the Hawaii 
legislature to regulate insurance so long as the legislature did not create a 
“cause of action that duplicates, supplements, or supplants the ERISA civil 
                                                                                                                 
118  Aetna Health Inc, 542 U.S. at 209-10. 
119  Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 378 (2002).    
120  Id. at 380 n.10. 
121  Id. at 381. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 52 (1987)  had stated:  
 
The Solicitor General, for the United States as amicus 
curiae, argues that Congress clearly expressed an intent 
that the civil enforcement provisions of ERISA § 502(a) be 
the exclusive vehicle for actions by ERISA-plan 
participants and beneficiaries asserting improper processing 
of a claim for benefits, and that varying state causes of 
action for claims within the scope of § 502(a) would pose 
an obstacle to the purposes and objectives of Congress. 
Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 18-19. We agree. 
The conclusion that § 502(a) was intended to be exclusive 
is supported, first, by the language and structure of the civil 
enforcement provisions, and second, by legislative history 
in which Congress declared that the pre-emptive force of § 
502(a) was modeled on the exclusive remedy provided by § 
301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 
(LMRA), 61 Stat. 156, 29 U.S.C. § 185. Id.  
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enforcement remedy.”122 Reading the two together, the court determined 
that the Supreme Court meant to distinguish between state laws that create 
a state law claim for relief against an employee benefit plan (as in the case 
of Aetna) and state laws that require insurers to provide certain procedural 
protections to insureds.123 Further, it understood the status of the law to be 
that a state statute is preempted by ERISA if it provides “a form of ultimate 
relief in a judicial forum that added to the judicial remedies provided by 
ERISA” or that “duplicates, supplements, or supplants the ERISA civil 
enforcement remedy.”124 
The Hawaii statute, the Hawaii Management court observed, is very 
similar to the Illinois statute at issue in Rush: both provide for an 
independent review of an insurer’s denial of benefits, both require the 
reviewing entity to consider the medical necessity of the procedure at issue, 
both allow the reviewer to overturn the insurer’s denial of coverage, and 
neither creates a claim for relief upon which a beneficiary can file a lawsuit 
(unlike in Aetna) or enlarges a beneficiary’s claim for benefits beyond what 
the beneficiary could obtain in an action under 29 U.S.C. 1132(a).125 
However, the court determined that the Hawaii and Illinois statutes have 
salient differences: first, the Hawaii statute provides for appellate review 
under the state’s administrative procedures act and sets forth the procedural 
requirements for contested cases, including, importantly, the availability of 
judicial review. Second, while the Illinois statute charged the reviewing 
physician to determine whether the procedure was medically necessary, the 
Hawaii statute charged the review panel to determine whether the actions 
of the HMO were “reasonable.” 126 
These distinctions, the court held, were fatal to the survival of the 
Hawaii law under conflict analysis.127 First, since the Hawaii statute did not 
seek a medical opinion per se but instead raised a broader question, i.e., 
whether the HMO’s actions were reasonable, the nature of the external 
review itself “more closely resembles ‘contract interpretation or evidentiary 
litigation before a neutral arbiter’ than ‘a practice (having nothing to do 
with arbitration) of obtaining another medical opinion.”128  
Beyond that and more damaging, according to the court, was the right 
                                                                                                                 
122  Haw. Mgmt. Alliance Ass’n, 100 P.3d at 964.  
123  Id. 
124  Id. at 965.  
125  Id. at 966. 
126  Id. 
127  Id.  
128  Haw. Mgmt. Alliance Ass’n, 100 P.3d at 966. 
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of the parties to seek judicial review.129 Such review, in the court’s opinion, 
was precisely the type of adjudication barred by Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. 
Dedeaux, which held that an action under 29 U.S.C. 1132(a) is the 
exclusive vehicle for actions by ERISA plan participants and beneficiaries 
asserting improper processing of a claim for benefits.130 The creation of a 
state-level judicial forum for asserting a claim for benefits under an ERISA 
plan resulted in duplication of ERISA’s civil enforcement scheme.131  
The result of the Hawaii Management case taken together with the 
Rush / Aetna analyses is that to avoid preemption, an external review law 
should not allow for judicial review of the decision of the independent 
reviewer.132  Allowing for court review, Hawaii Management says, results 
in preemption of the external review law.133 On the other hand, not 
allowing for such review likely violates state constitutional constraints 
relating to separation of powers. In such a circumstance, the external 
review law might not be preempted, but it may well be unconstitutional.  
 
PART V. IS THERE A WAY TO CUT THIS GORDIAN KNOT? 
 
If the Hawaii Management analysis is correct, but if at the same time 
lack of integration into legal adjudicatory systems violates separation of 
powers or “open courts” constitutional protections, the result would seem 
to be either that an external review system is preempted by ERISA or that it 
is constitutionally invalid – that there can be no valid state-level external 
review system applicable to ERISA plans. Of course, that would have been 
the result had the minority in Rush prevailed, and it does not yield an 
unthinkable or cataclysmic result; rather, it would identify and clarify 
federal policy choices, legislative action or inaction, in its wake. In the 
alternative, the Supreme Court could sharpen its diction and its message 
surrounding what it means when it speaks of exclusive remedies under 
ERISA. Hunter’s suggestion -  that the Court made the right decision for 
the wrong reason in Rush, and that the Court should instead reconsider 
what she believes to be an overly broad reach of ERISA enforcement 
                                                                                                                 
129  Id.  
130  Id. 
131  See id. at 966-67.  
132  That concern led to the introduction of legislation in Hawaii subsequent to the 
Hawaii Management case that would eliminate judicial review of external review decisions. 
Zachary Antalis, Hawaii’s Patients’ Bill of Rights: Saving the Right to External Review, 28 
U. HAW. L. REV. 295, 314 (2005). 
133  Haw. Mgmt. Alliance Ass’n, 100 P.3d at 966-967.  
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mechanisms134 -  is a different  approach to the conundrum. Which course 
is best depends on values and biases. One might believe that uniformity in 
approaches to claims administration and adjudication is desirable for multi-
state employers, a belief that informed the heart of ERISA’s preemption 
provisions to begin with, either on the grounds that such is what the 
employers bargained for (either in their contracts or, more broadly 
speaking, in their influence on the legislation, in Posnerian135 terms) or on 
the simpler grounds of efficiency, in which case one would not seek 
contraction of the “exclusive remedy” concept. Those same persons (or 
others) might believe that state-enforced external review is unneeded, that 
markets will punish errant health insurers and HMOs that too often appear 
to be determining claims to be lacking in medical necessity to the benefit of 
the insurer or HMO. On the other hand, one might believe that the potential 
for an insurer or HMO to deny claims too readily is strong enough that it is 
necessary to have what are, in the end, judgments about medical practice 
being made by a party not associated with the insurer, and that sufficient 
structural elements can be built into the identification of external reviewers, 
the standards to be used for review, and the appellate rights of parties 
involved to assure fairness to all. It would be an extraordinary waste, given 
the pressures of health care costs and the fundamental integrity of most 
insurers and HMOs, if, faced with this dilemma, legislators were to adopt a 
third approach, one clearly safe from any claim of ERISA preemption in 
taking the form of a mandated benefit, calling for insurers and HMOs to 
unquestioningly pay for any service a doctor might provide, order or 
recommend.  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
134  Hunter, supra note 3, at 127.   
135  Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has described legislation as 
a bargained-for good among interest groups: “The ‘interest group’ theory asserts that 
legislation is a good demanded and supplied much as other goods, so that legislative 
protection flows to those groups that derive the greatest value from it, regardless of overall 
social welfare…” Richard A. Posner, Economics, Politics, and the Reading of Statutes and 
the Constitution, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 265 (1982).   
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ABSTRACT 
 
This article discusses the efficacy of state court garnishment actions in 
comparison with federal declaratory judgments, particularly the issue of 
timing for such decisions in insurance coverage disputes. Jurisdiction of 
Constitutional Article III courts are largely governed by precedents found 
in either the Brilhart or Wilton analyses, and it is responsible for deciding if 
garnishment actions are removable to federal courts in such disputes. 
Federal abstention doctrine is also discussed as a discretionary response to 
ideas of comity, equity, and federalism under various precedential cases 
from the mid-twentieth century to the current decade. State court 
garnishments may serve as impediments to federal jurisdiction, and 
removability for insurance cases is in dispute. Such uncertainties present 
difficulties for insurers. Abstention doctrine therefore pushes insurers to 
take declaratory judgment filing actions early in the two situations of 
removable or non-removable garnishment actions.  
 
 
The abstention doctrine provides the backdrop for a recurring juridical 
controversy that arises out of insurance coverage disputes.  An insurance 
claim can produce two nascent suits: one in state and one in federal court.1  
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1  There have been historical exceptions to the dueling state and federal suits.  Prior 
to 1964, a discrete number of states (most notably Louisiana) had legislation permitting an 
injured person to bring suit directly against a liability insurer without joining the insured.  
This made it possible for a state citizen who had been injured by a citizen of that same state 
to litigate his or her suit in federal court if the state-citizen tortfeasor was insured by an out-
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Typically, an injured plaintiff will bring suit against the tortfeasor and 
litigate liability and damages in state court.  At the conclusion of the 
liability lawsuit through judgment, the plaintiff creditor will initiate a state 
court garnishment action.  Where coverage has been declined, the 
insurance company, seeking the benefits of federal forum,2 will bring a 
separate declaratory judgment action in federal court.  Oftentimes, the 
insurance company will initiate a federal declaratory judgment action as the 
state court liability proceedings conclude.  Once judgment is entered, the 
state court plaintiff will bring a second state court action seeking a writ of 
garnishment against the insurer.  The unfortunate insurer then finds itself at 
an intersection of jurisdictional complications and doctrinal contradictions.  
The varied courts’ holdings on abstention provide that a federal court may 
decline to exercise federal jurisdiction in a declaratory judgment action any 
                                                                                                                          
of-state insurer. See, e.g., Lumbermen’s Mut. Cas. Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S. 48 (1954).  An 
overwhelming number of suits were brought in federal court until 1964 when Congress 
amended 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) to allow federal jurisdiction only when the insurer defendant 
in a direct action was a citizen of the insured’s state as well as its own.  See Donald T. 
Weckstein, The 1964 Diversity Amendment:  Congressional Indirect Action Against State 
“Direct Action” Laws, 1965 WIS. L. REV. 268 (1965) (criticizing Congress’s amendment of 
the statute).    
2  It is commonly recognized that plaintiffs prefer to litigate in state court, whereas 
defendants prefer federal court.  This preference is said to result, in part, from the 
overburdened federal docket and federal judges’ alleged preference for early case 
dispositions.  See Abner J. Mikva, It’s Time to “Unfix” the Criminal Justice System, 20 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 825, 829-830 (1993) (the so-called war on drugs has so 
overburdened the federal judiciary such that getting a civil case tried in federal courts is 
almost impossible).  One commentator has noted that federal judges, in order to reduce their 
compressed dockets, have increasingly engaged in stringent control of discovery, have 
aggressively encouraged settlement, and have more frequently granted summary judgment.  
See Jonathan T. Molot, An Old Judicial Role for a New Litigation Era, 113 YALE L.J. 27, 
39-41 (2003).  Federal court is also perceived as more expensive and time consuming.  See 
Gregory M. Cesarano and Daniel R. Vega, So You Thought a Remand was Imminent? Post-
Removal Litigation and the Waiver of the Right to Seek Remand Ground on Removal 
Defects, 74 FLA. B. J. 22, 23-24 (2000). 
Moreover, the forum for litigation may in fact impact the plaintiff’s chance for success.  
Two Cornell law professors authored a study in 1998 which concluded that the plaintiff win 
rate in removed federal civil cases was 36.7% compared to the overall win rate in federal 
civil cases generally 57.9%. See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Do Case 
Outcomes Really Reveal Anything About the Legal System?  Win Rates and Removal 
Jurisdiction, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 581, 593 (1998).  The win statistics in diversity cases is 
more startling.  The win rate in original diversity cases was 71% compared to a 34% win 
rate in removed cases.  Id.  This disparity may be the result of forum impact.  Generally, 
“removed plaintiffs fare relatively worse before judges than before juries.”  Id. at 601. 
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time there is a parallel state court proceeding;3 and, a non-forum defendant 
cannot remove an action to federal court if it is supplemental or ancillary to 
another action.4  Thus, the question insurance companies and the courts 
must both wrestle is: can a garnishment suit – a derivative of a concluded 
state court liability and damages claim – be removed to federal court 
attendant with a federal declaratory judgment action?  Or, can a state court 
garnishment effectively impede litigation of coverage questions in federal 
court because an Article III court will be compelled to exercise its 
discretion and decline jurisdiction in lieu of the state court garnishment 
action?  
Effective procedural impediments may exist which preclude removal of 
the state garnishment action to federal court to unify both the garnishment 
and federal declaratory judgment proceedings.  In this situation, the United 
State Supreme Court’s decision in Brillhart v. Excess Insurance Company 
of America,5 provides the analysis to be applied by the federal courts in 
exercising their discretion to deny jurisdiction where concurrent state and 
federal cases exist.  Invariably, the defense to the garnishment proceedings 
rests upon the insurance company’s ability to establish that it is not a debtor 
because its insurance policy does not provide coverage for the events which 
produced the garnishable judgment.  Where the garnishment action is non-
removable, the insurance company’s declaratory judgment action is in 
jeopardy under federal abstention principles.  Where the garnishment 
action is properly removable, it is unclear whether federal abstention can be 
avoided.  The Supreme Court in Wilton v. Seven Falls Co.6 failed to 
delineate the outer boundaries of district court discretion to abstain in cases 
in which there are no parallel state proceedings.  Can a state garnishment 
action, properly removed to federal court, be used as a basis for a federal 
                                                                                                                 
3  See, e.g., Huth v. Hartford Ins. Co. of the Midwest, 298 F.3d 800, 803-804 (9th 
Cir. 2002) (refusing removal when the possibility exists that the insured may bring an 
analogous declaratory judgment action in state court). 
4  Unless federal question jurisdiction can be invoked, an action cannot be removed 
if any named defendant is a citizen of the forum state.  
 Any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction 
founded on a claim or right arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws of the 
United States shall be removable without regard to the citizenship or residence of the 
parties. Any other such action shall be removable only if none of the parties in 
interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which 
such action is brought.  
 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b). 
5  316 U.S. 491, 495-96 (1942). 
6  515 U.S. 277, 290 (1995). 
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district court judge to abstain from the exercise of jurisdiction under the 
discretionary Federal Declaratory Judgment Act? 
This article will proceed in four parts.  Part I will recount the abstruse 
history of the jurisdiction of Article III courts.  Part II will trace the 
evolution of the variegated iterations of the abstention doctrine.  Part III 
will examine the procedural and substantive characterization of state 
garnishment actions to assess whether the garnishment action is removable.  
Where the state garnishment action is not removable, the Brillhart analysis 
will prevail.  Where the state garnishment action is removable, the silence 
of the Wilton court on the question of abstention when there is no parallel 
state court proceeding will be brought into focus.  Part IV will analyze the 
application of federal abstention in cases involving state garnishment 
actions.   
 
I. THE JURISDICTIONAL HISTORY OF ARTICLE III COURTS 
 
Article III of the United States Constitution vests the judicial power of 
the United States in the Supreme Court “and in such inferior courts as the 
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.”7  This devolution of 
discretion to Congress, resulting from the Madisonian compromise,8 has 
been interpreted as affording Congress authority to not only create or 
decline to create inferior federal tribunals, but to define the contours of the 
jurisdiction the lower federal courts will enjoy.9  “All federal courts, other 
than the Supreme Court, derive their jurisdiction wholly from the exercise 
of the authority to ‘ordain and establish’ inferior courts ....”10  Congress’s 
power to create lower federal courts therefore includes the “power ‘of 
                                                                                                                 
7  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.  
8  Steven G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson, The Unitary Executive, Jurisdiction 
Stripping, and the Hamdan Opinions: A Textualist Response to Justice Scalia, 107 COLUM. 
L. REV.1002, 1033 (2007) (describing the “Tribunals Clause” as a “huge grant of power to 
Congress, made necessary by the Madisonian compromise.”); John Eidsmoe, The Article III 
Exceptions Clause: Any Exceptions to the Power of Congress to Make Exceptions?, 19 
REGENT U. L. REV. 95, 134 (2007) (noting that Madison’s Notes, which were released in 
1837 demonstrate that Article III, Section 2 was a “Madisonian compromise” to give 
Congress the choice of creating inferior federal courts.). 
9  Congress cannot, however, confer upon the lower federal courts jurisdiction 
greater than that contemplated in the Constitution.  In Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, the 
Supreme Court held Congress was limited by, inter alia, the Eleventh Amendment. 517 U.S. 
44, 65 (1996) (stating it is “fundamental that Congress could not expand the jurisdiction of 
the federal courts beyond the bounds of Article III”).   
10  Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182 (1943) (Chief Justice Stone writing for a 
unanimous court).  
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withholding jurisdiction from them in the exact degrees and character 
which to Congress may seem proper for the public good.”‘11   
Congress has never deemed it “proper for the public good” to grant to 
the Article III courts jurisdiction coterminous with that permitted by the 
Constitution.  Rather, every grant of jurisdiction to the lower federal courts 
has been a gift wrestled from the hands of Congress.  The Judiciary Act of 
1789,12 for example, did not provide for federal jurisdiction in cases 
“arising under [the] Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties 
made….”13  Rather, federal question cases had to fall under a more 
specialized grant of jurisdiction or be litigated in a state court, subject to 
review in the United States Supreme Court.14  It was not until 1875 that a 
Reconstruction Congress provided an enduring grant of general federal 
question jurisdiction.15  One commentator referred to the post Civil War 
broadening of federal judicial power as the greatest expansion in history, 
stating:  “In crabbed and obscure jurisdictional statues a hundred years old 
we may trace out great shifts of power, shifts that left the nation supreme 
over the states….”16  In spite of the magnanimous realignment of power 
that occurred in 1875, however, limits on federal question jurisdiction 
remain.  Under § 1331,17 a federal court cannot exercise jurisdiction over a 
case presenting a federal question unless the federal question appears on 
the face of the plaintiff’s well-pleaded complaint.18 
                                                                                                                 
11  Id.  
12  Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §§ 9, 11, 1 Stat. 73, 76-78 (1789). 
13  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
14  The “Midnight Judges” Bill did provide for federal jurisdiction in cases presenting 
federal questions.  See Act of Feb. 13, 1801, § 2, 2 Stat. 89 (repealed 1802).  See, e.g., 
Bankers Trust Co. v. Texas & Pac. Ry. Co., 241 U.S. 295, 303, 305 (1916); Knights of 
Pythias v. Kalinski, 163 U.S. 289, 290 (1896); Pacific R.R. Removal Cases, 115 U.S. 1, 10-
12 (1885).  
15  Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470 (1875).  
16  William M. Wiecek, The Reconstruction of Federal Judicial Power, 1863-1875, 
13 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 333, 333 (1969). 
17   28 U.S.C.A. § 1331 (2006). 
18  Federal Question Jurisdictional Amendments Act of 1980, Pub L. No. 96-486 § 1, 
94 Stat. 2369 (1981) (amending U.S.C. § 1331); Husvar v. Rapoport, 430 F.3d 777, 781 (6th 
Cir 2005) (recognizing that “the plaintiff is the master of the complaint, that the federal 
question must appear on the face of the complaint, and that the plaintiff may, by eschewing 
claims based on federal law, choose to have the cause heard in state court”);  Cal. ex rel. 
Lockyer v. Dynegy, Inc., 375 F.3d 831, 838 (9th Cir. 2004) ( “well-pleaded complaint” 
rule…provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when federal question is presented on the 
face of plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint). 
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Article III courts were granted federal diversity jurisdiction in the 
Judiciary Act of 1789,19 however, the authority of the lower federal courts 
to hear cases in which there is diversity of citizenship is still, by no means, 
unlimited.  Despite the constitutional mandate that the federal judiciary 
power extend to all cases “between citizens of different states,”20 federal 
diversity jurisdiction cannot be exercised by an Article III court unless the 
case meets the ever-increasing “amount in controversy” requirement21 and 
there exists full diversity among the parties.22  Still, federal diversity 
jurisdiction has been deemed necessary to provide a neutral forum for out-
of-state defendants against perceived local bias by state courts.23 As Chief 
Justice John Marshall stated in Bank of the U.S. v. Deveaux:  
However, true the fact may be, that the tribunals of the states will 
administer justice as impartially as those of the nation, to parties of every 
description, it is not less true that the constitution itself either entertains 
apprehensions on this subject, or views with such indulgence the possible 
fears and apprehensions of suitors, that it has established national tribunals 
                                                                                                                 
19  Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78 (1789). 
20  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. See also, THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 305 (Alexander 
Hamilton McLean ed., 1787) (noting “[t]he power of determining causes between two 
states, between one state and the citizens of another, and between the citizens of different 
states, is perhaps not less essential to the peace of the union than what has just been 
examined.”). 
21  The Judiciary Action of 1789 set the amount in controversy at $500.00. Judiciary 
Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 79. In 1887 it was raised to $2000. See The Judiciary Act of 
1887, ch. 373, 24 Stat. 552. And in 1911 it was raised to $3000.  See The Judiciary Act of 
1911, ch. 231, § 24, 36 Stat. 1091.  In 1958 the jurisdictional threshold was raised to 
$10,000. See The Judiciary Act of 1958, PUB. L. NO. 85-554, 72 Stat. 415.  In 1988, the 
amount was raised a final time to $50,000. See The Judiciary Act of 1988, PUB. L. NO. 100-
702, 102 Stat. 4646, before reaching the current requirement of $75,000.  See The Judiciary 
Act of 1996, PUB. L. NO. 104-317, 110 Stat. 3847).   
22  Strawbridge v. Curtiss held that in federal diversity cases, it is insufficient for 
merely some of the opposing parties to be from different states.  Rather, no plaintiff may be 
from the same state as any defendant. 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 267-268 (1806).  Moreover, 
Section 1441 of Chapter 28 of the United States Code prohibits removal of an action if a 
named defendant is a citizen of the forum state, thereby further divesting the federal courts 
of jurisdiction that would otherwise exist under federal diversity. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2000). 
23  See generally Patrick J. Borchers, The Origins of Diversity Jurisdiction, The Rise 
of Legal Positivism, and a Brave New World for Erie and Klaxon, 72 TEX. L. REV. 79, 82 
(1993) (identifying the historical justifications for federal diversity jurisdiction); see also 
Henry J. Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARV. L. REV. 483, 492-
93 (1928) (vulnerability of state courts to local pressure was initial justification for federal 
diversity jurisdiction).  
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for the decisions of controversies between aliens and a citizen, or between 
citizens of different states.24   
Like federal question and federal diversity jurisdiction, the grant of 
declaratory judgment jurisdiction to the federal courts was not secured 
without substantial effort.  Passage of the Federal Declaratory Judgment 
Act (“FDJA”) of 193425 marked the end of a long-waged campaign for 
legal reform.26  Advocates for passage of the FDJA viewed traditional 
common law remedies – awards of damages or injunctive relief - as 
inadequate.27  
Reformers argued social equilibrium can be disturbed not only be 
direct violations of rights, but also by actions that leave persons in ‘grave 
doubt and uncertainty’ about their legal positions. In their view, the 
existing remedial structure failed in three ways. First, it failed to address 
the plight of a person embroiled in a dispute who, limited by traditional 
remedies, could not have the controversy adjudicated because the opposing 
party had the sole claim to traditional relief and chose not to use it. Second, 
the traditional system of remedies harmed parties by forcing them to wait 
an unnecessarily long time before seeking relief. Third, the reformers 
criticized the harshness of damage and injunctive awards. Even when they 
could be invoked, they were thought to hamper litigants who did not need 
or desire coercive relief. For the reformers the declaratory judgment was 
the procedural innovation that would solve these problems.28 
However, in spite of widespread support for the FDJA, Congress was 
concerned that authorizing the federal courts to entertain suits for 
declaratory judgment was tantamount to allowing prohibited advisory 
opinions.29  Congressional concerns were quelled when the United States 
                                                                                                                 
24  9 U.S. (5 Cranch), 61, 87 (1809). 
25  28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02 (2000).  
26  Donald L. Doernberg &  Michael B. Mushlin, The Trojan Horse: How the 
Declaratory Judgment Act Created a Cause of Action and Expanded the Federal Judiciary 
While the Supreme Court Wasn’t Looking, 36 UCLA L. REV. 529 (1988-1989). 
27   Id. at 551, 552-53. 
28  Id. at 551-553. 
29  The United States Constitution extends the judicial power only to “cases” and 
“controversies.” U.S. CONST., art. III, § 2.  See also, Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. Wycoff, Co., 
344 U.S. 237, 244 (1952) (“The disagreement [underlying the declaratory relief action] must 
not be nebulous or contingent but must have taken on a fixed and final shape so that a court 
can see what legal issues it is deciding, what effect its decision will have on the adversaries, 
and some useful purpose to be achieved in deciding them.”); Old Colony Trust Co. v. 
Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 279 U.S. 716, 722 (1929) (considering whether “the 
proceedings before the Circuit Courts of Appeals or District Courts of Appeals on a petition 
to review are and can not be judicial, for they involve ‘no case or controversy,’ and without 
 
126 CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 15:1 
 
Supreme Court first reviewed a suit brought under a state declaratory 
judgment provision30 and when it later upheld the federal act.31   
The constitutionality of the FDJA was examined in Aetna Life Ins. Co. 
of Hartford, Conn. v. Haworth,32 where the Supreme Court recognized, 
“[t]he Declaratory Judgment Act of 1934, in its limitation to ‘cases of 
actual controversy,’ manifestly has regard to the constitutional provision 
and is operative only in respect to controversies which are such in the 
constitutional sense.”33  The Aetna court explained that the operation of the 
FDJA was procedural only, and in providing remedies and defining 
procedure, Congress was exercising its authority over the jurisdiction of the 
federal courts.34  In exercising this authority, Congress is not limited to 
traditional forms of relief or remedy.  “The judiciary clause of the 
Constitution ‘did not crystallize into changeless form the procedure of 1789 
as the only possible means for presenting a case or controversy otherwise 
cognizable by the federal courts.’”35  
The Aetna court examined what “controversy” meant in the context of 
the FDJA, holding the controversy must be “justiceable,” meaning it must 
not be “a difference or dispute of a hypothetical or abstract character” or 
“academic or moot.”36  Rather, the controversy must be “definite and 
concrete, touching the legal relations of the parties having adverse legal 
interests.”37  “It must be a real and substantial controversy admitting of 
specific relief through a decree of a conclusive character, as distinguished 
from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state 
of facts.”38  Thus, the Supreme Court held constitutional the FDJA’s 
authorization for the federal courts to issue declaratory judgment “in a case 
                                                                                                                          
this a Circuit Court of Appeals, which is a constitutional court, is incapable of exercising its 
judicial function.”); Muskrat v. U.S., 219 U.S. 346,356 (1911) (recognizing the federal 
judicial power is “limited to require an application of the judicial power to cases and 
controversies.”);  In re Pacific Railway Commission Ry Comm’n, 32 F. 241, 255 (1887) 
(recognizing the Eleventh Amendment’s modification of Article III, Section 2 of the 
Constitution and the requirement of a “case or controversy.”); Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 
419, 431-32 (1793) (discussing the relationship between criminal cases and the “case or 
controversy” requirement of Article III, Section 2.).   
30  Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis R. Co. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249,258 (1933). 
31  Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 239-240 (1937). 
32  Id. 
33  Id.. 
34  Id. at 240. 
35  Haworth, 300 U.S. at 240. 
36  Id.  
37  Id. at 240-241.   
38  Id. at 241 (citations omitted). 
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of actual controversy within its jurisdiction.”39 The jurisdictional qualifier 
incorporated into Congress’s grant of declaratory judgment jurisdiction 
raises the question: when is it proper for a federal court to abstain from 
entertaining an action that falls within the literal terms of a Congressional 
grant of jurisdiction?  This question was addressed by the United States 
Supreme Court in Fair Assessment in Real Estate Assn., Inc. v. McNary40 
and Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman,41 and has been answered, 
in part, by a number of juridical doctrines that provide the federal courts 
with procedural mechanisms whereby they may refrain from exercising 
their Congressionally-ordained jurisdiction.  These doctrines include the 
concepts of justicability,42 ripeness,43 forum non conveniens,44 and 
exhaustion of remedies,45 and the rules restricting the exercise of federal 
                                                                                                                 
39  Id. 
40  454 U.S. 100, 102, 104-105 (1981).  
41  319 U.S. 293, 296-297 (1943). 
42  The concept of justiciability allows the court to directly abstain.  A federal court 
may found its determination regarding abstention in the related doctrines of standing and 
mootness.  The Supreme Court has recognized that the doctrine of standing has both a 
constitutional and a prudential aspect.  See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 193-94 
(1996) (recognizing prudential objectives served by jus tertii limitations on standing); 
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 804 (1985) (recognizing the prudential 
limitation that a “litigant must normally assert his own legal interest rather than those of 
third parties”); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975) (court addressed the prudential 
limitations that were “closely related to Article III concerns but essentially matters of 
judicial self-governance”). 
43  Discretionary abstention is also reflected in the doctrine of ripeness.  A 
comparison of Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961) and Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 
(1968) makes it difficult to discern whether a particular result rests upon the court’s view of 
constitutional necessity or on prudential choice.  See, e.g., United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 
330 U.S. 75, 89-90 (1947) (challenges to the Hatch Act unripe with the intimation that the 
result was constitutionally mandated.)  Mootness is an intentionally open-ended concept of 
justiciability. In an action for equitable relief, for example, the reasonable expectation of 
repetition cannot render the matter moot despite a defendant’s voluntary discontinuance of a 
challenged practice.  See, e.g., United States v. W. T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632-33 
(1953). 
44  Another aspect of indirect abstention comes in the form of forum non conveniens.  
See e.g., Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507 (1947) (noting that “the principle of 
forum non conveniens is simply that a court may resist imposition upon its jurisdiction even 
when jurisdiction is authorized by the letter of a general venue statute.”). 
45  The federal courts may abstain when a plaintiff has not exhausted alternative 
routes of relief before seeking a federal forum.  As an example, “[a] refusal to enjoin a state 
criminal proceeding is, in effect, a holding that a federal court will consider the federal 
claim only on direct review or on habeas corpus, after the state proceeding has come to an 
end.  And Pullman abstention represents a decision that a federal court will not consider the 
constitutionality of a state statute until the plaintiff has sought a clarification of state law . . . 
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jurisdiction in probate and domestic relations matters.46  The federal courts 
have embraced with ever-increasing latitude, the judicially created doctrine 
of abstention,47 as a basis for declining jurisdiction.   
Application of the abstention doctrine was traditionally restricted to 
cases arising in equity;48 however, the doctrine has distended through 
application and is now applied to “all cases in which a federal court is 
asked to provide some form of discretionary relief.”49  And the federal 
courts have, over the years, amassed a collection of jurisprudential defenses 
from which a federal judge may select a predicate for his or her decision to 
abstain.  These include “equitable discretion, federalism and comity, 
                                                                                                                          
from a state court.”  David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 
558 (1985).  See also Ex Parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 245 (1886) (a prisoner, about ready to 
be tried in a state court, sought federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that the state 
statute was unconstitutional).  Id. at 245.  In the opinion, Justice Harlan, observed that the 
federal court had jurisdiction over the case and that in special circumstances it might be 
appropriate for a court to grant relief before the conclusion of the state proceedings.  Id. at 
245-50.  However, the court held that the state court should typically be permitted to 
proceed without federal interference so long as the state court was competent to consider the 
federal claim at involved.  Id. at 251. 
46  The view that Article III excludes jurisdiction in domestic relations cases was 
originally supported by the assertion that certain matters were beyond the historical scope of 
law and equity.  In Fontain v. Ravenel, Chief Justice Taney argues in his dissent that the 
federal courts lacked power to enforce a charitable bequest, as the “chancery jurisdiction” of 
the federal courts conferred by Article III extended only to matters of which chancery had 
jurisdiction “in its judicial character as a court of equity,” and not the “prerogative powers, 
which the king, as parens patriae, in England, exercised through the courts,” which 
remained with the sovereign states. 58 U.S. (17 How.) 369, 391-93 (1854). Taney’s analogy 
to the chancery courts was subsequently attacked by Judge Weinstein, who, in Spindel v. 
Spindel, criticized the development of the federal domestic relations exception.  283 F.Supp. 
797, 802 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).  Judge Weinstein challenged the historical premise, noting that 
matrimonial matters were handled by the ecclesiastical courts and not in chancery acting in 
its judicial capacity.  In  Ankenbrandt v. Richards, Justice White eschews any mention of the 
historical arguments about the scope of chancery jurisdiction, instead relying on judicial 
precedent and Congress’s failure to object to them. 504 U.S. 689, 700-01 (1992). 
47   Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 716-18, 722 (noting the 
“abstention doctrine is of a distinct historical pedigree . . . .”).  
48  Id. at 717.  The Quackenbush court stated that “it has long been established that a 
federal court has the authority to decline to exercise its jurisdiction when it ‘is asked to 
employ its historic powers as a court of equity.’”  Id. 
49   Id. at 730.  The abstention doctrine is oft used in spite of Justice O’Connor’s 
notation in Quackenbush, that it requires “rare circumstances” for the federal courts to 
“relinquish their jurisdiction in favor of another forum.”  Id. at 722.  See, e.g., Great Lakes 
Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293, 297 (1943); Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 
66, 69-70, 72-73 (1971). 
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separation of powers, and judicial administration.”50  Regardless of the 
doctrinal justification invoked in a given case, the propriety of an Article 
III court’s voluntary divestiture of the jurisdiction conferred by Congress is 
a matter of broad debate.  
One side of the debate has ostensible origins in Chief Justice John 
Marshall’s opinion in Cohen v. Virginia,51 in which Justice Marshall stated, 
“[w]e have no more right to decline the exercise of a jurisdiction which is 
given than to usurp that which is not given.  The one or the other would be 
treason to the constitution.”52 This is the position championed by Professor 
Martin H. Redish of Northwestern University School of Law.  Professor 
Redish views a federal court’s invocation of the abstention doctrine as an 
usurpation of congressional power to define the jurisdiction of the federal 
courts, which is fundamentally incompatible with basic premises of 
constitutional democracy.53  Redish argues:  
 
“[t]he fact that Congress theoretically could delegate to the 
court the power to modify otherwise unlimited legislation [] does 
not mean that Congress has actually done so.  It is this improper 
leap from theoretical possibilities to assumed fact that ultimately 
undermines any defense of the [] abstention model from a 
separation-of-powers attack.”54  
 
In The Federalist No. 80, however, Alexander Hamilton, writing on the 
extent of the power of the judiciary outlined in Article III, stated, “[i]f there 
are such things as political axioms, the propriety of the judicial power of a 
government being co-extensive with its legislative, may be ranked among 
                                                                                                                 
50  Shapiro, supra note 45, at 579.  See also, Gene R. Shreve, Pragmatism without 
Politices – A Half Measure of Authority for Jurisdictional Common Law, 1991 B.Y.U. L. 
REV. 767, 768, 797, 803 (1991) (arguing abstention is appropriate when based on concerns 
about judicial administration, but not when based on matters requiring “political choices”).  
51  19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821).  
52   Id. at 404. 
53   Martin H. Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial 
Function, 94 YALE. L.J. 71, 77-79 (1984).  See also, Anthony J. Dennis, The Illegitimate 
Foundations of the Younger Abstention Doctrine, 10 U. BRIDGEPORT L. REV 311, 312 
(1990); Donald L. Doernberg, “You can Lead a Horse to Water . . . “: The Supreme Court’s 
Refusal to Allow the Exercise of Original Jurisdiction Conferred by Congress, 40 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV. 999, 1000-02 (1989-1990).  
54  MARTIN H. REDISH, THE FEDERAL COURTS IN THE POLITICAL ORDER: JUDICIAL 
JURISDICTION AND AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORY 59-60 (1991).  
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the number.”55  Indeed, the federal jurisdiction decisions seem to suggest 
that the Supreme Court plays at least as great a role as Congress in defining 
boundaries of jurisdictional authority.56  Legal commentators who address 
the issue have described the process as a “dialogic process of congressional 
enactment and judicial response.”57  “[A]s experience and tradition teach, 
the question whether a court must exercise jurisdiction and resolve a 
controversy on its merits is difficult, if not impossible, to answer in gross.  
And the courts are functionally better adapted to engage in the necessary 
fine tuning than is the legislature.”58   
While opinions on the propriety of abstention proliferate, the federal 
courts continue to utilize the doctrine as a weir constructed to regulate their 
case loads.  In doing so, the federal courts have sullied the litigation 
process with an ever-increasing number of externally inconsistent and 
internally under-justified opinions in which discretionary abstention is 
exercised.   
 
II. EVOLUTION OF THE ABSTENTION DOCTRINE 
 
The abstention doctrine is a byproduct of the coherence of principles of 
comity and federalism.59  The abstention doctrine may also be surmised as 
a judicial effort to balance conflicting goals: militating on one side is the 
desire to eschew premature constitutional determinations, to defer to state 
                                                                                                                 
55  THE FEDERALIST NO. 80 (Alexander Hamilton).   
56   See, e.g., Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 519-20 (1982) (adopting a “total” 
exhaustion rule); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 85, 90-91 (1977) (changing procedural 
default test from “deliberate bypass” to “cause and prejudice” without any evidence of 
changed Congressional intent); Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 449-52 (1986) 
(discussing Congressional adoption of judicially crafted “ends of justice” standard). 
57   Barry Friedman, A Different Dialogue: The Supreme Court, Congress and 
Federal Jurisdiction, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 2 (1990).  
58  Shapiro, supra note 45 at 574.  See also Richard A. Matasar & Gregory S. Bruch, 
Procedural Common Law, Federal Jurisdictional Policy, and Abandonment of the Adequate 
and Independent State Grounds Doctrine, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1291, 1337-38 (1986) 
(arguing that, at best, abstention can be seen as fine tuning the implicit intent of Congress 
that is reflected in jurisdictional grants).   
59  See 17A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 
4241 (3d ed. 2007), for a brief comparison of abstention doctrine.  In justifying federal 
abstention, the Supreme Court has expressed concern for comity and federalism interests.  
The relationships between coordinate state and federal judicial systems is often referred to 
as “comity.”  The relationships between state and federal sovereigns is often referred to as 
federalism. See also, Randall P. Bezanson, Abstention: The Supreme Court and Allocation 
of Judicial Power, 27 VAND. L. REV. 1107, 1151 (1974) (asserting abstention is the highest 
form of cooperative judicial federalism). 
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courts on state law questions, to avoid duplicative proceedings, and to 
interfere as little as possible with state processes.60  Competing interests 
include upholding a litigant’s choice of a federal forum, respecting the 
policies of the jurisdictional grants, and effectuating timely vindication of 
federal rights.61  
While there are many types of abstention,62 the principle variants are 
Pullman abstention, to allow resolution of unsettled questions of state 
law;63 Burford abstention, exercised in deference to state sovereignty and 
policies;64 and Younger abstention, which avoids interference with state 
criminal proceedings.65  These types of abstention “are not rigid 
pigeonholes into which federal courts must try to fit cases.  Rather, they 
reflect a complex of considerations designed to soften the tensions inherent 
in a system that contemplates parallel judicial processes.”66  The Pullman, 
Burford, and Younger doctrines are, however, supplemented by a more 
general requirement that the federal courts yield discretionary jurisdiction 
when judicial economy demands.67   
                                                                                                                 
60  See 17A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 3d § 
4241 (2007). 
61  The federal court’s application of the abstention doctrine has, in some cases, 
prevented the federal issue from ever being heard.  In United States v. Leiter Minerals, Inc., 
for example, the federal court abstained from hearing the federal issue in deference to state 
authority, and then dismissed the matter as moot when it returned to the federal court eight 
years after the abstention doctrine was originally invoked. 381 U.S. 413 (1965). 
62  Many concepts can be labeled as part of the abstention doctrine.  A case in point is 
exemplified by so-called Rooker-Feldman abstention which originated from Rooker v. 
Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923) and D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 
462 (1983).  Under Rooker-Feldman abstention, the court recognizes that Congress has 
conferred original jurisdiction and not appellate jurisdiction on the federal district courts.  
Rooker, 263 U.S. at 415; Feldman, 460 U.S. at 486.  Rooker-Feldman abstention prevents a 
state court party from having two bites at the apple:  one through the state courts with a 
petition to the U.S. Supreme Court and the other through a subsequent collateral attack 
originating in the federal courts.  Rooker, 263 U.S. at 415; Feldman, 460 U.S. at 486.  
Where a party begins litigating a constitutional matter in state court and stops short of 
petitioning the U.S. Supreme Court, and then initiates litigation in federal court regarding 
the same constitutional matter, the federal district court can abstain.  Rooker-Feldman 
abstention essentially holds that the federal district court does not have appellate jurisdiction 
over the state court.  The state court party should continue through the state court 
proceeding up through the U.S. Supreme Court. 
63  See R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 501 (1941). 
64  See Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 319 (1943). 
65  See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 53 (1971). 
66  Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 11 n.9 (1987). 
67  See, e.g., Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co. of Am., 316 U.S. 491, 495 (1942) 
(discussing abstention based on concerns of judicial economy and federalism); Will v. 
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A. PULLMAN ABSTENTION 
 
The Pullman abstention doctrine68 arose out of the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Railroad Comm’n of Texas v. Pullman Co..69 It is to be applied 
by the federal courts in cases presenting federal constitutional issues and 
questions of state law, provided that the federal court finds that the federal 
question presented may be made moot or will otherwise be substantively 
implicated by a state court determination of the relevant state law question 
involved in the case.70  “When a federal constitutional claim is premised on 
an unsettled question of state law, the federal court should stay its hand in 
order to provide the state courts an opportunity to settle the underlying 
state-law question and thus avoid the possibility of unnecessarily deciding 
a constitutional question.”71  Thus, the Pullman abstention doctrine has 
traditionally been touted as a reflection of the Supreme Court’s doctrinal 
goal of constitutional avoidance.72  Pullman abstention may, however, be 
                                                                                                                          
Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655, 663-64 (1978) (endorsing the Brillhart reasoning in a 
federal declaratory judgment action).  
68  See, e.g., Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 75-76 (1997); 
Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 236 (1984); Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. 
Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 9 (1983); Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 427-28 (1979); 
Ohio Bureau of Employment Servs. v. Hodory, 431 U.S. 471, 477 (1977); Harris County 
Comm’rs Court v. Moore, 420 U.S. 77, 83 (1975); but cf. Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 32 
n.1 (1993) (stating that while the Pullman doctrine is referred to as a form of abstention, 
“[t]o bring out more clearly, however, the distinction between those circumstances that 
require dismissal of a suit and those that require postponing consideration of its merits, it 
would be preferable to speak of Pullman ‘deferral.’ Pullman deferral recognizes that federal 
courts should not prematurely resolve the constitutionality of a state statute... .”). 
69  312 U.S. 496 (1941). 
70  Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 814 (1976) 
(quoting County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 189 (1959)).  
71  Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 285 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting).  See also Sims, 442 
U.S. at 427-28 (stating “that a federal action should be stayed pending determination in state 
court of state-law issues central to the constitutional dispute.”); Elkins v. Moreno, 435 U.S. 
647, 662 (1978); Hodory, 431 U.S. at 477 (stating that Pullman abstention “involves an 
inquiry focused on the possibility that the state courts may interpret a challenged state 
statute so as to eliminate or at least to alter materially, the constitutional question 
presented.”); Boehning v. Ind. State Employees Ass’n., Inc., 423 U.S. 6,8 (1975); Askew v. 
Hargrave, 401 U.S. 476, 4787 (1971); Reetz v. Bozanich, 397 U.S. 82, 87 (1970); Dresner 
v. City of Tallahassee, 375 U.S. 136, 136-38 (1964); Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 363 U.S. 
207, 211-12 (1960); City of Meridian v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 358 U.S. 639, 640 (1959); 
Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 105 (1944); R.R. Comm’n v. 
Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 499-501 (1941). 
72  See, e.g., Cincinnati v. Vester, 281 U.S. 439, 448-49 (1930) (constitutional 
questions will not be decided unnecessarily).  The roots of Pullman abstention cannot be 
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founded more on concerns relating to the preservation of federalism than 
on constitutional avoidance.  By its own statement, the Pullman holding 
was crafted with the intent to avoid “‘needless friction’ between federal 
pronouncements and state policies.”73   
                                                                                                                          
fully understood without reference to the historical context in which the opinion was issued.  
Justice Frankfurter suggests in the Pullman opinion that the constitutional question 
“touche[d] on a sensitive area of social policy.” Pullman, 312 U.S. 498 (1941) (emphasis 
added).  The “sensitive” area to which Justice Frankfurter refers is the same divisive issue 
that at one time threatened to dissolve the union of the United States. As Professor Resnik 
points out: 
 
The testimony [in the record] in Pullman is filled with 
discussion of how white women feel ‘a little bit safer ... 
with a white man conductor in charge of that car’ * * * 
Further, in an effort to prop up the porters’ claims, the 
record also includes testimony aimed at distinguishing ‘the 
Pullman porter[s]’ as ‘pretty high-classed colored men,’ 
from those other kids of ‘colored men.’ 
In 1941 it was [] not obvious how federal 
constitutional law would decide [the equal protection] 
question [that Pullman presented].  It was not easy because 
national norms did not readily trump local customs and 
prejudices, indeed because national norms may well have 
shared such prejudices.  Thus the case was ‘sensitive,’ the 
engagement between federal and state law fraught with 
anxiety, and if some other point of law could determine the 
outcome without having to consider announcing federal 
constitutional rules about discrimination based on race, 
more the better.  
 
Judith Resnik, Rereading “The Federal Courts”: Revising the Domain of Federal 
Court Jurisprudence at the End of the Twentieth Century, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1021, 1039 
(1994).  It often goes unnoted that Pullman’s predecessor, Siler v. Louisville & Nashville 
R.R. Co., held that if a controverted question of state law was presented in an action that 
also presented a federal constitutional question, the federal district court should decide the 
state question first.  The doctrine of Pullman abstention, therefore, may have been a result of 
the judiciary’s unwillingness to interfere in race relations in the southern states.  See, e.g., 
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (affirming Louisiana statute providing separate 
railway carriages for “the white and colored races,” thereby establishing “separate but 
equal” requirement); Cumming v. Richmond County Bd. of Educ., 175 U.S. 528 (1899) 
(refusing to interfere in state operation of segregated high schools); Berea College v. 
Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45 (1908) (affirming conviction of private college that violated 
Kentucky law requiring separation of the races); Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78 (1927) 
(allowing Mississippi to exclude a child of Chinese ancestry from attending school reserved 
for whites). 
73  Reetz v. Bozanich, 397 U.S. 82, 87 (1970) (citing Pullman, 312 U.S. at 500). 
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Pullman abstention is an equitable doctrine74 and, therefore, cannot be 
formulaically applied.75  Rather, the court must make a sui generis 
determination as to whether the proper combination of elements exist in a 
given controversy.76  In order to exercise Pullman abstention, a case must 
present two conjunctive77 elements or “special circumstances.”78  There 
must be an unanswered question of state law79 and the unsettled question of 
state law must be susceptible80 to a construction that will moot, limit, or 
                                                                                                                 
74  Despite the doctrine’s equitable foundations, the court has applied the doctrine, 
without discussion, to actions at law in several significant cases.  See Fornaris v. Ridge Tool 
Co., 400 U.S. 41, 44 (1970); United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Ideal Cement Co., 369 U.S. 134, 
135-36 (1962); Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 363 U.S. 207, 212 (1960).  
75  See Gonzales v. Gonzales, 536 F.2d 453, 457 (1st Cir. 1976); Ahrensfeld v. 
Stephens, 528 F.2d 193, 196-97 (7th Cir. 1975) (stating abstention is a discretionary, judge-
made doctrine to be applied on a case-by-case basis only where special circumstances exist); 
Muskegon Theaters, Inc. v. City of Muskegon, 507 F.2d. 199, 201 (6th Cir. 1974) 
(abstention is equitable doctrine turning on case-by-case facts). 
76  Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 375 (1964). 
77  See, e.g., Id. at 375-76 (1964) (abstention not automatic merely because doubtful 
issue of state law exists); and Meredith v. City of Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 234 (1943) 
(absent a potential limiting of a constitutional issue, abstention is inappropriate because a 
challenged state law is difficult or uncertain). 
78  See Meredith, 320 U.S. at 234 (describing the two constituent elements as 
“exceptional circumstances”).  The Supreme Court has not been consistent in its 
determination of when the special circumstances warranting Pullman Abstention are 
present.  Compare Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 439  (abstention inappropriate 
because no ambiguity existed in state statute), with Reetz, 397 U.S. 82, 86-87  (abstention 
appropriate because it was “conceivabl[e]” that a state court would interpret the state statute 
at issue contrary to its clear import, thus avoiding a constitutional question).   
79  Federal courts should avoid making forecasts of state law.  R.R. Comm’n of Tex. 
v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 499-500 (1941).  The court in Baggett noted that Pullman 
abstention was generally appropriate only when state law issues are complex, unsettled, or 
unclear.  Baggett, 377 U.S. at 375 (citing Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472, 492 (1949)) (when 
federal court has been granted jurisdiction, abstention should not impede normal course of 
action).  Under Baggett, the federal courts pre-abstention analysis should take into 
consideration the nature of the unsettled question.  
80  Similar inconsistencies exist in the Courts’ articulation of whether an unsettled 
state law question is subject to a limiting construction which is dispositive of the federal 
question.  One articulation requires a challenged statute to be “obviously susceptible to a 
limiting construction.”  Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 251 n.14 (1967) (where state 
statute not obviously susceptible of a limiting construction, abstention is inappropriate).  A 
different articulation focuses on whether the state statute is “fairly” susceptible to such a 
construction.  See, e.g., Harman v. Forsinius, 380 U.S. 528, 534-35 (1965) (where state 
statute not fairly susceptible to limiting construction, abstention inappropriate).  A third 
articulation finds abstention appropriate where it is “conceivable” that the challenged state 
statute is amenable to a limiting construction.  Fornaris v. Ridge Tool Co., 400 U.S. 41, 43-
44 (1970) (abstention appropriate where “conceivable” that phrase in state statute amenable 
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otherwise alter the consideration the federal court will give to the federal 
question.81   
While the federal courts may have enjoyed application of Pullman 
abstention at the outset, the Court’s enthusiasm for the doctrine seemed to 
wane once the judiciary was faced with the reality of the resultant delay 
caused by the prescribed procedure.82  Critics argue for abolition of the 
doctrine on that basis.83   The viability and value of abstention as a judicial 
construct has ever been criticized by members of the Supreme Court whose 
reasoning gave form to the doctrine.84  The Pullman abstention doctrine 
                                                                                                                          
to limiting construction).  The Court has suggested that these articulations of susceptibility 
are interchangeable.  See Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984). 
81  Pullman, 312 U.S. at 499-501.  See also Harris County Comm’rs v. Moore, 420 
U.S. 77, 84 (1975) (where resolution of unclear state law question would avoid or 
significantly modify the federal constitutional question, abstention is appropriate); Kusper v. 
Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 54-55 (1973) (where state statute is susceptible of a construction by 
the state judiciary that would avoid or modify necessity of reaching a federal constitutional 
question, abstention is appropriate).  
82  See, e.g., Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. O’Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951) (eight year 
delay in federal court’s adjudication of issue); United States v. Leiter Minerals, Inc., 381 
U.S. 413 (1965) (dismissed as moot eight years after abstention was ordered). 
 The delay associated with Pullman abstention merits particular consideration 
where a state statute is challenged on grounds that it inhibits first amendment freedoms.  
Baggett, 377 U.S. at 378-379.  Because the delay from abstention would seriously inhibit 
the realization of first amendment rights, these claims are exempt from Pullman abstention.  
See, e.g., Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 251-252 (1967).  See also Procunier v. Martinez, 
416 U.S. 396, 404 (1974) (where first amendment challenge involved, abstention was 
inappropriate).  Cf. Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat’l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 308-09 
(1979) (Court abstained from deciding first amendment challenge to an ambiguous state law 
limiting deceptive union publicity aimed at consumers of agricultural products).  The 
Court’s concern over the heightened cost of abstention involving first amendment rights has 
also been expressed in cases involving basic civil liberties.   See, e.g., Harman, 380 U.S. at 
537. 
83  See, e.g., Philip P. Kurland, Toward a Cooperative Judicial Federalism: The 
Federal Court Abstention Doctrine, 24 F.R.D. 481, 488-491 (1959); Marth A. Field, The 
Abstention Doctrine Today, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 590, 605-606 (1976-1977); David P. Currie, 
The Federal Courts and the American Law Institute, Part II, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 268, 317 
(1969).   
84  See, e.g., England v. La. State Bd. Of Med. Exam’rs, 375 U.S. 411, 425 (1964) 
(Douglas, J. concurring), Justice Douglas urged reconsideration of the doctrine:  
 
I was a member of the Court that launched Pullman 
and sent it on its way.  But if I had realized the creature it 
was to become, my doubts would have been far deeper than 
they were. 
Pullman from the start seemed to have some qualities 
of a legal research luxury.  As I said in Clay v. Sun Ins. 
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enjoyed a healthy resurgence, however, under the Burger Court.85  In fact, 
in 1970, the Supreme Court arguably expanded Pullman abstention in Reetz 
v. Bozanich86 where the Court addressed whether constitutional challenges 
to state law were appropriately decided by state or federal courts.87   
                                                                                                                          
Office, 363 U.S. 207, 228, 80 S.Ct. 1222, 1234, 4 L.Ed.2d 
1170 (dissenting opinion): 
‘Some litigants have long purses. Many, however, can 
hardly afford one lawsuit, let alone two.  Shuttling the 
parties between state and federal tribunals is a sure way of 
defeating the ends of justice.  The pursuit of justice is not 
an academic exercise. There are no foundations to finance 
the resolution of nice state law questions involved in 
federal court litigation.  The parties are entitled-absent 
unique and rare situations-to adjudication of their rights in 
the tribunals which Congress has empowered to act.’ 
As recently stated by the late Judge Charles E. Clark 
of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, ‘As a result of this 
doctrine, individual litigants have been shuffled back and 
forth between state and federal courts, and cases have been 
dragged out over eight- and ten-year periods.’  Federal 
Procedural Reform and States’ Rights, 40 TEX. L. REV. 
211, 221 (1961). 
Professor Charles A. Wright described the results that 
occurred when this doctrine was applied to a suit to enjoin 
the enforcement of a state statute restricting the rights of 
state employees to join unions: ‘* * * after five years of 
litigation, including two trips to the Supreme Court of the 
United States and two to the highest state court, the parties 
still had failed to obtain a decision on the merits of the 
statute.’  The Abstention Doctrine Reconsidered, 37 TEX. L. 
REV. 815, 818 (1959). 
 
 Id. 
85  Chief Justice Warren Earl Burger served as chief justice from 1969 to 1986.  See, 
e.g., Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat. Union, 442 U.S. 289 (1979); Harris County 
Com’rs Court v. Moore, 420 U.S. 77 (1975); Lake Carriers’ Ass’n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 
498 (1972).  
86  397 U.S. 82, 85 (1970).  In Wisconsin v. Constantineau, however, the Court 
upheld the decision of a lower federal court which invalidated a Wisconsin statute providing 
for public posting, without notice or hearing to the person affected, the name of any person 
whose excessive drinking produced specified social problems. 400 U.S. 433 (1971).The 
statute “forbid the sale or gift of intoxicating liquors to one who ‘by excessive drinking’ 
produces described conditions or exhibits specified traits, such as exposing himself or 
family ‘to want’ or becoming ‘dangerous to the peace’ of the community.”  Id. at 434.  It 
was argued that the statute violated both state and federal law.  Id.  Upon review, the United 
States Supreme Court declined to abstain, stating, “the naked question, uncomplicated by an 
unresolved state law, is whether that Act on its face is unconstitutional.”  Id. at 439. 
 
2008] IS TIMING EVERYTHING? 137 
 
                                                                                                                          
 The Supreme Court attempted to reconcile the Reetz and Constantineau decisions 
in Harris County Commissioners Office v. Moore, in which the high Court ordered a federal 
court in Texas to abstain in order to allow a Texas state court to construe relevant provisions 
of the Texas Constitution. 420 U.S. 77 (1975).  In Moore, a number of displaced justices of 
the peace and constables, along with voters who had lived in their precincts, brought an 
action for injunctive relief based on claim that the Texas statute pursuant to which they had 
been removed violated due process and equal protection clauses of Fourteenth Amendment.  
Id.  The Texas statute provided for removal of justices of the peace and constables when 
boundaries are changed and, as a result, more than the allotted number of justices or 
constables reside within a changed district.  Id.  The Moore court noted that in Constantineu, 
it had declined to order abstention because the “the federal due process claim was not 
complicated by an unresolved state-law question, even though the plaintiffs might have 
sought relief under a similar provision of the state constitution.”  Id. at 85 n.8.  However, the 
Court continued, “where the challenged statute is part of an integrated scheme of related 
constitutional provisions, statutes, and regulations, and where the scheme as a whole calls 
for clarifying interpretation by the state courts, we have regularly required the district courts 
to abstain.” Id. (citing Reetz). 
87  Reetz, 397 U.S. at 85.  Federal litigants are not prohibited from litigating 
constitutional claims in state court.  The litigant who submits the claims to state court will 
be bound by the state court decision and will not be able to avoid a contrary decision by re-
litigating the claims in federal court.  England v. La.  Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 375 U.S. 411, 
419 (1960).   
 Commentators have criticized this procedure because the “shuttling” of cases 
between federal and state courts exacerbates the potential for delay already inherent in 
Pullman abstention.  See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 52 at 305-06 
(4th ed. 1983); Martha A. Field, Abstention in Constitutional Cases: The Scope of the 
Pullman Abstention Doctrine, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1071, 1085 (1974) (where author observes 
that substantial delay occurs due to “shuttling” between federal and state court).  However, 
the Court in England justified this delay because the federal plaintiff had the option of 
avoiding the delay by submitting all issues to the state court.  375 U.S. at 418 (plaintiff may 
waive the right to federal court and submit his entire case to the state courts, thus avoiding 
much of the delay and expense associated with the abstention process).  
 Reetz involved a federal suit for declaratory judgment regarding the 
constitutionality of Alaska fishing laws and regulations, which limited eligibility to receive 
certain commercial fishing licenses. 397 U.S. at 83.  The Reetz plaintiffs argued these 
regulations violated the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution as well as 
provisions of the Alaska Constitution – one reserving fishing rights to the people and the 
other proscribing exclusive fishing rights.  Id. at 84.  The case was decided by a federal 
three-judge court, from which there was direct review by the U.S. Supreme Court.  Id. at 85.  
On appeal, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded to the federal court with directions to 
abstain.  Id. at 87.  The Reetz Court cited Pullman’s doctrinal aim of avoiding “needless 
friction” between federal pronouncements and state policies. Id.  The Court stated, “[t]he 
instant case is the classic case in that tradition, for here the nub of the whole controversy 
may be the state constitution. Id. The constitutional provisions relate to fish resources, an 
asset unique in its abundance in Alaska. Id.  The statute and regulations relate to that same 
unique resource, the management of which is a matter of great state concern.”  Id.  
Certification of unsettled state law issues to the state’s highest court may be effective 
alternative to Pullman Abstention.  See Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 150-51 (1976) 
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B. BURFORD AND THIBODAUX ABSTENTION 
 
In its paradigmatic application, the Pullman doctrine involves 
challenges to state action in which resolution of an unsettled question of 
state law may eliminate or narrow a corresponding federal question.  
Burford v. Sun Oil Co.,88 and Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of 
Thibodaux89 establish an alternative theory of abstention, sometimes 
referred to as “administrative” abstention. Burford abstention recognizes 
and gives deference to the sovereignty of state governments in carrying out 
domestic policy, and endeavors to preempt conflict between state and 
federal judiciaries.90  Burford abstention is intended to facilitate the federal 
courts giving “proper regard for the rightful independence of state 
governments in carrying out their domestic policy.”91   
                                                                                                                          
(certification saves time, energy and resources and aids in developing cooperative judicial 
federalism).   
88   319 U.S. 315 (1943). 
89  360 U.S. 25 (1959). 
90  Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 727-28 (1991).  
91  Burford, 319 U.S. at 318 (quoting Pennsylvania v. Williams, 294 U.S. 176, 185 
(1935)). The Supreme Court applied Burford abstention, rather than Pullman, in Ala. Pub. 
Serv. Comm. v. Southern R.R., and in doing so, provided the first glimpse of the doctrinal 
juggernaut abstention would become. 341 U.S. 341 (1951).  Chief Justice Vinson, writing 
for the Court, conceded that there was no unsettled question of state law and there was no 
facial challenge to the constitutionality of a state statute; however, he reasoned:  
 
This Court has held that regulation of intrastate 
railroad service is ‘primarily the concern of the state.’. . . 
.Statutory appeal from an order of the Commission is an 
integral part of the regulatory process under the Alabama 
Code. . . . And, whatever the scope of review of 
Commission findings when an alleged denial of 
constitutional rights is in issue, it is now settled that a 
utility has no right to relitigate factual questions on the 
ground that constitutional rights are involved. . . . As 
adequate state court review of an administrative order 
based upon predominantly local factors is available to 
appellee, intervention of a federal court is not necessary for 
the protection of federal rights. Equitable relief may be 
granted only when the District Court, in its sound discretion 
exercised with the ‘scrupulous regard for the rightful 
independence of state governments which should at all 
times actuate the federal courts,’ is convinced that the 
asserted federal right cannot be preserved except by 
granting the ‘extraordinary relief of an injunction in the 
federal courts’. . . .   
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Thibodaux involved a proceeding by the City of Thibodaux to take the 
property of Louisiana Power & Light by eminent domain.92  Louisiana 
Power & Light removed the case to federal court on the basis of diversity 
                                                                                                                          
Id. at 346-50.  The Supreme Court has not, however, 
invoked the Burford abstention doctrine since Southern 
Railroad.  In McNeese v. Bd. of Educ., for example, the 
Court refused to abstain in a school desegregation case in 
which the state presented evidence of an administrative 
procedure available to handle the dispute.  373 U.S. 668, 
673-674 (1963).  The majority opinion distinguished 
McNeese from Burford, stating the federal right at issue 
was not “in any way entangled in a skein of state law that 
must be untangled before the federal case can proceed.” Id. 
at 674.  Moreover, the Court held, “it is immaterial whether 
respondents’ conduct is legal or illegal as a matter of state 
law”.  Id.  Since Southern Railroad, the Court’s continued 
recognition of the Burford abstention doctrine is limited to 
discussion of the doctrine each time it eschews its 
application.  See, e.g., Colo. River Water Conservation 
Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 815-16 (1976) 
(finding Burford abstention inappropriate because the state 
law was settled and although a federal decision might 
conflict with that of a state tribunal, it would not 
impermissibly impair state water policy); Ankenbrandt v. 
Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 705-06 (1992) (recognizing that 
Burford abstention would be appropriately applied in a 
domestic dispute that presents “difficult question of state 
law bearing on the policy problems of substantial import 
whose importance transcends the result in the case then at 
bar,” but holding this is not that case); New Orleans Pub. 
Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 362 
(1989) (refusing to apply Burford abstention and holding, 
“[w]hile Burford is concerned with protecting complex 
state administrative processes from undue federal 
interference, it does not require abstention whenever there 
exists such a process, or even in all cases where there is a 
‘potential for conflict’ with state regulatory law or 
policy.”); Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 731 (1996) 
(overturning Ninth Circuit’s application of Burford, stating 
“federal courts have the power to dismiss or remand cases 
based on abstention principles only where the relief being 
sought is equitable or otherwise discretionary.  Because this 
was a damages action, we conclude that the District Court’s 
remand order was an unwarranted application of the 
Burford doctrine.”). 
92  360 U.S. 25.  
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of citizenship.93  The core issue addressed in the case was whether, as a 
matter of Louisiana law, municipalities had authority to condemn public 
utility properties.94  The action was stayed by the federal district court 
pending a state declaratory judgment action and a decision by the Louisiana 
Supreme Court.95  The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district 
court, but was in turn reversed by the United States Supreme Court.96  
While the Supreme Court’s opinion in Thibodaux dedicates some time 
to discussing competing views on the propriety of federal abstention,97 the 
Court’s holding is foreshadowed in the opening lines of the opinion, which 
incorporate a quote from Justice Holmes.98 “The fundamental fact is that 
eminent domain is a prerogative of the state, which on the one hand, may 
be exercised in any way that the state thinks fit, and, on the other, may not 
be exercised except by an authority which the state confers.”99  Justice 
Holmes words are no less than an oracle, for the Supreme Court directs the 
lower federal courts to abstain, and the majority opinion concludes 
extolling the wisdom of the district court judge who saw fit to stay the 
matter.100  The Court’s holdings in Thibodaux and Burford, as well as those 
later cases in which Burford abstention was not applied,101 reveal how 
unpredictably the doctrine can be invoked. 
                                                                                                                 
93  Id. at 25. 
94  Id. at 26. 
95  Id. at 30. 
96  Id.  
97  The Court notes, “[w]e have increasingly recognized the wisdom of staying 
actions in the federal courts pending determination by a state court of decisive issues of state 
law.”  Id. at 27. However, the Court also recognizes, “that the mere difficulty of state law 
does not justify a federal court’s relinquishment of jurisdiction in favor of state court 
action.” Id.  
98  La. Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 26 (1959). 
99  Id. (quoting Madisonville Traction Co. v. St. Bernard Mining Co., 196 U.S. 239, 
257 (1905). 
100  Caught between the language of an old but uninterpreted statute and the 
pronouncement of the Attorney General of Louisiana, the district judge determined to solve 
his conscientious perplexity by directing utilization of the legal resources of Louisiana for a 
prompt ascertainment of meaning through the only tribunal whose interpretation could be 
controlling-the Supreme Court of Louisiana.  The District Court was thus exercising a fair 
and well-considered judicial discretion in staying proceedings pending the institution of a 
declaratory judgment action and subsequent decision by the Supreme Court of Louisiana.  
See id. at 30. 
101  See, e.g., Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 731 (1996); 
Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 706 (1992); New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. 
Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 364 (1989); Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. 
United States, 424 U.S. 800, 815 (1976). 
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Regardless of the consistency in application, however, the ambition of 
the abstention doctrine crafted in Burford and Thibodaux is a laudable one.  
The doctrine seeks to secure the sovereignty of the states from federal 
intrusion.102  A federalist system that mediates the dual sovereignty of the 
state and federal governments is a defining feature of our system of 
government.103  The concurrent sovereignty of the states is only limited by 
the supremacy clause of the Constitution,104 and the federal government is, 
by constitutional grant, a government of limited powers.105  Thus, the states 
                                                                                                                 
102  See La. Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 33 (1959); Burford 
v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 332 (1943).  
103  Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991).  For the advantages and 
disadvantages of the dual sovereignty system see generally Michael W. McConnell, 
Federalism:  Evaluating the Founders’ Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484, 1491 (1987); 
Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third 
Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV.  1, 3-10 (1988).  
 Originally, under the Articles of Confederation, Congress could not directly 
legislate the American people; it could only do so with the approval of the states.  New York 
v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 163 (1992) (“Congress could not directly tax or legislate 
upon individuals; it had no explicit ‘legislative’ or ‘governmental’ power to make binding 
‘law’ enforceable as such.”)  (citing Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty & Federalism, 96 
YALE L.J. 1425, 1447 (1987).  The inadequacy of the federal government to directly 
legislate was responsible in part for the Constitution Convention.  Id.  The Constitutional 
Convention sought to restructure Congress and give it the power to legislate without the 
need of state legislatures.  Alexander Hamilton addressed this issue in The Federalist No. 16 
by stating: 
 
[the new national government] must carry its agency 
to the persons of the citizens.  It must stand in need of no 
intermediate legislations ... the government of the Union, 
like that of each State, must be able to address itself 
immediately to the hopes and fears of individuals. 
 
 THE FEDERALIST NO. 16 at 116 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).  
During the Constitutional Convention, delegates debated two different plans – the Virginia 
and New Jersey Plans – by which the federal government could exercise its powers.  New 
York, 505 U.S. at 164.  Under the Virginia Plan, Congress could exercise legislative 
authority directly without employing the states as intermediaries.  Id.  The New Jersey Plan 
mirrored the status quo and Congress would continue to require the approval of the states 
before legislating.  Id.  A repeated objection to the New Jersey Plan was that it might require 
Congress to coerce the states into implementing legislation.  Id.  Consequently, the 
Convention adopted a constitution in which Congress would exercise its legislative 
authority directly over individuals, rather than over states.  Id. at 165.  One reason for 
adopting the Virginia Plan was to avoid coercing states as separate sovereign entities.  
Instead, Congress would be able to legally coerce individuals.  Id. 
104  U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2. 
105  U.S. CONST., amend. X. 
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concede their sovereign authority only where the Constitution recognizes 
the supremacy of federal authority.106   
In essence, Burford abstention acknowledges that the state court 
systems have been created by independent state legislatures as an integral 
part of an administrative system that regulates activities of substantial 
interest to the many states.107  State courts are given broad discretion to 
participate in the development of regulatory policy,108 and Burford 
abstention gives due recognition to this discretion by limiting federal 
participation in any case in which exercise of federal jurisdiction may 
interfere with a state’s development of a consistent regulatory policy.109 
 
C. YOUNGER ABSTENTION: EQUITABLE RESTRAINT 
 
The doctrine of equitable restraint established in Younger v. Harris110 
has its origins in the English Courts of Chancery.111  It was a venerable 
maxim of the Chancery Courts that equity will not enjoin a criminal 
prosecution.112  The Chancery Courts also embraced the notion that equity 
will not provide relief unless there is no adequate remedy at law and the 
                                                                                                                 
106  See Gregory, 501 U.S. at 457. 
107  See Peter M. Shane, Interbranch Accountability in State Government and the 
Constitutional Requirement of Judicial Independence, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 21, 42-
43 (1998) (discussing separation of powers issues raised by the administrative code of state 
courts). 
108  See id.  Oftentimes state legislatures make the state courts an integral part of an 
administrative system that regulates activities of substantial interest to the state.  When 
states grant regulatory power to their courts they grant two forms of discretion.  First, they 
grant discretion to devise remedies that are appropriate given the particular facts at issue.  
Second, they vest in the courts the discretion to decide whether to grant relief at all.  
109  Courts are divided on whether Burford abstention must be premises upon the 
existence of prior state administrative agency action.  Compare Quackenbush v. Allstate 
Insurance Co., 517 U.S. 706, 733 (1996) (Kennedy J. concurring) (“[t]he fact that a state 
court rather than an agency was chosen to implement California scheme provided more 
reason, not less, for the Federal Court to stay its hand.”); Nelson v. Murphy, 44 F.3d 497, 
500-01 (7th Cir. 1995) (agencies role in dispute was not essential to Burford abstention) and 
Friedman v. Revenue Mgmt., 38 F.3d 668, 671 (2d Cir. 1994) (Burford abstention 
appropriate in absence of agency action) with St. Paul Ins. Co. v. Trejo, 39 F.3d 585, 589 
(5th Cir. 1994) (“[t]he concerns of governing the Burford abstention doctrine are not present 
in the instant case.  St. Paul’s lawsuit does not involve a state administrative proceeding.”). 
110  401 U.S. 37 (1971). 
111  Id. at 44. 
112  Shapiro, supra note 50, at 550 n. 37. 
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plaintiff is threatened with irreparable injury.113  These principles were 
adopted in the states in the First Judiciary Act, which stated, “suits in 
equity shall not be sustained in ... the courts of United States, in any case 
where plain, adequate, and complete remedy may be had at law.”114  This 
provision, however, precluded equitable relief only if the remedy was 
available in law in a federal court; it did not alter a criminal defendant’s 
right to a federal forum.115  
The doctrine of Younger abstention116  holds, “a federal court should 
not enjoin a state criminal prosecution begun prior to the institution of the 
federal suit except in very unusual situations, where necessary to prevent 
immediate irreparable injury.”117  The Younger doctrine speaks to the 
relationship between the courts of the United States and those of its former 
                                                                                                                 
113  Whitten, Federal Declaratory and Injunctive  Interference with State Court 
Proceedings: The Supreme Court and the Judicial Discretion, 53 N.C. L. REV. 591, 598. 
114   Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20 § 16, 1 STAT. 82 (1789).   
115  Atlas Life Ins. Co. v. W.I. Southern, Inc., 306 U.S. 563, 569 (1939). 
116  See generally Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 689; New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc.,, 491 
U.S. 350 (1989); Deakins v. Monaghan, 484 U.S. 193 (1988).  The Younger doctrine has 
been criticized by scholars.  See, e.g., Owen W. Fiss, Dombrowski, 86 YALE L.J. 1103, 
1117-1120 (1977); Judge Gibbons, Our Federalism, 12 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1087, 1087-
1088 (1978); Douglas Laycock, Federal Interference with State Prosecutions: The Need for 
Prospective Relief, 1977 SUP. CT. REV. 193, 194; Aviam Soifer & Hugh C. MacGill, The 
Younger Doctrine: Reconstructing Reconstruction, 55 TEX. L. REV. 1141, 1141-1143 
(1977).   
117  Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 68 (1971).  See also Colo. River Water 
Conservation Dist., 424 U.S. at 816 (1976) (observing that “abstention is inappropriate 
where, absent bad faith, harassment, or a patently invalid state statute, federal jurisdiction 
has been invoked for the purpose of restraining state criminal proceedings.”).  Although the 
Younger doctrine has equitable origins, the Supreme Court has, in large part, abandoned the 
equitable foundation in cases subsequent to Younger.  See George D. Brown, When 
Federalism and Separation of Powers Collide – Rethinking the Younger Abstention 59 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 114, 120 n.56 (1990) (post Younger cases have strayed form the equitable 
rationale); Howard B. Stravitz, Younger Abstention Reaches a Civil Maturity:  Pennzoil Co., 
v. Texaco Inc., 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 997, 1007 (1989) (Younger’s progeny toppled the 
equitable pillar in favor of federalism and comity); Larry W. Yackle, Explaining Habeus 
Corpus, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 991, 1042 (1985) (arguing that the Supreme Court has eroded the 
equitable foundation to the doctrine).  Numerous lower court cases have addressed Younger 
as a case based on comity and federalism as opposed to equity.  See, e.g. Warmus v. 
Melahn, 62 F.3d 252, 255 (8th Cir. 1995) vacated 116 S. Ct. 2493 (1996) (Younger 
Abstention has its roots in comity and federalism); Schilling v. White, 58 F.3d 1081, 1084 
n.3 (6th Cir. 1995) (Younger doctrine is founded in federalism and comity); Gwyned 
Properties v. Lower Gwyned Township, 970 F.2d 1195, 1199-2000 (3d Cir. 1992) (Younger 
abstention arose primarily from the notion of comity). 
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colonial master.  It is also yet another iteration of the federal courts mantra 
to avoid “undue interference” with state court proceedings.118   
The Supreme Court subsequently extended the application of Younger 
abstention to “civil enforcement proceedings,119 [including] civil 
proceedings involving certain orders that are uniquely in furtherance of the 
state courts’ ability to perform their judicial functions.”120   The Supreme 
Court, in Middlesex County Ethics Committee v. Garden State Bar Ass’n,121 
articulated a three part test for Younger’s application:  (1) the proceedings 
must be ongoing;122 (2) the proceedings must implicate important state 
interests;123 and (3) there must be an adequate opportunity in the state court 
proceeding to raise constitutional challenges.124   
Prior to the Court’s decision in Quackenbush v. Allstate Insurance 
Co.,125 there existed, however, a question as to whether Younger abstention 
was appropriate when a state court defendant sought legal relief.126  Before 
                                                                                                                 
118  Several federal courts have concluded that adjudication of damages actions does 
not “unduly” interfere with state proceedings to a level contemplated by the Supreme Court.  
See, e.g., Alexander v. Ieyoub, 62 F.3d 709, 713 (5th Cir. 1995). 
119  New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 368 
(1989) (citing Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 604 (1975)); Trainor v. Hernandez, 
431 U.S. 434, 444 (1977); Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 423 (1979).  In Huffman v. Pursue 
Ltd. the court expanded Younger to encompass quasi-criminal cases.  420 U.S. 592, 607 
(1975).  In Moore v. Simms  the court applied Younger to a Texas child welfare agency case 
involving the loss of custody of a child based on allegations of child abuse.  442 U.S. 415, 
431 (1979).  See also,  Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 447 (1977) (applying Younger 
to attachment proceedings); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 338-39 (1977) (applying Younger 
to appeals of contempt of court and judgment creditor actions).  Younger has also been 
applied to non-judicial cases.  See, e.g., Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n v. Dayton Christian 
Sch., Inc., 477 U.S. 619, 622 (1986); Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 237-38 
(1984). 
120  New Orleans Pub. Serv., 491 U.S. at 368 (citing Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 
336, n.12 (1977) (civil contempt order); Pennzoil, 481 U.S. at 13 (1987) (requirement for 
the posting of bond pending appeal). 
121  457 U.S. 423 (1982). 
122  Id. at 432. 
123  Id. 
124  Id.; see also Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n v. Dayton Christian Sch. Inc., 477 U.S. 
619, 619-620, 628-629 (1986) (holding that even if complainants in an administrative 
hearing could not raise First Amendment objections, it was sufficient that the objections 
could be raised in judicial review of the administrative hearings by the state courts). 
125  517 U.S. 706 (1996). 
126  Id. at 719 (citing Deakins v. Monaghan, 484 U.S. 193, 202, & n.6 (1988) 
(reserving the question whether Younger requires abstention in an action for damages)); see 
also Jeremy D. Sosna, Comment, Quackenbush v. Allstate Insurance Co.: The Continuing 
Saga of the Younger Doctrine, 82 IOWA L. REV. 275, 277-78 (1996). 
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Quackenbush was decided, a considerable number of federal district courts 
were applying the Younger doctrine and abstaining from hearing a matter 
when legal relief was being sought by the federal court plaintiff.127  A 
unanimous court in Quackenbush held that a federal district court does not 
have the authority to abstain when the district court plaintiff seeks only 
non-discretionary relief.128  While the Quackenbush decision only expressly 
spoke in relation to Burford abstention, the context of and equitable 
justifications for Younger abstention, support an argument that 
Quackenbush may also constrain a federal court’s power to invoke the 
principles of Younger in cases at law.129 
 
D. BRILLHART V. EXCESS INSURANCE COMPANY 
 
The exercise of federal jurisdiction under the FDJA is discretionary.130  
It is not surprising then that the question of whether a federal court should 
                                                                                                                 
127  See, e.g., Schilling v. White, 58 F.3d 1081, 1083-84 n.3 (6th Cir. 1995) (electing 
to stay proceedings rather than adjudicate a §1983 damages action ), Simpson v. Rowan, 73 
F.3d 134, 137-39 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that the Younger doctrine authorizes the court to 
stay the damages action pending the outcome of state court proceedings while not directly 
permitting abstention); Kyricopoulos v. Town of Orleans, 967 F.2d 14, 15-16 (1st Cir. 1992) 
(dictum) (inferring that dismissal of a damages action pursuant to Younger was proper; 
however, the court did not address the issue because the parties waived application of the 
abstention doctrine), Traverso v. Penn, 874 F.2d 209, 213 (4th Cir 1989) (staying the federal 
damages action), Williams v. Hepting, 844 F.2d 138, 144-45 (3d Cir. 1988) (also staying 
federal damages action), Mann v. Jett, 781 F.2d 1448, 1449 (9th Cir. 1986) (where damages 
action would “have a substantially disruptive effect upon ongoing state proceedings 
Younger abstention may be appropriate”), Giulini v. Blessing, 654 F.2d 189, 193-194 (2d 
Cir. 1981) (staying a damages action pursuant to the Younger doctrine), Parkhurst v. 
Wyoming, 641 F.2d 775, 777-78 (10th Cir. 1981) (also staying a damages action); McCurry 
v. Allen, 606 F.2d 795, 799 (8th Cir. 1979) rev’d on other grounds, 449 U.S. 90 (1980) 
(staying a damages action).  
128  In Quackenbush, the court did not delineate between broad categories of 
“equitable” or legal relief.  517 U.S. 706, 730.  The court also reviewed various abstention 
doctrines as a function of “the historic discretion exercised by federal courts ‘sitting in 
equity.’”  Id. at 716-718.  After distinguishing all authority to the contrary, the court held 
that abstention in damages actions contravened the principles of abstention.  Id. at 720-21. 
129  See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 396-97 n.3 (1975). 
130   Under the FDJA, a federal court “may declare the rights and other legal relations 
of any interested party.”  28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2001) (emphasis added).  Federal jurisdiction in 
Pullman abstention cases is not discretionary; jurisdiction exists over federal questions 
pursuant to the 1875 Judiciary Act.  Judiciary Act of 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470.  Federal 
jurisdiction in Burford abstention cases likely arises through diversity of citizenship; 
jurisdiction in federal diversity cases was granted to the federal courts in the Judiciary Act 
of 1789.  Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 79.  Federal jurisdiction in Younger 
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abstain from exercising its jurisdiction in suits brought under the FDJA 
generated yet another test for application of the abstention doctrine.131  The 
question of whether a federal court should abstain from hearing a claim 
brought under the FDJA most commonly arises when a parallel case is 
pending in state court at the time the federal court is presented with the 
declaratory judgment suit.132  Brillhart v. Excess Insurance Co. of America 
sets forth the analysis to be applied by the federal courts in exercising their 
discretion to deny jurisdiction in these concurrent federal cases.133   
In fact, Brillhart itself involved a request for declaratory judgment 
brought by Excess Insurance Company of America in federal court while a 
state suit was pending.  Excess asked the federal court to define the extent 
and nature of Excess’s obligations in the pending state court proceeding.134  
The Brillhart court found that it would “ordinarily be uneconomical as well 
as vexatious for a federal court to proceed in a declaratory judgment suit 
where another suit is pending in a state court presenting the same issues, 
not governed by federal law, between the same parties.”135   
The Brillhart analysis is designed for consideration of issues of comity, 
judicial economy, and federalism.136  These issues arise when a petition for 
declaratory judgment is filed in federal court pursuant to the FDJA, and 
over which the federal court has discretionary jurisdiction, when there is a 
separate pending state court case that involves additional state law issues.137  
This is particularly true if the state action includes non-removable state 
court claims or a forum defendant is named in the state action, precluding 
its removal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b).  
The Brillhart Court declined to establish a test for the exercise of 
federal jurisdiction, however, the lower federal courts have developed from 
the holding a three-pronged test for determining whether jurisdiction is 
                                                                                                                          
abstention cases arises from the grant in the First Judiciary Act.   Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 
20, 1 Stat. 82.  
131  In Quackenbush v. Allstate Insurance Co., the Supreme Court found that the 
various forms of the abstention doctrine had been extended to “certain classes of declaratory 
judgments…, the granting of which is generally committed to the court’s discretion.”  517 
U.S. at 718.  It is interesting to note that in Great Lakes Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293, 297-
298 (1943) and Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 69, 72-73 (1971) the Supreme Court 
recognized that the actions were brought pursuant to the FDJA but did not exercise 
discretion under this statute; rather, it applied a different form of the abstention doctrine. 
132  Maryland Casualty Co. v. Knight, 96 F.3d 1284, 1288 (9th Cir. 1996). 
133  316 U.S. 491, 495-96 (1942). 
134  Id. at 492-93. 
135  Id. at 495. 
136  Gov’t Employees Ins. Co. v. Dizol, 133 F.3d, 1220 1225-26 (9th Cir. 1998).  
137   See id. at 1224. 
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appropriately exercised.  The lower federal courts have identified some 
variation of the following three factors:  (1) a district court should avoid 
needless determination of state law issues; (2) it should discourage litigants 
from filing declaratory judgment actions as a means of forum shopping;138 
                                                                                                                 
138  This factor really asks whether the parties are “forum shopping.”  The term 
“forum shopping” typically refers to a party’s act of seeking the most advantageous venue in 
which to try a particular case.  See Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whiteford, Venue 
Choice and Forum Shopping in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held 
Companies, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 11, 14 (1991) (attempting to have a case heard in a forum 
where it has the greatest chance of success is commonly defined as “forum shopping”); see 
also Kimberly Jade Norwood, Shopping for a Venue: The Need for More Limits on Choice, 
50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 267, 268 (1996) (when a party attempts to have its action tried in a 
particular court or jurisdiction where the most favorable judgment or verdict may be 
rendered is “forum shopping”).  Although “forum shopping” has a pejorative connotation, 
various courts have recognized the place of forum shopping as part of potential sound 
litigation strategy.  See, e.g., Goad v. Celotex Corp., 831 F.2d 508, 512 n.12 (4th Cir. 1987) 
(“there is nothing inherently evil about forum shopping”).  The court in Celotex called 
forum shopping a “spectre, or ... strawman depending on whose ox is being gored.”  Id. at 
512.  Indeed, Justice Rehnquist in Keeton v. Hustler Magazine Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 779 
(1984), approvingly refers to the forum shopping strategy, calling it “no different from the 
litigation strategy of countless plaintiffs who seek a forum with favorable substantive or 
procedural rules for sympathetic, local populations.”  See generally Douglas G. Baird, Loss 
Distribution, Forum Shopping and Bankruptcy: A Reply to Warren, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 815, 
825-26 (1987) (recognizing that once two different courts are available in which to litigate 
disputes, there is an incentive to forum shop).  Indeed, selecting a forum is part of the social 
fabric.  See, e.g., Michael Bradley & Cindy A. Schipani, The Relevancy of the Duty of Care 
Standard and Corporate Governance, 75 IOWA L. REV. 1, 65-66 (1990) (documenting the 
reincorporation of many firms in Delaware to seek the protection of a new statute limiting 
directors’ liability).  Convenience of counsel may be a strong motivator in the choice of 
forums.  See Neal Miller, An Emperical Study of Forum Choices in Removal Cases Under 
Diversity and Federal Question Jurisdiction, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 369, 400 (1992). 
 Commentators have written about the abuse of forum shopping.  See Kevin M. 
Clermont & Theodore Isenberg, Exorcising the Evil of Forum Shopping, 80 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1507, 1508 n.1 (1995) (discussing examples of plaintiffs seeking venues in certain 
south Texas counties where judges are sympathetic and juries are generous).  See also Coast 
Mfg. Co, Inc.. v. Keylon, 600 F. Supp. 696 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).  In that case, the court refused 
Rule 11 sanctions against plaintiffs’ forum shopping efforts:   
 
[I]t is understandable that litigants will do a small 
amount of artful conniving to gain access to the diversity 
jurisdiction of the federal courts, and for a long time such 
efforts have been tolerated.  It is our duty to protect the 
diversity jurisdiction from abuses of the sort attempted 
here.  In doing so, we need not become punitive.   
 
Id. at 698.   
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and (3) its should avoid duplicative litigation.139 These factors are not, 
however, exhaustive.  An Article III court may also consider, for example, 
whether a subsequent declaratory judgment action (either in federal or state 
court) is filed merely for the purposes of procedural fencing.140   
 
E. COLORADO RIVER WATER CONSERVATION DISTRICT V. UNITED 
STATES 
 
The validity of the Brillhart analysis was called into question in 
Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, in which the 
Pullman, Burford, and Younger abstention doctrines were summarized by 
the Court.141  The Court there identified three situations in which it was 
appropriate for a federal court to abstain from exercising jurisdiction, 
which correspond to the three abstention doctrines discussed above:  
 
(a) Abstention is appropriate ‘in cases presenting a federal 
constitutional issue which might be mooted or presented in a 
different posture by a state court determination of pertinent state 
law.’  
(b) Abstention is also appropriate where there have been 
presented difficult questions of state law bearing on policy 
problems of substantial public import whose importance 
transcends the result in the case then at bar.  
c)  Finally, abstention is appropriate where, absent bad faith, 
harassment, or a patently invalid state statute, federal jurisdiction 
has been invoked for the purpose of restraining state criminal 
proceedings, state nuisance proceedings antecedent to a criminal 
prosecution which are directed at obtaining the closure of places 
exhibiting obscene films, or collection of state taxes.142 (citations 
omitted). 
 
The Colorado River court held that abstaining from exercising federal 
jurisdiction is the exception, not the rule.  The court stated that 
“[a]bdication of the obligation to decide cases can be justified under [the 
abstention] doctrine only in the exceptional circumstances where the order 
                                                                                                                 
139   Dizol, 133 F.3d at 1225.   
140  Id. at 1225 n.5. 
141  424 U.S. 800 (1976).   
142  Id. at 814-16. 
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to the parties to repair to the State court would clearly serve an important 
countervailing interest.”143  The court went on to identify the “exceptional 
circumstances” that would justify federal abstention as those that exist 
when there are concurrent proceedings in the state and federal courts and 
considerations of “wise judicial administration, giving regard to 
conservation of judicial resources and comprehensive disposition of 
litigation” suggest that the federal court should abstain.144 
The “exceptional circumstances” test set forth in Colorado River was 
subsequently affirmed and expanded in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital 
v. Mercury Construction Corp.145  The Moses H. Cone court formulated 
two additional factors for the “exceptional circumstances” test:  (1) the 
determination of which forum’s substantive law would govern the merits of 
the litigation; and (2) the adequacy of the state forum to protect the rights 
of the parties.146  The Court emphasized the federal courts’ “virtually 
unflagging obligation” to exercise the jurisdiction given to them.147  In spite 
                                                                                                                 
143   Id. at 813.  
144   Id. at 817-18. 
145  460 U.S. 1 (1983). 
146  Id. at 23-27.  Five justices in Will v. Calvert Fire Insurance Co. (Blackmun, J., 
concurring and four dissenters) supported the consideration of controlling state law as a new 
factor.  437 U.S. 665,  667-68 (Blackmun, J. concurring); Id. at 668-677 (Brennan, J., 
dissenting).   
147  Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 15 (1983).  
After Moses H. Cone, the circuit courts were divided over which standard governed a 
district court’s decision to stay or dismiss a declaratory judgment action where there were 
parallel state proceedings.  The Third, Fourth, Fifth and Ninth circuits applied the 
discretionary standard articulated in Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co. of America, 316 U.S. 491, 
497-98 (1942) and Calvert, 319 U.S. at 663.  See, e.g., Travelers Ins. Co. v. La. Farm 
Bureau Fed’n Inc., 996 F.2d 774, 778 n.12 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding Colorado River and 
Moses H. Cone inapplicable in declaratory judgment actions); Mitcheson v. Harris, 955 F.2d 
235, 237-38 (4th Cir. 1992) (also holding the “exceptional circumstances” test of Colorado 
River and Moses H. Cone inapplicable in declaratory judgment actions); Terra Nova Ins. Co. 
v. 900 Bar, Inc., 887 F.2d 1213, 1223 n.12 (3d Cir. 1989); Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Robsac Indus., 
947 F.2d 1367, 1369-70 (9th Cir. 1991); Chamberlain v. Allstate Ins. Co., 931 F.2d 1361, 
1366 (9th Cir. 1991) (Colorado River test does not apply to declaratory relief actions 
because they have “special status”). 
 However, other circuit courts applied the narrow exceptional circumstances test 
developed in Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 
813 (1976), and expanded in Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. 15-16.  See, e.g., Employers Ins. of 
Wausau v. Mo. Elec. Works, 23 F.3d 1372, 1374 n.2 (8th Cir. 1994) (following Colorado 
River and Moses H. Cone, the district court was not justified in staying or dismissing a 
declaratory relief action absent “exceptional circumstances”); Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. 
Conn. Bank & Trust Co., 806 F.2d 411, 413 (2d Cir. 1986) (also holding that district court 
should have considered Colorado River and Moses H. Cone applicable).  A middle ground 
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of the Court’s reiteration of this directive, the proposition Colorado 
River148 stands for is: if the case does not fall within the narrow holdings of 
Pullman, Burford and Younger, there are other principles which may also 
be invoked so as to result in the federal court’s abstention.149   
 
F. WILTON V. SEVEN FALLS COMPANY  
 
The disparate standards set forth in Colorado River and Brillhart 
resulted in a split in the federal courts regarding the proper test for 
abstention in a federal declaratory judgment action.150 The Supreme Court 
granted certiorari in the case of Wilton v. Seven Falls Company expressly 
for the purpose of “resolv[ing] Circuit conflicts concerning the standard 
governing a district court’s decision to stay a declaratory judgment action 
in favor of parallel state litigation and the applicable standard for an 
appellate court’s review of a district court’s decision to stay a declaratory 
judgment action.”151  
In determining that Brillhart properly governs the abstention question 
in causes of action brought under the FDJA, the Supreme Court noted the 
difficulty of reconciling the jurisdictional mandate inherent in the Colorado 
River “exceptional circumstances” requirement with the discretionary 
nature of federal declaratory judgment jurisdiction.152  The Court reiterated 
with approval Professor Borchard’s observation that “[t]here is ... nothing 
                                                                                                                          
between these two positions can be found.  See, e.g., Fuller Co. v. Ramon I. Gil, Inc., 782 
F.2d 306, 308-11 (1st Cir. 1986) (where the state court has expended significant resources 
through the adjudicatory process of the state law claims, federal courts may decline to 
exercise jurisdiction over a declaratory judgment action). 
148  Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 814-17. 
149  Id. at 817 (stating that “[a]lthough this case falls within none of the abstention 
categories, there are principles unrelated to considerations of proper constitutional 
adjudication and regard for federal-state relations which govern in situations involving the 
contemporaneous exercise of concurrent jurisdictions, either by federal courts or by state 
and federal courts.”). 
150  Compare Employers Ins. of Wausau, 23 F.3d at 1374, n.2 (applying “exceptional 
circumstances” test of Colorado River and Moses H. Cone), and Lumbermens, 806 F.2d at 
413 (2d Cir. 1986) (also applying Colorado River and Moses H. Cone), with La. Farm 
Bureau, 996 F.2d at 778 n.12 (the “exceptional circumstances” test of Colorado River and 
Moses H. Cone is inapplicable in declaratory judgment actions), and Mitcheson, 955 F.2d at 
237-238 (also holding that there are no reasons to apply Colorado River in declaratory 
judgment cases). 
151   515 U.S. 277, 281 (1995) (citations omitted). 
152  Id. at 286-89. 
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automatic or obligatory about the assumption of ‘jurisdiction’ by a federal 
court”153 to hear a declaratory judgment action.  Rather, the Court declared: 
By the Declaratory Judgment Act, Congress sought to place a remedial 
arrow in the district court’s quiver; it created an opportunity, rather than a 
duty, to grant a new form of relief to qualifying litigants.  Consistent with 
the nonobligatory nature of the remedy, a district court is authorized, in the 
sound exercise of its discretion, to stay or to dismiss an action seeking a 
declaratory judgment before trial or after all arguments have drawn to a 
close.  In the declaratory judgment context, the normal principle that federal 
courts should adjudicate claims within their jurisdiction yields to 
considerations of practicality and wise judicial administration.154 
Thus, the Wilton court concluded that the principles of comity, judicial 
economy, and federalism incorporated into the Brillhart test are those that 
are determinative of the federal courts’ exercise of jurisdiction in 
declaratory judgment actions.155 
The Wilton Court left open, however, an important question of 
jurisdictional procedure.  The Court specifically narrowed application of its 
holding, stating, “[w]e do not attempt at this time to delineate the outer 
boundaries of that discretion in other cases, for example, cases raising 
issues of federal law or cases in which there are no parallel state 
proceedings.”156  Relevant to the insurance coverage context is the question 
of abstention when an insurer has brought a federal suit for declaratory 
judgment while the injured plaintiff litigates the defendant tortfeasor’s 
liability in an underlying state court suit.  On the face of it, two such cases 
do not meet requirements of Brillhart, that is, they do not “present[] the 
same issues ... between the same parties.”157  Brillhart’s application to an 
insurance coverage issue becomes slightly more convoluted, however, once 
the liability and damages claim is concluded and the injured state court 
plaintiff files an action for garnishment against the insurer.158    
 
G. FEDERAL CIRCUIT DECISIONS POST-WILTON 
 
Federal circuit court decisions answering the Wilton question have 
yielded inconsistent results.  On the one hand, there is a disheartening trend 
                                                                                                                 
153  Id. at 288. 
154   Id. 
155   Id. at 289-90.  
156   Id. at 290. 
157  Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 282 (5th Cir. 1995). 
158  Id. 
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among the circuit courts to inflate the boundaries of Brillhart abstention in 
insurance coverage actions and to view the “parallel state proceeding” as 
only a factor to be considered in applying Wilton, rather than a predicate to 
Wilton’s application.159  The circuit courts’ movement toward unjustified 
and mechanical invocation of the abstention doctrine is most poignantly 
reflected in the recent decisions of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeal in 
Travelers Indemnity Company v. Bowling Green Professional Associates, 
P.L.C.160  The Bowling Green decision demonstrates that, in practice, some 
federal courts have moved so far from the origins of the abstention doctrine 
that the juridical policies once mirrored in the doctrine are now reflected 
only as a tarnished doubt as to the propriety of the federal courts’ actions.   
There are, however, other federal decisions to consider.  There are 
opinions out of the Eighth,161 Tenth,162 and Fourth163 circuits that mitigate 
the impact of decisions like Bowling Green.  These courts recognize that 
                                                                                                                 
159  See, e.g., Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Ind-Com Elec. Co., 139 F.3d 419, 423 (4th Cir. 
1998) (holding “[t]here is no requirement that a parallel proceeding be pending in state court 
before a federal court should decline to exercise jurisdiction over a declaratory judgment 
action ... the existence or nonexistence of a state court action is simply one consideration 
relevant to whether to grant declaratory relief.”); Polido v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 
110 F.3d 1418, 1423 (9th Cir. 1997) (“[T]he dispositive question is not whether the pending 
state proceeding is ‘parallel,’ but rather, whether there was a procedural vehicle available to 
the insurance company in state court to resolve the issues raised in the action filed in federal 
court.”); Golden Eagle Ins. Co. v. Travelers Cos., 95 F.3d 807, 810 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating 
that the existence of a parallel state court proceeding is a “major factor” in the 
determination, but “the absence of a parallel state proceeding is not necessarily dispositive; 
the potential for such a proceeding may suffice.”); Employers Reins. Corp. v. Karussos, 65 
F.3d 796, 799-801 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding that district court erred in accepting jurisdiction 
in insurance coverage declaratory judgment action on duties to defend and indemnify state 
court suit, where the state court action was purely a tort action and did not involve issues of 
coverage).  Polido, Golden Eagle, and Karussos have all been overruled on other grounds 
by Gov’t Employees Ins. Co. v. Dizol, 133 F.3d 1220, 1227 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that 
when district court has constitutional and statutory jurisdiction to hear case under the 
Declaratory Judgment Act, district court may entertain action without sua sponte addressing 
whether jurisdiction should be declined).  See also Sherwin-Williams Co. v. Holmes 
County, 343 F.3d 383, 394 (5th Cir. 2003) (“This court finds that a per se rule requiring a 
district court to hear a declaratory judgment action is inconsistent with the discretionary 
Brillhart and Wilton standard....  The lack of a pending parallel state proceeding should not 
automatically require a district court to decide a declaratory judgment action, just as the 
presence of a related state proceeding does not automatically require a district court to 
dismiss a federal declaratory judgment action.”).  
160  495 F.3d 266 (6th Cir. 2007).  
161  Scottsdale v. Detco Indus., Inc., 426 F.3d 994, 997 (8th Cir. 2005). 
162  United States v. City of Las Cruces, 289 F.3d 1170, 1180-81 (10th Cir. 2002). 
163  Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Ind-Com Elec. Co., 139 F.3d 419, 422 (4th Cir. 1998). 
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the parallel state court proceeding is a prerequisite to application of the 
broad discretionary standard of Wilton.164  These courts hold that, in the 
absence of a parallel state court proceeding, an alternative analysis has to 
be applied to determine whether the federal court should exercise or abstain 
from exercising its jurisdiction.165  Emblematic of these courts reasoning is 
the Eighth Circuit’s holding in Scottsdale v. Detco Indus., Inc.166 
 
1. Bowling Green  
 
Bowling Green involved a Kentucky state court suit for wrongful death 
and an action for declaratory judgment brought in the Kentucky District 
Court.167  The state court suit for liability and damages was brought against 
Bowling Green Professional Associates, an out-patient drug treatment 
facility in Kentucky, after Bowling Green allowed one of its patients, Jonas 
Wampler, to drive after receiving a methadone treatment.168  Mr. Wampler 
navigated his vehicle into the oncoming traffic lane and collided head on 
with another vehicle, driven by Stephanie Caudill, causing the death of 
both Mr. Wampler and Ms. Caudill.169  Both Mr. Wampler and Ms. Caudill 
brought a wrongful death action against Bowling Green.170 The federal 
declaratory judgment action was brought by Bowling Green’s insurer, 
Travelers Indemnity Company.171  Bowling Green’s other insurer, 
Evanston Insurance Company, cross-claimed, seeking declaratory 
                                                                                                                 
164 Scottsdale, 426 F.3d at 996-998 (broad discretion granted in Wilton does not apply 
when there are no parallel state court proceedings); Las Cruces, 289 F.3d at 1182-84 
(requirement that district courts first determine whether the federal and state proceedings are 
parallel before considering Colorado River abstention analysis is consistent with the 
narrowness of the doctrine); Aetna Casualty, 139 F.3d at 423 (noting the existence of a 
parallel state court proceeding should be a significant factor in the district court’s 
determination). 
165  Scottsdale, 426 F.3d at 998 (applying a six factor test to determine whether 
abstention by the district court would be appropriate in a declaratory judgment action in 
which there are no parallel state court proceedings); Las Cruces, 289 F.3d. at 1183 
(applying Mhoon five factor analysis in absence of parallel proceedings); Aetna Casualty, 
139 F.3d at 423 (holding that even in the absence of a state court proceeding, the criteria 
outlined in Quarles, as well as the considerations of federalism, continue to be factors which 
the district court should balance when determining to assert jurisdiction over a declaratory 
judgment action). 
166  426 F.3d 994 (2005).   
167   495 F.3d 266, 268 (6th Cir. 2007). 
168  Id. 
169  Id. 
170  Id. 
171  Id. at 269. 
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judgment on the coverage issue as well.172  The Kentucky District Court 
granted the insurers’ motions for declaratory judgment and Bowling Green 
appealed.173  On appeal, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals sua sponte 
raised the issue of subject matter jurisdiction.174  
In considering whether the federal district court abused its discretion in 
exercising jurisdiction under the FDJA, the Bowling Green court 
considered the five factors enumerated in Grand Truck W. R.R. Co. v. 
Consol Rail Co.175  Namely:  
 
(1)   whether the declaratory action would settle the 
controversy; (2) whether the declaratory action would serve a 
useful purpose in clarifying the legal relations in issue; (3) whether 
the declaratory remedy is being used merely for the purpose of 
“procedural fencing” or “to provide an arena for a race for res 
judicata;” (4) whether the use of a declaratory action would 
increase friction between our federal and state courts and 
improperly encroach on state jurisdiction; and (5) whether there is 
an alternative remedy which is better or more effective.176 
 
The Sixth Circuit supplemented its analysis with three additional 
factors it previously recognized in Scottsdale Insurance Company v. 
Roumph.177  These include: 
 
(1)    whether the underlying factual issues are important to 
an informed resolution of the case; (2) whether the state trial court 
is in a better position to evaluate those factual issues than is the 
federal court; and (3) whether there is a close nexus between the 
underlying factual and legal issues and state law and/or public 
policy, or whether federal common law or statutory law dictates a 
resolution of the declaratory judgment action.178 
                                                                                                                 
172   Id. 
173  Travelers Indem. Co. v. Bowling Green Prof’l Assoc., 495 F.3d 266, 269 (6th Cir. 
2007). 
174  Id. at 271. 
175  Id. (citing Grand Truck W. R.R. Co. v. Consol Rail Co, 746 F.2d 326 (6th Cir. 
1984)). 
176  Id. at 271. 
177  Id. (citing Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Roumph, 211 F.3d 964, 967 (6th Cir. 2000)). 
178  Id. 
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As to the first two factors, the Sixth Circuit took exception to the 
District Court’s finding that these factors favored an exercise of 
jurisdiction, holding instead that because the “district court’s decision 
could not settle the controversy in the underlying state court litigation,” 
these factors weighed in favor of abstention.179   
The appellate court recognized that the declaratory judgment action 
would clarify the legal obligations of the two insurers, however, it held that 
the declaratory judgment action did nothing to settle the controversy or 
clarify the legal relationship between the other parties.180  As to the third 
                                                                                                                 
179  Travelers Indem. Co. v. Bowling Green Prof’l Assoc., 495 F.3d 266, 269 (6th Cir. 
2007). 
180  Id at 272.  The court noted that the two individuals that had brought wrongful 
death suits against Bowling Green, Mr. Wampler and Ms. Caudill, were not named as 
defendants in the declaratory judgment action, and as non-parties, they would not be bound 
by the entry of declaratory judgment. Id.  
 However, had the claims of Mr. Wampler and Ms. Caudill been consolidated with 
the declaratory judgment action, they could have been heard in federal court. Id.  The 
doctrine of pendent jurisdiction allows federal courts to hear state law claims brought jointly 
with a federal claim in federal court wherein a case is removed to federal court, even though 
the state law claims could not have been brought separately in federal court because by 
themselves they do not have an independent basis in federal jurisdiction.  See Richard D. 
Freer, A Principled Statutory Approach to Supplemental Jurisdiction, 1987 DUKE L.J. 34, 34 
(1987); Arthur R. Miller, Ancillary and Pendent Jurisdiction, 26 S. TEXAS L.J. 1, 1 (1985); 
Note, Problems of Judicial Power and Discretion in Federal Pendent Jurisdiction Cases, 7 
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 689, 690 (1981).  In United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 
725-27 (1966), the Supreme Court constructed a two prong test for pendent jurisdiction.  
The state law claims must be closely related to the action which is within the court’s 
statutory jurisdiction.  First, “power” exists to hear the state claim brought with the federal 
claim if both claims derive from a “common nucleus of operative facts: and the claims are 
such that plaintiff would ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding . . . 
.”  Id. at 725.  This power need not be exercised in every case because its justification lied in 
considerations of judicial economy, convenience and fairness to litigants; if these are not 
present a federal court should dismiss the claims without prejudice.  Id. at 726-27.  An 
intermediate part of the test was added after Gibbs which requires the court to determine 
whether the exercise of jurisdiction would violate a particular federal policy or whether it is 
an attempt by plaintiff to manufacture federal jurisdiction when it is otherwise foreclosed by 
statute.  Ambromovage v. United Mine Workers, 726 F.2d 972, 989-90 (3d Cir. 1984).  
Both pendent and ancillary jurisdiction are judicial doctrines that permit a Federal Court to 
exercise jurisdiction over a party or claim normally not within the scope of federal judicial 
power.  Bradford Gram Swing, Federal Common Law Power to Remand a Properly 
Removed Case, 136 U.PA. L. REV. 583, 584 n.9 (1987).  Pendent jurisdiction concerns the 
resolution of a plaintiff’s federal and state law claims against a single defendant in one 
action  while ancillary jurisdiction, on the other hand, typically involves claims by a 
defending party hauled into court against his will, or by another person whose rights might 
be irretrievably lost unless he can assert them in an ongoing action in a federal court.  Owen 
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factor, both courts agreed that there was no evidence that the declaratory 
judgment action brought by the insurers was an attempt at “procedural 
fencing” or a “race to judgment.”181  
As to the forth factor, the Court of Appeals once again took issue with 
the District Court’s holding, concluding instead that the Kentucky state 
court was in a better position to evaluate the terms and exclusions in the 
insurance contracts because they involved pure questions of state law.182  In 
particular, the Court of Appeals held that Kentucky law would govern the 
determination of whether Bowling Green’s act of allowing Mr. Wampler to 
leave the facility and drive his car was part of Mr. Wampler’s medical 
treatment and therefore constituted “medical negligence.”183  The Court of 
Appeals held, “[n]egligence questions are largely reserved to the states,” 
and “[h]ere, it appears that the issue has not been squarely resolved under 
Kentucky law.”184   
The Sixth Circuit further explained that the fourth factor did not fall in 
favor of exercising federal jurisdiction because “insurance contract 
interpretation are questions of state law with which the Kentucky state 
courts are more familiar and, therefore, better able to resolve.”185  In a 
statement that is reminiscent of the United States Supreme Court’s holdings 
in Burford and Thibodaux, the appellate court noted, “states regulate 
insurance companies for the protection of their residents, and state courts 
are best situated to identify and enforce the public policies that form the 
foundation of such regulation.”186 
                                                                                                                          
Equipment Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 370, 376 (1977).  Ancillary jurisdiction often arises 
in the context of counterclaims, cross-claims, third-party claims and interpleaders. Id. at 
375. 
181  Travelers Indem. Co. v. Bowling Green Prof’l Assoc., 495 F.3d 266, 272 (6th Cir. 
2007). 
182   Id.  
183  Id.  
184  Id.  
185  Id. at 273. 
186  Id.; See Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Roumph, 211 F.3d 964, 968-69 (6th Cir. 2000); 
Employers’ Fire Ins. Co. v. Danis Bldg. Constr. Co., No. 99-3987, 2000 WL 1234321, at *2 
(6th Cir. Aug. 22, 2000); Omaha Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 923 F.2d 446, 448 (6th 
Cir. 1991); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Mercier, 913 F.2d 273, 277 (6th Cir. 1990); Am. Home 
Assurance Co. v. Evans, 791 F.2d 61, 63 (6th Cir. 1986); Manley, Bennett, McDonald & 
Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 791 F.2d 460, 462 (6th Cir. 1986).).  But see, Gov’t 
Employees Ins. Co. v. Dizol, 133 F.3d 1220, 1225 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that “there is no 
presumption in favor of abstention in declaratory actions generally, nor in insurance 
coverage cases specifically.”). 
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The court further noted that the “lack of clearly-settled Kentucky 
precedent on the issue is compounded by the lack of a factual record.”187  It 
then compressed its analysis of the supplemental Roumph factors into a 
brief consideration of the fourth factor articulated in Grand Truck.188  The 
court noted that the fifth factor weighed in favor of state court jurisdiction, 
and then concluded by vacating the District Court’s judgment and 
remanding189 the matter with instructions to dismiss for lack of 
jurisdiction.190  
As the Bowling Green court’s analysis demonstrates, if a federal court 
is inclined to decline jurisdiction by invoking the abstention doctrine, the 
abstention analysis is fluid enough to allow it to do so.191  The Bowling 
Green court predicated its decision to abstain on 1) the existence of a 
dispute regarding the proper interpretation of the insurance contract and 2) 
a question of negligence, both of which the Court held were appropriately 
reserved for the states.192  The existence of a dispute regarding insurance 
contract interpretation is, however, the sine qua non of this genus of 
declaratory judgment action.  And, the coverage dispute that involves some 
question of negligence is by no means a legal anomaly.  If these are 
appropriate grounds for federal abstention, it is difficult to imagine a 
declaratory judgment action that would be appropriately heard by a federal 
court.  The Kentucky District Court simply did not reach very far into its 
reserve before selecting an excuse upon which to base its decision to 
abstain. This type of irresponsible invocation of abstention is what makes 
the doctrine such a juridical vice. 
 
                                                                                                                 
187  Travelers Indem. Co. v. Bowling Green Assoc., 495 F.3d 266, 273 (6th Cir. 2007). 
188  Id. 
189  Id. Orders denying remand are interlocutory in nature and, thus, are not 
reviewable except as part of an appeal from final judgment.  See Cervantez v. Bexar County 
Civil Serv. Comm’n, 99 F.3d. 730, 732 (5th Cir. 1996) (reviewing denial of remand as part 
of review of final judgment). 
 “An order remanding a case to the State Court from which it was removed is not 
reviewable on appeal or otherwise . . . .”  28 U.S.C. §1447(d) (1994).  The span on appellate 
review is limited to remand based on the two grounds enumerated in §1447(c).  See Things 
Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca, 516 U.S. 124, 127 (1975) (“section 1447(d) must be read in 
pari materiai with section 1447(c) . . . .”). 
190  Bowling Green, 495 F.3d at 273-74.  Abstention results in either a stay or 
dismissal of the federal actions.  See, e.g., La. Power and Light Co. v. Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 
25, 30-31 (1959) (stay); Harris County Comm’r Court v. Moore, 420 U.S. 77, 88-89 (1975) 
(dismissal).  
191  Bowling Green, 495 F.3d at 271-74. 
192  Id. at 272-73. 
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2. Scottsdale v. Detco Indus., Inc. 
 
Detco Industries, Inc., which was insured by Scottsdale Insurance 
Company, was named as a defendant in multiple class action lawsuits in 
Arkansas state court stemming from a 2004 explosion at its facility in 
Conway, Arkansas.193  Subsequent to the commencement of the state court 
actions, Scottsdale sought a federal declaratory judgment from the 
Arkansas District Court that it was not obligated to indemnify or defend 
Detco in the state court actions.194  Detco argued for federal abstention, and 
the District Court granted Detco’s motion.  Scottsdale appealed the matter 
to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.195   
The Eighth Circuit’s opinion opens with citation to the “exceptional 
circumstances” mandate set forth by the Supreme Court in Colorado 
River.196  The Court noted, however, that in Wilton, the Supreme Court held 
that “a federal district court has much broader discretion in determining 
whether to exercise jurisdiction in a declaratory judgment action during the 
pendency of parallel state court proceedings.”197  The Court of Appeals 
recognized that Wilton expressly left unanswered the question of whether 
abstention was appropriate in cases in which there is no parallel state 
proceeding.198   
The threshold question the court turned to then was whether there was 
a parallel proceeding pending in state court at the time Scottsdale brought 
its action for federal declaratory judgment.199  The Eighth Circuit answered 
that question in the negative, relying in large part on the requirement that 
the parallel suit involve the “same issues … between the same parties,” as 
set forth by the Supreme Court in Brillhart and later reiterated by the 
Fourth Circuit in New Beckley Mining Corp. v. Int’l Union, United Mine 
Workers of America.200  The court noted that Scottsdale was not a 
defendant in the state court suit and the state court matters did not involve 
the same issues as the declaratory judgment action, which was limited to a 
determination of coverage.201   
                                                                                                                 
193  Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Detco Indus., Inc., 426 F.3d 994, 996 (8th Cir. 2005).  
194  Id. 
195  Id.  
196   Id. 
197  Id.  
198  Id.  
199  Scottsdale, 426 F.3d at 997. 
200  946 F.2d 1072, 1073 (4th Cir. 1991); Scottsdale v. Detco Indus. Inc., 426 F.3d 
994, 997 (8th Cir. 2005). 
201  Scottsdale, 426 F.3d at 997. 
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Having determined there was no parallel state proceeding, the court 
then inquired into whether abstention may be appropriately exercised by a 
federal court entertaining jurisdiction under the FDJA.202  The Court of 
Appeals read Wilton as granting the federal courts greater latitude in 
exercising or abstaining from exercising their jurisdiction only when there 
is a parallel state proceeding.203  While the court declined to return to the 
“exceptional circumstances” standard of Colorado River when no parallel 
proceeding exists, it did hold that the considerations of practicality and 
wise judicial administration that allow a district court to exercise greater 
discretion than otherwise granted by the FDJA were diminished and 
abstention would, accordingly, be inappropriate.204  Thus, the court struck a 
balance between the standard of Colorado River and Wilton by “allowing 
the federal district court some, but not complete, discretion in determining 
whether to dismiss or stay declaratory judgment actions when there are no 
parallel state court proceedings.”205 
                                                                                                                 
202  Id. 
203  Id. 
204  Id. at 999.  As the Court notes in Scottsdale, the holding concurs with the holdings 
of a number of other circuit court holdings.  See, e.g., United States v. City of Las Cruces, 
289 F.3d 1170, 1188 (10th Cir. 2002) (establishing a five factor test for cases in which there 
is no pending parallel state action:  (1) whether a declaratory action would settle the 
controversy; (2) whether it would serve a useful purpose in clarifying the legal relations at 
issue; (3) whether the declaratory remedy is being used merely for the purpose of procedural 
fencing or to provide an arena for a race to res judicata; (4) whether use of declaratory 
action would increase friction between our federal and state courts and improperly encroach 
upon state jurisdiction; and (5) whether there is an alternative remedy which is better or 
more effective); Scottsdale, 211 F.3d at 968 (examining the question of federal abstention 
when there is no parallel state proceeding under the same factors as articulated by the court 
in Las Cruces); Aetna Cas. & Surety Co. v. Ind-Com Electric Co., 139 F.3d 419, 422 (4th 
Cir. 1998) (per curium) (defining a six part test for cases in which there is no parallel state 
court proceeding:  (1) whether the declaratory judgment sought “will serve a useful purpose 
in clarifying and settling the legal relations in issue”; (2) whether the declaratory judgment 
“will terminate and afford relief from the uncertainty, insecurity, and controversy giving rise 
to the [federal] proceeding”; (3) “the strength of the state’s interest in having the issues 
raised in the federal declaratory judgment action decided in the state courts”; (4) “whether 
the issues raised in the federal action can more efficiently be resolved in the court in which 
the state action is pending”; (5) “whether permitting the federal action to go forward would 
result in unnecessary ‘entanglement’ between the federal and state court systems, because of 
the presence of ‘overlapping issues of fact or law’ “; and (6) “whether the declaratory 
judgment action is being used merely as a device for ‘procedural fencing’–that is, ‘to 
provide another forum in a race for res judicata’ or ‘to achiev[e] a federal hearing in a case 
otherwise not removable.’”). 
205  Scottsdale, 426 F.3d at 998. 
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The Eighth Circuit then applied the six-factor test articulated by the 
Fourth Circuit in Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Ind-Com Electric 
Company206 – in substance, the same test that the Sixth Circuit applied in 
Bowling Green. That test considers:  (1) whether the declaratory judgment 
sought “will serve a useful purpose in clarifying and settling the legal 
relations in issue”; (2) whether the declaratory judgment “will terminate 
and afford relief from the uncertainty, insecurity, and controversy giving 
rise to the [federal] proceeding”; (3) “the strength of the state’s interest in 
having the issues raised in the federal declaratory judgment action decided 
in the state courts”; (4) “whether the issues raised in the federal action can 
more efficiently be resolved in the court in which the state action is 
pending”; (5) “whether permitting the federal action to go forward would 
result in unnecessary ‘entanglement’ between the federal and state court 
systems, because of the presence of ‘overlapping issues of fact or law’”; 
and (6) “whether the declaratory judgment action is being used merely as a 
device for ‘procedural fencing’-that is, ‘to provide another forum in a race 
for res judicata’ or ‘to achiev[e] a federal hearing in a case otherwise not 
removable.’”207 
The appellate court quickly found the first, second, third, and fourth 
factors weighed in favor of exercising federal jurisdiction.208  The court 
determined that the declaratory judgment action would “clarify and settle 
the legal relations at issue and would afford relief from the uncertainty, 
insecurity, and controversy between Scottsdale and Detco.”209  The court 
further held that the record does not reflect any particular state interest in 
having the issues decided in state court, and that judicial economy would 
be served by having the coverage issues decided in federal court – the only 
court in which the matters had been raised for resolution.210  
The court looked more critically at the fifth factor – whether the federal 
action would result in any unnecessary entanglement between the federal 
and state court systems.211  Here, the Eighth Circuit recognized a distinction 
that the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals could not seem to find.212  The 
Eighth Circuit carefully delineated between the factual determinations that 
were necessary for resolution of the state court tort action against Detco 
                                                                                                                 
206  139 F.3d at 422. 
207  Scottsdale, 426 F.3d at 998. 
208  Id. at 999. 
209  Id. 
210  Id. 
211  Id. at 999-1000. 
212  Id.  
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and the factual determinations required in deciding the coverage issue.213  
The Eighth Circuit importantly recognized that the coverage issue was 
properly resolved based on the allegations on the face of the complaint, not 
on the judicial determinations made as to the validity of those 
allegations.214  Thus, the court held the fifth factor also weighed in favor of 
the federal district court exercising its discretionary jurisdiction.215  As to 
the sixth factor, the Scottsdale court was unable to glean any improper 
motive from Scottsdale’s federal filing.216  Accordingly, the decision of the 
district court was overturned and the matter remanded to federal court.217   
 
III. CAN A STATE COURT GARNISHMENT SUIT SERVE AS AN 
EFFECTIVE IMPEDIMENT TO FDJA JURISDICTION?  
 
Section 1441 of Chapter 28 of the United States Code, Subsection (a) 
allows any civil action over which there is federal jurisdiction to be 
removed from state to federal court.218  A suit which is merely ancillary or 
supplemental to another action, however, cannot be removed to federal 
court under this statute.219  The federal courts are divided on the question 
of whether a garnishment proceeding is an ancillary proceeding or an 
independent civil action.220  According to one district court “the prevailing 
standard among the circuits is to permit removal of a garnishment 
action.”221  There are, however, a number of district and circuit courts that 
                                                                                                                 
213  Scottsdale, 426 F.3d at 999-1000. 
214  Id. 
215  Id. at 1000. 
216  Id. 
217  Id. 
218  28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2000). 
219  Fed. Savings & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Quinn, 419 F.2d 1014, 1018 (7th Cir. 1969) 
(recognizing that “[u]nder the general removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441, only independent 
suits are removable.”); Adriaenssens v. Allstate Ins. Co., 258 F.2d 888, 890 (10th Cir. 1958) 
(addressing challenge to removal based on argument that garnishment action was 
supplemental to the suit determining liability). 
220  See.,e.g., Richmond v. Allstate Ins. Co., 624 F. Supp. 235, 236 (E.D. Pa. 1985) 
(noting “[t]here is no controlling precedent or consensus among the federal courts on the 
question of whether garnishment actions should be treated as ancillary or independent civil 
actions.”); Bridges v.  Bentley, 716 F. Supp. 1389, 1391 (D. Kan. 1989) (recognizing that 
the federal courts are divided on the question of whether a garnishment action is 
independent or ancillary to the primary action.). 
221  Wausau Ins. Cos. v. Koal Indus. Int’l, Inc., 811 F. Supp. 399, 400 (S.D. Ind. 
1991). 
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have adopted the opposing view.222  As the Pennsylvania District 
Courtnoted in International Organization Masters, Mates & Pilots of 
America, Local No. 2 v. International Organization Masters, Mates and 
Pilots of America, Inc., “[t]he garnishment cases constitut[e] the most 
numerous category of ‘ancillariness’ decisions ... [and] the courts are 
hopelessly divided in their results and reasoning.”223   
In answering the question of whether a garnishment action is 
removable, the federal courts are confronted with a separate and related 
question on which they are also divided – whether the nature of a 
garnishment proceeding should be determined by state or federal law.224  
Those courts that hold the state characterization of the garnishment action 
is determinative base their position on the United States Supreme Court’s 
decision in Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins.225  The Erie doctrine from which it 
derived, provides that the substantive law of the state is to be applied when 
the claim is brought in federal court based diversity of citizenship and 
amount in controversy.226  The question of whether state or federal law 
governs the characterization of a proceeding is in some sense determinative 
of the answer to whether a garnishment proceeding is ancillary or 
independent. Accordingly, the courts’ holdings on whether state or federal 
                                                                                                                 
222  Compare, e.g., Barry v. McLemore, 795 F.2d 452, 455 (5th Cir. 1986); Butler v. 
Polk, 592 F.2d 1293, 1295 (5th Cir. 1979); Swanson v. Liberty Nat. Ins. Co., 353 F.2d 12, 
13 (9th Cir. 1965); Randolph v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. of Wis., 260 F.2d 461, 464 
(8th Cir. 1958); Adriaenssens v. Allstate Ins. Co., 258 F.2d 888, 889-90 (10th Cir. 1958); 
Stoll v. Hawkeye Cas. Co. of Des Moines, 185 F.2d 96, 99 (8th Cir. 1950); Smotherman v. 
Caswell, 755 F. Supp. 346, 348 (D. Kan 1990) (garnishment is an independent civil action 
and removable) with Am. Auto Ins. Co. v. Freundt, 103 F.2d 613, 616-17 (7th Cir. 1939); 
Murray v. Murray, 621 F.2d 103 (5th Cir. 1980); W. Med. Prop. Corp. v. Denver 
Opportunity, Inc., 482 F. Supp. 1205, 1207 (D. Colo. 1980); Overman v. Overman, 412 F. 
Supp. 411, 412 (E.D. Tenn. 1976); Hoagland v. Rost, 126 F. Supp. 232, 234 (W.D. Mo. 
1954); Toney v. Md. Cas. Co., 29 F. Supp. 785, 786 (W.D. Va. 1939); Oppenheim v. Cir. 
Ct. of Eleventh Jud. Cir., 438 N.E.2d 176, 179 (Ill. 1982) (garnishment is ancillary to the 
original judgment and non-removable). 
223  342 F. Supp 212, 214 (E.D. Pa. 1972). 
224  Compare, e.g., Richmond v. Allstate Ins. Co., 624 F. Supp. 235, 237 (E.D. Pa. 
1985); Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. R.R. Co. v. Stude, 346 U.S. 574, 580 (1953); Graef v. 
Graef, 633 F. Supp. 450, 452; Swanson, 353 F.2d 12, 13; Bridges, 716 F. Supp. at  1391 
(character of garnishment to be determined by federal law) with Overman, 412 F. Supp. at 
412; Toney, 29 F. Supp. 785, 786; Oppenheim, 438 N.E.2d at 179 (applying state law to 
determine whether garnishment action is independent or ancillary).  
225  304 U.S. 64 (1938).  
226  Id.  See Swanson v. Sharp, 224 F. Supp. 850, 851 (D. Alaska 1963) (noting 
application of Erie doctrine to removal of garnishment actions). 
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law governs the characterization of a garnishment action will be discussed 
first.  
 
A. SHOULD STATE OR FEDERAL LAW GOVERN THE 
CHARACTERIZATION OF A GARNISHMENT ACTION?  
 
The Supreme Court has held that the right of removal under the federal 
statutes is to be determined under federal law by the federal courts, and that 
classification by the state courts can neither limit nor enlarge that right.227  
This is the position that has been adopted by a majority of the federal 
courts.228  In Swanson v. Liberty Nat. Ins. Co., for example, the Ninth 
Circuit held that “separability, so far as it affects removal, is in the end a 
federal question.”229  In Swanson, the Ninth Circuit noted that, while the 
state court’s characterization of a garnishment proceeding should “be 
entitled to great weight,” the Ninth Circuit subscribes to the view that the 
removal issue is a matter of federal law.230  Similarly, in Randoph, the 
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals stated, “[t]he question of whether a civil 
action is removable and has been properly removed is one for the 
consideration of the federal court and is not controlled by State law.”231 
In spite of the Supreme Court’s holding in Chicago, Rock Island & 
Pacific Railroad v. Stude,232 and the federal court holdings that followed, a 
discrete minority of federal and state courts still apply state law in 
determining whether a garnishment action is independent of or ancillary to 
another proceeding. Some courts that allow state law characterization of a 
garnishment action to control removal turn to the applicable state statute, 
recognizing that “if a state characterizes its garnishment as a distinct ‘civil 
action,’ it is removable, but if the state fashions the proceeding as just 
supplemental to the underlying cause of action, then it is not removable 
under 1441(a).”233  The Tenth Circuit, for example, has looked to 
Oklahoma’s garnishment statute in order to determine whether a 
                                                                                                                 
227  See, e.g., Stude, 346 U.S. at 580; Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 
100, 104 (1941); Comm’rs of Rd. Improvement Dist. v. St. Louis S.W. Ry. Co., 257 U.S. 
547, 548 (1922); Harrison v. St. Louis & S. F. R.R., 232 U.S. 318, 319 (1914). 
228  See, e.g., Randoph v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 260 F.2d 461, 464 (8th Cir. 
1958); Paxton v. Weaver, 553 F.2d 936, 940-41 (5th Cir. 1977); Federal Savings and Loan 
Ins. Co. v. Quinn, 419 F.2d 1014, 1019 (7th Cir. 1969).  
229  353 F.2d 12, 13 (9th Cir. 1965). 
230  Id. 
231  260 F.2d at 463. 
232  346 U.S. 574 (1953). 
233  Graef v. Graef, 633 F. Supp., 450, 452 (E.D. Pa. 1986).  
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garnishment action is a separate or ancillary proceeding.234  The courts of 
Colorado,235 Maryland,236 and Tennessee237 have, similarly, examined the 
governing statutes of their respective states in making the characterization 
determination. Elsewhere, courts applying the state law characterization 
have done so based on application of an “ancillariness” test.238  These 
courts have considered “(1) whether a separate issue of fact might be raised 
in the garnishment proceeding, and (2) whether the proceeding was 
adversarial, calling for judgment independent of the underlying cause.”239  
A number of courts, however, have eschewed the question of whether 
state or federal law governs all together by simply developing an 
“ancillariness” test and applying it to the garnishment action in question.  
In Scanlin v. Utica First Ins. Co., for example, the court posed three 
questions to determine whether the garnishment action at issue there was 
removable:  (1) whether the garnishment proceeding was substantially a 
continuation of the prior state court suit; (2) whether the issue in the 
garnishment action was completely separate from the central issue in the 
state court proceeding; and (3) whether the “true” defendant was the same 
in the garnishment action.240  This three part test was also adopted by the 
Pennsylvania federal court in Haines by Midlantic Bank, N.A. v. Donn’s 
Inc.241 
In Connecticut Bank of Commerce v. Republic of Congo, the Delaware 
federal courtset forth four considerations in making its determination that a 
                                                                                                                 
234  Fleeger v. Gen. Ins. Co. of Am., 453 F.2d 530, 532 (10th Cir. 1972) (looking to 
Oklahoma law to determine the nature of a garnishment action); London & Lancashire 
Indem. Co. of Am. v. Courtney, 106 F.2d 277, 281 (10th Cir. 1939) (used Oklahoma law to 
resolve a garnishment action). 
235  W, Medical Prop. Corp. v. Denver Opportunity, Inc., 482 F. Supp., 1205, 1207 
(D. Colo. 1980); Zurich Ins. Co. v. Bonebrake, 320 P.2d 975, 976 (Colo. 1958); Wright v. 
Nelson, 242 P.2d 243, 247-48 (Colo. 1952).   
236  Toney v. Md. Cas. Co., 29 F. Supp., 785, 786 (W.D. Va. 1939). 
237  Overman v. Overman, 412 F. Supp. 411, 412 ( E.D. Tenn. 1976); Rowland v. 
Quarles,  100 S.W.2d 991, 994 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1936). 
238  See Scanlin v. Utica First Ins. Co., 426 F. Supp. 2d 243, 249–50 (M.D. Penn. 
2006); Conn. Bank of Commerce. v. Rep. of Congo, 440 F. Supp. 2d 346, 350 (D. Del. 
2006); Silverman v. China Nat’l. Native Produce & Animal By-Products Imp. & Exp. 
Corp., No. 06cv1710, 2007 WL 518605,  at *6 (W.D.Pa.. Feb. 12, 2007); Nat’l Ass’n. of 
Reg. Util. Comm’rs v. F.C.C., 533 F.2d 601, 615 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
239  Moore v. Sentry Ins. Co., 399 F. Supp. 929, 930 (S.D. Miss. 1975); Smotherman 
v. Caswell, 755 F. Supp. 346, 349 (D. Kan. 1990); Graef v. Graef, 633 F. Supp., 450, 452 
(1986). 
240  Scanlin v. Utica First Ins. Co., 426 F. Supp. 2d 243,  249 (M.D.Pa. 2006).  
241  No. 95-1025, 1995 WL 262534, at *2 (E.D. Pa. April 27, 1995). 
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state court garnishment action was a separate and independent civil 
action.242  In particular the Delaware Court considered (1) whether 
Delaware garnishment proceedings present a “separate process to which the 
original debtor is not a party and the purpose of which is to determine the 
legality of the attachment”; (2) whether the garnishment action present 
substantive “issues for resolution that are distinct from the original state 
action”; (3) whether the “true” defendant in the garnishment action was the 
garnishee; and (4) whether the federal court would have to engage in any 
“duplicate” function of the state court in adjudicating the garnishment 
action.243  
 
B. CAN A STATE COURT GARNISHMENT ACTION BE REMOVED 
TO FEDERAL COURT IF A FEDERAL ACTION RELATING TO THE 
LIABILITY UNDERLYING THE GARNISHMENT IS PENDING?  
 
While there is no consensus among the courts regarding whether a 
garnishment proceeding is in fact removable or whether state or federal law 
appropriately governs the issue of characterization, there are some strong 
trends with respect to the question of removal.  The most pronounced of 
these by far seems to be the removal of garnishment actions brought 
against an insurer after the underlying issues of the defendant tortfeasor’s 
liability and damages have been litigated in state court.  There are a number 
of federal court opinions addressing this recurring issue.  Regardless of 
whether state or federal law or an “ancillariness” test is applied to the 
characterization issue, the courts have found, with rare exception, the 
garnishment action is independent and the proceeding is, therefore, 
properly removed to federal court.   
In Swanson v. Liberty Nat. Ins. Co., the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
held that a garnishment action against an insurer is an independent civil 
action, and therefore removable.244  In that case, the Ninth Circuit affirmed 
the judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Alaska, 
which denied a request for remand after a garnishment action brought 
against an insurance company was removed to federal court.245  The Ninth 
Circuit rested its holding on the fact that the only parties in the case were 
the insurance company and the judgment creditor.246  The court noted, 
                                                                                                                 
242  440 F. Supp. 2d 346, 351-352 (D. Del. 2006). 
243  Id.  
244  353 F.2d 12, 13 (9th Cir 1965). 
245  Id. 
246  Id. at 12-13. 
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however, “[w]e may get some interesting problems in diversity when the 
judgment defendant debtor stays on, seeks in, or is brought into the 
garnishment proceedings.”247  
The Fifth, Eighth, and Tenth circuits have made similar holdings.  In 
Butler v. Polk, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that a garnishment action brought 
by a judgment creditor against the judgment debtor’s liability insurer was 
properly removed to federal court because “garnishment actions against 
third-parties are generally construed as independent suits, as least in 
relation to the primary action.”248  In Randolph, the Eighth Circuit Court of 
Appeals held a garnishment action against an insurance company was 
separable from the underlying liability action.249  The Eighth Circuit 
reasoned, “[t]he only issue is the liability of the garnishee on its insurance 
contract.250  If the garnishee is liable, the amount of such liability has been 
established by the judgment against [the insured] in the state court 
action.”251  Likewise, in Adriaenssens, the Tenth Circuit held a garnishment 
action against an insurer was removable, relying on that Court’s earlier 
holding in London & Lancashire.252  The court noted that the action in 
question was an “original and independent actions between the holders of 
the judgments and the insurer.”253  Because the requisite diversity of 
citizenship and amount in controversy was present, the matters were, 
accordingly, open to removal.254   
In Scanlin, discussed above, the Pennsylvania District Courtheld that a 
garnishment action brought against an insurer was properly removed.255  
The Scanlin court found that the issue to be resolved in the garnishment 
action - whether the defendant’s parents’ insurance policy would provide 
coverage for their son’s judgment - was distinct from the issues of the 
defendant’s liability in the initial personal injury action.256  The court 
further found that the tortfeasor defendant in the personal injury suit was no 
                                                                                                                 
247   Id. at 13. 
248  592 F.2d 1293, 1295-1296 (5th Cir. 1979) (citing Swanson v. Liberty Nat. Ins. 
Co., 353 F.2d 12 (9th Cir. 1965); Randolph v. Employers Mut. Liability Ins. Co., 260 F.2d 
461 (8th Cir. 1958); Adriaenssens v. Allstate Ins. Co., 258 F.2d 888 (10th Cir. 1958); and 
Stoll v. Hawkeye Cas. Co, 185 F.2d 96 (8th Cir. 1950)). 
249  260 F.2d 461, 464-465 (8th Cir. 1958). 
250  Id. at 464. 
251  Id. 
252  258 F.2d 888, 890 (1958).  
253  Id. 
254  Id. 
255  426 F. Supp. 2d 243, 250 (M.D. Pa. 2006). 
256  Id. 
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longer a party in the garnishment litigation; only the garnishee, Utica First 
Insurance Company, was a named party, and the tortfeasor defendant had 
assigned his rights against Utica to the garnishment plaintiff.257   
The court therefore concluded that the garnishment action, as an 
independent civil action, was appropriately removed.258  The Scanlin 
decision is consistent with the result set forth by the Pennsylvania District 
Court in Graef as well.259  The Graef court made observations similar to 
those made by the Scanlin court: “the only issue is the liability of the 
garnishee on its insurance contract ...  Moreover, in the present controversy 
we have only one defendant, the garnishee.... “260   
In a case involving a garnishment action and allegations of bad faith, 
the federal court in Kansas held that, under federal law, the garnishment 
action brought against the insurer was separate and distinct from the 
underlying liability claim.261  The Smotherman court rested its holding on 
the fact that: 
 
 “[t]he issues in the garnishment action are whether [the 
insurance company] acted negligently or in bad faith in refusing to 
settle within the limits of the policy prior to trial and exposing its 
insured [] to an excess judgment, and whether because of its 
negligence or bad faith the [insurance company] is liable to the 
plaintiff for the entire judgment and not just the policy limits.”262   
 
The Pennsylvania courts reached a like conclusion in Shearer v. 
Reed,263 and the Kansas District Court denied a motion to remand in 
Bridges for Bridges based on a similar analysis.264   
Garnishment actions against an insurer have not, however, always been 
granted.265  In Richmond, for example, the federal district court considered 
whether it would be called upon to re-examine in the garnishment action 
                                                                                                                 
257  Id. 
258  Id. at 251 
259  Graef v. Graef, 633 F. Supp. 450, 454 (E.D. Pa. 1986).  
260  Id. at 453. 
261  Smotherman v. Caswell, 755 F. Supp. 346, 348 (D. Kan. 1990). 
262  Id. 
263  428 A.2d 635, 640 (Pa. 1981) (the garnishment action subsequent to a tort 
judgment permitted a new claim for bad faith against the defendant’s insurer). 
264  Bridges v. Bentley, 716 F. Supp. 1389, 1389 (D. Kan. 1989). 
265  Toney v. Maryland Cas. Co., 29 F. Supp. 785, 787 (W.D. Va. 1939) (A 
garnishment action brought against an insurer subsequent to a liability suit was also 
dismissed). 
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issues of fact contested in and “inseparably tied to” the initial state 
action.266  In remanding the matter back to state court, the court addressed 
several policy concerns, including (1) the federal court having to re-litigate 
the same issues of fact as those litigated by the state court, (2) 
unnecessarily bifurcating the trial by allowing execution of the judgment to 
take place in a different court, (3) wasting federal resources in executing 
the judgment of a state court’s action, and (4) burdening the federal court 
with “minor” matters.267  The court concluded that the garnishment action 
against the tortfeasor defendant’s insurer was supplemental to the original 
personal injury action because the insurer had raised the issue of payment 
in the state action, and it would be a “duplication of the function performed 
by the state court” to further determine whether defendant’s insurer had 
previously paid the full proceeds permitted by defendant’s policy.268 In 
addition, the Richmond court foresaw that it would be called upon to 
determine the facts giving rise to the defendant’s liability in order to 
ascertain the extent of coverage.269  Therefore, the court determined that the 
garnishment action was not a distinct civil action.270   
 
C. THE INSURER’S DILEMMA:  ENJOY THE BENEFITS OF 
LITIGATING IN FEDERAL COURT OR THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHT OF DUE PROCESS 
 
The holding of the Pennsylvania District Court in Richmond reflects 
the quandary the insurer faces.  If the insurer raises any defense in the state 
court action, it hazards a subsequent finding by the federal court that the 
garnishment action is supplemental to the personal injury action and 
cannot, therefore, be removed.271  The Richmond court also predicated its 
decision on the concern that within the context of the federal declaratory 
judgment action, the court would be required to make a determination on 
the liability issue – an issue within the province of the state court.272  There 
is, however, a reciprocal jurisdictional intrusion that has yet to be 
recognized by a court addressing the issue.  In granting the injured 
plaintiff’s request for garnishment against the insurer, unless the insurer is 
                                                                                                                 
266  Richmond v. Allstate Ins. Co., 624 F. Supp. 235, 238 (E.D. Pa. 1985). 
267  Id. at 237. 
268  Id. at 237-38. 
269  Id. at 237. 
270  Id. at 238. 
271  Id. at 236-37. 
272  Richmond v. Allstate Ins. Co., 624 F. Supp. 235, 237-38 (E.D. Pa. 1985).   
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afforded the right to challenge the extent of its liability within the 
garnishment action, the state court is making a de facto finding of 
coverage.  The garnishment assigns financial liability to the insurer without 
full hearing on whether the insurer actually owes a duty of indemnification 
to the state court defendant tortfeasor.   
While it has long been recognized that issuance of a pre-judgment writ 
of garnishment that does not afford notice and hearing violates fundamental 
principles of due process,273 the Supreme Court did not rule until some 
eighty-four years ago on the constitutionality of post-judgment garnishment 
actions.274  In Endicott-Johnson v. Encyclopedia Press, the high court held 
due process did not require notice and an opportunity to be heard before the 
issuance of a writ to garnish a judgment-debtor’s property.275  The Court 
reasoned that the judgment debtor, who “has had his day in court” in the 
action on the merits must “take notice of what will follow.”276  An insurer 
against which garnishment is sought while a federal declaratory judgment 
action is still pending has not, however, had its “day in court.”277  The 
underlying state suit for liability and damages may have afforded the 
insured the required notice and opportunity, but when the issue of coverage 
                                                                                                                 
273  See, e.g., North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 602-03 
(1975) (Georgia garnishment statute permitting writ of garnishment to be issued in pending 
suits by court clerk without participation by judge on affidavit of plaintiff or his attorney 
containing only conclusory allegations deprived garnishee due process of law); Sniadach v. 
Family Finance Corp. of Bay View, 395 U.S. 337, 338-39 (1969) (holding Wisconsin statute 
that “sets in motion the machinery whereby wages are frozen” before trial and without any 
opportunity for the garnishee to be heard or otherwise tender any defense he might have 
violates due process); Finberg v. Sullivan, 634 F.2d 50, 59-60 (3rd Cir. 1980) (Pennsylvania 
post-judgment garnishment procedure did not require hearing with sufficient promptness to 
satisfy requirements of due process); Davis v. Paschall, 640 F. Supp. 198, 203 (E.D. Ark. 
1986) (Arkansas post-judgment garnishment procedure did not contain sufficient procedural 
safeguards to satisfy due process); Scott v. Danaher, 343 F. Supp 1272, 1278 (N.D. Ill. 
1972) (Illinois garnishment statute violates due process of law because statute fails to 
provide a means of determining whether or not the particular debtor knowingly and 
intelligently executed the judgment note waiving right to hearing). 
274  Endicott-Johnson Corp. v. Encyclopedia Press, Inc., 266 U.S. 285, 290 (1924). 
275  Id. 
276  Id. at 288.  
277  See Crist v. Hunan Palace, Inc., 89 P.3d 573, 581 (Kan. 2004) (upholding 
garnishment against insurer, noting insurer “had the means by which it could have protected 
itself.  It chose not to enter the fray in defense of the [insured tortfeasor] or to file a 
declaratory judgment action to define its contractual obligations”); Baldridge v. Kirkpatrick, 
63 P.3d 568, 572 (Okla. Civ. App. 2002) (refusing to enter judgment against insurer which 
had no opportunity to present a defense). 
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has yet to be determined, that notice and opportunity does not necessarily 
transfer to the insurer.278  
There are a number of states that insure due process by allowing, 
pursuant to state statute, an insurer to test the validity of the judgment in a 
garnishment action.279  Interestingly, the Supreme Court in Brillhart 
suggested it would have been stratified with the proceedings below had the 
District Court considered whether “under applicable local law, the claims 
sought to be adjudicated by the respondent in th[e] suit for a declaratory 
judgment had either been foreclosed by Missouri law or could adequately 
be tested in the garnishment proceeding pending in the Missouri state 
court.”280  Despite the Supreme Court’s comfort with such a determination, 
however, it alone does not resolve the issue for the insurer.  The insurer’s 
dilemma remains because the states that allow the insurer to test the 
validity of the judgment in the garnishment action also consider the 
garnishment action to be an ancillary or auxiliary proceeding.281   
Insurers seeking judicial determination of coverage issues are, 
therefore, faced with bleak alternatives.  If the insurer fails to act in the 
state court action, either by defending the insured or asserting defenses to 
coverage, such as the insured’s failure to pay the premium,282 then the 
insurer may be found to have forfeited its only opportunity to secure due 
process of law.283  However, if the insurer acts in the state court action, then 
                                                                                                                 
278  Crist, 89 P.3d at 581. 
279  Standard Acc. Ins. Co. v. Leslie, 55 F. Supp. 134, 138 (D. Ill. 1944) (noting 
Illinois garnishment action may be properly used to test the liability of an alleged insurer on 
its policy); Carpenter v. Superior Court, 422 P.2d 129, 136 (Ariz. 1966) (holding insurer 
had the opportunity to test its liability in the garnishment action); Sandoval v. Chenoweth, 
428 P.2d 98 (Ariz. 1967) (insurer was not deprived of due process where the insurer had the 
opportunity to set aside the default judgment, but failed to act promptly); Baldridge, 63 
P.3d at 572 (insurer had right to due process and present its case in court, and that it could 
do so in an equitable garnishment action following a judgment against its insured). 
280  316 U.S. 491, 495-96 (1942). 
281  Standard, 55 F. Supp. at 138 (recognizing in Illinois that a garnishment action is 
an ancillary proceeding provided by statute); City of Phoenix v. Collar, Williams & White 
Eng’g, Inc., 472 P.2d 479, 481 (Ariz. App. 1970) (“a garnishment proceeding is always 
ancillary to the main or principle action”); Spears v. Preble, 661 P.2d 1337, 1343 (Okla. 
1983) (holding garnishment action against insurer is in aid of an ancillary to the main action 
against the insured). 
282  Richmond v. Allstate Ins. Co., 624 F.Supp. 235, 236-37 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (finding 
garnishment action ancillary to state court liability and damages action when insurer raised 
issue of insured’s failure to pay premiums in the state court action). 
283  See Crist v. Hunan Palace, Inc., 89 P.3d 573 (Kan. 2004) (allowing garnishment 
action against insurer in spite of due process concerns where insurer could have defended 
state suit, but choose not to). 
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the subsequent garnishment action may be found to be ancillary to the state 
court damages and liability suit.284  If ancillary to the damages and liability 
suit, removal of the garnishment action would be precluded.285  Once the 
state court plaintiff has sequestered the garnishment action in state court by 
defeating removal, the garnishment proceeding may then serve as an 
anchor, utilized to pull the federal court declaratory judgment action into 
state court and the insurer loses the benefits of litigating the coverage issue 
in federal court.286  
 
IV. STATE GARNISHMENT ACTIONS AND FEDERAL 
ABSTENTION  
 
A. SURVEY OF CASE LAW WHERE GARNISHMENT AND 
ABSTENTION WERE ADDRESSED 
 
There are only a handful of cases that address the propriety of 
abstaining in a federal declaratory judgment action when there is a 
garnishment proceeding pending in state court.287  Brillhart v. Excess 
Insurance Company,288 of course, is chief among them.  In Brillhart, 
Excess Insurance Company filed a declaratory judgment action in federal 
court to determine its rights under a reinsurance agreement it entered into 
with Central Mutual Insurance Company of Chicago.289  Central had issued 
a public policy liability policy to Cooper-Jarrett, Inc.290  While the federal 
action was pending, a state court wrongful death action was brought against 
Cooper-Jarrett, and Central refused to defend.291  Central and Cooper-
Jarrett encountered financial difficulties and Central was liquidated and all 
                                                                                                                 
284  Richmond, 624 F. Supp. at 237-38. 
285  Id. at 236-37 (refusing to remove garnishment action). 
286  See Huth v. Hartford Ins. Co. of the Midwest, 298 F.3d 800, 802-3 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(refusing to exercise discretionary diversity jurisdiction when possibility of state court 
action existed). 
287  See, e.g., W. Heritage Ins. Co. v. Gallup, No. 06-4165-CV-C-WAK, 2007 WL 
62696 (W.D. Mo. Jan. 8, 2007); Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Carter Enterprises, Inc., No. 
04-0933-CV-W-JTM, 2005 WL 3310467 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 6, 2005); Nw. Pac. Indem. Co. v. 
Safeway, Inc., 112 F.  Supp. 2d 1114 (D. Kan. 2000); Fed. Ins. Co. v. Sprigg Lane Inv. 
Corp., 915 F.  Supp. 122 (E.D. Mo. 1996); Lewis v. Blackmon, 864 F. Supp. 1 (S.D. Miss. 
1994). 
288  316 U.S. 491 (1942).  
289  Id. at 493. 
290  Id. 
291  Id. 
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claims against it barred; Cooper-Jarrett filed bankruptcy, pursuant to which 
any judgment entered against it was discharged.292  Because Central and 
Cooper-Jarrett were both insolvent, the state court plaintiff initialed a 
garnishment proceeding against Excess Insurance Company through 
service on the Missouri superintendent of insurance.293  Brillhart moved for 
dismissal of the suit, which the district court granted.294   
The matter was appealed to the Tenth Circuit, which remanded the 
matter to the federal court for adjudication on the merits.295  The ruling of 
the Tenth Circuit was then appealed to the Supreme Court. 296  The 
Supreme Court, like the Tenth Circuit, remanded the matter to the district 
court.297  The Supreme Court noted that the motion to dismiss was 
predicated in its entirety on the assertion that there was a parallel state court 
suit pending, in which the issues between the parties could be fully 
resolved. 298  The Court noted, “[t]he correctness of this claim was certainly 
relevant in determining whether the District Court should assume 
jurisdiction and proceed to determine the rights of the parties.” 299  While 
the Brillhart court expressed some concern about the federal courts making 
a determination regarding the adequacy of a state garnishment proceeding 
to address the issues in the declaratory judgment action, the court 
ultimately held that the District Court erred in granting the motion to 
dismiss, and issued a remand. 300   
In contrast to Brillhart, in the majority of the other cases to consider 
abstaining in deference to a state court garnishment action, the federal court 
has abstained from exercising its jurisdiction.301  In Western Heritage Ins. 
Co. v. Gallup, for example, the Missouri federal court considered whether 
abstention was proper under Brillhart.302  The court gave a truncated 
                                                                                                                 
292  Id. 
293  Id at 492-493. 
294  Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co. of Am., 316 U.S. 491, 493 (1942). 
295  Id. at 494. 
296  Id. 
297  Id. at 498. 
298  Id. at 495. 
299  Id. 
300  Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co. of Am., 316 U.S. 491, 497-98 (1942). 
301  See, e.g., W. Heritage Ins. Co. v. Gallup, No. 06-4165-CV-C-WAK, 2007 WL 
62696, at *3 (W.D. Mo. Jan. 8, 2007); Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Carter Enter., Inc., No. 
04-0933-CV-W-JTM, 2005 WL 3310467, at *3 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 6, 2005); Nw. Pac. Indem. 
Co. v. Safeway, 112 F. Supp. 2d 1114, 1122 (D. Kan. 2000); Fed. Ins. Co. v. Sprigg Lane 
Inv. Corp., 915 F. Supp. 122, 124 (E.D. Mo. 1996). 
302  No. 06-4165-CV-C-WAK, 2007 WL 62696, at *1 (W.D. Mo. Jan. 8, 2007). 
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consideration of four factors:  (1) whether the garnishment involved the 
same issues between the same parties; (2) whether all issues could be 
resolved in the garnishment; (3) whether it would be inefficient to require 
duplicative litigation; and (4) whether the parties were amendable to 
process in the state proceeding.303  The Gallup court then concluded by 
noting that even though “the federal declaratory judgment action was filed 
prior to the state equitable garnishment proceeding ... the timing does not 
outweigh the other considerations favoring abstention.”304  
A federal court in  Kansas also elected to abstain from exercising its 
discretionary federal jurisdiction in Northwestern Pacific Indem. Co. v. 
Safeway, Inc..305  The Kansas District Court considered two of the four 
Brillhart factors addressed in Gallup, electing not to consider (1) whether 
the state court proceeding involved the same issues between the same 
parties, and (2) whether abstention would avoid duplicative proceedings.306  
The Kansas District Court added to that analysis one additional Brillhart 
factor, whether the necessary parties have been joined in the state 
proceeding, and five supplemental factors articulated by the Tenth Circuit 
Court of Appeals.307  Northwestern urged the federal district court to 
decline from abstaining because, Northwestern argued, it had no means of 
                                                                                                                 
303  Id., at *2.  
 In Carter Enterprises, the United States District Court for the Western District of 
Missouri applied a similar analysis, and again determined that abstention was appropriate.  
2005 WL 3310467, at *1.  In Carter Enterprises, however, the court only considered the 
first three of the four factors articulated in Gallup. Id. at *2.  The Carter Enterprises court 
weighed these factors against American Family’s choice of forum, but still held in favor of 
abstention. Id. at *3. 
304  Gallup, 2007 WL 62696, at *2. 
305  112 F.  Supp. 2d 1114, 1122 (D. Kan. 2000).  
306  Id. at 1118.  
307  Id. (citing Buzas Baseball, Inc. v. Bd. of Regents, 189 F.3d 477 (10th Cir. 1999) 
and St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v. Runyon, 53 F.3d 1167, 1169 (10th Cir. 1995) as 
setting forth the following five factors: 
 
[1] whether a declaratory action would settle the 
controversy; [2] whether it would serve a useful purpose in 
clarifying the legal relations at issue; [3] whether the 
declaratory remedy is being used merely for the purpose of 
“procedural fencing” or “to provide an arena for a race to 
res judicata”; [4] whether use of a declaratory action would 
increase friction between our federal and state courts and 
improperly encroach upon state jurisdiction; and [5] 
whether there is an alternative remedy which is better or 
more effective.) 
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testing the validity of the judgment entered against it in the garnishment 
proceeding.308  The Kansas District Court discussed some state case law on 
the matter, and then suggested that, “affidavits with documentation could 
be offered to support the amounts of the claims ... [and] independent expert 
testimony evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of the parties’ positions 
could be presented.”309  In sum, the Kansas District Court held that the state 
garnishment action would provide an adequate opportunity for 
Northwestern to present its case, regardless of what that opportunity 
entailed.  
In the only case to address both removal of a state court garnishment 
action and abstention from hearing a federal declaratory judgment action, 
the federal court entertaining the issues held removal was proper and 
abstention was not warranted.310  In Lewis v. Blackmon, the plaintiff argued 
that the federal court should decline to exercise its jurisdiction over a 
declaratory judgment action based on Pullman and Burford abstention and 
a Fifth Circuit case, United Services Life Insurance Company v. Delaney.311  
The federal court in  Mississippi disagreed, holding that the concerns 
articulated in Pullman, Burford, and Delaney were not present in the 
declaratory judgment action, in which the insurer sought a declaration of 
the insurer’s duty to defend and indemnify its insured.312  After deciding 
that it would not abstain from exercising its discretionary jurisdiction, the 
federal court then turned to the issue of removal.313  The court held the 
garnishment action was not ancillary to another state court action, and was 
properly removed under federal law.314  
 
B. NON-REMOVABLE GARNISHMENTS 
 
The Supreme Court’s decisions in Brillhart and Wilton provide a broad 
tower of abstention over federal declaratory judgment actions where there 
                                                                                                                 
308  Id. at 1121. 
309  Id. at 1119-20 (quoting Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc.v. Americold Corp., 
934 P.2d 65, 87 (Kan. 1997).  The Safeway court went on to note that, “[a]s the Supreme 
Court of Kansas has directly remanded this issue for the district court’s determination, the 
court has no doubts that the state court proceeding will provide an adequate forum for the 
determination of the propriety of the settlement amount.”  Id.   
310  Lewis v. Blackmon, 864 F.Supp. 1, 2 (S.D. Miss. 1994).  
311  Id. at 3 (citing United Services Life Ins. Co. v. Delaney, 328 F.2d 483 (5th Cir 
1964)). 
312  Id.  
313  Id. at 4.    
314  Id.  
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are pending parallel state actions.  These decisions, however, left a glaring 
void in relation to the proper and valid application of the abstention 
doctrine when the parallel state action is no longer pending because it has 
been removed.  In those cases where the insurance company denies a claim 
for coverage in a liability context, the insurance company must assess the 
timing of coverage litigation to minimize the risk of abstention.   
It is not uncommon for insurance companies to decline to defend or 
indemnify its insured and then close the file, which results in the insured 
defending against the liability claim.  Such a decision by the insurer can 
have dire consequences, not the least of which may be a liability judgment 
against the insured which the injured plaintiff will attempt to enforce 
against the insurer.315  A final judgment creates a creditor/debtor 
relationship which is the foundational predicate for a garnishment action 
being initiated against the debtor policyholder.  The presence of a 
garnishment action filed in state court may foreclose federal jurisdiction to 
the insurance company. 
Where a non-removable garnishment action has been filed in state 
court, federal court jurisdiction can be challenged through the abstention 
doctrine because of the presence of a parallel state court garnishment 
proceeding.  In this situation the Brillhart analysis asks whether another 
case involving the same parties would be able to also address the 
controversy in the declaratory judgment action.316  The question of 
coverage is typically litigated in the garnishment action.  The insurance 
company will object to the writ of garnishment claiming that it has no 
“indebtedness” to the insured because its policy does not provide coverage 
for the underlying claim.  Thus, the essential subject matter of the 
garnishment litigation will focuses upon the question of coverage which 
makes the scope of the garnishment proceeding co-extensive with the scope 
of the declaratory judgment action.  There will also be a similarity of the 
                                                                                                                 
315  Depending on the state in which the insurer is operating, a wrongful denial of a 
defense or indemnification can result in the insurer being held liable either up to policy 
limits, or for the full amount of the judgment.  In New Mexico, for example, the courts have 
held that an insurer who wrongfully denies its insured a defense may be precluded from 
later asserting policy defenses, and may be held liable up to the full amount of the judgment 
in the liability action.  See, e.g., Valley Imp. Ass’n, Inc. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Corp., 129 
F.3d 1108, 1125 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding, “[b]ecause we have affirmed the district court’s 
holding that USF & G breached its duty to defend, USF & G will not be heard to complain 
that the claims might not have been within the coverage”); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. 
Price, 684 P.2d 524, 531 (N.M. App. 1984) (holding insurer was liable up to policy limits 
for its refusal to defend).  
316  See Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 282-83. 
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parties in both the garnishment and declaratory judgment actions.  In order 
to bind the judgment creditor to a determination of no coverage, the 
insurance company oftentimes will name the judgment creditor as a party 
defendant in the declaratory judgment action.  The insured is also named as 
a party defendant.   
The Supreme Court has not specifically delineated a set of factors to be 
applied pursuant to Brillhart.  However, the lower courts have done so.  
One of the essential factors to be considered is duplicative litigation.317  
Another factor focuses on whether the adjudication of the case by a federal 
court “would be disruptive of state efforts to establish a coherent policy 
with respect to a matter of substantial public concern.”318 
Whether the federal action would be duplicative of an action already 
proceeding before a state court, stems from the concern expressed by the 
Supreme Court that, “[g]ratuitous interference with the orderly and 
comprehensive disposition of a state court litigation should be avoided.”319  
Essentially, this Brillhart factor is focused on federal interference with 
ongoing state litigation.320  This factor is present when there is a pending 
parallel state garnishment proceeding.   
A broad reading of the factor involving disruption of state efforts to 
establish a coherent policy can be applicable in the liability insurance 
context where many states have expressed a general public policy concern 
that victims of tortious conduct be fairly compensated.321   
                                                                                                                 
317  See Gov’t Emp.’s Ins. Co. v. Dizol, 133 F.3d 1220, 1225 (9th Cir. 1998); Cont’l 
Cas. Co. v. Robsac Ind., 947 F.2d 1367, 1371, 1373 (9th Cir. 1991). 
318  Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 814 (1975).  
See also, Lehman v. City of Louisville, 967 F.2d 1474, 1478 (10th Cir. 1992); Ripplinger v. 
Collins, 868 F.2d 1043, 1049 n.5 (9th Cir. 1989). 
319  Chamberlain v. Allstate Ins. Co., 931 F.2d 1361, 1367 (9th Cir. 1991). 
320  Id. 
321  Armstrong v. Land & Marine Applicators, Inc., 463 So.2d 1327, 1328-29 (5th Cir. 
1984) (holding the proper approach for resolving choice of law problems regarding 
insurance policies written in other states is the interest analysis theory; it is good public 
policy meant to allow state courts to apply situations requiring choice of law where state 
interest is sufficient to require that result); Richards’ Realty Co., L.L.C. v. Paramount 
Disaster Recovery, Inc., 476 F. Supp. 2d 618, 622-24 (E.D. La. 2007) (holding under 
Louisiana choice-of-law rules, Louisiana law, not law of California where the contract was 
entered, applied to validity of contingency fee contract between Louisiana insured and 
California adjuster for adjustment of insurance claims in Louisiana, despite adjuster having 
much business in California, because Louisiana’s interest in regulating insurance industry in 
state and strong public policy against private adjusters receiving contingency fees); Transp. 
Ins. Co. v. Protective Ins. Co., 696 F. Supp. 870, 871-73 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (concluding that 
Truckmen’s Endorsement in occupational comprehensive liability and comprehensive 
physical damage policies, denying coverage to insured vehicle use to carry property in any 
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Another Brillhart factor which must be taken into consideration is 
whether the declaratory judgment action is being filed as a means of forum 
shopping.322  Whether the declaratory action was filed as a means of forum 
shopping “[u]sually is understood to favor discouraging an insurer from 
forum shopping.  For example, filing a federal court declaratory action to 
see if it might fare better in federal court at the same time the insurer is 
                                                                                                                          
business or used in the business of any person to whom the vehicle was rented, was against 
New York public policy and therefore unenforceable regarding an accident in New York, 
even though the endorsement was valid in Ohio, where the insurance contract was entered 
into, especially where the policy provided for interpretation to give the broader coverage 
required by the financial responsibility or compulsory insurance laws of other states); U.S. 
Fire Ins. Co. v. Beltmann N. Am. Co., Inc., 703 F. Supp. 681, 682-83 (N.D. Ill. E. Div. 
1988) (holding that Illinois law was to determine the legality of purpose of a Minnesota 
corporation’s commercial umbrella policy issued in Minnesota; the claim against the 
corporation arose in Illinois, and if Illinois public policy forbade insurance against liability 
for insured’s claims, Illinois courts would not permit the parties to evade this policy by 
contracting for insurance in a state that allows such coverage.); Am. States Ins. Co. v. 
Allstate Ins. Co., 922 A.2d 1043, 1052-53 (Conn. 2007) (holding Connecticut driver’s 
personal umbrella liability insurer could make a sufficiently compelling showing necessary 
to overcome the presumption favoring Florida law validating automobile policy’s household 
exclusion of liability coverage for injury to named insured, only if insurer demonstrated that 
applying Florida law would violate a fundamental public policy of Connecticut); State Farm 
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Roach, 945 So.2d 1160, 1163-65 (Fla. 2006) (recognizing that in the 
context of insurance contracts, the public policy exception of lex loci contractus requires a 
Florida citizen in need of protection, a paramount Florida public policy, and that the insured 
is on reasonable notice that he is a Florida citizen.); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Am. 
Red Ball Transit Co., Inc., 938 P.2d 1281, 1285-86 (Kan. 1997) (noting that the law of the 
state where it was made normally determines the validity of an insurance contract and its 
construction, but that there is an exception when the contract violates public policy of the 
state whose tribunal is to enforce the contract.); Daniels v. Nat. Home Life Assur. Co., 747 
P.2d 897, 898-99 (Nev. 1987) (concluding life insurance policy bought by Nevada resident 
from Pennsylvania insurer, that did not provide for notice prior to termination for failure to 
pay when due, was against public policy of Nevada and therefore unenforceable, despite 
insurer’s argument that policy was a group policy that should be governed by Missouri law 
because the master policy was delivered in Missouri); Demir v. Farmers Tex. County Mut. 
Ins. Co., 140 P.3d 1111, 1115-16 (N.M. App. 2006) (holding Texas law requiring physical 
contact to recover uninsured motorist benefits for injuries caused by unknown driver did not 
apply to Texas insured’s claim to recover uninsured motorist benefits from New Mexico 
accident under policy issued in Texas; Texas law would violate New Mexico’s public policy 
as expressed in its uninsured motorist statutes). 
322  The term “forum shopping” was first used in a judicial opinion in 1951.  See 
Covey Gas & Oil Co. v. Checketts, 187 F.2d 561, 563 (9th Cir. 1951).  Earlier, the phrase 
“shopping for a forum” was used by the court in Miles v. Ill. Central R.R., 315 U.S. 698, 
706 (1942) (Jackson, J. concurring).  The concept was targeted in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 
304 U.S. 64 (1938).  
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engaged in a state court action.”323  Federal courts generally decline 
jurisdiction in “reactive” declaratory judgment actions.324  In the insurance 
law context, declaratory judgment actions are routinely used by insurance 
companies and insureds to anticipate each others claims and, therefore, 
may be viewed as reactive.325  Thus, a declaratory judgment action by an 
insurance company against its insured during the pendency of a “non-
removable”326 state court garnishment action presenting the same issues of 
state law can be seen as a “reactive” litigation.327  In situations where the 
insurance company waits until the garnishment action is initiated, the filing 
of the declaratory judgment action in federal court at that point runs the risk 
of being considered a “reactive” litigation.  
In those jurisdictions where a garnishment action is considered to be 
ancillary or supplemental, a declaratory judgment action should be initiated 
at the earliest point in time while the state court liability lawsuit is 
occurring.  If the federal declaratory judgment action can be advanced 
substantially prior to the entry of judgment against the policyholder, it will 
be difficult, as a practical matter, for a judgment creditor to establish an 
abstention challenge to the federal declaratory judgment action through the 
offensive use of a garnishment proceeding to create a parallel state court 
proceeding.328  
                                                                                                                 
323  Am. Cas. Co. of Reading, Penn. v. Krieger, 181 F.3d, 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 1999).  
The Supreme Court has denounced state and federal forum shopping on grounds of comity 
and parity.  See, e.g., Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 95-96 (1980).   
324  Gov’t Emp.’s Ins. Co. v. Dizol, 133 F.3d 1220, 1225 (9th Cir. 1998). 
325  See Fed. Res. Bank of Atlanta v. Thomas, 220 F.3d 1235, 1246 n.11 (11th Cir. 
2000) (declaratory judgment actions are “routinely used by potential litigants”). 
326  Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, Coury v. Prot, 85 F.3d 244, 248 
(5th Cir. 1996), and therefore any case which is removed must be one which, at the time of 
removal, could have been brought in federal court initially.  See, e.g., Cervantez v. Bexar 
County Civil Serv. Comm’n, 99 F.3d. 730, 733 (5th Cir. 1996).   
327  Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Robsac, Ind., 947 F.2d 1367, 1372 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting that 
allowing declaratory judgment action to proceed while there is a non-removable state action 
would circumvent diversity jurisdiction). 
328  As a technical matter, however, abstention may be raised by the parties or the 
court at any time during the federal court or federal appellate court proceedings. See, e.g., 
Columbia Basin Apartment Ass’n v. City of Pasco, 268 F.3d 791, 799 (9th Cir. 2001) 
(recognizing the Younger doctrine may be raised sua sponte at any time in the appellate 
process); Munich Am. Reinsurance Co. v. Crawford, 141 F.3d 585, 588 (5th Cir. 1998) 
(holding Burford abstention can be raised at any time); Mountain Funding Inc. v. Frontier 
Ins. Co., 329 F. Supp. 2d 994, 997 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (stating abstention principles can be 
raised and revisited at any time during a proceeding); Cal. Prolife Council Pol. Action 
Comm. v. Scully, 989 F. Supp. 1282, 1288 (E.D. Cal. 1998) (holding abstention by federal 
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C. ELIMINATION OF THE PARALLEL STATE COURT GARNISHMENT 
PROCEEDING THROUGH REMOVAL 
 
Generally there is a judicial recognition that the use of the abstention 
doctrine to remand cases that have been removed on the basis of diversity 
should be done cautiously.329  Where federal diversity jurisdiction can be 
established, removal of a state garnishment action eliminates the parallel 
state court proceeding which is the predicate for the exercise of federal 
abstention.  While Wilton set the standard for applying the abstention 
doctrine where there was a pending parallel state action, it did not establish 
the exact boundaries of discretion when there was no pending state court 
action achieved through removal.330   The modern trend is to view the 
existence of a pending parallel state court proceeding as only one factor in 
the overall abstention analysis.331  Thus far, the Fourth Circuit,332 the Ninth 
Circuit,333 and the Fifth Circuit334 have found that the lack of a pending 
parallel state court proceeding is not dispositive in the abstention analysis 
under the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act. 
A significant case of concern for the insurance company is Huth v. 
Hartford Ins. Co. of the Midwest.335  In the district court, Hartford 
Insurance brought an action pursuant to the Federal Declaratory Judgment 
Act.336  Approximately one week after Hartford filed the suit under the 
Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, Huth filed an identical action in 
Arizona state court pursuant to Arizona’s Declaratory Judgment Act.337  
Because diversity jurisdiction existed, Hartford removed the state 
                                                                                                                          
court from considering constitutionality of state statute under the Pullman doctrine can be 
raised by the parties or the court at any time).   
329  Minot v. Eckardt-Minot, 13 F.3d 590, 593 (2d Cir. 1994) (“The possibility of 
prejudice to out-of-state litigants, which provides whatever diminishing justification for 
federal diversity jurisdiction remains, suggests that courts should be wary of using 
judicially-crafted abstention doctrines to deny out-of-state litigants a federal forum that they 
prefer”). 
330  Wilton, 515 U.S. at 290.  
331  Sherwin-Williams Co. v. Holmes County, 343 F.3d 383, 393-94 (5th Cir. 2003). 
332  See, e.g., Aetna Cas. & Surety Co. v. Ind-Com Electric Co., 139 F.3d 419, 423 
(4th Cir. 1998). 
333  See, e.g., Huth v. Hartford Ins. Co. of the Midwest, 298 F.3d 800, 802-803 (9th 
Cir. 2002). 
334  See, e.g., Sherwin-Williams Co., 343 F.3d at 394. 
335  298 F.3d 800. 
336  Id. at 802. 
337  Id.  Unlike the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, Arizona’s Declaratory 
Judgment Act is not discretionary.  See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1832  (2003). 
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declaratory judgment action to the Arizona District Court and the state and 
federal actions were then consolidated.338  Following removal, Huth filed a 
motion to remand the state portion of the consolidated action and to 
simultaneously stay the federal portion of the consolidated action.339  The 
District Court granted both the motion to remand and the motion to stay.340  
The District Court found that despite the fact that the Arizona declaratory 
judgment action had been properly removed to federal court, that action 
still was a “pending” state action and could thus be remanded pursuant to 
the court’s discretion under the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act.341   The 
District Court in Huth explained its decision to apply the abstention 
doctrine in a footnote:  
 
[T]here is no state court action as it has been removed to 
federal court.  The court does not find this argument persuasive.  
Clearly [the original state action] began in state court.  Once this 
court decides to remand the action the case will proceed in state 
court rather than federal court.  Hartford cannot avoid the court’s 
jurisdictional discretion under the FDJA by removing a state court 
action and then arguing no state court action exists.342   
 
The authority by which the District Court in Huth remanded the state 
court action and thereby revested by federal decision a parallel state court 
proceeding, may be supported by recent amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 
1447(c).343  
                                                                                                                 
338  Huth, 298 F.3d at 802. 
339  Huth v. Hartford Ins. Co. of the Midwest, 298 F.3d 800, 802 (9th Cir. 2002). 
340  Id.  
341  Hartford Ins. Co. of the Midwest v. Huth, No. CIV 00-2067-PHX-MSM, No. CIV 
00-2345-PHX-MHM, Slip. Op. at 5 n.4 (D.Ariz. April 5, 2001). 
342  Id. 
343  Commentators have noted that the 1988 amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) have 
allowed courts to recognize other basis for remand other than jurisdictional and procedural 
defects.  See, e.g., David D. Siegel, Commentary on 1988 Revision of Section 1447, 28 
U.S.C.A. § 1447 (1994 & Supp. 2006), H.R. REP. 100-889 at 72 (1988), a reprinted in 1988 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5982, 6033.  The 1996 amendment to the statute has solidified this viewpoint.  
The 1996 amendment changed the basis of removal from “any defect in removal procedure” 
to “any defect other than lack of subject matter jurisdiction.”  28 U.S.C. 1447(c) (supp. II 
1996).  By using the phrase “any defect other than lack of subject matter jurisdiction,” it has 
been argued that Congress implicitly recognized situations that are neither procedural nor 
concerned with subject matter jurisdiction.  David D. Siegel, Commentary on 1996 Revision 
of Section 1447, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1447 (Supp. 2006).  Following these amendments, courts 
recognized the possibility of non-statutory justifications for remand.  See, e.g., Stevo v. CSX 
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V. CONCLUSION 
 
State court garnishment actions can be a formidable impediment to 
coverage litigation initiated by insurance companies in federal court.  
Where the garnishment action is non-removable, the insurance company 
should initiate its declaratory judgment action early while the state court 
tort litigation is being litigated.  At that point, the two actions are 
significantly differentiated so that they are not identical or substantially 
similar regarding their scope of issues.  The early filing of a declaratory 
judgment action will allow the federal court proceedings to advance 
sufficiently to make the exercise of abstention by the federal court 
unpalatable when the garnishment action is ultimately initiated after the 
liability lawsuit is resolved through judgment against the policyholder. 
In those situations where the state garnishment action is removable, the 
abstention doctrine still presents a formidable impediment to sustaining 
federal jurisdiction.  There is substantial elasticity in the Brillhart factors to 
permit a federal court to abstain by staying the federal declaratory 
judgment action and remanding the state declaratory judgment action under 
a broadened view of abstention exemplified in Huth.  In this situation, the 
early filing of a declaratory judgment action, while the state court liability 
case is being litigated, will also allow the insurance company to 
substantially advance the federal declaratory judgment action before the 
ultimate judgment creditor can initiate a state garnishment action, which 
can only be brought after a final judgment is secured in the state liability 
lawsuit. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                          
Transp., Inc., 940 F.Supp. 1222, 1224-25 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (collecting cases).  A significant 
number of courts held that remand based on the abstention doctrine was proper.  Id. at 1225 
(collecting cases); see also, IMFC Prof. Servs. of Florida., Inc. v. Latin American Home 
Health, Inc., 676 F.2d 152, 159-60 (5th Cir. 1982);  Todd v. Richmond, 844 F.   Supp. 1422, 
1425 (D. Kan. 1994).   
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GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM INSURANCE 
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ABSTRACT 
 
This article examines the recent market for terrorism insurance, 
detailing the history and goals of the United States Terrorism Risk 
Insurance Act (TRIA) in all its iterations. Reinsurance, coverage, 
reimbursement, and liability are discussed in the context of the Act, as well 
as benefits and consequences of government-support terrorism insurance. 
The market reactions to the September 11th, 2001 terrorism attacks are 
presented to discuss imperfect capital markets. Additionally, the future of 
Chemical, Nuclear, Biological and Radiological (CNBR) terrorism and its 
impact on insurance programs and markets is also discussed.  
 
 
Federal government support for the terrorism insurance industry has a 
very brief history. The terrorist attack(s) on September 11, 2001, radically 
altered the way the United States insurance industry perceived terrorist-
related risks.  Prior to the September 11th attack, terrorist-related losses 
were sufficiently small and infrequent that insurers did not take them into 
account when underwriting risks.1  The industry did not even conceive of 
an attack that could generate such significant losses.2  This dramatic shift in 
perception has caused many to suggest that terrorism risks are 
“uninsurable” from an underwriting perspective.3  Some claim that 
                                                                                                                 
∗  Thomas Russell is an Associate Professor of Economics at Santa Clara University. 
He is the co-recipient of the 2007 Robert J Mehr award of the American Risk and Insurance 
Society given for research on insurance which has had the most impact after 10 years. 
+  Jeffrey E. Thomas is Associate Dean for International Programs and Professor of 
Law at the University of Missouri – Kansas City School of Law. 
1  See MUNICH RE, 11TH SEPTEMBER 2001, §§ 3.3-3.4 (2001); Economic Impact of 
the Lack of Terrorism Risk Insurance: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and 
Investigation of the H. Comm on Financial Services, 107th Cong. (2002) (statement of Mark 
J. Warshawsky, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic Policy) available at 
http://www.treas.gov/offices/economic-policy/press/testimony_terrorism_risk_insurance.pdf 
[hereafter Warshawsky]. 
2  See MUNICH RE, supra note 1, § 3.4.  
3  See MUNICH RE, supra note 1, at 1. For a specific analysis of insurability, See INS. 
INFO. INST., TERRORISM, INSURANCE AND THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT 3-4 (2004).  
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uncertainty about the probability of a future attack and amount of damages 
caused by such an attack makes it impossible to calculate an appropriate 
premium for such coverage.4 
The notion that terrorism risk was “uninsurable” was part of the 
rationale advanced for government intervention. When the initial efforts at 
legislation failed, the industry began to withdraw from the market for 
terrorism insurance by adding exclusions for terrorism-related losses to 
their policies.5  Reinsurers were the first to adopt such exclusions, in part 
because they bore about two-thirds of the losses from the September 11th 
attack.6  Because they are subject to more limited governmental regulation,7 
reinsurers were able to exclude terrorism risk without governmental 
approval. A majority of reinsurance contracts were up for renewal in 
January 2002,8 and most of the renewed contracts excluded coverage for 
terrorist-related losses.9 
                                                                                                                 
4  See Terrorism Insurance: Rising Uninsured Exposure to Attacks Heightens 
Potential Economic Vulnerabilities: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and 
Investigationsof the H. Comm on Financial Services, 107th Cong.3 (2002) (statement of 
Richard J. Hillman, Director of Financial Markets and Community Investment)  available at 
www.gao.gov/news.items/d02472t.pdf [hereinafter Hillman]; see also Terrorism 
Uninsurable, INS. DAY, Feb. 27, 2002, at 1. 
5  See What Makes Terrorism Different?, 23 VIEWPOINT No. 3, Winter 2002 
(available at http://www.aais.org).   
6  See Hillman, supra note 5, at 8. 
7  See Hillman, supra note 5, at 3-4.   
8  The majority of reinsurance policies expired in January, and by some reports 
could account for as much as 70% of reinsurance.  See Hillman, supra note 5, at 4 n.2. 
9  “Industry sources confirm that little reinsurance is being written today that 
includes coverage for terrorism.”  Hillman, supra note 5, at 4; see also Warshawsky, supra 
note 1, at 2 (“[T]he reinsurance industry has almost entirely stopped assuming terrorism 
risk.”).  This trend was confirmed in surveys.  The New York Insurance Department 
received responses from companies that represented 89% of commercial insurance writings 
in NY state, and 83% of those companies reported that their reinsurers were excluding or 
limiting coverage for terrorism.  Testimony of New York State Insurance Department: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on 
Financial Services, 107th Cong. 20-21 (2002) (statement of Gregory V. Serio, 
Superintendent of Insurance, New York State Insurance Department)  available at 
www.ins.state.ny.us/speeches/pdf/testimony.pdf.  Similarly, the AAIS found that “[m]ore 
than 80% of the 37 personal lines companies [surveyed] indicated that ‘their current or 
upcoming reinsurance contracts exclude or in some way limit coverage for loss caused by 
terrorism.’” AM. ASS’N OF INS. SERV., AAIS WEIGHS ACTION IN WAKE OF NAIC DECISION 
ON PERSONAL LINES TERRORISM EXCLUSIONS (2002) available at http://www.aais.org.  
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The reinsurers’ withdrawal from the terrorism market left the primary 
insurers at risk of insolvency in the event of a major terrorism loss.10  
According to the National Association of Insurance Commissioners 
(“NAIC”), a $25 million loss for a single primary property/casualty insurer 
in 2001 would have threatened the solvency of 886 companies, or 44% of 
the companies writing commercial property/casualty insurance.11  
Consequently, the regulators endorsed a terrorism exclusion for 
commercial property/casualty insurers.12  As of February 2008, “45 states 
and the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico” had approved a standard 
terrorism exclusion drafted by the Insurance Services Organization,13 
which provides many standard form policies and endorsements used by the 
industry.   
It is unclear whether the difficulty in obtaining terrorism insurance 
alone would have been enough to motivate Congress to adopt the Terrorism 
Risk Insurance Act (“TRIA”), but when Congress decided that reduced 
availability of terrorism insurance was causing a “drag” on the U.S. 
economy,14 TRIA was adopted. It was originally a “temporary” measure set 
to expire in 2005,15 but Congress first extended it for two years,16 and then 
extended it again in 2007 for another 7 years.17     
 
WHAT ARE TRIA’S ESSENTIAL FEATURES? 
                                                                                                                 
10  See Press Release, Insurance Information Institute, Terrorism Coverage is a 
Taxpayer – Not Insurance Company – Responsibility, Industry Forum Told (Jan. 23, 2002) 
available at www.iii.org/media/updates/press.599963; California, New York take Big Risks 
on Terrorism Policies, NAT’L UNDERWRITER, Jan. 27, 2002, at 24.  
11  Hillman, supra note 5, at 17. 
12  News Release, National Association of Insurance Commissioners,  NAIC 
Members Come to Agreement Regarding Exclusions for Acts of Terrorism (Dec. 21, 2001).  
13  Hillman, supra note 5, at 5.  
14  STAFF OF J. ECON. COMM., 107TH CONG., ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM 
INSURANCE 8 (2002); Session Dates of Congress, http://clerk.house.gov/art_history/ 
house_history/Session_Dates/100tocur.html (last visited Sept. 18, 2008). The White House 
suggested that the absence of terrorism insurance caused 300,000 jobs to be lost in construction 
alone. The source of this number was not given and detailed analysis suggests that actual job loss 
was an order of magnitude smaller. Thomas Russell, Dept of Econ., Santa Clara Univ., The 
Costs and Benefits of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act, Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research 
Presentation (2002).   
15  Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-297, § 108(a), 118 Stat. 
2322, 2336. 
16  Terrorism Risk Insurance Extension Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-44, §2(a), 119 
Stat. 2660, 2660. 
17  Terrorism Risk Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-
60, § 3(b), 121 Stat. 1839, 1839-40. 
186 CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 15:1 
 
TRIA has been described as creating a Federal “backstop” for terrorism 
insurance.  The “backstop” is a statutory mechanism that provides Federal 
financial support for payment of terrorism claims in the event of a fairly 
large terrorism incident.  This financial support is similar to reinsurance in 
that it provides reimbursement to insurers18 after they pay claims to a 
specified level (the insurer deductible). It is also similar to reinsurance in 
that insurers retain a proportion of the risk (a “co-pay). But the “backstop” 
is different from reinsurance because insurers don’t pay any premiums to 
be eligible, and the government does not establish any reserves or 
“underwrite” particular risks or books of business.19  Instead, the costs of 
the program are borne by the tax payer with some or all of those costs 
subject to being recouped after the payments through a premium tax on 
property and casualty insurance.   
 A. SCOPE OF COVERAGE 
The backstop was made available for specific lines of property and 
casualty insurance in the event of an attack by foreign terrorists.  TRIA 
covered commercial property and casualty insurance, including excess 
insurance, workers compensation insurance and surety insurance. It did not 
include Federal crop insurance, private mortgage insurance, financial 
guaranty insurance, insurance for medical malpractice, health or life 
insurance, flood insurance, or reinsurance.20 TRIA originally only covered 
acts of terrorism in the United States by foreign terrorists.  The Act defined 
terrorism as a violent act or an act dangerous to life, property or 
infrastructure that resulted in damage in the United States.21 To be covered, 
the acts must be committed “by an individual or individuals acting on 
behalf of any foreign person or foreign interest, as part of an effort to 
                                                                                                                 
18  See Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-297, §§103-04, 118 
Stat. 2322, 2327-29. It should be noted that the Secretary of Treasury has authority to pay 
policyholders directly rather than reimbursing insurers, but that is likely to be an exceptional 
circumstance.   
19  See Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-297, §103(a)(3), 118 
Stat. 2322, 2327 (showing that all insurers are eligible for reimbursement, regardless of 
premium payment or specific risks). In this regard the TRIA program in the US differs from 
the equivalent program in the UK. The British program, Pool Re, essentially replicates a 
market based reinsurance program up to a threshold beyond which the UK government 
covers all loss. See Pool Reinsurance Company Limited (2008), available at 
http://www.poolre.co.uk/Introduction.html. 
20  Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-297,  §§ 101(b)(1), 
102(12),118 Stat. 2322, 2323, 2326. 
21  § 102(1)(A). Including an air carrier or vessel or a U.S. mission. §102(1)(A)(iii). 
2008] TERRORISM INSURANCE 187 
 
coerce the civilian population of the United States or to influence the policy 
or affect the conduct of the U.S. Government by coercion.”22   
 B.  MANDATORY OFFERING 
Insurers for those lines covered by the Act are required to participate.  
They must offer terrorism coverage on the same conditions as coverage for 
non-terrorist losses.23  This means that the covered policies cannot have 
exclusions, limitations or conditions specifically for terrorism (as defined 
by TRIA). However, insurers were allowed to maintain certain exclusions 
applicable to all losses that might apply to some terrorism activity. For 
example, because most policies exclude or limit coverage for nuclear 
incidents, that exclusion would still be applicable to a terrorism event. In 
addition, insurers were allowed to set the price for terrorism coverage 
(within the parameters of state regulation for pricing).   
C. GOVERNMENTAL REIMBURSEMENT FOR CERTIFIED ACTS OF 
TERRORISM 
If a policyholder chooses to buy terrorism coverage, the Act provides 
that the government will reimburse for terrorism losses once aggregate 
insured losses for a certified terrorism event exceed a specified threshold. 
The original threshold was $5,000,000.24  The Secretary of Treasury 
decides, in consultation with the Secretary of State and the Attorney 
General, whether to certify an event as an “act of terrorism.”25 This 
determination is final and not subject to judicial review.26 After the 
triggering event, the government will pay a portion of terrorism losses 
above the deductible.  The original proportion paid by the government was 
90% of terrorism losses.27 During the first year of TRIA, the insurer 
deductible was 7% of an insurer’s direct earned premium from the previous 
year for property and casualty insurance eligible for the program covering 
losses in the United States.  The insurer deductible was increased to 10% in 
the second year of TRIA and then to 15% in the third year.28    
 D. GOVERNMENTAL RECOUPMENT  
                                                                                                                 
22  § 102(1)(A)(iii)(I). 
23  § 103(c)(1). 
24  § 102(1)(B). 
25  Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-297, § 102(1)(A), 118 
Stat. 2322, 2323. 
26  § 102(1)(C). 
27  § 103(e)(1)(A). 
28  § 102(7)(C)-(D). 
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Federal government payments are subject to being recouped from the 
industry through a premium tax on eligible property and casualty insurance.  
The Act required a mandatory recoupment for amounts above the insurers’ 
share and deductible up to a maximum of $10,000,000,000 the first year of 
the program, which was increased to $12,500,000,000 in the second year 
and to $15,000,000,000 in the third year.29 If aggregate insured losses 
exceed mandatory recoupment amount, the Secretary of Treasury had 
discretion to recoup more than the mandatory amount, up to a maximum 
3% premium tax on property and casualty insurance.30  While 3% of 
premiums will not recoup a large loss in a single year, the duration of the 
tax is not specified in the Act, so the process of recoupment could continue 
for a number of years after the loss should the Secretary of Treasury require 
it. In exercising discretion for recoupment, the Secretary is to take various 
factors into account and may set different taxes for different lines of 
insurance or smaller policyholders.31   
 E. CAP ON LIABILITY 
The program has a $100,000,000,000 cap. The original cap was a “soft 
cap” because it could easily be lifted. The Act in 2002 provided that 
payments made by the Secretary of Treasury under the program were 
limited to no more than $100,000,000,000.  If that amount is likely to be 
exceeded, the Secretary is to notify Congress, which “shall determine the 
procedures for and the source of any payments for such excess insured 
losses.” 32  Thus, if there were a $150 billion loss, Congress could decide to 
fund the additional $50 billion.  It is somewhat unclear how supplemental 
Congressional action might affect insurers. On the one hand, the original 
Act provided that “no insurer that has met its insurable deductible shall be 
liable for the payment of any portion of that amount that exceeds 
$100,000,000,000.”33 On the other hand, since that provision is only in 
reference to the $100 billion cap, if Congress chooses to fund beyond the 
cap amount, perhaps it will decide that Insurers should bear some of those 
costs.   
  F. AMENDMENTS TO TRIA 
                                                                                                                 
29  § 103(e)(6). 
30  Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-297, § 103(e)(7)-(8), 118 
Stat. 2322, 2329-30. 
31  § 103(e)(8)(D). 
32  § 103(e)(3).  
33  § 103(e)(2)(A)(ii).  
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The 2005 extension made relatively minor changes in the lines of 
insurance covered by the act and some of the numbers. Directors and 
officers liability insurance was added to the Act’s coverage while 
commercial automobile, burglary and theft insurance, surety insurance, 
professional liability insurance and farm owners multiple peril insurance 
were removed.34 The trigger for coverage was changed from $5,000,000 to 
$100,000,000.35 The government’s obligation for reimbursement was 
lowered from 90% to 85% (after insurer deductibles),36 and insurer 
deductibles were raised to 17.5% of direct earned premium for the first year 
of the extension, and then to 20% for the second year.37  The extension also 
raised the mandatory recoupment levels from $15,000,000,000 to 
$25,000,000,000 for the first year of the extension and to $27,500,000,000 
thereafter.38 
The 2007 extension also made relatively minor changes, but also made 
the notable change of extending the scope of the act to include domestic 
terrorism. This was done by striking the reference to “foreign” terrorism in 
the definition.39 Insurer deductibles remained the same (20% of direct 
earned premium), as did the portion of losses to be paid by insurers 
(15%).40 The cap remained at $100 billion, but language suggesting that 
Congress might raise the cap was removed41 so that the limitation on 
liability for insurers is more definite. The recoupment numbers were 
changed somewhat to address the Congressional Budget Office analysis 
suggesting that the program was too costly to comply with Congressional 
spending rules.42 Under the 2007 extension, the mandatory recoupment is 
133% of the difference between the industry retention (which was left at 
$27.5 billion) and the amount that insurers have to pay due to their 
                                                                                                                 
34  Terrorism Risk Insurance Extension Act of 2005 § 3, Pub. L. No. 109-144, 119 
Stat 2660, 2660-61.  
35  § 6(2)(B)(i). 
36  § 4(1)(B). 
37  § 3(c)(3)(E)-(F). 
38  § 5(3)(D)(i), (E)(i).  
39  Terrorism Risk Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-
160, §2, 121 Stat. 1839 (providing that the definition of an act of terrorism was amended by 
“striking ‘acting on behalf of any foreign person or foreign interest’”). 
40  See Terrorism Risk Insurance Extension Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-144, §4, 
119 Stat. 2660, 2661. 
41  § 4(a)(1)(A). 
42  See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, U.S. CONG., COST ESTIMATE, TERRORISM RISK 
INSURANCE PROGRAM REAUTHORIZATION ACT OF 2007 1-2 (2007) [hereinafter COST 
ESTIMATE]. 
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deductibles and copayments.43 For example, suppose that there was a $25 
billion loss, and that industry retentions and copays amounted to a total of 
$7 billion. Mandatory recoupment would be 133% of the difference 
between these two figures, or about $24 billion (25 b - 7 b = 18 b x 1.33 = 
23.94). The 3% surcharge is still part of the program, but it is the maximum 
that can be allowed under discretionary recoupment. These changes will 
increase the amount of recovery that Treasury will be able to obtain from 
the industry after an event, which will reduce the cost of the program. The 
other noteworthy change in the 2007 extension is the requirement for 
Treasury to adopt allocation and recoupment regulations within a specified 
timeframe.44    
 G.  SUMMARY: CURRENT STRUCTURE 
The following bullet points summarize the terms of the Act:  
• Scope. The Act covers commercial property and casualty 
insurance, including excess insurance, workers compensation and 
directors and officers insurance; insurers selling those lines of 
insurance are required to participate; 
• Mandatory offering. Terrorism coverage must be offered 
on the same on the same conditions (but not at the same price) as 
non-terrorism coverage;  
• Certified act of terrorism. A terrorist event causing more 
than $100,000,000 in insured losses certified by the Secretary of 
Treasury will trigger the Act’s provisions;  
• Insurer deductibles and co-payments. Insurers must first 
pay 20% of their previous year’s direct earned premium for the 
losses, after which they will be reimbursed by the government for 
85% of additional covered losses;  
• Cap. The maximum to be paid under the Act is $100 
billion; and   
• Recoupment. The government is required to recoup 133% 
of the first $27.5 billion paid out under the act (less the amount 
that insurers pay that is not subject to reimbursement) by imposing 
a premium surcharge on all eligible insurance, and may impose an 
additional surcharge of up to 3% in the Secretary’s discretion. 
                                                                                                                 
43  Terrorism Risk Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-
60 § 4(e)(1)(A), 121 Stat. 1839, 1841. 
44  See §§ 4(c), 4(e)(1)(B)(I). 
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A graphical depiction of the program is provided in the Figure below, 
prepared by the Congressional Budget Office:  
 
 
 
WHY SUPPORT TERRORISM INSURANCE?   
The recent renewal of TRIA raises a number of important issues with 
regard to the structure of regulation of the terrorism insurance industry. 
First among these is the question of why the industry needs any support at 
all. With government support now guaranteed through 2014, all pretense of 
a need for “temporary” or “short term” assistance has been dropped. 
Instead it is now argued that private market provision of terrorism 
insurance is permanently compromised, uninsurability being a consequence 
of two features: 
1) The size of potential loss. 
2) The lack of precise underlying probabilities of terrorist attack.  
Given that TRIA and its extensions set up a potential transfer from the 
tax payer to otherwise profitable enterprises, both of these arguments for 
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intervention require detailed scrutiny. With respect to the size of the loss, it 
is true that some potential terrorism losses, particularly those associated 
with Chemical, Nuclear, Biological, and Radiological (so called CNBR) 
attacks are of an order of magnitude greater than any losses experienced by 
the insurance industry to date. As an illustration, Table 1 shows the 
estimates of loss for various scenarios as developed by the American 
Academy of Actuaries.45 Other loss estimates, for example by Risk 
Management Solutions, are of the same order of magnitude.46  
Table 1: Estimated Terrorism Losses 
 
Source: American Academy of Actuaries: 2006 
As a point of reference, the total surplus (reserves) of property/casualty 
insurers in the US in 2007 was $687 billion.47 This surplus is required to 
                                                                                                                 
45  Open Letter from Michael G. McCarter, Chair, Terrorism Risk Insurance 
Subgroup of the American Academy of Actuaries, to the President’s Working Group on 
Financial Markets: Terrorism Risk Insurance Analysis (April 21, 2006), available at 
http://www.actuary.org/pdf/casualty/tris_042106.pdf [hereinafter 2006 Open Letter]. 
46  See RISK MGMT SOLUTIONS, INC., A RISK-BASED RATIONALE FOR EXTENDING THE 
TERRORISM RISK INSURANCE ACT (2005), available at http://www.rms.com/Publications/ 
A%20Risk%20Based%20Approach%20for%20Extending%20TRIA.pdf.  . 
47  CONSUMER FED’N OF AM.15.1(C)&(D) , INSURERS MAINTAIN RECORD PROFITS IN 
2007 BY OVERPRICING POLICIES AND UNDERPAYING CLAIMS (2008), available at 
http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/2008_INSURANCE_RELEASE_FINAL.pdf. 
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pay all property casualty losses, not just terrorism loss. Clearly a large 
CNBR attack in New York City could wipe out the whole property casualty 
insurance industry in one blow. 
The cost of damages from CNBR attacks, however, is not a relevant 
benchmark to justify TRIA, because, as already noted, under the current 
Act, mandatory offering is limited to requiring only that insurers offer 
terrorism coverage on the same terms and conditions as non-terrorism 
insurance.48  Non-terrorism insurance already excludes nuclear risks, 
pollution and contamination. As a consequence, even though the Treasury 
would support CNBR loss in exactly the same way as it supports 
conventional terrorism loss, CNBR coverage is typically excluded from 
standard terrorism insurance contracts. The one exception to this is workers 
compensation, where regulation permits no exclusions.49 This and other 
issues related to CNBR coverage will be addressed later in the article, but 
within the context of current insurance practice and legislative parameters 
the only question is whether or not a conventional terrorist attack could 
cause such large damages that it would present any real capacity problem 
for the private sector. From that point of view, even such a dreadful event 
as a truck bomb in Manhattan ($12b estimated loss) represents a mere 2% 
of current surplus.50 Events of this magnitude clearly do not threaten the 
viability of the private sector and of course such events occur infrequently. 
How infrequently? The second argument for continued government 
intervention goes to the difficulty in answering this question. Unlike, say 
auto or life insurance, there are no precise actuarial tables of terrorism 
attacks from which profit guaranteeing premiums can be calculated.  
But this is not to say that anything can happen. The Congressional 
Budget Office, for example, is charged with estimating the costs to the 
Government of new legislation, and for the most recent TRIA extension 
they used expert opinion to estimate the probability of loss. As they state:  
Although estimating losses associated with terrorist events is difficult 
because of the lack of meaningful historical data, the insurance industry has 
experience setting premiums for catastrophic events—namely, natural 
disasters. Setting premiums for hurricanes and earthquakes, for example, 
involves determining areas that could sustain damage, the value of the 
                                                                                                                 
48  See supra note 19 and accompanying text.  
49  2006 Open Letter, supra note 45, at 3.  
50  Again to calibrate the size of the loss, note that AIG lost $1b in the 9/11 attacks 
and in January 2008 wrote down $11.1 billion of guarantees sold to fixed-income investors. 
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losses that could result from various types of events with different levels of 
severity, and the frequency of such events.  
Similarly, estimating premiums for losses resulting from terrorist 
attacks involves judgments regarding potential targets and the frequency of 
such attacks. Because there is a very limited history of terrorist attacks in 
the United States, many of the parameters needed by the insurance industry 
to set premiums are based on expert opinion regarding terrorist activities 
and capabilities rather than on historical data.51  
Given the argument that losses are too large for the private sector to 
bear on its own, it is somewhat surprising that the CBO estimates that the 
new Act, which the industry argued was necessary for its survival, would 
only increase direct Government spending by $3.1 billion over the entire 
2008-2012 period and by $6.6 billion over the 2008-2017 period. Clearly 
the removal of a subsidy this small does not threaten the viability of the 
private terrorism insurance industry.52  
It is true that, however, that in general insurers dislike imprecise 
estimates of risk. When it is difficult to attach a precise number to the 
probability of attack, risk becomes “ambiguous” in the sense identified by 
Ellsberg.53 It is well known that insurers are “ambiguity averse,”54 
preferring to insure risks with known probabilities which are subject to 
actuarial calculation. As Kunreuther et al noted,55 managers of insurance 
companies facing ambiguous probabilities demand a large premium over 
expected loss to write these lines.  
Notwithstanding this ambiguity aversion, in the absence of price 
regulation, there is no reason why the ambiguity cannot be handled by 
setting larger premiums.  As the CBO notes, other lines with uncertain risk 
parameters, notably earthquake insurance, are provided by the private 
sector.56 So again it is puzzling why insurers continue to assert that 
terrorism is uninsurable.  
                                                                                                                 
51  COST ESTIMATE, supra note 42, at 5. 
52  Id. at 4.  The bill contains a provision that limits payments to no more than $100 
million, which helps to preserve private sector viability. We discuss this provision later. 
53  See Daniel Ellsberg, Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms, 75 Q. J. ECON. 643 
(1961). 
54  See Howard  Kunreuther, J. Meszaros, R. Hogarth & M. Spranca, Ambiguity and 
Underwriter Decision Processes, 26 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 337 (1995); R. Hogarth & 
Howard Kunreuther, Risk, Ambiguity and Insurance, 2 J. RISK & INS. 5(1989). 
55  See Howard  Kunreuther, J. Meszaros, R. Hogarth & M. Spranca, Ambiguity and 
Underwriter Decision Processes, 26 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 337 (1995). 
56  CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 42, at 5. 
2008] TERRORISM INSURANCE 195 
 
The market reaction to the September 11th attacks, while generally one 
of withdrawal and higher prices, is consistent with the theoretical 
explanation given above. Although many insurers excluded terrorism from 
standard coverages, the Treasury study found that significant terrorism 
coverage was still available in the market during 2002, prior to the 
enactment and effective date of TRIA.57 Treasury found that “roughly 73 
percent of commercial property and casualty insurers wrote some terrorism 
coverage in TRIA-eligible commercial property and casualty lines 
(excluding workers’ compensation) in 2002.”58 This coverage was provided 
in approximately 60% of commercial property and casualty policies that 
year.59  
While this coverage was significant, it was far from universal. The 
Treasury study also found that while some 40% of insurers offered 
terrorism coverage in all of their policies (and many times without separate 
premium charges),60 in 2002 about 27% of insurers offered terrorism 
insurance coverage in none of their policies, and about another 5% offered 
terrorism in 50% or less of their policies.61  
Consistent with the ambiguity aversion, prices for terrorism insurance 
were quite high after September 11th, especially compared to the price 
prior to September 11th (zero, as it was not a separately considered risk), 
but those prices came down as the market was able to develop models to 
address the ambiguity and with the adoption of TRIA. Immediately after 
September 11th, insurers were worried that another attack could be 
imminent; as concerns subsided, prices dropped by 50-75% within the first 
nine months of 2002.62 But even in 2003, terrorism insurance could add 
10% to the average property insurance premium for small to medium-sized 
properties, up to 20% for large properties, and considerably more for 
landmark properties in major urban areas.63 By the third quarter of 2004, 
the typical price for terrorism coverage was about 4% of total premiums for 
                                                                                                                 
57  See OFFICE OF ECON. POLICY, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, ASSESSMENT: THE 
TERRORISM RISK INSURANCE ACT OF 2002 3, 27 (2005). 
58  Id. at 57 (2005). 
59  Id. at 58 (2005). 
60  U.S. Department of Treasury, Assessment: the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 
2002, at 60 (2005). 
61  See Figure 4.3, U.S. Department of Treasury, Assessment: the Terrorism Risk 
Insurance Act of 2002, at 59-60 (2005).  
62  Congressional Budget Office, Federal Terrorism Reinsurance: An Update, at 6 
n.18 (2005). 
63  Id. at 6. 
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property coverage.64  By 2006, the median rate for terrorism insurance was 
down to $47 per $1 million compared to $56 per million in 2003.65 
As prices declined, more policyholders purchased terrorism coverage.66  
According to a study conducted by Wharton Risk Management and 
Decision Processes Center at the University of Pennsylvania, by 2005 
“about 50% of commercial enterprises had purchased TRIA-line terrorism 
insurance.”67 The take-up rate climbed to 64% in the first half of 2007.68 
Without TRIA support, prices would likely rise and take-up rates decline.69 
While lower prices are certainly welcomed by consumers, lower prices 
and higher take up rates alone do not justify TRIA. If consumers are 
unwilling to pay the market price for terrorism insurance, one may 
conclude that they should bear the risk of terrorism.  However, there are 
some social benefits from terrorism insurance. In particular, use of 
terrorism insurance makes available the insurance industry’s underwriting 
and claims apparatus. The claims process after September 11th, which at 
the time was the “largest single insured event in history,” went relatively 
smoothly.70 Of the nearly 20,000 insurance claims filed two months after 
the attack, the New York Insurance Commissioner’s Office only received 
63 complaints.71 The Insurance Commissioner concluded that consumers 
were generally “satisfied” with the claims handling, and that the industry 
approached its claims obligations “responsibly.”72 This is a dramatic 
                                                                                                                 
64  Chalk, Peter; Hoffman, Bruce; Reville, Robert; & Kasupski, Anna-Britt; Trends in 
Terrorism: Threats to the United States and the Future of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act 
(RAND Corp. 2005). 
65  Congressional Budget Office, Federal Reinsurance for Terrorism Risks: Issues in 
Reauthorization, at 16 (2007) (available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/87xx/ 
doc8761/TRIAsenate.pdf).  
66  Chalk, Peter; Hoffman, Bruce; Reville, Robert; & Kasupski, Anna-Britt; Trends in 
Terrorism: Threats to the United States and the Future of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act 
(RAND Corp. 2005). 
67  Wharton Risk Management and Decision Process Center, TRIA and Beyond, at 2 
(Wharton School of Business 2005). 
68  Congressional Budget Office, supra note 62, at 15. 
69  Dixon, Lloyd; Lempert, Robert J.; LaTorrette, Tom; Reville, Robert T.; Terrorism 
Insurance: Evaluating Alternatives in an Uncertain World at 30 (RAND Corp. 2007) 
(noting that “studies suggest that the take-up rate would fall by 25 to 75 percent if TRIA 
were to expire, resulting in take-up somewhere between 14 and 49 percent”). 
70  Jeffrey Thomas, Insurance Implications of September 11 and Possible Responses, 
34 URB. LAW. 727, 730-31 (2002). 
71  Jeffrey E. Thomas, Insurance Implications of September 11 and Possible 
Responses, 34 Urb. Lawyer 727, 732 (2002) (citing testimony of Gregory V. Serio, New 
York Commissioner of Insurance). 
72  Id.  
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contrast to FEMA’s handling of Federal Assistance claims in the aftermath 
of Hurricane Katrina. The Government Accountability Office identified 
significant problems in the processes used by FEMA, and estimated that 
more than $1 billion in payments were improper and/or fraudulent.73 
Moreover, because it seems likely that the government will step in to 
provide disaster relief to victims of a terrorist attack, terrorism insurance 
provides for private payment of at least part of the claims, which reduces 
the cost to the government even when the insurance is subsidized. 
 
UNINSURABILITY AND IMPERFECT CAPITAL MARKETS 
 
If the conventional arguments do not explain uninsurability, why did 
firms withdraw from this market following 9/11? In previous works it is 
argued that the failure of the terrorism and other catastrophe insurance 
markets is a consequence of imperfections in the market for capital.74 The 
difficulty of raising external capital is documented in several works.75 Gron 
and Lucas, for example, document that insurers raise premiums following a 
loss of surplus but make surprisingly little use of the external capital 
market.76 This strategy will not work for catastrophic losses.  In general, for 
infrequent, high loss events, it is not possible to guarantee payment of 
losses out of pre accumulated premiums. Suppose that a one in a hundred 
year event occurs soon after an insurance line has been established. 
Because sufficient time will not have elapsed in which to accumulate 
adequate reserves from premiums, an insurer will then be forced to raise 
capital in external capital markets. This can be a very difficult task. 
Consider the analogy with the banking sector. A bank may be a 
perfectly solvent business going forward, but if there is a run (a type of 
catastrophe) or indeed any situation in which the bank is forced to liquidate 
                                                                                                                 
73  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-300, HURRICANE KATRINA AND 
RITA DISASTER RELIEF; CONTINUED FINDINGS OF FRAUD, WASTE AND ABUSE 1-4 (2007). 
74  See Dwight Jaffee & Thomas Russell, Markets Under Stress: The Case of 
Extreme Event Insurance, in ECONOMICS FOR AN IMPERFECT WORLD: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF 
JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ 35, 41-43 (Richard Arnott et al. eds., 2003); Dwight M. Jaffee and 
Thomas Russell, Catastrophe Insurance, Capital Markets, and Uninsurable Risks, 64 RISK 
& INS. 205, 227-228 (1997). 
75  See Anne Gron & Deborah Lucas, External Financing and Insurance Cycles, in 
THE ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY-CASUALTY INSURANCE 5 (David F. Bradford, ed., 1998); 
Anne Gron, Capacity Constraints and Cycles in Property-Casualty Insurance Markets, 25 
RAND J. ECON. 110 (1994); Ralph A. Winter, The Liability Insurance Market, 5 J. ECON. 
PERSP. 115 (1991).  
76  See Gron & Lucas, supra note 75.  
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assets, the bank may find that the market’s appetite for cash is so strong 
that even safe assets cannot be liquidated. This preference for cash may not 
be rational, but it is part of the environment of financial intermediation, and 
in the banking industry the institution of central banking exists to provide 
liquidity in just such circumstances. As one central banker has noted: 
 
[P]olicy practitioners operating under a risk-management 
paradigm may, at times, be led to undertake actions intended to 
provide insurance against especially adverse outcomes . . .  When 
confronted with uncertainty, especially Knightian uncertainty, 
human beings invariably attempt to disengage from medium to 
long-term commitments in favor of safety and liquidity. . . The 
immediate response on the part of the central bank to such 
financial implosions must be to inject large quantities of 
liquidity.77  
 
Providers of terrorism insurance are not as fortunate as bankers. Not 
only is there no central bank to provide liquidity following a large loss, 
insurance companies have no hard assets to use as security against a capital 
inflow. The insurer may well be solvent in the sense that the future flow of 
premiums (over perhaps a century or longer) would cover the loss and 
provide profits, but few counterparties, having just witnessed an event such 
as 9/11, will agree to provide capital against these future flows. Given that 
post loss capital is so difficult to obtain, a contract of terrorism insurance 
which relies on such external capital is not credible, and so insurers refrain 
from writing it. This analysis suggests a very different approach to 
terrorism insurance regulation, but before turning to this, it is useful to 
consider what, if any, private arrangements might reduce the reliance on 
external capital.  
One obvious approach is to arrange in advance for capital injections 
following a loss. This is the “Lloyd’s solution.”  Lloyds of London was 
originally organized as a syndicate of rich investors (names) who pledged 
their capital with unlimited liability “down to their last shirt button.” 
Lloyd’s itself held only operating capital, but in the event of a large loss, 
the capital of the names was subject to a “call,” this internal capital 
removing the need to access external markets.  
                                                                                                                 
77  Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Risk and Uncertainty in Monetary 
Policy (Jan. 3, 2004), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/BoardDocs/ 
Speeches/2004/20040103/default.htm.  
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Indeed given the efficiency of English capital markets, there was no 
need even for the names to hold liquid capital. Many names were rich 
landowners who could meet a call by pledging their land as a security for a 
loan. In this way the capital of the names, land, which was pledgeable, was 
substituted for the future premium stream of the syndicate which was not. 
When this structure was in place, Lloyds fulfilled the function of a central 
bank for primary catastrophe insurers who could lay off their risks in the 
London market. 
This solution, however, is no longer available. A series of financial 
reversals has made the names no longer willing to accept unlimited 
liability, and Lloyds, moving towards the organizational form of most of 
the world’s major re-insurers, is in the process of becoming a limited 
liability joint stock company. With this organizational form, Lloyds too 
will face the problem of raising external capital ex post. 
Given the difficulties which this entails, it is natural to look for 
alternative mechanisms to pre-capitalize the premium stream. Recently a 
number of creative ways of tapping into capital markets have been 
developed. Known collectively as Insurance Linked Securities, (ILS) the 
most notable instruments are catastrophe bonds (“cat bonds”), and 
“sidecars.”78 Cat bonds are loans whose principal is forfeited to the 
borrower in the event of a triggering loss. Sidecars are a type of insurance 
book- of- business based hedge fund.  
Some market participants have high hopes that this market will grow 
large enough to pre fund even mega catastrophes. For example, 
extrapolating past growth, Jacques Aigrain, CEO of Swiss Re, predicted a 
size of between $250 billion and $710 billion by 2016.79 Obviously if even 
the low end of this forecast were to be realized, the need for government 
intervention would evaporate. 
 
  
                                                                                                                 
78  Morton N. Lane, See Of Sidecars and Such, LANE FINANCIAL TRADE NOTES (Lane 
Financial, Wilmette, IL), Jan. 31, 2007, available at http://www.lanefinancialllc.com/ 
images/stories/Publications/2007-01-30_Of_Sidecars_and_Such.pdf (providing an excellent 
overview of the history and current state of the sidecar instrument). 
79  Jaques Aigrain, Chief Executive Officer, Swiss Re, UBS Swiss Alpine Summit 
(Jan. 19, 2007), available at http://www.swissre.com (follow “Investor Relations” 
hyperlink, then follow “Presentations” hyperlink, then follow “2007” hyperlink, scroll down 
to January 19th Presentation). 
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Figure 2: Growth of the ILS Market: Source Aigrain 2007.  
However, extrapolation of past trends is a dangerous game, especially 
from a low base, and this predicted scenario seems to be particularly rosy. 
It is true that following the 2005 hurricane losses due to Katrina, Rita, and 
Wilma, (KRW) the ILS market proved remarkably resilient. Despite the 
fact that investors in one cat bond issue (Kamp Re) lost their entire 
principal, $6.2 billion dollars was raised in the cat bond market in 2006, 
and $6.3 billion was raised in sidecars.  This growth has gone on into 2007.  
 
 
Figure 3: Post Katrina Financing: Source Lane Financial 
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It should be pointed out, however, that these sums fall far short of the 
KRW losses of $56.5 billion. More worrying, the sub-prime problems have 
cast a shadow over the whole structured investment/special investment 
vehicle market, and it is unlikely that the ILS market will escape this pall.  
 
POSSIBLE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR TRIA 
 
In the absence, then, of a multi billion ILS Market, what is the 
appropriate role for government in regulating the conventional terrorism 
loss insurance industry? Based on the analysis here, several conclusions 
emerge. 
1) TRIA may be justified as a way of limiting industry loss. A 
fixed cap on loss limits the size of the needed recapitalization following an 
event and thus reduces reliance on external capital markets. In light of the 
$687 billion in total reserves,   the current loss cap of $100 billion, ($70 
billion after tax) seems more than adequate. There is evidence from other 
catastrophe lines (for example, earthquake insurance in California),80 that 
private insurers will write insurance if they know that the maximum 
possible loss is limited to a manageable sum. As reserves increase, this 
upper limit could be increased. TRIA further limits industry losses through 
the reimbursement of 85% of losses after the insurer deductible has been 
met. Within the liability cap, this reinsurance seems unnecessary. 
2) With a manageable total loss cap in place, there seems no 
reason why, within the overall $100 billion limit, the government should 
provide the industry with any subsidy. As noted above, the expected value 
of this subsidy is in any case small, and with total loss capped, the industry 
seems quite capable of paying claims without any co-payments from the 
government. The more the industry is required to bear its own risk, the 
more incentive there will be to discover creative financing arrangements 
such as the ILS discussed above. It is little wonder that some insurers such 
as Swiss Re are reluctant to enter the terrorism insurance market when they 
must compete with an agency, the federal government, which makes 
reinsurance available at zero cost. 
3) TRIA may be justified as a way of reducing the price for 
terrorism insurance. Although insurers have the capability to pay claims, 
because of uncertainty about the probability of the losses, ambiguity 
aversion drives up the price of terrorism insurance. While it is beyond the 
                                                                                                                 
80 Dwight M. Jaffee and Thomas Russell, Should Governments Provide Catastrophe 
Insurance?, ECONOMISTS’ VOICE, Apr. 2006 at 2. 
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scope of this paper to explore in detail, it may be that without TRIA the 
price of terrorism insurance will be higher than many policyholders are 
willing to pay.81  In the absence of insurance it seems likely that Federal 
and State governments would be obliged to make ex post payments 
following a terrorist attack, and the larger the share of these losses covered 
by insurance, the smaller the burden on the taxpayer.82  TRIA also helps to 
address ambiguity aversion through the recoupment process, which uses 
actual costs of a terrorism incident rather than trying to model and predict 
what those costs would be. Public policy reasons (such as ex ante planning 
and ex post claims adjusting expertise) may justify the program to improve 
take-up rates and to reduce prices.  
All of this said, the parameters of government intervention in the 
conventional terrorism insurance industry have now been set till 2014, so 
reforms are not imminent. There does remain the question of what to do 
about CNBR risk, and since the extension of TRIA requires the 
Comptroller General to study “the availability and affordability of 
insurance coverage for losses caused by terrorist attacks involving nuclear, 
biological, chemical, or radiological materials” and issue a report by 
December 2008,83 this question remains of some current interest. 
 
WHAT SHOULD BE DONE ABOUT CNBR RISK?   
 
In the original House version of what became the Terrorism Risk 
Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2007, the “mandatory offer” 
provision was extended to acts of CNBR terrorism. Although at least parts 
of the industry supported this provision, which was supplemented by lower 
deductibles and other provisions favorable to insurers (such as the so-called 
“reset” provision), the final version did not expand TRIA’s coverage to 
include CNBR risks. The administration and some Senators opposed the 
inclusion of CNBR risks as an inappropriate expansion of TRIA. In the 
                                                                                                                 
81  Take-up rates have gone from about 24% to 60% since TRIA was first enacted. 
These take-up rates are at least in part because of lower pricing under the program, and 
without TRIA it is reasonable to expect that prices would rise and take-up rates would fall.  
See PETER CHALK ET AL., TRENDS IN TERRORISM: THREATS TO THE UNITED STATES AND THE 
FUTURE OF THE TERRORISM RISK INSURANCE ACT 7-8 (2005). 
82  This view informs the RAND study.  See  LLOYD DIXON ET AL., RAND CTR FOR 
TERRORISM RISK MGMT POLICY, THE FEDERAL ROLE IN TERRORISM INSURANCE: EVALUATING 
ALTERNATIVES IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD 37-41 (2007) available at 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2007/RAND_MG679.pdf. 
83  Terrorism Risk Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-
160, § 5(a), 121 Stat. 1839, 1841-42 (2007). 
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show-down between the House and Senate versions the Senate version 
won, in significant part because of a threatened veto, and so the CNBR 
provision was not included, leaving only the requirement for the 
Comptroller General study.  
Although in many ways the issues raised by CNBR terrorism are the 
same as those raised by conventional terrorism (except with larger loss 
estimates), the risk of large losses combined with even less experience and 
data about such attacks makes it less likely that the private market will 
provide significant insurance coverage for NBCR risks. In its September 
2006 report on insuring NBCR risks, for example, the GAO notes that 
“insuring NBCR risks is distinctly different from insuring other risks 
because of the potential for catastrophic losses, a lack of understanding or 
knowledge about the long-term consequences, and a lack of historical 
experience with NBCR attacks in the United States.”84 The GAO 
concluded that, “[g]iven the challenges faced by insurers in providing 
coverage for, and pricing, NBCR risks, any purely market-driven 
expansion of coverage is highly unlikely in the foreseeable future.”85   
As noted above in Table 1, some scenarios of CNBR attacks are 
estimated to cause losses that approach $700 billion. Under the current 
TRIA structure, however, this would present no marginal threat to the 
surplus positions of private insurers. Even with CNBR coverage included, 
private insurance losses would remain capped at $100 billion ($70 billion 
after tax). 86 
For insurers, then, the real question is the extent to which the addition 
of CNBR risk would increase the probability of payouts below the $100 
billion cap. To answer this question, it is necessary to estimate the 
probability of a CNBR attack, and, because we have little clear data on how 
close terrorists are to developing weapons of mass destruction,87 this is 
even more difficult than estimating the probability of a conventional 
terrorism attack. 
                                                                                                                 
84  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-1081, TERRORISM INSURANCE: 
MEASURING AND PREDICTING LOSSES FROM UNCONVENTIONAL WEAPONS IS DIFFICULT, BUT 
SOME INDUSTRY EXPOSURE EXISTS 4 (2006). 
85  Id. at 4. 
86  See McCarter, supra note 45, at 30 tbl. 1.     
87  E.g., WILLIAM LANGEWIESCHE, THE ATOMIC BAZAAR: THE RISE OF THE NUCLEAR 
POOR (2007) (providing an interesting discussion of the challenges which terrorists face in 
obtaining highly enriched uranium, the heart of a nuclear bomb). For a qualitative 
assessment of CNBR risks based on current terrorism threats, see PETER CHALK ET AL., 
TRENDS IN TERRORISM: THREATS TO THE UNITED STATES AND THE FUTURE OF THE TERRORISM 
RISK INSURANCE ACT 11-38 (2005). 
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Experts are deeply divided on this issue. On the one hand, there are 
those who see a CNBR attack on the US in the near future as all but 
inevitable.  For example, William Frist, the former United States Senate 
majority leader in 2005 stated,  “The greatest existential threat we have in 
the world today is biological”  and would come  “at some time in the next 
10 years.” 88 
On the other hand, there is much data suggesting that terrorism risk is 
in fact very low. As Mueller has pointed out:  
 
Even with the September 11 attacks included in the count, 
however, the number of Americans killed by international 
terrorism over the period [1975-2003] is not a great deal more than 
the number killed by lightning--or by accident-causing deer or by 
severe allergic reactions to peanuts over the same period. In almost 
all years the total number of people worldwide who die at the 
hands of international terrorists is not much more than the number 
who drown in bathtubs in the United States--some 300-400.89 
 
Attempts to reach scientific estimates of probability are bedeviled by 
the well known judgmental bias called by Tversky and Kahneman, the 
availability heuristic.90 Events such as a suitcase nuclear bomb attack on a 
US city are vivid and easy to imagine, a fact reinforced by the frequent use 
of such events in popular fiction. Because such events are “available,” they 
are believed to occur more frequently than the data suggests. When the 
availability heuristic is combined with the fact that inducing fear of an 
invisible enemy is often a powerful political instrument, the divergence of 
views is easy to understand. 
Insurers are caught in the middle of this debate, and thus find it very 
difficult to know what premium would be appropriate for CNBR coverage. 
So even though extending the “must offer” requirement within the $100 
billion cap would not threaten the viability of insurers, it would require an 
increase in premiums to cover the ambiguity in the estimates of likelihood. 
                                                                                                                 
88  Kevin McElderry, US Senate Leader Urges Research Push Against Bio-terrorism, 
AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, January 27, 2005.  For a more scholarly assessment of CNBR risks 
from Al-Qaeda, see CHALK ET AL., supra note 81.  
89  JOHN MUELLER, REACTING TO TERRORISM: PROBABILITIES, CONSEQUENCES, AND 
THE PERSISTENCE OF FEAR (2007), http://psweb.sbs.ohio-state.edu/faculty/jmueller/ 
ISA2007T.pdf.   
90  See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging 
Frequency and Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 207, 207 (1973).    
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To offset this premium increase, some form of special subsidy for CNBR 
terrorism may be needed. The government payment of 85% of losses (after 
insurer deductibles) would help reduce the price for such coverage. 
Industry representatives have argued that for CNBR coverage to be 
affordably priced, the industry deduction for CNBR terrorism loss should 
be lower than for conventional losses.91 This kind of special treatment of 
CNBR loss was a feature of the House version of 2007 extension of TRIA 
(which was not accepted by the Senate or the Administration).92 
 
CNBR AND WORKERS COMPENSATION 
  
The workers compensation line faces two special challenges with 
respect to CNBR risks.   
1) With the exception of Pennsylvania,93 workers compensation 
statutes permit no exclusions for CNBR risks. 
2) The benefits payable under workers compensation are preset 
by statute. For some injuries likely to be associated with CNBR attacks, for 
example skin grafting following burns, these individual benefits may 
exceed $15 million. 
Thus, private insurers who offer this line have substantial exposure. For 
example, some 5.7% of total 9/11 losses (approximately $2 billion) was 
due to workers compensation claims, and the estimates of the workers 
compensation loss from a New York City CNBR incident given in Table 1 
approach one half trillion dollars.  
To be sure, not all of this risk is written by the for- profit private sector.  
In four states and two territories,94 workers compensation insurance is 
                                                                                                                 
91  See Hearing on Terrorism Risk Insurance Before the Subcomm. on Capital 
Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises of the H. Comm. on Financial 
Servs., 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of Brian Dowd, CEO, Insurance-North America).   
92  Terrorism Risk Insurance Revision and Extension Act of 2007, H.R. Res. 
2761, 110th Cong.  § 101 (2007).  
93  In Pennsylvania, workers compensation statutes explicitly exclude acts of war.  
See 77 PA STAT. ANN. § 431 (West 2002).  Other jurisdictions are silent on this class of risk. 
Since acts of war may therefore be included in workers compensation contracts, TRIA and 
its extensions provide that the Federal program includes acts of war as well as acts of 
terrorism.    
94  North Dakota, Ohio, Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Washington, Wyoming.   
See Carl Hammersburg, Benefits of Adding Workers’ Compensation Data to the Public 
Assistance Reporting Information System (PARIS), http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/paris/ 
state_info/worker_white_paper.html.  
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provided by a state run monopoly, and in thirteen other states95 a not- for- 
profit state enterprise competes with the private sector. In New York State, 
the state exposed to the half trillion dollar estimate of Table 1, the top five 
writers of workers’ comp insurance in 2006, according to A.M. Best Co. 
were: the State Insurance Fund of New York, a not–for- profit state agency, 
with 40.4% market share; American International Group Inc., with 18.7%; 
Liberty Mutual Insurance Cos., with 9.1%; Hartford Insurance Group, with 
4%; and Zurich Financial Services North America Group, with 3.6%.  
Clearly, the exposure of the private sector in this state (60%) is 
significant,96  and for private insurers who write this line, the argument 
that, because of its size and non predictability, CNBR risk is uninsurable, 
apparently does not apply. 
Obviously when given the all or nothing choice to offer CNBR 
insurance or quit the workers compensation line, many companies have 
found a way to stay in business. How did they do it?  In the first place, 
many companies scrutinized their book of business to make certain that 
they had no accumulation of geographic risk. This statement by the CEO of 
New York Mutual describes the policy: 
With respect to workers’ compensation coverage, as long as employee 
counts were not too concentrated, our company considered offering 
coverage. We also implemented a computer system to geo track risk 
accumulations to the street level as well as the number of employees in a 
given building, and risk concentrations by zip code.97 
Concentration of risk is clearly a major issue. If an insurer were to 
write workers compensation insurance in the District of Columbia (where 
the death benefit is worth approximately $1.8 million) for a company 
which lost 300 employees as a result of a terrorist attack, the total claim 
                                                                                                                 
95  Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Maryland, Minnesota, Montana, New York, 
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Utah.   See id.  
96  In California, the share of the risk taken by the state enterprise, State 
Compensation Insurance Fund, fell sharply between 2005 and 2006 (from over 42% to 31%) 
and the state is actively campaigning to attract further private capital. Apparently investors 
in this state are not put off by the fact that their capital is exposed to CNBR risk. See 2006 
ANNUAL REPORT, STATE COMPENSATION INSURANCE FUND 5 (2006), available at 
http://www.scif.com/pdf/2006AnnualReport.pdf. 
97  Hearing on the Need to Extend the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act Before the 
Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises of the H. 
Comm. on Financial Servs., 110th Cong. 3 (2007) (statement of Warren Heck, Chairman 
and CEO, Greater New York Mutual Insurance Company, Insurance Company of Greater 
New York and Strathmore Insurance Company), available at http://www.house.gov/apps/ 
list/hearing/financialsvcs_dem/htheck030507.pdf.   
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would equal $500 million. It would clearly not be prudent for one company 
to cover all these employees.   
Given the obvious benefit of regional diversification, it might be 
thought that there would be benefits to the development of an industry pool 
to share workers compensation risks.98 A 2004 private market sponsored 
study by Tillinghast Reinsurance, however, concluded that such a pool 
would do little to add to capacity, and the industry opted instead to rely on 
the federal program. As the study states, 
In the face of catastrophic events (the type that threaten the viability of 
the industry), the pool could not provide the industry any meaningful 
protection for the foreseeable future. This is true even under the most 
optimistic of assumptions including, notably, that the pool could achieve 
favorable tax  treatment that  enables it to accumulate capacity more 
quickly.99  
Secondly, though it is true that forecasting terrorist attack is more art 
than science, if a premium rate must be developed, assumptions can be 
made, and a rate brought forth. Following 9/11 this was done by the 
National Council on Compensation Insurance for insurers in the states for 
which they develop rates. 100  Details of how it was done are available at 
NCCI (2002). 
In any case, we simply note that conventional and CNBR terrorism risk 
is currently provided by the private sector under the workers compensation 
line. The private sector has clearly concluded that the federal backstop 
provides adequate reinsurance in the event of a major loss.  If, the 
Comptroller General report on CNBR insurance recommends that CNBR 
events be added to the must offer provision in TRIPRA, it seems likely that 
property /casualty insurers would react in much the same manner as 
providers of workers compensation insurance. Indeed, as with AIG, in 
many cases the same companies are involved. 
 
                                                                                                                 
98  In the UK, all terrorism risks are shared via an organization called Pool Re with 
the UK Government providing a backstop. Details may be found on the Pool Re webpage 
http://www.poolre.co.uk/.   
99  TOWERS PERRIN, WORKERS COMPENSATION TERRORISM REINSURANCE POOL 
FEASIBILITY STUDY 3 (2004), available at https://www.towersperrin.com/ 
tillinghast/publications/reports/WC_Terr_Pool/WC_Terr_Pool_Study.pdf 
100  The NCCI is the workers compensation rate making body rate for 35 states (AL, 
AK, AZ, AR, CO, CT, DC, FL, GA, HI, ID, IL,  IA, KS, KY, LA, ME, MD, MS, MO, MT, 
NE, NV, NH, NM, OK, OR, RI, SC, SD, TN, UT, VA, and VT), see NCCI State Map, 
https://www.ncci.com/nccimain/IndustryInformation/TerrorismWC/Resources/Pages/default
.aspx. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
In this article we have deliberately discussed terrorism insurance 
regulation within the context of the recently passed Terrorism Risk 
Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2007. Since this Act provides 
the regulatory framework for the next seven years, this seems appropriate. 
Recognizing that the original Terrorism Risk Insurance act of 2002 was 
passed in some haste, the question may be raised as to how terrorism 
insurance would be optimally regulated if we started with a clean slate. 
To the extent that this article correctly identifies the fundamental 
problem of terrorism insurance (indeed of all catastrophe insurance) as 
being the near impossibility of obtaining adequate capital in the aftermath 
of a large loss, there is clearly an argument for maintaining some limit on 
the industry’s aggregate loss. The Comptroller General is charged with 
examining this question, but in the context of lowering the limit after a loss. 
Given the growth in size of reserves since the $100 billion limit was set 
five years ago, there would seem to be an argument in the opposite 
direction for raising the limit, keeping it to some fixed fraction of industry 
reserves. Certainly experience with the California Earthquake Authority 
and with the Price Anderson Act governing the insurance of nuclear 
accidents suggests that if the industry knows its liability is limited to a 
manageable amount, it will be more willing to continue to offer this line. 
Beyond that, it may be time to recognize a fact of which bankers have 
been aware since at least the time of the 19th century English writer on 
capital markets, Walter Bagehot.101  From time to time, capital markets fail 
to act rationally in their evaluation of streams of future payments. During 
these periods markets fail to provide liquidity, so it is necessary to have 
liquidity provided by a government agency. In the case of banking this role 
is played by the central bank.  
By making it difficult to raise capital, a catastrophe such as a terrorist 
attack has much the same effect on an insurance company as does a run on 
a bank during a period of illiquidity. In both cases, external capital is 
needed, and in both cases external capital is not available. To a limited 
extent, TRIA provides this needed liquidity by providing government 
support to pay terrorism claims (followed by recoupment of some or all of 
the government payments). Perhaps the time has come to address this 
liquidity problem more systematically by extending to insurers the same 
                                                                                                                 
101  WALTER BAGEHOT, LOMBARD STREET: A DESCRIPTION OF THE MONEY MARKET 
(Charles Scribner’s Sons 1897).  
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courtesy which the Federal Reserve System extends to banks, namely 
giving them temporary access to public capital until such times as the 
liquidity crisis passes.102    
In addition to addressing the capital problems associated with terrorism 
risk, TRIA provides a mechanism to address the ambiguity problem in two 
ways: First, by limiting the amount of risk faced by insurers to their 
deductible and co-payments (even within the $100 billion cap); and second, 
by providing for a ex post assessment of the risk based on actual costs 
passed on to insureds through the recoupment mechanism. This reduces the 
price of terrorism insurance, and increases the take-up rates. Wider use of 
terrorism insurance has social benefits of providing access to the insurance 
industry claims apparatus and at least marginally reducing the government 
cost of compensating victims of a terrorist attack.   
 
 
  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
102  More details of such a scheme may be found in Dwight Jaffee & Thomas Russell, 
NBCR TERRORISM: WHO SHOULD BEAR THE RISK, IN GLOBAL BUSINESS AND TERRORISM 
(Harry Richardson, ed., forthcoming 2008). 
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THE SCOPE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY IN INSURANCE BAD 
FAITH CASES: CAN THE EXPERT TESTIFY ON THE 
MEANING OF THE INSURANCE POLICY?  
 
Charles Miller* 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This article discusses the use of claims handling experts in bad faith 
insurance claims and the admissibility of their testimony in legal 
malpractice cases. While a duty of good faith has been established in 
insurance case law, insurance claims experts are used in court to provide 
information and analysis on training, policy, and interpretation by various 
insurance claims handlers and their subsequent decisions in covering or 
denying situations. Such experts minutely examine the training and 
preparation regimes of the claims handlers, but their testimony is 
sometimes limited based on concerns over invading the court’s province 
and whether policies are ambiguous. This article argues that such concerns 
are invalid and unworkable, and that such expert testimony, analogous to 
testimony for cases in legal malpractice, is both acceptable and helpful to 
legal proceedings.  
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The use of claims handling experts in insurance bad faith cases has 
dramatically increased in the past several years.  Claims handling experts 
are used to provide testimony on whether the insurance company handled 
the claim properly, in bad faith, or in accordance with insurance industry 
practices and standards.  Claims experts can also provide the trier of fact 
with an important understanding of how the insurance claims business 
works—i.e., what an insurance adjuster does and what they are supposed to 
do.  
                                                                                                                 
*  Mr. Miller is a licensed attorney in California.  Since 1990 Mr. Miller’s practice 
has been devoted to insurance law.  Prior to 1990 Mr. Miller was employed in the insurance 
industry for 18 years where he worked as an insurance claims representative and claims 
manager.  Mr. Miller has been retained in over seventeen states and territories, including 
Canada, as an expert on insurance industry practices and standards and various insurance 
policy coverage issues.  Mr. Miller can be reached at cmiller.ilc@earthlink.net. 
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Expert testimony in insurance bad faith cases can be extremely 
important to both sides.  Indeed, expert testimony may be the key factor 
that sways the trier of fact.  For example, in the trial of Campbell v. State 
Farm in Utah, the expert testimony of two claims experts was a significant 
factor in the $145 million punitive damage award.1   
Although insurance claims experts are being increasingly used by both 
plaintiff and defense in insurance bad faith cases, the testimony of such 
experts has, however, been limited to whether the insurer’s conduct 
complied with the practices and standards in the insurance industry for 
claims handling.2  Many courts have precluded insurance claims experts 
from testifying on whether the insurer properly interpreted and applied an 
                                                                                                                 
1  Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 65 P.3d 1134 (Utah 2001), rev’d in 
part, 538 U.S. 408 (2003).  
To rebut State Farm’s “honest mistake” defense, the Campbells called experts 
Stephen Prater and Gary Fye. These men were intimately acquainted with the intricacies of 
the insurance industry and with State Farm’s practices in particular. Their qualifications as 
experts were not challenged by State Farm. Their testimony focused upon explaining State 
Farm’s PP & R policy and demonstrating its far-reaching effects. State Farm now argues 
that much of this testimony was without foundation and was prejudicial. In particular, State 
Farm challenges the experts’ testimony concerning the company’s excess liability 
handbook, its failure to maintain statistics on excess verdicts, the profits it derived from 
improper claims handling and the effects of its PP & R policy and related practices in the 
insurance industry in general. State Farm also argues that Mr. Prater impermissibly testified 
to legal conclusions. 
Id at 1159.  
     We have reviewed the entire transcript of both Prater’s and Fye’s trial testimony. 
With the exception of the argument concerning legal conclusions, we find it unnecessary to 
address with particularity State Farm’s specific challenges. That the experts’ testimony was 
helpful is evident. State Farm conceded the witness’ qualifications. Although the rule does 
not require that the issue to which an expert testifies be arcane, the issues raised in this case 
were in fact quite difficult for the average person to understand. The experts’ familiarity 
with the insurance industry in general, and State Farm in particular, must have greatly aided 
the jury’s understanding of the issues. Moreover, our review of the record satisfies us that 
the experts’ testimony, given its relevance and its helpfulness, did not raise any concerns 
under rule 403 sufficient to warrant exclusion. Thus, because the experts’ testimony was 
helpful to the jury, the trial court did not abuse its discretion under rule 702. 
Id. at 1160.  
2  Experts in insurance bad faith cases frequently testify on the standards and 
practices in the insurance industry for the handling of claims. See, e.g., Hanson v. Prudential 
Ins. Co. of America, 783 F.2d 762, 765 (9th Cir. 1985); Tricor Cal. Inc. v. State Comp. Ins. 
Fund, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 550, 551-552 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994); Rawlings v. Apodaca, 726 P.2d 
565, 569, 574 (Ariz. 1986) (insurance claims expert permitted to testify that insurer’s 
conduct breached insurance industry custom and practice). However, an insurer may not 
excuse its treatment of the insured by proving that it conformed to industry standards. 
Silberg v. Cal. Life Ins. Co., 521 P.2d 1103, 1109 (Cal. 1974). 
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insurance policy provision.3  The courts have usually reasoned that the 
interpretation of a contract provision is the domain of the court and not 
expert testimony. 
The purpose of this article is to examine whether insurance claims 
experts should be permitted to testify on the meaning of insurance contract 
provisions in evaluating whether the insurer acted reasonably in applying a 
policy provision to a given claim.  In the article I will argue that the courts 
have too narrowly limited the scope of insurance claims experts’ testimony 
in insurance bad faith cases.  Insurance claims experts should be able to 
testify on whether an insurance claims handler has properly interpreted and 
applied insurance policy provisions.  Admissible expert testimony should 
not only include insurance industry claims handling standards pertaining to 
the interpretation and application of insurance policy provisions, but also 
testimony regarding the applicable case law.  This is necessary because 
insurance claims handlers, in applying an insurance policy provision, have 
been trained to consider and apply both industry standards and case law 
when making a coverage decision.  Accordingly, expert testimony 
concerning not only insurance industry practices but also the applicable 
case law is needed in insurance bad faith cases where there is a coverage 
issue in order to provide the trier of fact with all the relevant facts and 
testimony concerning the insurer’s conduct.   
The first section of the article will summarize the development of bad 
faith law and how it relates to the handling of claims.  To find that the 
insurer has breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing, the trier of fact 
must, in most jurisdictions, find that the insurer’s conduct was not only 
unreasonable but also in reckless disregard for the interests of the 
policyholder.4  In spite of this broad standard, insurance claims handling 
experts have often been prevented from testifying as to whether the claim 
handler investigated and resolved insurance coverage issues in accordance 
with insurance industry standards, including the applicable case law.  This 
is in spite of the fact that the claims handler almost daily addresses and 
                                                                                                                 
3  See, e.g., McHugh v. United Serv. Auto. Ass’n, 164 F.3d 451, 454-55, 457 (9th 
Cir. 1999); Flintkote Co. v. Gen. Accident Assurance Co., 410 F.Supp.2d 875, 876, 885 
(N.D. Cal. 2006). 
4  Although this article focuses on expert testimony on insurance contract 
interpretation with regard to the bad faith cause of action, the same testimony would be 
helpful, and should be considered, with regard to the breach of contract claim.  Any 
reference herein to bad faith cause of action should also be read to include the breach of 
contract cause of action.        
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makes important decisions concerning the application of coverage, which 
themselves involve consideration of the applicable case law. 
The second section of the article will examine what insurance claims 
personnel do in their day to day handling of claims.  Here, it will be noted 
that insurance claims personnel receive a wide range of training and 
experience in the interpretation of insurance policy provisions, and are 
called upon, on a daily basis, to interpret and apply insurance policy 
provisions to an equally wide variety of insurance claims.  Further, there is 
substantial literature in the insurance industry regarding the interpretation 
and application of insurance policy provisions.  This literature is available 
to insurance claims personnel to assist them in the interpretation and 
application of insurance policy provisions. This training and education, 
along with the available literature, constitutes, at least in part, the insurance 
industry’s standards for insurance claims handling with regard to the 
interpretation and application of insurance policy provisions.  Such 
information is relevant in both insurance contract and bad faith actions in 
order for the trier of fact to determine, first, the meaning of the contract 
provision, and second, in the bad faith cause of action, whether the insurer 
has complied with those standards.    
The third section of the article will address the current status of case 
law as it applies to the admissibility of expert testimony on the 
interpretation of insurance policy provisions in insurance bad faith cases.  
Here, it is noted that the courts have articulated two principle reasons for 
restricting expert testimony when it comes to insurance contract 
construction: First, the rules of evidence preclude such testimony absent a 
finding of ambiguity, and second, such testimony invades the province of 
the court.  Both of these limitations fail to recognize the nature of insurance 
claims handling, including insurance industry publications and materials on 
insurance policy interpretation and that claims handling routinely involves 
consideration of the applicable case law.  Further, these limitations have 
proved to be unworkable either because they are fraught with exceptions or 
they are artificial and fail to offer sufficient guidance on how to determine 
what expert testimony is admissible and what is not. 
The fourth section will turn to a discussion of expert testimony in legal 
malpractice cases.  A discussion of expert testimony in legal malpractice 
cases is appropriate because of the similarities between the legal and claims 
handling professions.  A consideration of expert testimony in legal 
malpractice cases also offers a possible approach to the admissibility of 
expert testimony on the meaning of insurance contact provisions in 
insurance bad faith cases.  In this regard it will be noted that expert 
testimony in legal malpractice cases can extend to legal issues, or in other 
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words, matters that may normally be considered to be in the province of the 
court.  Here, it will be argued that insurance claims handling is a quasi- 
legal profession with regard to the interpretation and application of 
insurance contract provisions.  Accordingly, insurance claims experts 
should be given the same latitude of testimony that is granted to experts in 
legal malpractice cases.  Without such latitude the trier of fact will be 
precluded from hearing relevant evidence concerning the conduct of the 
insurance claims handler. 
The article will conclude that expert testimony on the interpretation of 
insurance contracts should be permitted on both insurance industry 
practices and standards and applicable case law.  By expanding insurance 
expert testimony to include the interpretation and application of insurance 
policy provisions the trier of fact will be permitted to hear relevant 
evidence concerning the insurer’s conduct.  Any concern that such 
testimony will amount to instructing the jury on the law can easily be 
obviated by appropriate procedural mechanisms.    
               
II. INSURANCE BAD FAITH LAW AND THE ROLE OF THE 
INSURANCE CLAIMS EXPERT 
 
Most courts have held that every insurance contract contains an implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing “that neither party will do anything 
which will injure the right of the other to receive the benefits of the 
agreement.”5  In the seminal case of Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., the 
California Supreme Court held that, “in every insurance contract there is an 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.  The duty to so act is 
imminent in the contract whether the company is attending to the claims of 
third persons against the insured or the claims of the insured itself.” 6   
Having held that insurance contracts contain a duty of good faith the 
courts were then required to address how that duty was to be established.  
Several courts have adopted a two pronged test, under which the insured 
has the burden (1) “[t]o show…the absence of a reasonable basis for 
denying the benefits of the policy; and (2) the insurer’s “knowledge or 
                                                                                                                 
5  See, e.g., Commuale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 328 P.2d 198, 200 (Cal. 1958);  
see also, Dougals G. Houser, Good Faith As a Matter of Law: The Insurance Company’s 
Right to be Wrong, 27 TORT & INS. L.J. 665, 666 (1991-1992). 
6  510 P.2d 1032,1038 (Cal. 1973).  
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reckless disregard of the lack of a reasonable basis for denying the claim.” 7  
It appears that two jurisdictions, Hawaii8 and Ohio9, have adopted only the 
first prong of this test. 
The first part of the two prong test requires a determination of whether 
the insurer’s conduct is objectively reasonable, whereas the second prong 
addresses the mental state of the claims handler and asks whether he/she 
acted “deliberately and consciously rather than negligently.”10 
Insurance claims experts are frequently called upon to provide 
testimony on both prongs of the bad faith test.  The expert may provide 
testimony of whether the insurer’s conduct was reasonable (the first prong) 
in light of insurance industry claims handling standards and practices.  
Similarly the expert may be asked to testify on whether insurance company 
programs or policies created, in the expert’s opinion, improper incentives 
such that the claims handler was motivated to handle the claim to the 
insurer’s benefit and the detriment of the policyholder.11   
The insurance claims expert may also be asked to testify on whether 
the insurer reasonably interpreted and applied a particular policy provision.  
For example, where the insurer denies coverage on a first party water loss 
because of a policy exclusion for long term seepage,12 the claims expert 
may be asked not only for his/her opinion on the adequacy of the insurer’s 
investigation but also on whether, based on the facts, the insurer was 
reasonable in its denial of coverage.  Such expert testimony may not only 
                                                                                                                 
7  Regal Homes, Inc. v. CNA Ins., 171 P.3d 610, 621 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007); Picket 
v. Lloyd’s, 621 A.2d 445, 453 (N.J. 1993); Anderson v. Cont’l. Ins. Co., 271 N.W.2d 368, 
376  (Wis. 1978).  
8  Best Place, Inc. v. Penn. America Ins. Co., 920 P.2d 334, 347 (Haw. 1996).  
9  Zoppo v. Homestead Ins. Co., 644 N.E.2d 397, 399-400 (Ohio 1994).  
10  Vandeventer v. All American Life & Cas. Co., 101 S.W.3d 703, 721 (Tex. App. 
2003) (citing Colley v. Ind. Farmers Mut. Ins. Group, 691 N.E.2d 1259, 1261 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1998)).   
11  Courts have found that certain insurance company programs or policies create 
such improper claims handling motivations. For example, the Arizona Supreme Court in 
Zilisch v. State Farm, 995 P.2d 276, 280 (Ariz. 2000), called attention to these practices 
when it wrote: “There was sufficient evidence in this case from which a jury could find that 
State Farm acted unreasonably and knew it. There was evidence that State Farm set arbitrary 
goals for the reduction of claims paid. The salaries and bonuses paid to claims 
representatives were influenced by how much the representatives paid out on claims.”   
12  Homeowners’ insurance policies may commonly contain an exclusion for “loss 
caused by continuous or repeated seepage or leakage of water or steam from within a 
plumbing, heating or air conditioning system or from within a domestic appliance which 
occurs over a period of weeks, months or years.” See Fidelity Casualty & Surety Bulletins, 
Personal Lines Volume, Dwellings HIB-3, Nov. 1994. 
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involve consideration of the policy language, but also insurance industry 
publications which provide guidance generally on the interpretation of 
insurance policies as well as industry publications concerning the meaning 
of the operative policy provision itself.  In addition, the reasonableness of 
the insurer’s conduct in interpreting and applying the policy provision may 
also depend on whether the insurer properly considered the applicable case 
law.13  Some courts have precluded expert testimony on insurance industry 
policy interpretation, excluding testimony on the applicable case law on the 
grounds that such testimony invades the court’s domain.14   
The limitations on the scope of an insurance claims expert’s testimony 
appear artificial when considered in context with how insurance claims 
handlers are trained and what they are asked to do on a daily basis; that is, 
make coverage decisions.  The limitation also fails to recognize the 
extensive insurance industry literature on the interpretation of insurance 
policies, which are relied upon frequently by insurance claims handlers to 
adjust claims.  In other words, the limitations on the scope of testimony of 
experts concerning insurance policy interpretation issues are not tied to the 
real world.  In order to appreciate this disconnect between the rules 
concerning admissibility of expert testimony and the real work of insurance 
claims handlers it is necessary to examine that “real world.”      
 
III. INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF INSURANCE 
POLICY PROVISIONS IN THE INSURANCE CLAIMS 
HANDLING PROCESS 
 
Insurance claims handling not only involves the proper investigation, 
evaluation and settlement of claims, but also, and frequently on a daily 
basis, the interpretation and application of insurance policy provisions.  In 
the real world of insurance claims handling, insurance claims handlers are 
trained in policy interpretation; provided resources on how to interpret and 
apply policy provisions, and then required to interpret and apply insurance 
policies to specific fact situations.  Any evaluation of whether the insurer’s 
conduct in applying and interpreting a policy provision must, therefore, 
                                                                                                                 
13  See, e.g., Redies v. Attorneys Liab. Prot. Soc’y, 150 P.3d 930, 938 (Mont. 2007); 
Barnes v. Okla. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 11 P.3d 162, 174 (Okla. 2001); 
Transcontinental Ins. v. Wash. Pub. Utilities Districts’ Util. Sys., 760 P.2d 337, 347 (Wash. 
1988).  
14  See, e.g,. McHugh v. United Serv. Auto. Ass’n, 164 F.3d 451, 454-55, 457 (9th 
Cir. 1999).  McCrink v. Peoples Benefit Life Ins. Co., 2005 WL 730688, at *4 (E.D. Pa. 
March 29, 2005).  
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consider the resources and training available to insurance claims handlers 
and whether those resources and training were utilized and followed.15        
Insurance claims handlers are trained on how to interpret and apply 
insurance policies.  This training includes educating the claims person on 
the insurance industry rules for the interpretation of insurance policies.  
These include the following:  (a) exclusions are to be interpreted 
narrowly,16 (b) insuring agreements are to be interpreted broadly,17 (c)  the 
insurance company must resolve doubts concerning coverage in favor of 
the policyholder,18 (d) policy language should be given its plain, ordinary 
and popular meaning;19 (e) ambiguous policy provisions should be 
interpreted against the insurer and in favor of coverage,20 (f), and that the 
insurance company has the burden of proving the application of an 
excluded peril.21   
There are also several texts which have been used to train insurance 
industry claims handlers on not only proper claims handling but also on the 
interpretation and application of insurance policy provisions.22  A partial 
list of such insurance texts would include the following: 23 
                                                                                                                 
15 At least one commentator has contended that there is no such thing as insurance 
industry standards and that the expert’s opinion in insurance cases should “be based upon 
the same three things that a court’s opinion would be based upon: the policy language, 
judicial precedent and any relevant statutes.” ALLAN D. WINDT, INSURANCE CLAIMS & 
DISPUTES: REPRESENTATION OF INSURANCE COMPANIES & INSUREDS § 9:26A (4th ed. 2001 & 
Supp. 2006) (hereinafter “WINDT”)  Such a view ignores the vast amount of material used in 
the insurance industry, other than case law, to assist in the interpretation and application of 
insurance policies.  
16  KENNETH S. WOLLNER, HOW TO DRAFT AND INTERPRET INSURANCE POLICIES 19 
(1999) (“Exclusions and other limitations are strictly construed against the party seeking to 
impose the limitation.”). 
17  ERIC A. WIENING & DONALD S. MALECKI, AM. INST. OF CPCU, INSURANCE 
CONTRACT ANALYSIS 76 (“[I]nsuring agreement provides a broad statement of coverage.”). 
18  DONNA J. POPOW, AM. INST. OF CPCU, PROPERTY LOSS ADJUSTING § 5.34 (2003).  
19  PRENTISS REED & PAUL THOMAS, ADJUSTMENT OF PROPERTY LOSSES 48 (McGraw 
Hill 1977).  
20  Id. at 50. 
21  Insurance claims handlers have testified that these standards are used in the 
insurance industry to interpret and apply insurance policies.  See Deposition of Stephen 
Hinkle at 166, Illing v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., No.: 1:06cv513-LG-RHW (So. Dist. 
Miss., Feb 9, 2007) (Stephen Hinkle, a State Farm claim consultant, testified at his 
deposition that it is a basic tenant of insurance claims handling that the insurer must prove 
the application of the exclusion). 
22  In addition to texts, there are a number of insurance industry publications which 
may provide invaluable information.  Possibly the most important such publication is the 
magazine, “Claims,” published by the National Underwriter Company.  This magazine, 
which is published monthly, contains articles on a wide variety of insurance claims 
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PRENTISS REED & PAUL THOMAS, ADJUSTMENT OF PROPERTY LOSSES 
(McGraw Hill 1977). 
JANE S. LIGHTCAP, INT’L CLAIM ASSOC., MANAGING CLAIM DEPARTMENT 
OPERATIONS (1997).  
JAMES J. MARKHAM ET AL., INS. INST. OF AM., THE CLAIMS 
ENVIRONMENT (1993).  
DONNA J. POPOOW, AM. INST. OF CPCU, PROPERTY LOSS ADJUSTING 
(2003). 
JAMES R. JONES, AM. INST. OF CPCU, LIABILITY CLAIM PRACTICES 
(2003). 
DONALD J. HIRSCH, CASUALTY CLAIM PRACTICE (McGraw Hill 1996). 
 
Some of these texts have been cited by several courts,24 and may be 
admissible as evidence of insurance industry standards.25   These texts 
frequently contain advice on how a claims handler should interpret an 
insurance policy.  For example, Thomas and Reed in their book, 
Adjustment of Property Losses, which has been used in the training of 
insurance claims handlers,26 sets forth 16 standard rules for the construction 
of insurance policies.27 
                                                                                                                          
adjusting issues, including the investigation and adjustment of mold claims, catastrophic 
injury claims, and workers compensation claims, among others.  The magazine provides 
additional information on insurance industry standards, including the state of the art on 
insurance industry claims handling practices.  See Claims Magazine, available at 
http://www.claimsmag.com/cms/claims/website. 
23  Frequently, the insurer’s counsel will argue that such publications should not be 
admissible because they are parole evidence, which should not be allowed to change the 
agreed terms to a contract.  In the insurance contract context, however, many courts have 
allowed the introduction of extrinsic evidence as an aid in contract interpretation. See, e.g., 
Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Admiral Ins. Co. 897 P.2d 1, 14 (Cal.1995). 
24  For example, REED & THOMAS, supra note 19, has been cited by several courts.  
See, e.g., Willhite v. Marlow Adjustment Co., 623 S.W.2d 254, 261 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981); 
Los Angeles Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cawog, 106 Cal. Rptr. 307, 310 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973); Creole 
Explorations, Inc. v. Underwriters at Lloyds, Inc., 161 So.2d 768, 775 (La. 1964).  
25  The Federal Rule of Evidence permits the admittance of such texts as substantive 
evidence. “[S]tatements contained in published treatises, periodicals, or pamphlets on a 
subject of history, medicine or other science or art, established as a reliable authority by the 
testimony or admission of the [expert] witness or by other expert testimony or by judicial 
notice.” FED. R. EVID. 803(18). 
26 In the preface, the authors note that the text “provides guidance and information to 
enable the claim representative to perform his or her duties in an effective and professional 
manner,” and “[t]his…is a text for both student and instructor; it is a reference for all 
property claim personnel.”  REED & THOMAS, supra note 19, at iii, iv.     
27  Id. at 47-50.  
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Insurers often require that their claims handlers be trained in how to 
interpret and apply insurance policies.  For example, State Farm mandates 
that its claims personnel attend claim training courses in which they are 
taught “[h]ow to read a policy, [and] how to determine coverage.”28 
In addition to insurance industry texts, insurance claims handlers make 
use of a wide range of publications that provide guidance on the 
interpretation of insurance policies. 29  For example, the Fidelity, Casualty 
and Surety Bulletins (FC&S Bulletins”), published by the National 
Underwriter Co., has been used in the insurance industry for decades to 
provide guidance on the interpretation and application of insurance 
policies.30  The FC&S Bulletins have also been widely cited in court 
opinions.  As one court noted:  
 
The FC & S bulletin, which is published by the National 
Underwriters Association, is used by insurance agents and brokers 
to interpret standard insurance policy provisions. (Maryland 
Casualty Co. v. Reeder (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 961, 972, 270 
Cal.Rptr. 719.) “[R]eliance on [an] FC & S bulletin is appropriate 
under Civil Code section 1645 which provides: ‘Technical words 
are to be interpreted as usually understood by persons in the 
profession or business to which they relate, unless clearly used in a 
different sense.’” (Maryland Casualty Co. v. Reeder, supra, at p. 
973, fn. 2, 270 Cal.Rptr. 719; American Star Ins. Co. v. Insurance 
Co. of the West (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 1320, 1331 & fn. 8, 284 
Cal. Rptr. 45.) “[I]nsurance industry publications are particularly 
persuasive as interpretive aids where they support coverage on 
behalf of the insured. Ultimately, the test is whether coverage is 
‘consistent with the insured’s objectively reasonable expectations.’ 
[Citation.]” (Prudential-LMI Commercial Ins. Co. v. Reliance Ins. 
Co. (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1508, 1512-1513, 27 Cal.Rptr.2d 
841.)31 
                                                                                                                 
28  Deposition of Mike Porterlance at 88, Davis v. State Farm, No.: 1:06cv638-LTS-
JMR  (quoting Mike Porterlance, a State Farm claims department employee). 
29  See Maryland Cas. v. Reeder, 270 Cal. Rptr. 719, 722-723, 725 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1990). The court also found that the insurance industry’s own interpretation of the broad 
form endorsement and certain exclusions precluded application of the exclusions in 
plaintiff’s policy.  Id. at 725-726. 
30 See FC&S Bulletins Homepage, http://cms.nationalunderwriter.com/cms/fcsbulletins/ 
public+website/ (last visited Oct 13, 2008). 
31  Golden Eagle Ins. Co. v. Ins. Co. of the West, 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 682 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2002). 
2008] THE SCOPE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY 221 
 
Similarly, the International Risk Management Institute publishes 
several volumes, which are used in the insurance industry, among other 
subjects, on the interpretation and application of personal and commercial 
lines policy forms and provisions.32 
In addition to being knowledgeable regarding insurance industry policy 
interpretation standards and rules, insurance claims handlers need to be, 
and are often familiar with the applicable law in the jurisdictions in which 
they work.  This includes the law of tort and contracts, as it applies to 
insurance contracts.  In the book, The Claims Environment, Markham 
points out that “claims representatives should have expert knowledge of 
insurance policy coverages, the law, and determination of damages.”33  
Insurance claims personnel are commonly trained in the applicable law of 
the jurisdictions in which they work.  For example, Stephen Hinkle, a State 
Farm Claim Consultant, has testified that, “over the course of [my] tenure 
as a claim consultant I’ve become familiar with the law in all four states 
that I’m involved in.”34  Without such training and knowledge, an 
insurance adjuster would not be able to handle properly many of the claims 
assigned to him or her.   
Insurers also publish their own written guidance documents on the 
interpretation and application of the insurance policies that they sell.  For 
example, State Farm publishes a number of Operation Guides, which 
provide guidance to claims personnel on the handling of first party property 
claims. These Operation Guides frequently provide information on how 
particular policy provisions are to be interpreted.  For example, State Farm 
Operation Guide 75-100, entitled “Claim Interpretations-Losses Insured 
First Party,” is “[t]o provide the Company interpretation of selected Section 
I-Losses Insured.”35  With regard to Hurricane Katrina, Stephen Hinkle of 
                                                                                                                 
32  The International Risk Management Institute (“IRMI”) publishes several volumes 
on various types of insurance policies, including commercial liability, commercial property, 
and personal property policies.  These volumes are also used widely in the insurance 
industry to assist claims personnel in the interpretation and application of insurance policies.  
33  JAMES J. MARKHAM ET AL., INS. INST. OF AM., THE CLAIMS ENVIRONMENT 12 
(1993). (Markham, the director of Curriculum, General Counsel, and Ethics Counsel of the 
Insurance Institute of America, was previously employed by State Farm.). 
34  Deposition of Stephen Hinkle at 121, Illing v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., No. 
1:06 CV 513-LG-RHW (S.D. Miss. Mar. 16, 2007).  Mr. Hinkle, who was responsible for 
consulting on State Farm claims in several southern States, testified that he actually kept a 
“folder that says Georgia law, Alabama law, South Carolina law, and Mississippi law.” Id. 
at 123. 
35  State Farm Operation Guide 75-100, entitled “Claim Interpretations-Losses 
Insured First Party” (on file with author).   
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State Farm drafted the Wind-Water Protocol, which provided guidance to 
State Farm claims personnel on how to apply State Farm policies to Katrina 
related claims.36 These training materials are consistent with State Farm’s 
requirement that one of the responsibilities of a claims representative is to 
“determine if the cause of that loss is covered [under] the contract.”37   
An insurance claims handlers’ obligation to interpret and apply 
properly insurance policy provisions is required by the National 
Association of Insurance Commissioners Model Unfair Claims Practices 
Act (“Act”) and Model Unfair Claims Practices Regulations 
(“Regulations”).38  Over 45 states have adopted the Act either in its original 
form or in a modified form. 39  Likewise, many state insurance 
commissioners have adopted the Regulations.40  
The Act and the Regulations are two of many important sources of 
information for insurance industry standards for the proper handling of 
claims.41  The requirements set forth in the Regulations address an 
                                                                                                                 
36  Memorandum from Stephen Hinkle, State Farm, State Farm Wind-Water Protocol 
(Sept. 13, 2005).   
37  Deposition of Mike Porterlance at 51, Davis v. State Farm, No. 1:06cv638-LTS-
JMR (S.D. Miss. Date?); see also  Porterlance Dep. at 116 (adjusters are expected to make a 
coverage determination on the loss). 
38  NAIC UNFAIR CLAIMS SETTLEMENT PRACTICES ACT, vol. 6, § 900-1 (2008); NAIC 
UNFAIR PROPERTY/CASUALTY CLAIMS SETTLEMENT PRACTICES MODEL REGULATION , vol. 6, 
§ 902-1 (2008). Regulations or statutes which govern insurance claims handling can be used 
as standards against which the insurer’s conduct can be measured.  Wailua Assocs. v. Aetna 
Cas. & Sur. Co., 27 F. Supp. 2d 1211, 1221 (D. Haw. 1998) (the Hawaii Supreme Court, in 
adopting a common law remedy for bad faith, expressed its concern that the administrative 
remedies provided in H.R.S. § 431:13-103(a) were inadequate to “‘provide sufficient 
incentive to insurers to perform their obligations in good faith’ . . . [a]lthough H.R.S. § 
431:13-103 does not provide for a private cause of action, the insurance industry should not 
be encouraged to commit the types of unfair practices contained therein. Therefore, the 
Court finds that violations of the unfair settlement provision, § 431:13-103(a), may be used 
as evidence to indicate bad faith.” (citation omitted)).  See also Spray, Gould & Bowers v. 
Associated Int’l Ins. Co., 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 552,560 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (where the court 
observed that “[t]he [Insurance] Commissioner’s Regulations establish the standard of 
conduct for insurers in California”); Peiffer v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 940 P.2d 967, 
971 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996) (expert permitted to testify that insurer violated provisions of the 
Colorado Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act).     
39  NAIC UNFAIR CLAIMS SETTLEMENT PRACTICES ACT, vol. 6, § 900-1 (2008). 
40  For example, in California the Act is codified at CAL. INS. CODE § 790.03(h) 
(2005), and the Regulations, which have been adopted by the California State Insurance 
Commissioner, can be found at CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 10 § 2695.1 (2008). 
41  Markham has pointed out that, “insureds are frequently permitted to introduce 
evidence of violations of the Model Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act and Model 
Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Regulations “because the model act is a nationally 
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insurer’s obligations when it comes to interpreting and applying insurance 
coverage provisions.  For example, the Regulations require: 
 
Every insurer shall disclose to a first party claimant or 
beneficiary, all benefits, coverage, time limits or other provisions 
of any insurance policy issued by that insurer that may apply to the 
claim presented by the claimant.42    
It is difficult to imagine an insurer complying with this 
requirement without knowing how to interpret and apply the 
applicable policy provisions.  Similarly, the Regulations set forth 
detailed requirements with regard to denial letters, which would 
also mandate knowledge on how to interpret and apply the 
insurance policy.   
Where an insurer denies or rejects a first party claim, in whole 
or in part, it shall do so in writing and shall provide to the claimant 
a statement listing all bases for such rejection or denial and the 
factual and legal bases for each reason given for such rejection or 
denial which is then within the insurer’s knowledge.  Where an 
insurer’s denial of a first party claim, in whole or in part, is based 
on a specific statute, applicable law or policy provision, condition 
or exclusion, the written denial shall include reference thereto and 
provide an explanation of the application of the statute, applicable 
law or provision, condition or exclusion to the claim. 43   
Many insurers have inserted the Act and Regulations into their claims 
manuals.44  State Farm, in its 1997 Catastrophe Claims Manual, sets forth 
the Act.45  Similarly, Farmers’ Regional Claims Manual States: “In all 
                                                                                                                          
recommended standard of care.  It was developed [by the National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners] as a guide for insurance regulators in every state to establish reasonable 
claim practices.  Since the NAIC [National Association of Insurance Commissioners] is 
made up of insurance “experts,” juries should consider their opinion of what constitutes 
unfair claim practices when evaluating the behavior of an insurer in a bad faith case.  Thus, 
although the model [Unfair Claims Settlement Practices] act may not allow insureds or 
claimants who have been treated unfairly by an insurer to file a private action, it has been 
used indirectly for the benefit of many plaintiffs.” MARKHAM, supra note 33, at 397. 
42  CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 10 § 2695.4(a) (2008). 
43  CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 10 § 2695.7(b)(1) (2008). 
44  Insurers may be required to have manuals or written claims handling standards.  
For example, The Act required insurers to “adopt and implement reasonable standards for 
the prompt investigation and processing of claims arising under insurance policies.” CAL. 
INS. CODE § 790.03(h)(3) (2005). 
45  State Farm Catastrophe Claims Manual, P. 1.1 (on file with author). 
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cases, the applicable state’s Unfair Claims Settlement Practices 
Act/Regulations take precedence over anything in this manual.46  The 
principles defined are so basic to good claims practice that we adhere to 
them throughout our operating territory as a matter of company policy.  
The Unfair Claims Practices Regulations of some states are more restrictive 
than the Model Regulations.  If that is the case, those regulations will take 
precedence over anything in this manual.”47      
 
IV. THE SCOPE OF THE INSURANCE CLAIMS EXPERT’S 
TESTIMONY48 
 
Ignoring the real world of insurance claims handling, many courts have 
held that an insurance claims expert cannot testify on the insurer’s 
interpretation of an insurance policy because such testimony either invades 
the court’s province as the sole interpreter of contract provisions,49 or is 
barred by rules of evidence concerning contract interpretation.50  These two 
barriers to expert testimony on the meaning of insurance policies have 
                                                                                                                 
46  Farmers’ Regional Claims Manual (on file with author). 
47   Farmers’ Regional Claims Manual, p. IV-1 (on file with author).  Similarly, 
Farmers’ Claims Representative Field Manual sets forth the same standard as in the 
Regional Claims Manual, and, in addition, requires that “[e]ach claims representative be 
thoroughly familiar with the model act and their states’ specific regulations.”  Similar 
requirements are set forth in Farmers’ Branch Claims Office Procedure Manual.  Randy 
Sommers, a Farmers’ claims supervisor, who was deposed in the matter of Farmers Ins. Co. 
of Ariz. v. Stanley Wirick, Ariz., Case No. 2004-0201, pp. 19-20 & 34, testified that the 
unfair claims practices act sets forth Farmers’ minimum standards for claims handling. 
48  For further discussion of expert testimony in insurance bad faith cases see Joel S. 
Feldman et al., Expert Witnesses in Insurance Class Actions and Individual Cases – Defense 
Perspective, 2000 A.L.I.-A.B.A. COURSE OF STUDY 249 (2000).   
49  See Devin v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n,  8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 263, 268 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1992); Elder v. Pac. Tel. and Tel. Co., 136 Cal. Rptr. 203, 210 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977) (expert 
opinion testimony inadmissible where the issue is one of law for the court); G & G Servs., 
Inc. v. Agora Syndicate, Inc., 993 P.2d 751,762 (N.M. Ct. App. 1999) (refusing to let 
insurer’s expert witness, an attorney, testify generally concerning insurance law in suit for 
breach of duty to defend); Lone Star Steakhouse & Saloon, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Group, 
343 F. Supp. 2d 989, 1015 (D. Kan. 2004) (excluding testimony of claims expert on whether 
allegations in complaint fell within policy definition of “occurrence,” that insurer had no 
basis to apply exclusion for “expected and intended” injury, that insurer was inconsistent in 
its claims handling, and that insurer is barred by estoppel from denying coverage).   
50  Nonetheless, even under this limited approach to expert testimony in insurance 
bad faith cases, the expert may refer to facts in legal terms. Peiffer v. State Farm Mut. Auto. 
Ins. Co., 940 P.2d 967, 971 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996).   
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proved either unworkable or are so fraught with exceptions as to be 
virtually meaningless. 
 
A. LIMITATIONS ON EXPERT TESTIMONY IN INSURANCE CASES 
BASED ON CONCERN THAT TESTIMONY WILL INVADE THE 
COURT’S PROVINCE HAVE PROVED UNWORKABLE AND FAIL 
TO RECOGNIZE THE REALITY OF INSURANCE CLAIMS 
ADJUSTING.    
 
The admissibility of expert testimony under the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, as well as the rules of evidence for many states, is governed by 
whether the testimony will “assist the trier of fact.”51  The Federal Rules 
permit experts to testify on ultimate issues.52  While many courts have held 
that an expert cannot testify on legal matters, including the interpretation of 
insurance policies,53 courts will permit experts to testify on mixed 
questions of law and fact.54  Some commentators have noted that the 
distinction between purely legal testimony and testimony on mixed 
                                                                                                                 
51  FED. R. EVID. 702 (“If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will 
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness 
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify 
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.”); see Soutiere v. Soutiere, 657 A.2d 206, 
208 (Vt. 1995).  
52  “Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not 
objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact.” FED. 
R. EVID. 704.  At least one commentator has noted that, “[e]arly cases rejected expert 
testimony couched in terms of the ultimate issue—whether there is bad faith.  These cases 
suggested that the testimony was inadmissible because it invades the province of the jury.  
Because of the latitude afforded trial courts by the Federal Rules of Evidence and similar 
state rules, however, this objection may be difficult to sustain today.” Timothy J. 
Muldowney & Robert A. Zupkus, Bad Faith Claims: The Role of the Expert,  64 DEF. 
COUNS. J. 226, 231 (1997) [hereinafter Muldowney & Zupkus] (citations omitted). 
53  See, e.g., Mukhtar v. Cal. State Univ., Hayward,  299 F.3d 1053, 1065 n.10 (9th 
Cir. 2002) (“an expert witness cannot give an opinion as to her legal conclusion, i.e., an 
opinion on an ultimate issue of law.”) (emphasis omitted). 
54  See, e.g., Nimely v. City of N.Y., 414 F.3d 381, 397 (2nd Cir. 2005); U.S. v. 
Segna, 555 F.2d 226, 229 (9th Cir. 1977) (allowing expert testimony on defendant’s sanity); 
Dixon v. Jacobs, 427 F.2d 589, 595, n.17, 600-01 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (allowing testimony on 
the dangerousness of a mental patient); U.S. v. Sisson, 294 F. Supp. 520, 522-23 (D. Mass. 
1968) (noting general permissibility of expert testimony on the mixed question of patent 
infringement). 
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questions of law and fact has not been workable.55  A lawyer can frame the 
question as a matter of fact in order to get admitted expert testimony which 
otherwise would be excluded as testimony on the law.56   
Despite the inherent problems with distinguishing between fact and 
legal testimony, many courts have held that expert testimony regarding the 
meaning of an insurance policy is admissible under the guise that such 
testimony is limited to insurance industry practices and not the law.57  As 
one District Court noted: 
 
The Court alone determines the legal effect and construction of 
the USF&G policy.  But the Court was not seeking expert 
testimony to determine the ultimate legal issue of coverage under 
the policy. Instead, the Court was seeking the testimony solely to 
determine what general understanding, if any, the insurance 
industry has as to the meaning of certain provisions in USF&G’s 
policy.  While resolution of this factual question affects the legal 
issues involved, the factual issue of industry custom is distinct 
from the legal issue of construction.58 
 
At the very least, this approach comports, to some degree, with what 
actually occurs in the insurance industry.  That is, the industry has adopted 
its own interpretation of what policy provisions mean, if not provided its 
claims handlers with protocols on how to interpret and apply insurance 
policies.59  Despite the statement that factual issues are distinct from legal 
issues, it is apparent that the distinction cannot always be easily 
determined. 
                                                                                                                 
55  Note, Expert Legal Testimony, 97 HARV. L. REV. 797, 798 (1983-1984); Wilburn 
Brewer, Expert Witness Testimony in Legal Malpractice Cases, 45 S.C. L. REV. 727, 761 
(1993-1994) [hereinafter Brewer]. 
56  Brewer, supra note 56, at 767; see also, North River Ins. Co. v. Employers 
Reinsurance Corp., 197 F. Supp. 2d 972, 982-84 (S.D. Ohio 2002); Prof’l Consultants Ins. 
Co. v. Employers Reinsurance Co., 2006 WL 751244, at *21-22 (D.Vt. Mar. 8, 2006) 
(noting that expert opinions regarding policy meaning are admissible where opinion based 
on documents and depositions in the case, the course of conduct of the parties, and the 
experts knowledge of industry custom and practice).  
57  See, e.g., U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Williams, 676 F. Supp. 123, 126 (E.D. La. 
1987). 
58  Id. at 126 (footnote omitted). 
59  Expert testimony on the meaning of a policy provision may be particularly 
appropriate where the court determines that the provision is of a “specialized nature,” 
Playtex FP, Inc. v. Columbia Cas. Co., 622 A.2d 1074, 1076-77 (Del. Super. Ct. 1992). 
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An ample demonstration of the difficulty, if not the artificiality, of 
determining whether an expert opinion is based on law or fact is found in 
the District Court’s decision in Professional Consultants Ins. Co. v. 
Employers Reinsurance Co.60  The case presented the court with an issue of 
whether a reinsurance agreement limit was “an annual, or per policy, limit 
or a single limit for the life of the agreement.”61  The insured, Professional 
Consultants, in its opposition to the insurer’s motions for summary 
judgment, submitted an affidavit from Waterman, an expert on reinsurance 
matters, in which Waterman provided three opinions, which were 
challenged by the insurer as inadmissible legal conclusions.  Waterman’s 
opinions were: 
 
1.   “It is my opinion that the plain language of the 1993 
Agreement stipulates emphatically that the reinsurance coverage 
pertains to each policy issued by PCIC that became effective after 
the effective date and prior to the termination date of the 1993 
Agreement.” (Paper 121 ¶13.) 
2. “[I]t is my opinion that the 1993 Agreement affords, and in 
accord with reinsurance industry custom and practice should be 
understood to provide reinsurance indemnity for all policies issued 
to each insured during the period the 1993 Treaty Agreement was 
in effect.” (Paper 121 ¶ 13.) 
3. “It is also my opinion that ERC’s [Employers’ Reinsurance 
Company] argument that the dates of claim assigned to the 
LACERA and Raytheon claims are improper because they should 
have been assigned to later policy periods, which it raised for the 
first time in October 2003---over 5 ½ years after PCIC had first 
notified ERC of the claims and assigned the dates of claims---is 
contrary to the reinsurance custom, practice, and standards and 
does not conform with ERC’s obligation of utmost good faith to 
PCIC.” (Paper 121 ¶ 16.)62    
    
These would appear to be impermissible legal opinions, because they 
offer legal conclusions, such as whether the insurer acted in “utmost good 
                                                                                                                 
60  See Prof’l Consultants Ins. Co., No. 1:03-CV-216, 2006 WL 751244 (D.Vt. Mar. 
8, 2006). 
61  Id. at 2. 
62  Id. at 21. 
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faith,” and provided an interpretation of the policy.  Nonetheless, the court 
found the opinions admissible. 
 
Mr. Waterman’s statements appear not to be based on case law 
or legal standards but rather on his knowledge of the facts of the 
case, his experience, and his understanding of industry custom. 
(Paper 121 ¶ 9)  The first bulleted statement [number 1 above] . . . 
might be read as a legal determination that the contract is 
unambiguous.  See Luneau, 750 A.2d at 1033-34 (question of 
whether a contact term is ambiguous is a matter of law for the court 
to decide).  Mr. Waterman made the statement, however, in the 
middle of a paragraph in which he opined that if ERC intended 
more limited coverage, ERC would have been required by industry 
custom to make such restrictions explicit to PCIC.  (Paper 121  ¶ 
13).  Insofar as the statement is intended as a factual statement 
concerning prevailing reinsurance practices, the statement is an 
admissible factual description.  To the extent that it may be read as 
an opinion on the ultimate legal issue, it is not admissible.  See N. 
River Ins., 197 F. Supp. 2d at 982-84.63 
In the second and third bulleted statements [numbers two and 
three above] above, Mr. Waterman explicitly discusses “industry 
custom” as it applies to the parties here. To the extent that the 
statements are intended as facts concerning prevailing reinsurance 
customs, they are admissible as expert opinion testimony.  To the 
extent that they may be read as opinions on the ultimate legal 
issues before the Court, they are not admissible.  In accordance 
with the findings above, ERC’s motion to strike on this ground is 
DENIED in part and GRANTED in part.64 
 
The Court’s opinion is troublesome because the Court offers no 
guidance on how the parties are to determine what portions of the expert 
opinion are based on legal conclusions and what are based on industry 
                                                                                                                 
63  In support of its position, the court cited the opinion in North River Ins. Co.  v.  
Employers Reinsurance Corp., 197 F. Supp. 2d 972 (S.D. Ohio 2002), noting that the 
“North River court excluded the testimony where the parties based their opinions on case 
law and legal standards, but allowed the testimony where the experts based their opinions on 
facts of the case, experience in the industry, and their own research of reinsurance 
practices.” Prof. Consultants Ins. Co. v. Employers Reinsurance Co., No. 1:03-CV-216, 
2006 WL 751244, at *22 (D. Vt. Mar. 8, 2006). 
64  Id. at 22. 
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standards.  What if the law and industry standards are the same?  The Court 
does not address this issue either.  It would appear that to be admissible all 
that an expert has to do is label otherwise inadmissible legal opinions 
“insurance industry standards.”  Thus, form conquers substance.65  Finally, 
nowhere do we see any evidence of industry standards.  Indeed, the court 
concedes that “Waterman does not appear to base his testimony on any 
reference materials or treatises.”66   
The weaknesses in the court’s approach may be addressed by simply 
admitting that the issues addressed by the expert are both legal conclusions 
and opinions of insurance industry practice.  Where the law and industry 
practice are consistent the opinion should not be disregarded.67  The court 
could, therefore, make a determination of whether the opinions are 
consistent with the law, and where they are admit them even though they 
might also be legal opinions.  By taking this approach the court avoids the 
near impossible task of dividing up the opinions into legal and non-legal 
opinions and provides clearer guidance to the parties on what is admissible 
and what is not.68 
Despite the apparent artificiality between legal conclusions and 
insurance industry standards, some courts have persisted in their view that 
the testimony of insurance claims handling experts should be limited to 
industry standards, even when the expert is testifying on the meaning of a 
policy provision.  Therefore, the court in Aetna Insurance Co. of Hartford, 
Conn. v. Loxahatchee Marina, Inc.69 held: 
 
                                                                                                                 
65  “The prohibition of expert legal testimony often seems to be an elevation of form 
over substance.” Expert Legal Testimony, supra note 56, at 800. 
66  Prof. Consultants Ins. Co., No. 1:03-CV-216, 2006 WL 751244, at *21 (D. Vt. 
Mar. 8, 2006). 
67  North River, 197 F. Supp. 2d at 982 (noting that where insurance industry 
standards and the law are the same the expert’s opinion should not be disregarded). 
68  The Court should also require the expert to provide support for his or her opinions 
on industry practice, with citations to either texts or other materials. See North Star Mut. Ins. 
Co. v. Zurich Ins. Co., 269 F. Supp. 2d 1140, 1148 (D. Minn. 2003) (noting that it is 
important that expert’s opinion be “tethered to…independent authority”).  Absent such 
supporting evidence the opinions are merely general statements of practice, which may not 
be admissible. See Chateau Chamberay Homeowners Assoc. v. Assoc. Int’l. Ins. Co., 108 
Cal. Rptr. 2d. 776 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (holding two page conclusionary expert report on 
insurance company’s claims handling practices inadmissible). In other words, the expert’s 
opinion should not be based solely on the law. See North River, 197 F. Supp. 2d at 981 
(noting that an expert opinion is inadmissible where it is based on “settled principles of 
indemnity law.”). 
69   236 So. 2d 12 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970). 
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On the final question, the expert in the insurance business 
testified as to the customs and usages in the insurance business, 
types of policies, premium rates, exclusions and other matters and 
also answered hypothetical questions.  Aetna did not question the 
qualification of the witness but contends his testimony invaded the 
province of the trial judge to interpret the insurance contract.  This 
contention is not tenable. Obscure connotations of an insurance 
policy can be greatly illuminated by knowledge of custom and 
usage in the industry as well as the expert’s knowledge of terms 
which take on a different hue in the specialized field than in the 
filed of general knowledge.” 70      
 
Permitting an insurance expert to testify on the meaning of the policy 
based on insurance standards may comfortably avoid the legal testimony 
issue, but what then is the court to do when the issue is whether the 
insurer’s coverage decision was reasonable in light of all considerations 
normally considered in making a coverage decision, such as case law?71  
Equally troubling is whether the coverage dispute is reasonably debatable.72  
Courts may dismiss the insured’s bad faith claim if it can be shown that the 
insurer’s position is reasonably debatable.  Whether the position is 
reasonably debatable may depend not only on insurance industry standards, 
but also on applicable case law.73  Finally, what are the courts to do where 
                                                                                                                 
70  Id. at 14. See also Travelers Indem. Co. v. Scor Reins. Co., 62 F.3d 74, 78 (2d Cir. 
1995) (permitting testimony about reinsurance industry practice where testimony was 
relevant to interpret ambiguous policy provision), and North River Ins. Co., 197 F. Supp. 2d 
at 983 (permitting an expert to construe a certification of reinsurance to the extent it 
“constitutes a statement of fact concerning industry custom and practice”). 
71  Some courts, in apparent recognition of the need to allow expert testimony of the 
law, have allowed “[an expert] witness to give an opinion on the ultimate issue of whether 
the duty of good faith and fair dealing was breached.  The witness is allowed to describe 
industry standards and their historical basis, including a description of reported cases, statute 
or insurance commissioner regulations that shaped claim handling practices.  Such 
testimony is less truncated and usually more beneficial and easily understood by jurors.  It 
captures for the jury the complete claim universe, how standards were established, what 
they are and the significance of compliance or non-compliance with them.” Timothy J. 
Muldowney & Robert A. Zupkus, Bad Faith Claims: The Role of the Expert, 64 DEF. 
COUNS. J. 226, 232 (1997).      
72  “The mistaken [or erroneous] withholding of policy benefits, if reasonable or if 
based on a legitimate dispute as to the insurer’s liability under California law, does not 
expose the insurer to bad faith liability.” Tomaselli v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 31 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 433, 440 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).  
73  See Delgado v. Interinsurance Exch. Of Auto. Club of So. Cal., 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
799, 811-13 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (holding that the determination of whether an insurer had 
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the insurer has invoked the defense of reliance on counsel?  The insurer 
may have a defense to a bad faith claim where it can show that it obtained a 
coverage opinion from its counsel and reasonably relied on that opinion.74  
But how is the insurer’s reasonable reliance to be determined without 
consideration for not only insurance industry standards, but also applicable 
case law.75  In other words, the courts’ formulation that expert testimony 
must be limited to insurance industry standards is not only artificial, but it 
also does not address very real issues that face the courts every day in 
insurance bad faith cases.          
Excluding expert testimony on the law is also contrary to the widely 
held rule that insurance claims handling experts can testify on whether the 
insurer complied with or violated applicable statutory standards for claims 
handling.76  If an expert can testify on statutory standards then what can be 
the justification for precluding the expert from testifying on applicable case 
law, where consideration of that case law is pivotal to determining whether 
the insurer acted reasonably? The same should be the case where the expert 
testifies with regard to the interpretation and application of insurance 
policies. 
 
                                                                                                                          
reasonable basis to deny a duty to defend may turn on a question of law applicable to the 
facts). 
74  State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Superior Court ex rel. Johnson Kinsey, Inc., 279 
Cal. Rptr. 116, 117-18 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (holding good faith reliance on advice of 
counsel is factor in determining whether insurer acted in bad faith).    
75  George F. Hillenbrand, Inc. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d 586, 608 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (holding reliance on counsel is not a defense if insurer did not have 
probable cause to file a declaratory relief action).     
76  Hangarter v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 236 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1089 (N.D. Cal. 
2002) (“It would be reasonable for experts in bad faith insurance practices to look to the 
relevant statutory and regulatory requirements in examining the reasonableness of an 
insurer’s actions.”); Kraeger v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., No. Civ. A. 95-7550, 1997 WL 
109582, at *1 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (“[Expert] [t]estimony about how insurance claims are 
managed and evaluated and the statutory and regulatory standards to which insurance 
companies must adhere could be helpful to the jury in evaluating whether the claim in the 
instant case was handled in bad faith.”); Peiffer v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 940 P.2d 
967, 971 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996) (“[W]hile we agree with State Farm that an expert witness 
should not dictate the law that the jury should apply, an expert witness is permitted, in the 
trial court’s discretion, to refer to the facts of the case in legal terms.”); Crum & Forster, Inc. 
v. Monsanto Co., 887 S.W.2d 103, 134 (Tex. App. 1994) (“An expert . . . may offer his or 
her opinion as to a mixed question of law and fact . . . .”); accord Century Indem. Co. v. 
Aero-Motive Co., 254 F. Supp. 2d 670, 677 (W.D. Mich. 2003); and see Deposition of 
Stephen Hinkle, supra note 34.   
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B. PRECLUSION OF EXPERT TESTIMONY ON INSURANCE POLICY 
INTERPRETATION BECAUSE POLICY IS NOT AMBIGUOUS IS NO 
LONGER AN EFFECTIVE LIMITATION ON EXPERT TESTIMONY.   
 
Courts are also reluctant to allow expert testimony on the meaning of 
contract provisions unless the court first finds that the operative contract 
provision is ambiguous.77  This rule, however, is fraught with numerable 
exceptions.  Courts have, held that it is proper to consider facts extrinsic to 
the contract in determining whether the contract is ambiguous. 78  Similarly, 
evidence of industry custom and practice is admissible even where there is 
no ambiguity where it is shown that the parties to the contract were 
presumed to have known of the practice.79  Courts will also consider expert 
testimony on the purpose of insurance and the history of a particular policy 
even though there is no issue of ambiguity.80  Drafting history may also be 
                                                                                                                 
77  See Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 386 F. Supp. 2d, 1272, 
1277 (S.D. Fla. 2005)  (“[I]ntroduction of extrinsic evidence regarding the drafting history 
or intent behind an insurance policy is “inappropriate and unnecessary” when the policy 
language is unambiguous.”) (citation omitted), but see Prof’l Consultants Ins. Co. v. 
Employers Reins Co., No. 1:03-CV-216, 2006 WL 751244, at *20-22 (D. Vt. Mar. 8, 2006); 
Tapatio Springs Builders, Inc. v. Md. Cas. Ins. Co., 82 F. Supp. 2d 633, 649 (W.D. Tex. 
1999)  (admitting testimony by insurance claims expert that an insurance policy was 
ambiguous); MacKinnon v. Truck Ins. Exch., 73 P.3d 1205, 1217 (Cal. 2003) (holding 
history and purpose of pollution exclusion “may properly be used by courts as an aid to 
discern the meaning of disputed policy language”); and Montrose Chem. Corp. of Cal. v. 
Admiral Ins. Co. 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 645, 670-71 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (holding drafting history 
and similar insurance industry materials “may be of considerable assistance in determining 
coverage issues.”).        
78  See, e.g., Tapatio, 82 F. Supp. 2d at 641 (“[T]he contract may be read in the light 
of the surrounding circumstances to determine whether an ambiguity exists.”); Pac. Gas & 
Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 442 P.2d 641, 644 (Cal. 1968) (holding 
extrinsic evidence is relevant when it is offered to prove the meaning to which the contract 
language is reasonably susceptible); Feurzeig v. Ins. Co. of the West, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 629, 
632-34 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (holding expert testimony is admissible to show that a 
provision of a policy is or is not ambiguous); Imbrandtsen v. N. Branch Corp., 556 A.2d 81, 
84 (Vt. 1988) (noting a number of courts have held “circumstances surrounding the making 
of the agreement, [including] the “object, nature, and subject matter of the writing,” can be 
considered when the court is inquiring into whether the contract is ambiguous); and see 
Prof’l Consultants Ins. Co. 2006 WL 751244, at *3 (permitting a look at circumstances 
surrounding the making of the agreement when inquiring into contract ambiguity).  
79  Lambourne v. Manchester Country Props., 374 A.2d 122, 123-24 (Vt. 1977).  
80  Playtex FP, Inc., v. Columbia Cas. Co., 622 A.2d 1074, 1077-78 (Del. Super. Ct. 
1992). 
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considered, even in the absence of any ambiguity in the policy.81  Indeed, 
some courts have held that expert testimony is admissible regarding 
insurance industry understanding or usage to assist the court in interpreting 
the relevant policy provisions without any determination that the policy is 
ambiguous.82 Sometimes courts may also preclude expert testimony on the 
grounds that it presents impermissible evidence of a party’s subjective 
intent,83 but even then expert testimony has been admitted on what an 
insurer intended when it wrote the policy.84  Given these many exceptions 
it would appear that the rules regarding the admissibility of extrinsic 
evidence are of little practical use in providing guidance on how and when 
expert testimony on the meaning of an insurance policy should be admitted. 
                                                                                                                 
81  Fireguard Sprinkler Sys., Inc. v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 864 F.2d 648, 651-52 (9th 
Cir. 1988) (relying on explanatory information contained in an ISO circular and excerpt 
from a Fire Casualty & Surety Bulletin about the intended scope of a standard completed 
operations exclusion); Nestle Foods Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 135 F.R.D. 101, 105 
(D.N.J. 1990) (holding interpretation of policy language and establishment of whether 
policies are ambiguous, policyholder “must be allowed to explore the creation of the 
language and whether the intent of the drafter(s) is inconsistent with its application.”);  Md. 
Cas. Co. v. Reeder, 270 Cal. Rptr. 719, 723 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (“[T]he concomitant 
availability of interpretative literature is of considerable assistance in determining precisely 
what risks the Maryland policies cover.”); Eaton Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. No. 
189068, slip op. (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 9, 1992), reprinted in 8 MEALEYS LIT. REP. (INS.) 44, 
at F-1 (allowing drafting history because it might reveal admissible evidence concerning 
“ambiguity, meanings(s) of language, breath of coverage, intent, risks assumed and 
impeachment”); 1 LAW AND PRACTICE OF INSURANCE COVERAGE LITIGATION §1:15 (David 
L. Leitner et al. eds., 2005) (“drafting history evidence may used to (a) establish ambiguity, 
by demonstrating that the provision is susceptible to more than one reasonable 
interpretation; (b) provide extrinsic evidence to interpret the provisions; and/or (c) preclude 
the insurer from disputing the meaning advanced when approval for the clause was sought 
from the relevant regulatory authorities, irrespective of the policyholder’s reliance on, or 
even awareness of, that meaning (so-called ‘regulatory estoppel’).”).  But see U.S. Fid. & 
Guar. Co., v. Treadwell Corp., 58 F. Supp. 2d 77, 100-101 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (excluding 
drafting history because insurer did not participate in drafting of policy and because drafting 
history did not unambiguously support insured’s position).    
82  Gerawan Farming Partners, Inc., v. Westchester Surplus Lines Ins. Co., No. CIV F 
05-1186 AWI DLB, 2008 WL 80711, at *19-20 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 4, 2008).  
83  Winet v. Price, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 554, 558 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (holding 
uncommunicated subjective intent prior to the execution of the contact is not admissible to 
interpret the meaning of the contract). 
84  U.S. Elevator Corp. v. Associated Int’l Ins. Co., 263 Cal. Rptr. 760, 764-65 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1989) (holding testimony of insurer’s underwriter may be offered to establish that a 
policy provision is or is not applicable to the issue before the court).   
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Courts may need to look elsewhere for guidance if they are to 
recognize the true nature of insurance claims handling and adopt an 
approach to expert testimony that reflects that handling.  
 
V.  EXPERT TESTIMONY IN LEGAL MALPRACTICE CASES: A   
MODEL FOR EXPERT TESTIMONY IN INSURANCE BAD 
FAITH CASES.85 
 
Expert testimony in legal malpractice cases offers a model for how 
courts may approach similar expert testimony in insurance bad faith cases.  
Like the legal profession, the insurance industry considers claims handling 
a profession.86  Insurance claims handlers, like lawyers, are required to 
have extensive knowledge concerning legal matters.87  As with the legal 
profession,88 insurance claims handlers are subject to professional ethical 
standards.89 Given the nature of an insurance claims handler’s work, it is 
                                                                                                                 
85  For further discussion of expert testimony in legal malpractice cases see 
Ambrosio, Michael P., and McLaughlin, Denis F., “The Use of Expert Witnesses in 
Establishing Liability in Legal Malpractice Cases,” 61 TEMP. L. REV. 1351. 
86  MARKHAM, supra note 33, at 373 (“As professionals, claim representatives should 
use their position, knowledge and expertise for the benefit of their customers.  Claim 
representatives must have a professional attitude towards providing customer 
service…There are ethical obligations that arise out of the professional duties of claims 
representatives.”). 
87  Id. at 389 (“Claim representatives should be expert in matters of insurance 
coverage, legal liability, damages and methods of repair.”).  Granted the scope of a claims 
handler’s legal knowledge will be more limited than a lawyers.  For example, claims 
handlers will need to be informed on the law concerning tort liability and damages as well 
as applicable contract law but not, as with a lawyer, the law of estates or tax law.   
88   See Rogers v. Robson, Masters, Ryan, Brumund and Belom, 392 N.E.2d 1365, 
1371 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979), aff’d, 407 N.E.2d 47 (Ill. 1980) (Violations of rules of 
professional responsibility or ethical standards may be admitted as evidence or legal 
malpractice.  The court observed: “It is true that the present action is one for malpractice 
and not a disciplinary proceeding, but it would be anomalous indeed to hold that 
professional standards of ethics are not relevant considerations in a tort action, but are in a 
disciplinary proceeding.  Both malpractice actions and disciplinary proceedings involve 
conduct failing to adhere to certain minimum standards and we reject any suggestion that 
ethical standards are not relevant considerations.”).  See also Brewer, supra note 56, at 767; 
see also KATHERINE J. MCKEE, ANNOTATION, Admissibility and Effect of Evidence of 
Professional Ethics Rules in Legal Malpractice Action, 50 A.L.R.5th 301 (1997).  
89  MARKHAM, supra note 33, at 381-386.  For example, the Society of Special 
Investigation Units, the National Association of Public Adjusters, and the National 
Association of Independent Adjusters all publish ethical standards for their members.  One 
of the most well-known of these organizations is the American Institute of Chartered 
Property Casualty Underwriters (“CPCU”), which publishes a Code of Professional Ethics.  
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not surprising that courts have long recognized that insurance claims 
handlers often act in the capacity of a lawyer.90 Insurance claims adjusters 
have been found to be acting as a lawyer when they complete settlement 
and release forms, or advise the claimant regarding the claim process.91  In 
such circumstances the insurance claims adjuster may be subject to the 
standard of care of a practicing lawyer.92  Further, at least one court has 
held that an insurer’s standard of care is “analogous to the standard of care 
                                                                                                                          
Canon 3 of the CPCU Code contains the following ethical standards: “R3.1   In the conduct 
of business or professional activities, a CPCU shall not engage in any act or omission of a 
dishonest, deceitful, or fraudulent nature.  R3.2 A CPCU shall not allow the pursuit of 
financial gain or other personal benefit to interfere with the exercise of sound professional 
judgment and skills.”  CODE OF THE PROFESSIONAL ETHICS OF THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE FOR 
CPCU, Canon 3 (2007). 
90  See, e.g., Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Jones, 130 S.W.2d 945, 949 (Mo. 1939).  
91  Jones v. Allstate Ins. Co., 45 P.3d 1068, 1070 (Wash. 2002); Blinston v. Hartford 
Accident and Indem. Co., 441 F.2d 1365, 1367 (8th Cir. 1971) (holding that the standard of 
care for a practicing lawyer may not apply to an insurance claims handler where the claims 
handler is providing his/her employer with an appraisal of the company’s legal position, 
even though the claims handler is not a member of the bar); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 130 
S.W.2d at 961 (However, an insurance claims handler may not be engaging in the practice 
of law when he (1) “investigates…the facts and circumstances relating to a casualty or claim 
arising under a policy of casualty insurance issued by his employer, and reports to his 
employer the facts ascertained in such investigation”; (2) “determines for his employer the 
pecuniary limit which his employer will be willing to offer or pay in settlement of any claim 
arising under a policy of casualty insurance issued by such employer”; (3) state in his or her 
report to his or her employer “the opinion…given by the company’s counsel on any 
question of liability upon any given claim”; and (4) during “the negotiation and settlement 
of a claim arising under a policy of casualty insurance issued by his employer, truthfully 
states to the claimant or claimant’s representative what the company’s attorney has 
advised.”);  see also Sande L. Buhai, Act Like a Lawyer, Be Judged Like a Lawyer:  The 
Standard of Care for the Unlicensed Practice of Law, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 87, 88 (2007) (“A 
majority of courts have held that one who provides legal services, regardless of whether 
licensed or authorized, should be held to the standard of care applicable to attorneys 
providing those same services.”).  
92  Allstate Ins. Co., 45 P.3d  at 1075 (“[W]e hold that insurance claims adjusters, 
when preparing and completing documents which affect the legal rights of third party 
claimants and when advising third parties to sign such documents, must comply with the 
standard of care of a practicing attorney.”).  See also JAMES MCLOUGHLIN, ANNOTATION, 
Activities of Insurance Adjusters as Unauthorized Practice of Law, 29 A.L.R.4th 1158 
(1984) (“[T]he courts have held that adjusters for insurers who gave legal advice, made 
legal recommendations, appeared in court, or engaged in other activities requiring a 
lawyer’s training or status were engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.); see also 
Jeffrey A. Parness, Civil Claim Settlement Talks Involving Third Parties and Insurance 
Company Adjusters:  When Should Lawyer Conduct Apply?, 77 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 603, 
604-606 (2003).   
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owed by other professionals to their clients and [which] is elucidated by 
expert testimony.”93   
As with insurance claims handlers, expert testimony is commonly used 
in legal malpractice cases to establish the standard of care.  Courts will 
require expert testimony in legal malpractice cases unless the breach of the 
standard is so obvious that jurors can rely upon their common knowledge 
to determine if there has been malpractice.94  Expert testimony in legal 
malpractice cases may be limited to only factual issues, in the same way 
such testimony is limited in insurance bad faith cases.  One commentator 
has noted that, “[e]xpert legal testimony is frequently permitted (and 
sometimes required) on the issue of the standard of care in legal 
malpractice actions.  Even in jurisdictions which generally exclude expert 
testimony about the law, the testimony of legal experts about the ordinary 
knowledge and skill of members of the legal profession is admitted on 
grounds that it concerns a question of fact, not an issue of law.”95  In some 
cases, however, it is practically impossible to separate a lawyer’s standard 
of care from the law.96  Courts will, in certain circumstances, permit the 
expert to testify on legal matters.97  In other words, to provide an opinion 
on the standard of care requires a discussion of the applicable law. 
                                                                                                                 
93  See Sullivan v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 788 N.E.2d 522, 536 (Mass. 2003) (citing to 
cases in which expert testimony required in legal malpractice cases); see also Lentino v. 
Fringe Employee Plans, Inc., 611 F.2d 474, 480 (3d Cir. 1979). 
94  See, e.g., Ankey v. Franch, 652 A.2d 1138, 1153 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995) 
(expert testimony was necessary to establish whether attorney’s decision, in advising client 
not to appeal was reasonable); Suritz v. Kelner, 155 So. 2d 831, 834 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1963) (holding that expert testimony not required where jury alone could determine whether 
attorney committed malpractice).  
95  See TRIAL OBJECTIONS HANDBOOK § 8:28 (2d ed. 2001), and the cases cited 
therein.  
96  Smith v. Childs, 437 S.E.2d 500, 506 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993) (citing HAJMM Co. v. 
House of Raeford Farms, Inc., 403 S.E.2d 483, 488 (N.C. 1991)) (“When the expert witness 
is an expert legal witness, the voidance of testimony regarding legal conclusions can be 
problematical since attorneys deal with legal terms of art on a daily basis.”).  Expert Legal 
Testimony, supra note 56, at 799 (It is evident that “courts have had great trouble parsing the 
legal and factual elements in attorney malpractice cases.”).  
97  In Mazer v. Sec. Ins. Group, 368 F. Supp. 418, 422 n.4 (E.D. Pa. 1973) aff’d,, 507 
F.2d 1338 (3d Cir. 1975), the court said that the general rule “that a witness will not be 
permitted to give an opinion as to the ultimate fact in issue…is not followed where the 
matters involved are beyond the knowledge of ordinary laymen” and it made “no difference 
that this was being tried by a judge without a jury” since, “[o]bviously, not all judges are 
experts in all tactical matters which may pertain to all lawsuits.”  See also MICHAEL A. 
DISABATINO, ANNOTATION, Admissibility and Necessity of Expert Evidence as to Standards 
of Practice and Negligence in Malpractice Action Against Attorney, 14 A.L.R.4th 171 
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Similarly, expert testimony regarding the reasonableness of an 
insurance claims handler’s conduct will often involve not only purely 
factual issues, but also mixed questions of law and fact, as well as purely 
legal matters.  The latter situation may arise where the issue is whether the 
insurance claims handler properly interpreted and applied an insurance 
policy provision to the facts of a particular case.98  In such cases a coverage 
decision could not be reached without consideration of the insurance 
industry standards and publications regarding the policy provision at issue, 
as well as applicable case law.  Therefore, the claims handler may be asked 
not only whether he/she considered insurance industry standards and 
publications but also whether they considered the applicable case law, or 
whether they sought the advice of counsel on the coverage issue, and if so, 
whether they independently reviewed and evaluated that advice.99  Such an 
independent review may involve determining whether all the applicable 
case law has been considered and properly evaluated.  In other words, as 
with the legal professional, the claims professional’s conduct in a given 
case must consider the applicable case law.   
Where the claims professional’s conduct is inseparable from the law it 
would be appropriate to allow expert testimony on whether the claims 
handler reasonably evaluated the coverage issue, not just in light of 
applicable insurance industry standards, but also considering the applicable 
case law.  Any concern that the expert’s opinions may be contrary to the 
law can be addressed by the court hearing the expert’s testimony before it 
is heard by the jury.100  Further, the court can require that the expert’s 
                                                                                                                          
(1982); Nieves-Villanueva v. Soto-Rivera, 133 F.3d 92, 100-101 (1st Cir. 1997) (expert 
testimony on the law in legal malpractice cases may be admissible in some cases); Sharp v. 
Coopers & Lybrand, 457 F. Supp. 879 (E.D. Pa. 1978), aff’d in part, 649 F.2d 175 (3d Cir. 
1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 938 (1982) (law professor permitted to testify about tax 
consequences of an oil drilling venture and about the meaning of the relevant code 
provision).      
98  See WINDT, supra note 15, § 9:26A (“Case Law can, in many circumstances, 
constitute evidence that the insurer’s policy interpretation or understanding of its 
rights/obligations was reasonable.”). 
99  See Klinger v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 895 F. Supp. 709, 712 (M.D. Pa. 
1995) (testimony regarding the insurer’s reliance of counsel is admissible).   Of course, a 
review of the case law discussing the operative policy provision would be circumscribed by 
other standards applicable to insurance claims handling, such as the insurer’s duty to resolve 
any coverage doubts in favor of the policyholder.  See POPOW, supra note 18, at § 5.34.  
100  Expert Legal Testimony, supra note 56, at 813 (Court can prescreen proffered 
expert testimony to determine if testimony on the law is warranted, and if such testimony 
will conflict with the court’s instructions); see BREWER, supra note 56, at 761 
(“[C]ommentators have suggested that the trial judge should first hear the testimony outside 
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opinions not be based solely on the law, but also be grounded in insurance 
industry practices and standards.     
 
VI.  CONCLUSION   
 
The traditional rules limiting the admissibility of expert testimony on 
insurance policy interpretation have proved to be either unworkable or are 
fraught with so many exceptions so as to make them of doubtful use.  No 
longer do courts rigorously adhere to their prior refusal to hear expert 
testimony on policy interpretation unless the court first finds that the 
operative policy terms are ambiguous.  Rather, courts have shown an 
increasing willingness to consider a wide range of evidence on the meaning 
of policy terms, including insurance industry publications and drafting 
history materials, even where there is no determination that the policy is 
ambiguous.  Similarly, many courts have virtually abandoned the age-old 
requirement that expert testimony should not be admitted on the law 
because it invades the province of the court.  Courts have achieved this 
result by agreeing to hear expert testimony on policy interpretation as long 
as it couched in terms of insurance industry practices and standards, even 
though that same testimony may, for all practical purposes, be nothing 
more than the otherwise prohibited testimony on the law.101   
The historic limitations on expert testimony concerning insurance 
policy interpretation also fail to recognize the reality of insurance claims 
handling.  Insurance claims handlers are commonly trained in the 
interpretation of insurance policy provisions.  Those same claim handlers 
have access to a wide range of insurance industry publications and 
materials that provide further guidance on insurance policy interpretation.  
The claims handlers’ training includes training on the applicable insurance 
law.  Indeed, claims handlers are expected to know the case law that may 
be applicable to the interpretation of policies.   
In revisiting the traditional limitations on expert testimony in insurance 
bad faith cases the courts may gain guidance from decisions in legal 
                                                                                                                          
the presence of the jury to determine whether the expert’s legal premises are compatible 
with the anticipated jury instructions and then admit only that part of the testimony that the 
court finds to be in harmony with its view of the law.”). 
101 This is not to suggest that there are no insurance industry standards on the 
interpretation of policy terms generally and with regard to specific policy terms.  That is 
obviously not the case. (See discussion, supra, pp. 6-13)  Such evidence of insurance 
industry standards concerning policy interpretation has an equal place in the evaluation of 
an insurer’s conduct as does the case law.  
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malpractice cases.  Courts have recognized that expert testimony on the 
standard of care in legal malpractice cases must, in certain cases, include 
reference to the law. Indeed, without consideration of the applicable law it 
may not be possible to determine the standard of care for a lawyer in a 
particular specialty or case.   
It is appropriate to apply the standards for expert testimony in legal 
malpractice cases to expert testimony on the interpretation of insurance 
policies. There are many similarities between the legal and claims handling 
professions.  One important similarity is that, within their respective 
realms, the members of each profession are called upon to consider 
applicable case law when they make important decisions.  Accordingly, in 
determining whether an insurer has properly applied its insurance policy to 
a given set of facts the trier of fact should take into account whether the 
insurer properly considered that relevant case law in its coverage decision.  
In addition, at the least, the courts should also permit testimony on 
insurance industry standards concerning the interpretation of policy 
provisions.   Such testimony will assist the court and the trier of fact in not 
only better understanding, and therefore interpreting, the operative policy 
provision, but also in determining whether the insurer acted in bad faith 
when it applied the policy provision to the facts of the claim. 
Concerns that expert testimony on insurance industry standards and 
case law concerning the interpretation of policy provisions will invade the 
province of the court can be addressed by the court hearing, outside the 
jury, and the proffered expert testimony in order to determine whether the 
testimony will be in accord with the court’s instructions to the jury. 
Permitting expert testimony on the interpretation of insurance policy 
provisions in both breach of contract and bad faith actions will permit the 
trier of fact to hear a broader range of relevant evidence and, thereby, be 
better informed on the meaning and application of the operative policy 
provision.  Such expert testimony will provide for a more informed 
judiciary when it comes to the interpretation and application of insurance 
policy provisions.     
240 CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 15:1 
 
 
 
 
INSURANCE AND CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS:   
SHOULD LIKE THINGS BE TREATED ALIKE?* 
 
Arthur Kimball-Stanley** 
ABSTRACT 
 
This article focuses on the potential moral hazards created by the use of 
credit default swaps (“CDS”) and argues that perhaps such swaps should be 
regulated as analogous to regular insurance regimes. The author discusses 
academic mischaracterization of the issue, including arguments that CDS is 
not the same as insurance, and refutes this mischaracterization by 
comparing original rationales for regulating insurance with moral hazards 
created by the use of this credit risk management practice. Several specific 
examples are provided to illustrate this argument, including that of 
investment banks, scholarship on insurance contracts, control, regulatory 
value, and the issues of risk that underlie both regimes. Finally, the author 
asserts that, given the similarities and risks involved in CDS as compared 
to traditional insurance, regulation possibilities should be investigated.  
 
 
“…[L]egal rule and economic principle are but the concavity 
and convexity of the single lens of general policy. To ignore this 
fact is to chance the invidious probability that legal rules will 
calcify and become divorced from basic social values.” 1 
                                                                                                                 
*  Editor’s Note: This student note was written in February and March 2008, 
during the relatively early period of what has become a financial crisis of historical 
proportions. Since that time, the credit default swap market has received significant 
attention from regulators, including insurance regulators. This note does not discuss the 
newfound interest of insurance regulators in the credit default swap market because when it 
was written such interest seemed a remote possibility. Given the extent to which the credit 
default swap market has changed, much of the argument made by the author can be 
considered anachronistic. The note remains as originally conceived to show how much the 
regulatory culture and consequently the regulatory landscape has changed in that short space 
of time. 
**  J.D. Candidate, Boston College Law School, 2010.  I would like to thank 
Professors Thomas E. Baker, John Day, Thomas Morawetz, and Sanchin Pandya from the 
University of Connecticut School of Law for their guidance. 
1  Bertram Harnett & John V. Thornton, Insurable Interest in Property: A Socio-
Economic Reevaluation of A Legal Concept, 48 COLUM. L. REV. 1162, 1162 (1948) 
(citations omitted). 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Recent scholarship and journalism on the use of credit default swaps 
(“CDS”) provide evidence that these financial products create moral hazard 
similar to that created during the early history of insurance contracts. The 
insurable interest and indemnity doctrines, as well as other principles of 
insurance, created to mitigate moral hazard, provide guidance in dealing 
with the moral hazard CDS trading may create. 
Compare the following hypotheticals: 
 
An 18th century speculator buys insurance on a British cargo 
ship in which he has no interest. The speculator then sends a 
message to his cousin in Paris, asking the cousin to inform the 
French fleet of the ship’s schedule. A French frigate uses the 
information to sink the British vessel. The speculator collects on 
his insurance contract. To mitigate this danger, the insured interest 
doctrine was created to keep the speculator from profiting on his 
insurance contract. 
A 21st century hedge fund manager buys millions of dollars in 
CDSs that will pay off only if company (x) declares bankruptcy. 
The hedge fund manager then organizes the short-term purchase of 
creditor voting rights as the embattled company (x) attempts to 
borrow money to avert Chapter 11. The hedge fund votes against 
allowing further borrowing and company (x) is forced to declare 
bankruptcy. The CDS bet pays off and the hedge fund manager 
finds herself with a substantial return.  
 
In terms of the moral hazard to be averted, the second hypothetical is 
no different from the first as both create new risk through contract. Both 
hypotheticals effectively illustrate the moral hazard created by risk 
distribution contracts and why mitigation through the insurable interest and 
indemnity doctrines is necessary.  The growth of risk management products 
in the financial industry over the last few decades, in particular the 
emergence of a multi-trillion dollar CDS market, merits a reexamination of 
the purposes and the history of the insurable interest and indemnity 
doctrines.  
Since the market’s inception little more than a decade ago, CDS traders 
and their attorneys have worked hard to distinguish their new financial 
product from insurance to avoid stringent regulatory insurance regimes 
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operated throughout the United States and in the United Kingdom.2  
Applying the insurable interest doctrine to CDSs requires reevaluating the 
chief arguments for treating these contracts differently from traditional 
insurance. 
The focus of this reevaluation is not whether CDSs are insurance, as 
that misstates the problem, but whether CDS trading results in moral 
hazard typical of insurance contracts. This paper argues that attempts to 
distinguish CDSs from insurance on the basis of regulation rather than on 
the resultant risks are mischaracterizations of the issue.  Instead, this paper 
argues that CDSs create moral hazard similar to insurance such that policy-
makers should consider whether CDS should be regulated like insurance.3 
 Part one of this paper defines CDSs and discusses the arguments that 
attempt to show CDSs are not insurance as well as the stakes involved in 
making those arguments a success. Part two identifies evidence of morally 
hazardous uses of CDSs and compares that evidence to the original 
rationale for instituting early insurance regulations such as the insurable 
interest and indemnity doctrines.  Part Three analyzes the arguments used 
to differentiate CDSs and insurance in light of this evidence. The 
conclusion addresses the need for further research regarding the moral 
hazard created by CDSs, and argues that insurance regulators should 
examine the costs and benefits of their decision not to regulate CDSs.  
 
I.  THE PRODUCT 
 
CDS contracts are used to manage credit risk. They are among the most 
popular credit derivative products traded today, having grown into a 
multitrillion-dollar business in less than a decade.4  In June of 2007 over 
                                                                                                                 
2  See HELENE RAINELLI & ISABELLE HUALT, OLD RISK, NEW MARKET: 
CONSTRUCTING THE OVER-THE-COUNTER FINANCIAL MARKET FOR CREDIT DERIVATIVES, 16, 
(Multilevel Governance Workshop Papers 2007), available at http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/ 
fac/soc/csgr/activitiesnews/conferences/gmorgan/papers/; Paul C. Harding, A PRACTICAL 
GUIDE TO THE 2003 ISDA CREDIT DERIVATIVES DEFINITIONS 19 (Euromoney Institutional 
Investor Plc 2004); Robert F. Schwartz, Risk Distribution In the Capital Markets: Credit 
Default Swaps, Insurance and a Theory of Demarcation, 13 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 
167, 190 (2007). 
3  This paper does not explore the policy implications inherent in the determination 
that CDS and insurance are innately alike. 
4  Stephen J. Lubben, Credit Derivatives and the Future of Chapter 11, 81 AM. 
BANKR. L.J. 405, 409-10 (2007); Rick Hyman & Amit Trehan, Credit Default Swaps: What 
You Need to Know Now, THE SECURED LENDER, 26 (2007); See Deutsche Bank AG v. 
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$42 trillion in outstanding CDS contracts were recorded by the Bank for 
International Settlements.5 Originally designed to meet the needs of 
bondholders who did not want to resort to traditional forms of credit 
enhancement, these contracts have grown into a freely traded, liquid market 
all their own.6 This market, commonly referred to as the over the counter 
(“OTC”) derivatives market, is free from regulation or disclosure rules.7 
The International Swaps and Derivatives Association (“ISDA”) does, 
however, attempt to standardize CDS contracts and help buyers and sellers 
manage transactions.8 
 
A. CDS DEFINED  
 
A CDS contract allows a buyer to purchase credit protection with 
respect to one or more referenced entities from a seller. The two parties 
agree that the seller will pay a certain amount to the buyer upon the 
occurrence of a “credit event” with respect to the referenced entity or 
entities—usually some kind of debt obligation such as a bond—in 
exchange for the purchase price of the contract.9 The agreement allows the 
                                                                                                                          
Ambac Credit Prods., LLC, No. 04 CIV. 5594(DLC), 2006 WL 1867497, at *2 (S.D.N.Y 
July 6, 2006) for a brief discussion of the history and use of credit default swaps. 
5  Bank forInternational Settlements, Credit Defaults Swaps Market Notational 
amounts outstanding at end December 2007, available at http://www.bis.org/ 
statistics/otcder/dt21.pdf. 
6  Hyman, supra note 4 at 20, 22. The authors refer to letters of credit, guarantees 
and financial guarantee insurance as more traditional forms of credit enhancement; See also 
Frank Partnoy & David A. Skeel, Jr., The Promise and Perils of Credit Derivatives, 75 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 1019, 1020-1023 (2007). 
7  PHILIP M. JOHNSON & THOMAS L. HAZEN, DERIVATIVES REGULATION § 1.02[2][E] 
(Aspen Publishers 2004); The Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 (CFMA) in 
most cases completely bars and in some cases severely limits regulation of the Over-The 
Counter Derivatives Market. Neither the Securities and Exchange Commission nor the 
Commodities Futures Trading Commission have jurisdiction to regulate OTC CDS trading.  
In recent months, regulators have examined the possibility of changing this regime. Such 
methods have been resisted by the ISDA. At the time of this writing, there seems to be a 
stringent effort to create a clearinghouse for CDS trading. The hope is that a clearinghouse 
service would eliminate many of the structural problems created by the Over-The-Counter 
CDS market. This paper does not examine those structural market risks.  See Commodity 
Futures Modernization Act of 2000 §1(a)(5), 7 U.S.C.A. §1 (2000). 
8  See generally About ISDA, http://www.isda.org/. 
9  Deutsche Bank AG v. AMBAC Credit Prods., LLC, No. 04 CIV. 5594(DLC), 
2006 WL 1867497, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 6, 2006); Robert D. Aicher et al., Credit 
Enhancement: Letters of Credit, Guaranties, Insurance and Swaps (The Clash of Cultures), 
59 BUS. LAW. 897, 954-55 (2004). 
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buyer to hedge the risk associated with owning a reference entity that might 
suffer a credit event such as bankruptcy or default.10 
University of San Diego School of Law Professor Frank Partnoy offers 
the following example regarding the typical use of CDS contracts: A bank 
lends $10 million to company (y). The bank then enters into a $10 million 
dollar CDS with a third party to protect itself in case company (y) defaults 
on the loan.  If company (y) defaults, the bank executes its CDS, and 
recoups the loss. If company (y) does not default payment for the CDS 
reduces the profit accordingly. The seller of the CDS purchased by the 
bank determines the price of the contract by evaluating the likelihood of the 
company’s defaulting on the loan.11  
A CDS contract can be settled physically or with cash.  In a physical 
settlement the CDS buyer delivers to the seller one of the obligations of the 
reference entity upon which the CDS contract is based in exchange for the 
payout amount.12 CDS contracts may specify a certain obligation of a 
reference entity or may accept delivery of any obligation issued by the 
refrence entity.13  Alternatively, in a cash settlement the buyer exchanges 
the value of a specific defaulted obligation for a predetermined payout 
amount.14       
The chief difference between CDSs and insurance is that the buyer of a 
CDS contract need not own or have any relationship with the reference 
entity’s obligation.15 Unlike insurance, CDSs can be and are often used for 
speculation and arbitrage.16 These trades are intended to make the CDS 
market liquid.17 
CDS contracts provide a number of benefits to capital markets. As 
discussed above, the primary benefit is that they allow investors to hedge or 
reduce their risk. In 2005, Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan 
reminded the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago’s Conference on Bank 
Structure that CDS contracts were one of the reasons banks had been able 
to shrug off the losses of the 2000 downturn relatively easily.18 The ability 
                                                                                                                 
10  Id. 
11  Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 6, at 1021-22.  
12  Harding, supra note 2, at 134. 
13  David Z. Nirenberg & Richard J. Hoffman, Are Credit Default Swaps Insurance?, 
3 DERIVATIVES REP. 7, 14 (2001). 
14  Harding, supra note 2, at 134. 
15  Aicher et. al., supra note 9, at 955.  
16  Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 6, at 1022; Schwartz, supra note 2, at 190. 
17  Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 6, at 1022. 
18  Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Bd., Risk Transfer and Financial 
Stability, Remarks to the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago’s Forty-first Annual Conference 
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to hedge risk using CDSs also injects liquidity into the markets by making 
investors more comfortable in taking on risk. Finally, the pricing of CDS 
contracts and the result of the spread created by the buying and selling of 
CDSs, creates new information helpful in evaluating securities.19  
 These advantages, however, come at a price. The last several years 
are illustrative of how CDS contracts, in Partnoy’s words, might create 
incentives to destroy value by allowing profit to be born from loss. 
B. THE ARGUMENT THAT CDS ARE NOT INSURANCE 
 
Black’s Law Dictionary defines insurance as “[a] contract by which 
one party undertakes to indemnify another party…against the risk of loss, 
damage or liability arising from the occurrence of some specified 
contingency.”20  This basic definition by itself, is not dispositive of what 
should be considered insurance. It is important to note that there is no 
consensus regarding the definition of insurance.  Some scholars argue that 
a short definition of insurance is inherently misleading.21  However, 
simplicity has its merits. For example, the argument in favor of treating 
CDS like insurance is simple: that for the purpose of insurance regulation, 
contracts that create similar moral hazard as traditional insurance should be 
treated as insurance. 
The literature arguing that CDSs should not be considered insurance is 
limited but influential. It has allowed the market for CDSs to remain 
regulation-free. In an opinion commissioned by the ISDA, Robin Potts QC, 
an English barrister, argued what has become the basis for not treating 
CDSs as insurance.22 The so-called “Potts opinion” concluded that credit 
derivatives should not be characterized as insurance contracts because they 
are structured to pay out on the occurrence of a default or other credit 
event, irrespective of whether the buyer suffers a loss.23  Breaking down 
this point further, Potts wrote that CDSs “plainly differ from contracts of 
insurance” because “the payment obligation is not conditional on the 
                                                                                                                          
on Bank Structure (May 5, 2005), http://www.federalreserve.gov/Boarddocs/ 
Speeches/2005/20050505/default.htm. 
19  Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 6, at 1026-27.  
20  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 814 (8th ed. 2004).  
21  See 1 ERIC MILLS HOLMES & MARK S. RHODES, HOLMES’S APPLEMAN ON 
INSURANCE § 1.4 (2d ed. 1996). 
22  Opinion by Robin Potts QC, Erskine Chambers, prepared for the Int’l Swaps & 
Derivatives Ass’n (24 June 1997) (on file with author)  
23  Id. at 2-3. 
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payee’s sustaining a loss or having a risk of loss.”24 The contract is thus not 
one which seeks to protect an insurable interest on the part of the payee.  
“His rights do not depend on the existence of any insurable interest.”25 
According to Potts, these are substantial differences that justify the 
dissimilar treatment of CDSs and insurance. Potts’s reasoning was 
premised on the British common law which defines an insurance policy as 
“a contract to indemnify the insured in respect of some interest which he 
has against the perils which he contemplates it will be liable to.”26  Despite 
acknowledging “the economic effect of certain credit derivatives can be 
similar to the economic effect of a contract of insurance,” Potts concluded 
that CDS contracts are not insurance because the contracts lacked an 
insurable interest requirement and indemnity requirement.27  
ISDA attorneys, scholars and regulators in both the United Kingdom 
and the United States have used Potts’ argument, or similar reasoning ever 
since.  In 2000, an opinion from the New York Department of Insurance, 
responding to an inquiry as to whether CDSs constituted insurance, stated 
“[i]ndemnification of loss is an essential indicia of an insurance contract 
which courts have relied upon in the analysis of whether a particular 
agreement is an insurance contract under New York law. Absent such a 
contractual provision the instrument is not an insurance contract.”28  
Scholarship has also developed in support of the disparate treatment of 
CDSs and insurance. In “Are Credit Default Swaps Insurance?,” authors 
David Z. Nirenberg and Richard J. Hoffman concluded that though there 
were similarities between CDSs and insurance, the objectives of the 
financial products were sufficiently distinct to justify differential 
treatment.29  They applied three insurance tests set forth in Holmes’ 
Appleman on Insurance Law and Practice.30  Holmes’ tests are: (1) whether 
the contract constitutes the transfer of risk (“Substantial Control Test”); (2) 
whether that transfer is the dominant feature of the contract (“Principle 
Object Test”); and (3) whether it is in the public interest to regulate the 
contract as insurance (“Regulatory Value Test”).31 
                                                                                                                 
24  Id. at 7. 
25  Id. 
26  Id. at 4-5, (citing Wilson v. Jones, (1867) 2 Exch. Div. 150). 
27  Id. at 7, 10. 
28  Re: Credit Default Option Facility, (NY Dept. of Ins. Gen. Counsel June 16, 
2000).  
29  Nirenberg & Hoffman, supra note 14, at 16.  
30  HOLMES & RHODES, supra note 21, at § 1.4. 
31  Nirenberg & Hoffman, supra note 14, at 11-12. 
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Based on this analysis, the authors posited: “[t]o facilitate a 
determination that a particular credit default swap is not insurance, the 
transaction should be structured so that payment to the protection buyer is 
not contingent on the protection buyer suffering a loss.”32 In other words, 
the authors recommended that CDS trades be structured so that they do not 
perform the same function as insurance.  
Most recently, a Fordham Journal of Corporate and Financial Law 
article argued in favor of the dissimilar treatment of CDSs and insurance.33 
The article argued that “CDS[s] are capital market products” and not 
insurance.34 In support of this theory, the author Robert F. Schwartz, 
outlined six propositions, at least one of which applies to any CDS trade.35 
The propositions are:  
 
1) [w]here a party enters into a contract for contingent recovery 
possessing no economic interest in protecting the covered property 
from loss or damage, the contract is not insurance;…2) [w]hen the 
contract for recovery fails to reference property that the purchasing 
party has economic incentive to protect from loss or damage, the 
contract is not insurance;…3) [w]hen recovery under a contract can 
be had without substantiating any actual loss or damage the 
contract is not insurance;…4) [w]here a party can recover under a 
contract an amount that exceeds expenses caused by loss or 
damage, the contract is not insurance;…5) [w]here a contract for 
recovery allows physical settlement, the contract is not 
insurance;…6) [w]here a contract for recovery provides for cross-
payment netting under a master agreement, the contract is not 
insurance.36 
 
Failure of one proposition is dispositive of the analysis; meaning the 
CDS contract involved is insurance.37 
The premise of these arguments is that the insurable interest and 
indemnity doctrines are defining characteristics of insurance contracts. This 
premise is incorrect. These doctrines are policy responses to the moral 
hazard that insurance contracts create. Though they have become defining 
                                                                                                                 
32  Id. at 16. 
33  See Schwartz, supra note 2, at 174. 
34  Id. 
35  Id. at 200-01. 
36  Id. 
37  Id. 
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characteristics of insurance in some contexts, distinguishing CDSs from 
insurance using these requirements is disingenuous and circuitous. Such 
reasoning fails to consider the origins of the doctrines and does not utilize 
the appropriate legal framework for evaluating the benefits and costs of the 
CDS market.  
To date, there has been little work discussing the problems with the 
arguments used to distinguish CDSs from insurance. University of North 
Carolina Law Professor Thomas Lee Hazen identified the similarity 
between early insurance contracts and certain derivatives in a paper 
published in 2005. He wrote: 
 
The insurable interest doctrine attempts to provide a basis for 
drawing the line with respect to insurance contracts that the law 
will tolerate. It is an imperfect measure at best. A significant 
problem is whether the insurance limitation is really meaningful 
without a comparable control of derivatives contracts? The 
derivatives markets may now offer a way around the insurable 
interest requirement, unless courts treat the contract in question as 
insurance rather than as a derivative investment. If the insurable 
interest requirement remains justifiable for insurance contracts, 
then there may be good reason to close the gap with respect to 
parallel derivatives transactions created by the [Commodities 
Futures Modernization Act of 2000]. It would appear appropriate 
to either rethink the insurable interest doctrine or attempt to import 
something comparable into derivatives regulation.38 
 
Hazen’s argument succinctly highlights the illogical distinction 
between CDSs and insurance, and the potential adverse consequences it 
may have. This article elaborates on the consequences of the double 
standard currently applied to CDSs and traditional insurance, and 
emphasizes the flaws of arguments against treating CDSs as insurance.39 
                                                                                                                 
38  Thomas Lee Hazen, Disparate Regulatory Schemes for Parallel Activities: 
Securities Regulation, Derivatives Regulation, Gambling, and Insurance, 24 ANN. REV. 
BANKING & FIN. L. 375, 426 (2005). 
39  Id. 
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C. THE IMPORTANCE OF A DISTINCTION  
The National Association of Insurance Commissioners40 (“NAIC”) 
published a Draft White Paper in 2003 arguing that weather derivatives 
should be treated similarly to insurance contracts.41 The study noted that 
businesses that accept risk transfers for a fee are generally known as 
insurers and the fee paid by the entity seeking to transfer risk is comparable 
to an insurance premium.42  The same reasoning arguably applies to CDSs, 
where coverage in the event of a default is traded in exchange for an 
upfront payment.  
The NAIC noted: “These weather derivatives and other ‘non-insurance’ 
products are primarily temperature protection coverages (heating and 
cooling degree days) that appear to be disguised as ‘non-insurance’ 
products to avoid being classified and regulated as insurance products. In 
fact, there is evidence that the promoters of these products go to great 
lengths to be sure that the energy companies involved do not use terms that 
naturally describe what is taking place—namely the transfer of risk from a 
business to another professional risk taker.”43 
The ISDA quickly responded to the draft white paper in a letter to the 
NAIC.44  The letter argued that because weather derivatives do not require 
a party to have an insurable interest they are not insurance.45 The ISDA did 
not analyze whether weather derivatives or other derivative products, such 
as CDSs, create sufficient moral hazard to necessitate requiring the 
application of the insurable interest or indemnity doctrines. The ISDA’s 
letter also stated that the “Draft White Paper’s logic could extend to a broad 
array of derivatives and would create substantial and disruptive regulatory 
uncertainty.”46 Such concerns are frequently expressed by the ISDA.   
                                                                                                                 
40  National Association of Insurance Commissioners, About the NAIC (2008), 
http://www.naic.org/index_about.htm. The National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners is the organization of insurance regulators for all 50 of the United States, 
Washington D.C., and five United States territories.  
41  PROP. AND CAS. INS. COMM., WEATHER FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS (TEMPERATURE): 
INSURANCE OR CAPITAL MARKET PRODUCTS? (Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs Draft White 
Paper, Sept. 2, 2003). 
42  Id. The NAIC included all contracts used to hedge or protect against weather 
related risk in defining weather derivatives. 
43  Id. 
44  Letter from Robert G. Pickel, Executive Dir. and CEO, ISDA, to Ernst N. Csiszar, 
President, NAIC and Robert Esson, Senior Manager, Global Ins. Mkts., NAIC (Feb. 23, 
2004) (on file with author). 
45  Id. 
46  Id at 2. 
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In 2006, the ISDA sent a similar letter to the United Kingdom’s Law 
Commission addressing the commission reevaluation of British insurance 
law. The letter concluded by stating:  
 
There is a range of possible outcomes to such a review. If the 
outcome is seen as differing materially from the current market 
consensus view, it could create very considerable uncertainty and 
damage the [credit derivatives] market itself. Conversely, if the 
outcome is not seen as differing materially from the current market 
consensus, its value will be low.  
 
In the circumstances, we do not consider that it would be desirable to 
proceed with a review in this area. However, should the Commission 
decide to proceed regardless, then it will be critical to ensure that there is 
extensive consultation at every stage of the review in order to minimize the 
risks to the smooth operation of the market.47 
CDS traders, as well as the derivative industry in general, have worked 
hard to keep government regulation from interfering with their market. The 
ISDA has been highly successful in standardizing derivative contracts and 
managing potential disputes that arise between parties to a trade.48  Given 
that its members include some of the most powerful financial institutions in 
the world–J.P. Morgan Chase, Goldman Sachs, Citigroup49- it is 
unsurprising that the industry’s efforts have been sufficient to keep 
government regulators at bay.50  
Classifying CDSs as insurance has numerous and substantive 
consequences.  CDS vendors would be required to obtain an insurance 
license. Further, those responsible for paying out upon the occurrence of a 
credit event would be subject to state insurance regulatory oversight 
regarding market operations and reserve requirements.51 These 
requirements would complicate the current free market system in which 
                                                                                                                 
47  Letter from Richard Metcalfe, Senior Policy Dir., ISDA, to Peter Tyldesley, Law 
Comm’n, U.K 2 (Apr. 18, 2006) (on file with author). 
48  See Sean M. Flanagan, The Rise of a Trade Association: Group Interactions 
Within the International Swaps and Derivatives Association, 6 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 211, 
229-34 (2001).  
49 ISDA Primary Members (Jul. 18, 2008), http://www.isda.org/membership/ 
isdamemberslist.pdf. 
50  See Flanagan, supra note 46, at 246.  
51  Nirenberg & Hoffman, supra note 14, at 8; PROP. AND CAS. INS. COMM., supra 
note 41.  
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CDSs are traded.52  Interestingly, had regulation been implemented from 
the beginning, much of the current uncertainty regarding the American 
financial system could have been avoided.53  This is because regulation 
would limit the amount of risk banks take on and state regulators would 
review CDS accounts to make sure sellers could meet their obligations.54  
Some argue that much of the ISDA’s work consists of convincing the 
world that derivatives’ approach to risk is wholly different from anything 
that has come before and that in truth, there are few if any differences from 
decades and centuries old financial products, such as insurance, securities 
and commodities futures.55 Such questions, however, are beyond the scope 
of this paper.  
Interestingly, insurance companies have also argued against the 
classification of CDSs as insurance.  In 2004, the Association of Financial 
Guarantee Insurers successfully lobbied New York State to create a 
statutory definition of CDSs.56 An amendment to the New York state 
Insurance Laws that went into effect October 19, 2004 declared: “the 
making of [a] credit default swap does not constitute the doing of an 
insurance business.”57 The statute is hardly a convincing analysis of the 
legal issues involved in such a statement; but it is effective nonetheless.  
 
                                                                                                                 
52  Insurance companies generally keep more cash on their balance sheets than banks. 
For a study of the differences see Richard Herring & Til Schuermann, Capital Regulation 
for Position Risk in Banks, Securities Firms, and Insurance Companies, in CAPITAL 
ADEQUACY BEYOND BASEL: BANKING, SECURITIES, AND INSURANCE 15 (Hal S. Scott ed., 
Oxford University Press 2005). Overall, the problem is that capital adequacy requirements 
for insurance companies and banks are calculated differently. One financial commentator 
put it succinctly when he said: “a dollar of risk in banking is not the same thing as a dollar 
of risk in insurance.” Martin Mayer, THE FED: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW THE WORLD’S 
MOST POWERFUL FINANCIAL INSTITUTION DRIVES THE MARKET 302-303 (The Free Press 
2001).     
53  See Jenny Anderson &Vikas Bajaj, A Wall Street Domino Theory, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 15, 2008, at A1.; Gretchen Morgenson, Arcane Market is Next to Face Big Credit Test, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2008, at A1. 
54  See Hazen, supra note 38, at 416. 
55  See HELENE RAINELLI & ISABELLE HUALT, OLD RISK, NEW MARKET: 
CONSTRUCTING THE OVER-THE-COUNTER FINANCIAL MARKET FOR CREDIT DERIVATIVES, 16, 
(Multilevel Governance Workshop Papers 2007). 
56  Letter from Bob Mackin, Executive Dir., Ass’n of Fin Guarantee Insurers, to 
George E. Pataki, Governor of the State of N.Y., (Jul. 15, 2004) (on file with author). 
57  N.Y. Ins. Law § 6901 (j-1) (2005 & Supp. 1 2008). 
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II.  THE PROBLEM 
 
The following examples are illustrative of the moral hazard created by 
CDSs.  This resulting moral hazard has the potential to create negative 
economic interests and destroy value.  
 
A. TOWER AUTOMOTIVE AND STRANGE BEHAVIOR 
 
Truck frame supplier Tower Automotive’s declaration of bankruptcy in 
2005 may have been caused by speculators interested in profiting on CDS 
positions.58 Unable to pass the rising costs of metals and other supplies 
onto car-makers, Tower fought the squeeze by turning to the credit markets 
for cash.59  Hedge funds bought Tower’s debt in May, 2004.60 By 
November, Tower needed more money. The hedge funds refused to 
provide approval for the necessary new loans. Without the additional loans 
Tower was forced to file under Chapter 11 two months later.61  Some 
bankers believe hedge funds purposely triggered the filing in order to 
collect on CDS positions.62 The monetary gain for doing so exceeded any 
potential profits from the loans to Tower and therefore outweighed any 
incentive to maintain those loans.63 “Many hedge funds play in a gray 
world,” said Henry Miller, a restructuring advisor quoted in The Journal 
article, “[t]hey sometimes do things to make their positions worth more, 
which can cause difficulty for others.”64      
Tower supports the proposition that a lender with a credit derivative 
position may have an incentive to force a default, regardless of costs or the 
impact on the value of underlying assets.65 Partnoy argues, that the lack of 
required disclosure in the derivatives market makes assessing the adverse 
impact of transactions difficult.66      
Moreover, Professors Henry T.C. Hu and Bernard Black, both of the 
University of Texas School of Law, describe investment positions that 
                                                                                                                 
58  Henny Sender, Hedge-Fund Lending to Distressed Firms Makes for Gray Rules 
and Rough Play, WALL ST. J., July 18, 2005, at C-1.  
59  Id. 
60  Id. 
61  Id. 
62  Id. 
63  Id. 
64  Id. 
65  Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 6, at 1034-35.  
66  Id at 1035. 
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increase in value if a reference entity’s credit risk rises or suffers a credit 
event, as “negative economic ownership.”67 They argue that the use of 
CDSs in conjunction with derivatives that allow speculators to purchase the 
temporary use of rights that come with ownership of securities without 
buying those underlying securities may allow the pushing of a company 
into bankruptcy to trigger larger payoffs on CDS contracts.68  
While Hu and Black acknowledge that lack of disclosure requirements 
in the CDS market makes it difficult to determine the extent to which this 
strategy is used, there is evidence that it is used. 69  For example, the market 
for CDSs refrencing certain firms has at times been up to ten times larger 
than the dollar amount of underlying debt.70 Moreover, CDS contracts have 
begun to require buyers to act in the interest of creditors.  This change in 
contract language suggests, according to Black and Hu, that buyers were 
not previously acting in the interest of creditors and might not do so in the 
future.  How this contract language is enforced without disclosure, 
however, remains unclear.71 Further, Black and Hu cite conversations with 
bankruptcy judges who say they sometimes see strange courtroom behavior 
by creditors.72 One judge “described a recent case wherein a junior creditor 
complained of too high a valuation being assigned to the bankruptcy estate, 
for reasons the creditor did not offer.”73  
B. SPURRING THE DECLINING HOUSING MARKET 
 
CDSs might be partly responsible for inflaming the downturn in the 
national housing market. There is evidence to suggest that left unregulated 
these derivatives create a disincentive for mortgage service providers to 
work out new agreements with homeowners as an alternative to 
foreclosure.   
In January 2008, Federal Reserve Chairman Benjamin S. Bernanke 
reported to the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on the Budget 
                                                                                                                 
67  Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, Equity and Debt Decoupling and Empty Voting 
II: Importance and Extensions, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 625, 637, 731 (2008). 
68  See id. at 730-732. Such a practice is commonly referred to as “equity or debt 
decoupling” depending upon the relevant market. “Equity or debt decoupling” include the 
full range of rights and obligations typically associated with shareholder status, but reduce a 
shareholder’s economic exposure. Id. at 631, 728.  
69  See id. at 732-33. 
70  Id. at 733 n.265. 
71  Id. at 733. 
72 Id.  
73  Id.  
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that the housing market had declined significantly over the last two years 
and that the rates of foreclosures have added to an already elevated 
inventory of unsold homes.74  “New home sales and housing starts have 
fallen by about half from their respective peaks,” he said.75 The 
consequences of this market’s decline, Bernanke continued, would 
continue to be a drag on the overall economy.76  
CDS contracts are often sold by the same banks that package and 
service mortgage-backed securities.77 This means that the banks 
responsible for evaluating the need for and organizing mortgage 
modifications to prevent foreclosures are the same institutions that would 
                                                                                                                 
74  The Economic Outlook: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Budget, 110th Cong. 
1 (2008) (testimony of Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman of the Federal Reserve), available at: 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/bernanke20080117a.htm. 
75  Id. 
76  Id.  
77  Understanding the causes of this decline means understanding how the mortgage 
industry changed over the last several decades. Beginning in the early 1970s mortgage 
securitization allowed homebuyers access to the bond market and the deep pools of capital 
that came with such access. See Christopher L. Peterson, Predatory Structured Finance, 28 
CARDOZO L. REV. 2185, 2198-2202 (2007). Whereas once mortgagors dealt only with the 
bank that held their debt, securitization turned banks into mere service providers. This shift 
changed the outlook of banks servicing these mortgages. Instead of profiting on income 
from mortgages, banks increasingly profited from fees derived from selling mortgage-
backed securities and other financial products related to those securities. Among the 
consequences of this change is the complication of a bank’s role as a mortgage service 
provider. Owning the debt allowed banks to modify mortgage contracts at will when 
payments were missed to prevent foreclosure. Such loan modifications are widely 
recognized as an important tool to keep economic downturns and the subsequent likelihood 
of late mortgage payments from turning a flood of foreclosures into a deluge that would 
speed a declining housing market. See Kurt Eggert, Comment on Michael A. Stegman et 
al.’s “Preventive Servicing is Good for Business and Affordable Homeownership Policy”: 
What Prevents Loan Modifications?, 18 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 279, 282, 284 (2007). 
Securitization of mortgages turned banks into trustees of mortgage-backed bonds, requiring 
approval from bondholders before mortgage adjustments, known as “workouts,” could be 
executed. The process of mortgage securitization also created such diversity in terms of 
ownership rights that getting requisite bondholder approval became impractical in many 
circumstances. At the same time, these workouts were not impossible. Id. at 287. Banks, 
acting as trustees, might still be inclined to make them if drops in housing prices became 
more than regional. A national drop in housing prices would defeat the risk mitigating 
effects of a bond backed by a geographically diverse group of mortgages and give a bank 
incentive to attempt to rescue the entire bond. Id. Depending on the precise terms of the 
Service and Pooling agreements that created the bonds, the calculus of whether or not to 
take the trouble to attempt adjustments begins with comparing the percentage of defaulting 
mortgages that are contributing to a bond’s revenue stream with the cost of an adjustment. 
See Hu & Black, supra note 66, at 730.  
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pay out a CDS contract in the event of foreclosure. Obviously, such a 
situation presents a significant conflict of interest for these banks.78   
In June of 2007, Bear Stearns, a major trader of both CDS contracts 
and mortgage-backed securities, was accused of having such conflicting 
interests.79 Hedge fund investors, like John Paulson, speculating on a drop 
in the housing market had purchased a large number of CDS contracts. 
These investors did not own any of the mortgage-backed securities to 
which the CDS contracts were tied.80 Bear Stearns found that it would owe 
more in CDS payments than it would lose by making mortgage adjustments 
to prevent foreclosures and the resulting bond defaults. Despite the 
transaction costs of organizing such adjustments - which include seeking 
approval from large numbers of disparate investors with differing interests 
the bank began the process. CDS holders cried foul, accusing Bear Stearns 
of market manipulation.81 The question, according to press reports, was 
what motivared Bear Stearns to renegotiate sub-prime loans and enter into 
what Paulson called “uneconomic transactions?”82 Was the brokerage firm 
trying to keep homeowners in their houses or save itself from CDS 
losses?83     
The consequences of the Bear Stearns incident could be dire, though 
they merit more research. Mortgage holders who might have been able to 
benefit from a mortgage reorganization with the bank lost that chance and 
watched their houses go into foreclosure. Sellers saw additional properties 
added to the glut of housing on the market, forcing prices further down. It 
is arguable that CDS contracts kept workouts, one of the potential failsafe 
mechanisms of the mortgage industry, from being executed. 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
78  See Eggert, supra note 76, at 290-91. 
79   See Gregory Zuckerman, Editorial, Trader Made Billions on Subprime; John 
Paulson Bet Big on Drop in Housing Values; Greenspan Gets a New Gig, Soros Does 
Lunch, WALL ST. J., Jan. 15, 2008, at A1; Saskia Scholtes, Editorial, Fears Over Helping 
Hand for Mortgage Defaulters, FIN. TIMES (London), May 31, 2007, at 1. 
80  Kate Kelly and Serena Ng, Editorial, The Sure Bet Turns Bad: Funds Howl as 
Bear Stearns Buys Mortgages, WALL ST. J., JUNE 7, 2007, at c3. 
81   Roddy Boyd, Editorial, Hedge Fund Bearish on Sub-Prime Relief, N.Y. Post, June 5, 
2007, at http://www.nypost.com/seven/06052007/business/hedge_fund_bear_ish_on_ 
subprime_relief_business_roddy_boyd.htm. 
82   Id. 
83   Id. 
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C. INVESTMENT BANKS: WINNING AND LOSING WITH CDSS 
 
The banks themselves may be profiting by betting against their own 
securitized mortgages through CDS. Moreover, CDS might have 
contributed to the stunning collapse of one of Wall Street’s most powerful 
investment banks.  
In 2007, Goldman Sachs, another major trader of both CDS and 
mortgage-backed securities, made $4 billion by betting that securities 
backed by home loans would fall in value.84 While making these bets, 
Goldman was also underwriting bonds backed by these mortgages. Did 
Goldman keep churning out troubled bonds with the knowledge that it 
would profit from their decline in value using CDS? 
In March of 2008, Bear Stearns finally succumbed to betting 
incorrectly on the housing market.85 The firm’s brokerage and hedge fund 
clients began withdrawing their accounts in droves as fear of Bear Stearn’s 
lack of liquidity began to spread.86 As a result, Bear Stearns, found itself in 
an increasingly precarious position.87 The firm ended up agreeing to sell 
itself for $2 (later raised to $10) per share to J.P. Morgan Chase in a deal 
organized by the Federal Reserve.88 Some traders speculate whether the 
clients withdrawing accounts from Bear Stearns used the CDS market to 
profit from the firm’s demise.89  A hedge fund betting heavily that Bear 
Stearns will fail has much less incentive to keep its business with Bear 
Stearns because withdrawing its business makes it more likely that its CDS 
will pay out.90  
Some reports also suggested that certain Bear Stearns bond holders 
planned to vote against allowing J.P. Morgan Chase to buy the troubled 
                                                                                                                 
84  Kate Kelly, Editorial, How Goldman Won Big on Mortgage Meltdown; A Team’s 
Bearish Bets Netted Firm Billions; A Nudge from the CFO, WALL ST. J., Dec. 14, 2007, at 
A1. 
85   Robin Sidel et al., Editorial, The Week That Shook Wall Street: Inside the Demise 
of Bear Stearns, WALL ST. J., Mar. 18, 2008, at A1. 
86   Id. See Zuckerman, supra note 78, at A1. 
87   See Sidel et al., supra note 82, at A1; Zuckerman, supra note 78, at A1.  
88  Sidel et al., supra note 82, at A1; Matthew Karnitschnig & David Enrich, 
Editorial, Bear’s Run-up Sets the Stage for Epic Clash; Speculators Ignite Rally, Driving 
Shares Up 23%; Disbelief on Deal Price, WALL ST. J., Mar. 19, 2008, at C1; Andrew Ross 
Sorkin, Editorial, JP Morgan Raises Bid for Bear Stearns to $10 per share, N.Y. Times, 
March 24, 2008. 
89   Gregory Zuckerman, Editorial, Hedge Funds, Once a Windfall, Contribute to 
Bear’s Downfall, WALL ST. J., Mar. 17, 2008, at C1. 
90  Id. 
258 CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 15:1 
 
firm, electing bankruptcy instead in order to allow CDS bets to pay off.91 
Why attempt to salvage value when what might be lost to bankruptcy is 
less than what will be gained from CDSs as a result of bankruptcy?   
D. MORAL HAZARD AND INSURANCE DOCTRINE 
 
Whether bankruptcies or foreclosures, the potential activities described 
in section C all deal with what economists call moral hazard. Moral hazard 
can be defined as activity that reduces incentives to protect against loss or 
minimize the cost of a loss.92 Financial products that transfer wealth in the 
event of a loss give the buyer an incentive to bring about that loss, often in 
spite of the societal costs.  A CDS potentially creates such an incentive or 
moral hazard since it creates awards when bad things –such as bankruptcies 
or foreclosures- happen. One way to think about developing policies to deal 
with that moral hazard is to evaluate the earliest methods. Those methods 
are found in the history of insurance law.    
The doctrine of insurable interest invalidates insurance contracts in 
which buyers have no interest in the insured entity. It was created to 
counter moral hazard. The preamble of England’s Marine Insurance Act of 
                                                                                                                 
91   Karnitschnig & Enrich, supra note 85, at C1.  
92   TOM BAKER, INSURANCE LAW AND POLICY 4 (Wolters Kluwer ed., Aspen 
Publishers 2d ed. 1959 (2008). Moral hazard is a term and an idea that grew out of the 
insurance business. See generally Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 
Tex. L. Rev. 237 (1996).  To price insurance contracts, insurers borrowed probability 
theory used to determine the complicated odds of the dice game known in 18th 
century England as “Hazard.” They applied this theory to vital statistics such as births, 
marriages, suicide, fires, storms, murder, sickness and calamity at sea. Similarly to 
predicting the outcome of a game of “Hazard,” the laws of large numbers allowed 
insurers to predict on the aggregate how often a ship would sink, a duke would die, or 
a house would be destroyed. The knowledge allowed insurers to sell their product at a 
price that would allow them to honor their commitments to customers, turn a profit 
and not go broke (at least most of the time). See id.. at 245, 247. Former University of 
Connecticut School of Law Professor Tom Baker adds writes that fire insurers 
distinguished among physical hazards in two senses of the word. “There were hazards 
that caused fires (for example, lightning, short circuits, spontaneous combustion),” he 
wrote, “and there were hazards that affected the probability or magnitude of loss by 
fire (for example, the type of construction or use of a building).” Id. at 248. Later, 
Baker continues, insurers began using the term “moral” to distinguish both of these 
types of “hazard” from incentive that caused amoral behavior resulting in loss.  Id.  at 
248. “[F]raud and interested carelessness were moral hazards that caused losses,” 
Baker explains, while “[b]ad character or habits, financial embarrassment, poor 
business practices and over-insurance were moral hazards that increased the 
probability of loss.” Id.. at 248-249. 
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1746, which first codified the insurable interest requirement for the 18th 
century British Empire, lists the concerns of the legislators that passed it. It 
reads:  
 
“WHEREAS, it hath been found by experience, that the 
making assurances, interest or no interest, or without further proof 
of interest than the policy, hath been productive of many pernicious 
practices, whereby great numbers of ships, with their cargoes, have 
either been fraudulently lost and destroyed, or taken by the enemy 
in time of war; and such assurances have encouraged the 
exportation of wooll, and the carrying on many other prohibited 
and clandestine trades, which by means of such assurances have 
been concealed, and the parties concerned secured from loss, as 
well to the diminution of the publick revenue, as to the great 
detriment of fair traders…”93 
 
Eighteenth Century British law is to a large extent the father of 
American common law and the doctrine of insurable interest is no 
exception. Nearly every state in the United States has codified insurable 
interest rules.94 However, precise requirements of the doctrine often vary 
from state to state.95  
Closely related to the insured interest doctrine is the principle of 
indemnity. Some argue that indemnity is an outgrowth of the insured 
                                                                                                                 
93  Marine Insurance Act, 1746, 19 Geo. 2, c. 37 (Eng.). 
94  CHRISTOPHER S. ARMSTRONG, AMERICA’S QUEST FOR A PROPER CONCEPT OF 
“INSURABLE INTEREST”: THE PERILS OF IGNORING THE IMPLICATIONS 3, (2002), 
http://www.rmstrnglaw.com/publications/Americas_%20Quest.pdf. 
95  Id.   
There are two basic theories used to articulate the insured interest doctrine: the 
legal interest test and the factual expectancy test.   American courts have generally 
recognized contract rights, property rights or legal liability to be insurable. See ROBERT H. 
JERRY & DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW 283 (LexisNexis 2007). 
Property rights of any nature and quality will usually meet the requirement. In evaluating 
insurable interest based on contractual rights, courts usually look for the possibility of 
economic loss resulting from a contractual breach. Those subject to liability in the event of 
property damage or tort are also considered to have an insurable interest. Id.. at 284-287.     
The factual expectancy test is arguably a more generous test of an insured interest. 
The test simply inquires into whether the purchaser of insurance can expect a loss if the 
insured reference entity ceases to exist or expects a profit if the insured entity continues to 
exist. Id.. at 289. 
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interest doctrine.96 Insurance aims to do nothing more than reimburse. The 
principle of indemnity merely states that a contract for insured property 
cannot return to the buyer more than his interest in that property is worth. If 
a buyer of insurance could collect more than the property is worth, that 
additional amount would not be based on an insurable interest and the 
moral hazard doctrine attempts to avert that which would not be fully 
mitigated.97 
                                                                                                                 
96  Daniel Dumas, Insurable Interest in Property Insurance Law, 18 R.D.U.S. 407, 
423 (1988); HOLMES & RHODES, supra note 21, at § 3.1 (“The indemnity principle is 
dependent upon and interconnected with the doctrine of insurable interest.”).  
97  Jerry & Richmond, supra note 92, at 277. 
The extent to which insurance doctrine focuses on insurable interest or indemnity 
differs from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and country to country. The United Kingdom’s Law 
Commission, a statutory independent body created by Parliament to review the law and 
recommend reform, is currently revaluating whether the insured interest doctrine is useful 
considering that the indemnity doctrine serves a similar purpose. See The Law Comm. & 
The Scot. Law Comm., Insurable Interest, Issue Paper 4 (2008), (available at 
http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/docs/Insurance_Contract_Law_Issues_Paper_4.pdf). 
 In reviewing the current status of the insurable interest and indemnity doctrine it is 
important not to mistake the changes regarding life insurance as changes that affect 
insurance in general. Many jurisdictions have done away with the insurable interest doctrine 
as necessary for collecting on a life insurance policy. See Annotation, Validity of assignment 
of life insurance policy to one who has no insurable interest in insured 30 A.L.R 2D 1310, 
1333. This change allows holders of life insurance to sell their policies before their death, 
allowing them to unlock much of the value they have paid into the policy. 30 A.L.R 2D at 
1339-1340. The creation of a secondary market for life insurance contracts has been deemed 
legal. See BAKER, supra note 89, at 235-246.  Also deemed legal is the controversial 
practice of employers taking out life insurance contracts on employees. Id. at 238-239. 
Courts evaluating this practice have ruled that the employers have an insurable interest in 
the lives of those who work for them. Id. at 238-239. Australia abandoned the insurable 
interest requirement for life insurance policies altogether in 1995 stating that the doctrine as 
a defense against moral hazard no longer holds sway. See The Law Comm. at 53-54. 
 Many of these changes are due to the differences between life insurance and other 
types of insurance. Life insurance is often not considered an indemnity contract because of 
the difficulty in valuing human life.  HOLMES & RHODES, supra note 21. Moreover, courts 
deemed the public interest in allowing life insurance policy-holders to collect on their 
contracts before death to meet their needs in life outweighed the moral hazard of a buyer of 
the policy profiting through murder. See 30 A.L. R. 2d at 1333, 1339. 
One recent argument against the insurable interest doctrine focuses on its use by 
insurers to invalidate contracts. See Jacob Loshin, Insurance Law’s Hapless Busybody:  A 
Case Against the Insurable Interest Requirement, 117 YALE L.J. 475, 479 (2007). This 
scholar argues that the insured interest doctrine harms consumers who rely on contracts they 
believe are valid but are later found void by courts using a definition for the doctrine that is 
“erratic, ambiguous and inconsistent.” Id. at 487. The author argues that doing away with a 
legal insurable interest requirement would create more incentive for insurance companies to 
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Another insurance doctrine that might also be considered an outgrowth 
of the insurable interest and indemnity doctrines is subrogation. This 
doctrine seeks to avoid unjust enrichment on the part of the insured by 
substituting the insurer in place of the insured in regard to some claim or 
right the insured has against a third party regarding the insured’s loss.98 
When an insurer asserts a subrogation right he is viewed as “standing in the 
shoes” of the insured.99 Application of the doctrine bars the insured from 
filing a claim on a loss and then seeking compensation on that loss through 
other means, such as a tort suit.100   
These doctrines still serve as legal efforts to ensure that insurance helps 
cushion the effects of existing risks and does not create new risks. If 
applied to CDSs, they would prevent the creation of the negative economic 
interests discussed and eliminate the potential profit from the destruction of 
value.        
 
III. FAILING TO MAKE A CONVINCING DISTINCTION 
 
Given the similarities between CDSs and traditional insurance and the 
context with which the insurable interest and indemnity principles are 
applied, it is appropriate to revaluate the arguments that CDSs are not 
insurance contracts. 
 
 
                                                                                                                          
investigate potential moral hazard and not write policies for buyers who are likely 
deliberately to bring about the event insured against. Id. at 506-508. 
It is also important to remember that the origins of insurable interest are also closely 
related to the 18th and 19th century legislative aversion to gambling in Anglo-Saxon 
countries and the insurance business’ interest in separating itself from gaming activities. The 
history is sufficient to argue - as some of the sources referenced above do- that preventing 
gambling was the chief aim of the implementation of insurable interest as a legal doctrine. 
For the purposes of this discussion, gambling is considered to be part of the group of moral 
hazard that the doctrine seeks to avoid. However, given the changes in much of society’s 
views on gambling it is arguable that the premises on which insurable interest is based is no 
longer valid. See Dumais, supra note 93 at 410-417.      
Despite the ways in which the insurable interest and indemnity doctrines have evolved 
in certain parts of the world and criticisms of them, they are both alive and well as legal 
principles that discourage the destruction of value in order to collect on a property insurance 
contract. 
98  HOLMES & RHODES, supra note 21, §3.1 at 334. 
99  Id. 
100  Id. at 335-36. 
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A. SCHWARTZ’ ARGUMENT 
 
Schwartz’ propositions apply the same reasoning applied in the Potts’ 
opinion and the advisory letter issued by the New York Department of 
Insurance.101 Therefore, challenging Schwartz’ propositions should also 
serve to challenge Potts and the New York Department of Insurance’s 
analysis. 
First, Schwartz argues that “[w]here a party enters a contract for 
contingent recovery possessing no economic interest in protecting the 
covered property from loss or damage, the contract is not insurance.”102  
Thus, according to Schwartz, CDSs should not be labeled insurance 
because there is no insurable or economic interest requirement with respect 
to CDS contracts.103 Insurance contracts, however, did not always require 
that the buyer possess an insurable or economic interest in protecting the 
covered property. Rather, the legislative and judicial intent in requiring 
insurable interest is to limit the moral hazard insurance contracts create.104 
A CDS creates the same kind of moral hazard and therefore should 
possibly be regulate as insurance. Using Schwartz’ reasoning, insurance 
contracts before the adoption of the insurable interest requirement were not 
insurance contracts. Therefore Schwartz’ first proposition does not prove 
CDS are not insurance. 
Secondly, Schwartz argues that “[w]hen the contract for recovery fails 
to reference property that the purchasing party has economic incentive to 
protect from loss or damage, the contract is not insurance.”105 Similar to the 
first proposition, Schwartz’s second proposition also seeks to define 
insurance using the insured interest doctrine. Schwartz acknowledges in 
discussing the second proposition that the insured interest doctrine is 
intended to mitigate moral hazard.106 CDSs allow buyers to speculate, 
according to Schwartz, whether or not they bear any risk related to the 
reference entity and consequently are not insurance.107  This feature of 
CDSs distinguishes it from insurance only in the sense that modern 
insurance law prevents using insurance contracts to create a negative 
economic interest in a given entity. As discussed in the preceeding 
                                                                                                                 
101  See Schwartz, supra note 2 at 200; see also supra text accompanying notes 21, 27. 
102  Schwartz, supra note 2, at 200. 
103  See id. at 189. 
104  Jerry & Richmond, supra note 92, at 276. 
105  Schwartz, supra note 2, at 200. 
106  See id. at 190. 
107  Id. 
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paragraph, this is simply a difference in how two types of contracts are 
regulated as opposed to a difference in the contracts themselves. Given the 
evidence that CDSs create moral hazard similar to early insurance 
contracts, policy makers should consider applying the same regulation to 
CDSs as applied to insurance.      
Third, Schwartz argues that “[w]hen recovery under a contract can be 
had without substantiating any actual loss or damage the contract is not 
insurance.”108  Therefore, according to Schwartz, a CDS is not insurance 
because a credit event triggering a payout to a CDS buyer does not have to 
constitute a loss on the part of the buyer.109 The indemnity doctrine was 
instituted to prevent using an insurance contract to create a negative 
economic interest in the insured entity. CDSs not being subject to this 
requirement does not mean CDSs are not insurance. It only means CDSs 
are not regulated the same way as a standard insurance contract. 
Fourth, Schwartz argues that where the party can recover an amount 
that exceeds expenses caused by loss or damage, the contract is not 
insurance.110  CDSs allow a buyer to recoup, upon the occurrence of a 
credit event, amounts that bear little or no relationship to the buyer’s loss. 
Consequently, Schwartz argues CDSs are not insurance.111 Again, this 
argument uses the indemnity doctrine to define insurance when indemnity 
is merely a form of regulation restraining the use of insurance.   
Fifth, Schwartz argues that where a contract for recovery allows 
physical settlement, the contract is not insurance.112  While insurance 
contracts usually result in the insurer paying the insured a cash amount 
based on the loss, parties to a CDS contract can designate either cash or 
physical settlement.113  The possibility of physical settlement, where the 
obligation provided by the buyer to the seller in exchange for the payout 
amount is different from the reference obligation, would not be allowed in 
a standard insurance contract.114  By collecting on an insurance contract, 
the insured often hands over to the insurance company any right attached to 
the entity he or she had insured. This transfer of rights is called 
                                                                                                                 
108  Id. at 200. 
109  See id. at 193. 
110  Id. at 200-01. 
111  Schwartz, supra note 2, at 193. 
112  Id. at 200-01. 
113  Id. at 194. 
114  Id. at 195. 
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subrogation.115  This difference means CDS cannot be defined as insurance, 
according to Schwartz.116  Again, Schwartz has identified a distinction in 
the contract’s legal treatment and not in the contract’s effects.  If a CDS 
contract creates similar effects as an insurance contract that is not subject to 
subrogation, then policy-makers must assess whether subrogation should 
apply to CDSs.  
Sixth, Schwartz argues that where a contract for recovery provides for 
cross-payment netting under a master agreement, the contract is not 
insurance.117 Under the ISDA Master Agreement, CDS trades between 
accounts can be netted, meaning that instead of working through each 
transaction, market participants can settle the net balance outstanding 
between them.118  This aspect of the CDS market is merely a testament to 
the success of the ISDA in organizing consensus among its members.  An 
insurance company might be able to achieve the same result if it deducted 
premiums owed by an insured on one policy from the amount the insured 
was scheduled to collect from a different policy. This last characteristic 
identified by Schwartz simply describes the manner in which an insurance 
exchange, unencumbered by the insured interest, indemnity or subrogation 
doctrines, might organize itself to achieve maximum efficiency. It is hardly 
a characteristic distinguishing CDS from insurance. 
 
B. NIRENBERG AND HOFFMAN’S ARGUMENT 
 
The analysis presented by Nirenberg and Hoffman, presents a more 
subtle argument. It utilizes Holmes’ three tests; (1) Substantial Control; (2) 
Principal Object; and (3) Regulatory Value to determine whether CDS 
should be classified as insurance.119 
Under the Substantial Control Test, insurance is any contract by which 
one contracting party (the insurer) for a valuable consideration (the 
premium) given by the other party (the insured) assumes the other party’s 
fortuitous risk of loss or liability and then distributes the risk or liability 
                                                                                                                 
115  See Subrogation Administration, What Subrogation?, http://www.subrogation.com/ 
what/main.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2008).   
116  Schwartz, supra note 2, at 201; See Subrogation Administration, What 
Subrogation?, http://www.subrogation.com/what/main.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2008).     
117  Id. at 200-01. 
118  Id. at 195-96. 
119  See infra text accompanying notes 103-107. 
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among a similarly situated group of parties pursuant to the same 
distribution plan.”120  
Applying this standard to CDSs, there is a contract (the CDS 
agreement) by which one contracting party (the seller) for valuable 
consideration (the contracted payment obligation) tendered by the other 
party (the buyer) assumes the other party’s risk of loss or liability (the 
reference security becoming substantially devalued or worthless).121  But, 
they continue, whether the risk of loss or liability is fortuitous depends on 
the facts and circumstances of the transaction.122  Similarly, they argue, 
distribution of the risk by the CDS seller among buyers does occur, but not 
always.123  Nirenberg and Hoffman conclude that CDSs being deemed 
insurance based on the substantial control test depends on the 
circumstances of the particular transaction.124 
The Principle Object Test inquires whether the elements of risk 
transference and distribution of a fortuitous insured event are central to and 
a relatively significant feature of the commercial transaction.125 Nirenberg 
and Hoffman again find that this determination varies between CDS 
transactions as one buyer might be buying to hedge risk, meaning he is 
buying insurance, whereas another might be buying to speculate, meaning 
he is not buying insurance.126 
The Regulatory Value Test inquires whether a particular commercial 
transaction should be regulated in the public interest.127 More specifically, 
the test makes the following inquiries: 1) What is the private interest sought 
to be protected in the commercial transaction? 2) Who is the party 
assuming the risk transferred and is the protected interest indigenous to that 
party? 3) Is the protected interest indigenous to the state and all its 
interests? 4) Does the value of the indigenous interest invoke the purposes 
and policies of state insurance regulation for all its citizens?128 
Nirenberg and Hoffman provide a similar answer to the first two 
inquires as Potts and Schwartz. They reason that because CDSs do conform 
to the requirements of the insurable interest and indemnity doctrines they 
                                                                                                                 
120  Nirenberg & Hoffman, supra note 14, at 11; HOLMES & RHODES, supra note 21, at 
§ 1.4.   
121  Nirenberg & Hoffman, supra note 14, at 12. 
122  Id. at 10, 12.   
123  Id. at 12 
124  Id. at 10, 12.   
125  Id at 11; HOLMES & RHODES, supra note 21, at § 1.4.   
126  Nirenberg & Hoffman, supra note 14, at 12-13. 
127  HOLMES & RHODES, supra note 21, at § 1.4.   
128  Id. 
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are not insurance.129 As argued above, this analysis is faulty as it 
distinguishes CDS from insurance based on its purpose rather its effects. In 
evaluating the second two inquiries, Nirenberg and Hoffman assume that 
CDSs “affect neither the health nor the safety of the public, nor any other 
interest indigenous to the state or its citizens.”130 As discussed in part two 
of this paper, there is evidence that CDSs create negative economic 
interests that give CDS buyers incentive to destroy value in the economy. 
Policy-makers decided to check similar incentives created by early 
insurance contracts and should think about doing so with regard to CDSs. 
CONCLUSION 
 
Arguments against recognizing CDSs as insurance fail to recognize the 
moral hazard created by CDSs.  These arguments disregard the purpose of 
the insured interest and indemnity doctrines. Therefore, the differential 
treatment of CDSs and insurance merits review by policy-makers.   
The moral hazard created by CDSs described above might only be 
potential. Dispositive evidence showing speculators destroy value to profit 
on CDS speculation has not been found. However, analysis of the issue is 
difficult due to a lack of disclosure requirements in the OTC derivatives 
market, through which CDSs are traded. Some argue that simply creating 
more disclosure rules would mitigate any potential moral hazard.131 An 
alternative or supplemental measure might be the application of an 
insurable interest or indemnity requirement.  
Given the similarities between an old problem (moral hazard in the 
early insurance market) and a potential new one (moral hazard in CDS 
markets), policy-makers must analyze the consequences of classifying 
CDSs as insurance for regulatory purposes. There are some strong 
arguments regarding the benefits of CDSs and the dangers of government 
regulation. 132 Given the immense size of the CDS market more research is 
needed. Moreover, given the similarities between CDSs and insurance, 
more emphasis should be placed on studying insurance law and policy in 
evaluating the future of CDSs.  
     
 
                                                                                                                 
129  Nirenberg & Hoffman, supra note 14, at 13-14. 
130  Nirenberg & Hoffman, supra note 14, at 15. 
131  Hu & Black, supra note 66, at 682 - 684. 
132  See Greenspan, supra note 19. 
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ABSTRACT 
 
This casenote addresses the history and potential problems of the 1986 
US-Bermuda Tax Treaty, which narrowly focuses on the taxation of 
insurance premiums. Since Bermuda itself has no income tax, this unequal 
treaty gives the island state an advantage over the USA. The original 
reasons for entering into such a treaty have been eliminated, and the lack of 
tax information and possibility of tax evasion from non-Bermuda residents 
present problems for the future of US-Bermuda relations. Renegotiation of 
the treaty may be a prudent idea, in order to remedy these problems and 
increase taxable incomes. Since Bermuda’s flexible environment for 
reinsurance and insurance is attractive globally, its market is a benefit to 
the United States, although US reinsurers are bound by higher taxes. 
However, domestic concern about Bermuda’s insurance industry include 
concerns about tax loopholes in acquisition and corporate inversion, attack 
by the IRS under §845(b), and overcharging. Various federal bills have 
been proposed to “level the playing field,” appealing for changes in state 
legislation on reinsurance may be the best idea to increase economic 
activity domestically.  
 
 
In 1986, Bermuda and the United States signed the United States-
Bermuda Tax Treaty.  This treaty is unique because unlike all other tax 
treaties it does not alleviate double taxation.  One of the major goals of tax 
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treaties is to alleviate double taxation for companies and individuals that 
pay taxes in multiple countries. Bermuda, however, does not tax income, 
thus no double taxation is possible.  Furthermore, unlike most treaties, the 
tax treaty is very narrow in scope - it covers only the taxation of insurance 
premiums.  Why should the United States have a narrow treaty with 
Bermuda?  The first part of the article will try to answer that question by 
providing an overview of the treaty and reviewing its legislative history.  
The second part of the article will discuss the insurance industry in 
Bermuda after treaty ratification, specifically the current problems the U.S. 
insurance industry faces as a result of the tax environment in Bermuda.   
 
PART I. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF UNITED STATES-
BERMUDA TAX TREATY 
 
A.   OVERVIEW OF THE UNITED STATES-BERMUDA TAX TREATY1 
 
Under certain circumstances, the United States-Bermuda Tax Treaty 
provides for relief from taxation of insurance business profits.  The 
business profits of a Bermudian insurance company will not be taxed in the 
United States unless a company has a permanent establishment2 in the 
                                                                                                                 
1  Convention Between the Government of the United States of America and the 
Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (On Behalf of the 
Government of Bermuda) Relating to the Taxation of Insurance Enterprises and Mutual 
Assistance in Tax Matters, U.S.-Berm., Jul. 11, 1986, T.I.A.S. No. 11,676 [hereinafter U.S.-
Bermuda Tax Treaty]; Treasury Department Technical Explanation of Bermuda Tax Treaty, 
TAX NOTES TODAY, Sept. 29, 1986, available at LEXIS, 86 TNT 195-12. 
2  A permanent establishment is defined as: 
 
[A] regular place of business through which the 
business of an enterprise of insurance is wholly or partly 
carried on. The term “permanent establishment” . . . 
include[s] especially a place of management, a branch, an 
office, and premises used as a sales outlet.  The term 
“permanent establishment” . . . also include[s] the 
furnishing of services, including consultancy, management, 
technical and supervisory services, within a Covered 
Jurisdiction by an enterprise of insurance through 
employees or other persons but only if:(a) activities of that 
nature continue within the Jurisdiction for a period or 
periods aggregating more than 90 days in a twelve-month 
period, provided that a permanent establishment shall not 
exist in any taxable year in which such services are 
rendered in that Jurisdiction for a period or periods 
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United States. The tax treaty also provides relief from Bermudian taxation 
to American insurance companies unless the companies have a permanent 
establishment in Bermuda.3   In practice, no relief from taxation is needed 
because Bermuda does not tax income.  
Even if an American insurance company has a permanent 
establishment in Bermuda, it will not incur an income tax in Bermuda.  
Thus, the relief from taxation is a concession by the United States, not 
Bermuda.  Furthermore, by agreeing to only tax a permanent establishment 
of a Bermudian insurance company, the United States provides a greater 
benefit to Bermuda-based companies than enjoyed by U.S.-based 
companies.  Under the regular U.S. Code, the business profits of a domestic 
insurance company are taxed when the insurer has a trade or business 
carried on in the United States and the business profits are effectively 
connected with the trade or business.4  In contrast, under the treaty, the 
business profits of a Bermudian insurance company are taxed by the United 
States when the insurer has a fixed place of business in the United States 
and the insurer’s income is attributable to that fixed place of business.5  
Thus, a Bermudian insurance company, unlike a U.S.-based company, has 
to be more than engaged in a trade or business in the United States before 
the United States can tax its business profits.  The difference in taxation 
between a U.S.-based company and a Bermuda-based company is due to 
the fact that foreign companies in the United States are taxed only on their 
source income (income earned in the United States), while domestic 
companies are taxed on a world-wide basis. 
The relief from taxation granted to Bermuda-based companies includes 
two exceptions. Relief is only granted if more than 50% of a resident 
company’s stock is owned by a U.S. citizen, a U.S. resident, or a Bermuda 
resident.  The purpose of the qualifying provision is to prevent treaty 
                                                                                                                          
aggregating less than 30 days in the taxable year; or (b) the 
services are performed within the Jurisdiction for an 
associated enterprise. 
 
 U.S.-Bermuda Tax Treaty, supra note 1, at art. 3. See also Treasury Department 
Technical Explanation of Bermuda Tax Treaty, TAX NOTES TODAY , Sept. 29, 1986, 
available at LEXIS, 86 TNT 195-12. 
3  U.S.-Bermuda Tax Treaty, supra note 1, at art. 4; Treasury Department Technical 
Explanation of Bermuda Tax Treaty, TAX NOTES TODAY , Sept. 29, 1986, available at 
LEXIS, 86 TNT 195-12. 
4  S. FOREIGN RELATIONS COMM., TAX CONVENTION WITH THE UNITED KINGDOM (ON 
BEHALF OF BERMUDA), S. REP. NO. 100-23, at 14-15 (1988). 
5  Id. at 15-16. 
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shopping.6  However, it is much lower than the qualifying provision under 
the 1981 United States Model Tax Treaty, which requires 75% of a 
company’s stock to be held by individuals in the country of residence.7  
The second exception which is also meant to prevent treaty shopping 
provides for no tax relief on resident’s income when a resident uses the 
income in substantial part to make distributions to people who are not U.S. 
citizens, U.S. residents or Bermuda residents.8  There is an exception to the 
exception – if there is substantial and regular trading on a public stock 
exchange, tax relief is allowed for companies where U.S. citizens, U.S. 
residents, or Bermuda residents own less than 50% of the stock.9  Thus, 
publicly traded companies satisfy the requirements for tax relief.  The 
treaty also contains a waiver of the U.S. excise tax.10  An excise tax is a tax 
imposed on insurance premiums paid to foreign insurers. 
The treaty also includes a savings clause and a nondiscrimination 
clause.  The savings clause allows the United States to reserve their right to 
tax their own residents and citizens as if the treaty was not in force.11  The 
savings clause is traditionally placed into tax treaties to ensure that the U.S. 
tax burden for U.S. residents and U.S. citizens is not unintentionally 
reduced.12  The nondiscrimination clause provides that neither country may 
                                                                                                                 
6  Treaty shopping is a tax avoidance strategy where a company that resides in a 
country without a treaty with the United States routes income through a jurisdiction with a 
favorable tax treaty with the United States.  Thus, the company receives tax benefits under 
the tax treaty to which it was not directly entitled.  AM. LAW INST., INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS 
OF UNITED STATES INCOME TAXATION II:  PROPOSALS ON UNITED STATES INCOME TAX 
TREATIES 150-151 (1992). 
7  U.S. Model Income Tax Convention, art. 16, ¶ 210.16, Jun. 16, 1981, 1 TAX 
TREATIES (CCH).  When the United States-Bermuda Tax Treaty was ratified, the 1981 
Model Tax Treaty was the most recent model tax treaty.  Subsequent model tax treaties have 
lowered the 75% threshold to 50% making them comparable to the U.S.-Bermuda Tax 
Treaty.  See U.S. Model Income Tax Convention, art. 22, ¶ 210.22Sep. 20, 1996, 1 TAX 
TREATIES (CCH); U.S. Model Income Tax Convention, art. 16, ¶ 209.16, Nov. 15, 2006, 1 
TAX TREATIES (CCH).    
8  U.S. Model Income Tax Convention, art. 16, ¶ 211.16,  Jun. 16, 1981, 1 TAX 
TREATIES (CCH).   
9  Id.   
10  The treaty is reciprocal.  Any benefit provided to Bermuda is also provided to 
United States.  Id. at ¶ 211.02.  Thus, in theory, there is also a waiver of Bermuda excise 
taxes on U.S. insurance premiums.  However, Bermuda does not have an excise tax.   
11  U.S.-Bermuda Tax Treaty, supra note 1, art. 4(1); Treasury Department Technical 
Explanation of Bermuda Tax Treaty, TAX NOTES TODAY, Sept. 29, 1986, available at 
LEXIS, 86 TNT 195-12. 
12  Ernest R. Larkins, U.S. Income Tax Treaties in Research and Planning:  A 
Primer, 18 VA. TAX REV. 133, 186-187 (1998).  
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tax a permanent establishment that is a resident of the other country less 
favorably than it taxes its own resident insurance entities that carry on the 
same activities.13  Therefore a Bermudian permanent establishment cannot 
be taxed more severely in the United States than a similar U.S. insurance 
company. 
The treaty also provides for mutual assistance on tax matters.  The 
purpose of a mutual assistance provision is to prevent or decrease tax 
avoidance.14  Bermuda agrees to aid United States and vice versa in tax 
information gathering.  In the past, Bermuda’s bank secrecy laws have 
proved to be an obstacle to enforcement efforts in cases involving U.S. 
persons with business dealings in Bermuda.  The agreement provides a 
comprehensive set of exchange of information rules.  The mutual assistance 
provision, however, is narrower in scope than the 1981 United States 
Model Tax Treaty.  For example, under the tax treaty, the exchange-of-
information rules are not effective for taxable years prior to 1977 for 
matters other than tax fraud or tax evasion.15  “Matters other than tax fraud 
and evasion” are defined as civil tax matters with the exception of civil 
fraud.16  Another limitation under the treaty is that Bermuda can refuse to 
provide documents that were created after the treaty went into force, if 
providing such documents causes a breach of confidentiality.17  
Confidential information is defined as information protected by Bermuda 
statutory and common law.18  The post-entry-into-force limitation does not 
apply when a document is created before the treaty went into force, but is 
still relevant after the treaty was ratified.19 
Congress ratified the treaty with two reservations. First, the waiver of 
the insurance excise tax was set to sunset on January 1, 1990.20  Second, 
the treaty permits the U.S. government to impose insurance excise taxes 
                                                                                                                 
13  U.S.-Bermuda Tax Treaty, supra note 1, art. 4(7); See also S. FOREIGN RELATIONS 
COMM., TAX CONVENTION WITH THE UNITED KINGDOM (ON BEHALF OF BERMUDA), supra 
note 4, at 20. 
14  Larkins, supra note 12, at 205. 
15  Testimony of Alan L. Fischl on Bermuda Tax Treaty Before Joint Tax Committee, 
TAX NOTES TODAY, Sept. 29, 1986, available at LEXIS, 86 TNT 195-7. 
16  Id. 
17  Id. 
18  Id. 
19  Id. 
20  Metzenbaum Amendment Kills Provisions in Barbados and Bermuda Tax Treaties 
to Waive Some Excise Taxes on Insurance Premiums, TAX NOTES TODAY, Oct. 14, 1988, 
available at LEXIS, 88 TNT 209-42. 
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unless future agreements explicitly override this provision.21  The purpose 
of the treaty amendments was to ensure that the waiver of the excise tax 
was temporary and would not be granted in the future without explicit 
intent to do so.22 
 
B.   WHY MAKE THE TREATY? 
 
Tax treaties remove impediments to international investment and to the 
free flow of capital generally.23  There are two purposes of a tax treaty:  to 
prevent tax avoidance and evasion and to reduce international double 
taxation. 24  Neither purpose was the primary reasons behind the United 
States-Bermuda Tax Treaty. 
The Bermuda government sought a tax treaty with the United States 
because the United States signed a tax treaty with Barbados.  Bermuda 
wanted similar benefits that Barbados received from the United States 
under the United States-Barbados tax treaty.  The United States-Barbados 
Tax Treaty eliminated U.S. excise tax imposed on insurance premiums paid 
to Barbadian insurers by including the U.S. excise tax in the “Taxes 
Covered” section of the tax treaty.25  The inclusion of the U.S. excise tax in 
the “Tax Covered” treaty section is not unusual as it is included in the 1981 
Model Tax Treaty, (the most recent model tax treaty at the time of the 
United States-Barbados Tax Treaty ratification) and subsequent model tax 
treaties.26   
An insurance excise tax is imposed on premiums which are not subject 
to net-basis taxation, but are attributable to U.S.-based risks.27  In other 
words, United States imposes an excise tax when a company that does not 
                                                                                                                 
21  Id. 
22  See infra Part I.B, for information on excise taxes. 
23  Testimony of Alan L. Fischl on Bermuda Tax Treaty Before Joint Tax Committee, 
supra note 15.   
24  Id. 
25  Convention Between Barbados and the United States of America for the 
Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes 
on Income, U.S.-Barb., art. 2.1.a, Dec. 31, 1984, T.I.A.S. No. 11,090. 
26  See U.S. Model Income Tax Convention, art. 2, ¶ 211.02, Jun. 16, 1981, 1 TAX 
TREATIES (CCH); U.S. Model Income Tax Convention, art. 2, ¶ 210.02, Sep. 20, 1996, 1 
TAX TREATIES (CCH) ; U.S. Model Income Tax Convention, art. 2, ¶ 209.02, Nov. 15, 2006, 
1 TAX TREATIES (CCH). 
27  U.S. DEP’T. OF TREASURY, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE EFFECT OF U.S. 
REINSURANCE CORPORATIONS OF THE WAVIER BY TREATY OF THE EXCISE TAX ON CERTAIN 
REINSURANCE PREMIUMS 7 (1990) [hereinafter Treasury Excise Tax Study]. 
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have a trade or business in the U.S. either insures or reinsures risks located 
in the United States.28  The purpose of the excise tax is to ensure that all 
premiums tied to risks located in the United States are taxed (in this way, 
while foreign insurers that insure U.S.-based risks have a U.S. trade or 
business are taxed on a net basis, foreign insurers that insure U.S.-based 
risks and do not have a U.S. trade or business are taxed via the excise 
tax).29 
Although, a waiver of the insurance excise tax has been included in 
treaties with countries such as the United Kingdom, France, and Italy,30 
Barbados was the first country to receive the waiver that did not itself have 
an excise tax on insurance premiums.  Thus, the waiver of tax was not 
needed to alleviate double taxation in Barbados.  The Treasury Department 
acknowledged that the waiver of the excise tax was an unintended effect of 
the Barbados treaty.31  Bermuda, a competitor of Barbados in the insurance 
industry, asked the United States to confer a similar benefit on it.  Alan 
Fischl, a Legislation Attorney, testified before the Joint Committee on 
Taxation during a hearing on the proposed United States-Bermuda Tax 
Treaty, that because Barbados and Bermuda were competing centers for 
insuring non-domestic risks, fairness would indicate that insurance-related 
treaty benefits granted to one country should be extended to the other.32    
The United States also believed that having a tax treaty with Bermuda 
would be beneficial for the United States-Bermuda diplomatic relations.  
During the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Bermuda Tax Treaty 
Hearing, Navy representatives spoke in a closed session on the security 
benefit of the treaty.33  Non-confidential security reasons for ratifying the 
United States-Bermuda Tax Treaty were discussed by James Medas, the 
Deputy Assistant Secretary for the European and Canadian Affairs in the 
Department of State.  He testified that there were strong security reasons 
                                                                                                                 
28  This is most apparent in reinsurance contracts, where a foreign reinsurer contracts 
to indemnify a portion of the insurer’s claims based in the U.S.   For reinsurance premiums, 
the rate of the excise tax is 1%.  I.R.C. § 4371 (2002). 
29  Treasury Excise Tax Study, supra note 27, at 7. 
30  Testimony of Mindy Pollack on Bermuda Tax Treaty Before Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee, TAX NOTES TODAY, Sept. 29, 1986, available at LEXIS, 86 TNT 195-
11. 
31  Testimony of Alan L. Fischl on Bermuda Tax Treaty Before Joint Tax Committee, 
supra note 15.   
32  Id. 
33  Senate Foreign Relations Committee Agenda for Bermuda Tax Treaty Hearing, 
TAX NOTES TODAY, Sept. 29, 1986, available at LEXIS, 86 TNT 195-8.  
274 CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 15:1 
 
for the United States-Bermuda Tax Treaty. 34  The military bases which 
occupy about 10% of the entire island provide an “an excellent vantage 
point to observe extremely vital areas of the Atlantic and in conjunction 
with bases in Iceland and the Azores make an indispensable contribution to 
our security.”35  J. Roger Mentz, the Assistant Secretary of the Tax Policy 
Department of the Treasury, agreed with the Department of State, stating 
that the important national security interest was a primary motivating factor 
leading to the negotiation of the United States-Bermuda Tax Treaty.36  He 
added that the uniqueness of the treaty is directly attributable to concerns 
over national security.37  Furthermore, Mentz stated before the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee that the treaty would be a major step towards 
establishing a network for exchange of tax information between the United 
States and the Caribbean.38   
Due to these reasons, in 1986 the Senate ratified the tax treaty.  The 
“indispensable contribution” Bermuda made to U.S. security in the mid-
1980s may be doubtful, however.  Less than a decade after the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee heard testimony from Medas and Mentz, a 
government report described the U.S. military bases in Bermuda as rest and 
relaxation oases for senior naval officials and their families.39   In 1995, 
President Clinton announced that the U.S. bases in Bermuda would close.40  
He cited the end of the Cold War, budget deficits, and the bases’ reputation 
of being a vacation location for naval officers as reasons for closing the 
bases in Bermuda.41  Thus, the claim that Bermuda represented a strong 
security interest in the mid-1980s is probably overstated. 
Even before the announcement that the U.S. naval bases in Bermuda 
would close, the tax treaty was not without controversy.  There were three 
                                                                                                                 
34  Testimony of James Medas on Bermuda Tax Treaty Before Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee, TAX NOTES TODAY, Sept. 29, 1986, available at LEXIS, 86 TNT 195-
9. 
35  Id. 
36  Mentz’s September 25, 1986 Statement to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
Concerning Bermuda Tax Treaty, TAX NOTES TODAY, Sept. 29, 1986, available at LEXIS, 
86 TNT 195-10. 
37  Id.  
38  Id.  
39  Frank J. Parker, Closing Bermuda’s U.S. Naval Bases, 22 REAL EST. ISSUES 28, 30 
(Aug. 1997).   
40  Id. at 29.   
41  Id. at 30 (emphasis added). 
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main criticisms of the treaty42 - (1) there was no need to enter into a treaty 
because there was no double taxation;43 (2) the exchange of information 
clause was not as comprehensive as that in other treaties;44 and (3) the 
Treasury Department should study whether the U.S. reinsurance companies 
are at a competitive disadvantage to foreign companies due to the waiver of 
excise taxes on insurance premiums before the United States ratifies the 
United States-Bermuda Tax Treaty.   
The last criticism was especially a concern for the Reinsurance 
Association of America (RAA).  The Assistant General Counsel of RAA, 
Mindy Pollack, commented on the impact the Bermuda treaty would have 
on the domestic reinsurance market.45  During her testimony before the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Pollack urged Congress to wait until 
the Treasury Department studied the impact of excise tax waivers on the 
domestic reinsurance market before ratifying the treaty.46  Subsequently, 
Congress passed a tax bill that required the Treasury Department to study 
the competitive effect of U.S. treaties on the U.S. reinsurance corporations’ 
in comparison to foreign reinsurance corporations when the treaties include 
a waiver of the excise tax on insurance premiums [hereinafter the Treasury 
Excise Tax Study].47  The Treasury planned to renegotiate the Bermuda 
treaty if the Treasury Excise Tax Study indicated that waivers of insurance 
excise taxes cause a disadvantage to U.S. companies.48   
Senator Dodd of Connecticut argued that instead of granting a benefit 
to other countries, the inadvertent mistake provided in the tax treaty with 
Barbados – the waiver of the insurance excise tax - should be deleted from 
                                                                                                                 
42  Rostenkowski Letter to Treasury Secretary Baker Regarding United States-
Bermuda Tax Treaty, TAX NOTES TODAY, July 22, 1986, available at LEXIS, 86 TNT 144-
5.  
43  In fact, the U.S. had never negotiated a treaty with a country that did not have 
income taxes.  Testimony of Alan L. Fischl on Bermuda Tax Treaty Before Joint Tax 
Committee, supra note 15. 
44  Bermuda can refuse to provide documents that were created after the treaty went 
into force if providing such documents causes a breach of confidentiality.  For discussion on 
the Exchange of Information Clause, see supra Part I.A. at 5-6.  
45  Testimony of Mindy Pollack on Bermuda Tax Treaty Before Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee, supra note 30. 
46  Id. 
47  Tax Reform Act 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1244, 100 Stat. 2085, 2581 (1986).  
For the Excise Tax Study, see infra text accompanying notes 57-61. 
48  Comments of Treasury Secretary Mentz on U.S.-Bermuda Tax Treaty, TAX NOTES 
TODAY, Oct. 6, 1986, available at LEXIS, 86 TNT 200-3. 
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the United States-Barbados Tax Treaty.49  Renegotiating the treaty would 
remove the competitive disadvantage currently facing the Bermudian 
insurance industry.50  The Treasury Department believed that renegotiating 
the treaty with Barbados less than a year after the ratification of the United 
States-Barbados Tax Treaty would impair American credibility as a treaty 
partner.51  The Barbados Ambassador to the United States, Peter Laurie, 
urged Congress to await the results of the Treasury Excise Tax Study to see 
whether a waiver of the excise tax on the insurance premiums places the 
United States at a disadvantage.52  The Barbados ambassador believed that 
agreements such as the United States-Barbados Tax Treaty provide 
successful examples of cooperation between the United States and 
countries in the Caribbean.53  He feared that renegotiating the tax treaty 
only a few months after it was ratified would be viewed as a lack of 
cooperation between the parties upsetting the relationship between the 
United States and countries in the Caribbean.54  On the other hand, Senator 
Dodd believed that placing Barbados and Bermuda on equal competitive 
positions by extending the excise tax waiver to Bermuda would only 
compound the problem because a waiver would only reduce U.S. tax 
revenue.55  Congress agreed with the Senator.  While ratifying the United 
States-Bermuda Tax Treaty in 1988, Congress passed legislation that 
sunset the waiver of the excise tax with respect to premiums paid or 
credited on or after January 1, 1990 in both Barbados and Bermuda.56   
The Treasury released the Treasury Excise Tax Study on the impact of 
the waiver of excise taxes on the domestic insurance market in March 
1990, after the excise tax on insurance premiums was reinstated in 
Bermuda and Barbados.57  The Treasury Excise Tax Study revealed that the 
                                                                                                                 
49  Sens. Byrd, Dodd, & Pell Urge Treasury to Renegotiate Barbados Treaty Rather 
than Altering Bermuda Treaty, TAX NOTES TODAY, Oct. 22, 1986, available at LEXIS, 86 
TNT 211-6. 
50  Id. 
51  Comments of Treasury Secretary Mentz on U.S.-Bermuda Tax Treaty, supra note 
48. 
52  Barbados Tells Senators that Renegotiating the U.S.-Barbados Tax Treaty Could 
Upset the U.S.-Caribbean Policy, TAX NOTES TODAY, Nov. 13, 1986, available at LEXIS, 
86 TNT 226-3. 
53  Id.  
54  Id.  
55  Sens. Byrd, Dodd, & Pell Urge Treasury to Renegotiate Barbados Treaty Rather 
than Altering Bermuda Treaty, supra note 49. 
56  Metzenbaum Amendment Kills Provisions in Barbados and Bermuda Tax Treaties 
to Waive Some Excise Taxes on Insurance Premiums, supra note 20. 
57  Treasury Excise Tax Study, supra note 27, at 1. 
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United States is at a slight disadvantage when it offers a waiver of 
insurance excise taxes to foreign jurisdictions which charge low or no tax 
on insurance premiums.58 The Treasury Excise Tax Study also pointed out 
that depending on the reinsurance market, the cost of the excise tax is 
passed down to U.S. consumers that pay the premiums.59  Thus, a waiver of 
the excise tax, although it might disadvantage domestic reinsurers, may 
actually provide a savings to U.S. consumers.60  The Treasury Excise Tax 
Study cautioned, however, that it did not factor in the various regulatory 
requirements and non-tax aspects affecting firms in foreign countries.61 
   
C.  WHAT TO DO WITH THE TREATY? 
 
The primary reasons motivating the United States and Bermuda to 
enter into a tax treaty no longer hold.  Bermuda wanted the waiver of the 
excise taxes on insurance premiums.  The waiver sunset two years after the 
treaty ratification.  The United States entered into the treaty due to a 
concern over security interests in Bermuda.  After the end of the Cold War 
and the closing of the naval bases in Bermuda, the strong security reasons 
no longer exist.  The only pertinent aspect of the treaty is the mutual 
assistance provision.  However as discussed in Part I.A, the provision is 
limited because it allows Bermuda to refuse to provide documents that 
were created after the treaty went into force, if providing such documents 
causes a breach of confidentiality.  
As Bermuda has a favorable tax environment, third parties may try to 
engage in tax evasion or tax avoidance in their resident country by 
transferring income to Bermuda.  The United States may try to renegotiate 
the treaty to receive better tax information.  Renegotiation, however, will 
not change the fact that Bermuda does not tax income.  The United States 
could terminate the treaty completely, sending the policy message that the 
United States will not make treaties with countries that do not tax.62   
Another possibility is to renegotiate the treaty so that Bermudian 
companies that are managed and controlled in the United States will be 
taxed (under the treaty only Bermudian companies that have a permanent 
                                                                                                                 
58  Id. at 3. 
59  Id. at 2. 
60  Id. 
61  Id. 
62  STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 110TH CONG., PRESENT LAW AND ANALYSIS 
RELATING TO SELECTED INTERNATIONAL TAX ISSUES 65 (Comm. Print 2007), 
http://www.house.gov/jct/x-85-07.pdf. 
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establishment in the United States are taxed).63  The “managed and 
controlled” test would greatly impact the taxation of captive insurance 
companies, which are domiciled in Bermuda due to Bermuda’s historic 
expertise and regulatory system, but are managed domestically.64  
However, it is politically infeasible to implement the “managed and 
controlled” test because the Internal Revenue Code uses the place of 
incorporation test to define residence.  Thus, implementing the “managed 
and controlled” test would require a change in legislation.  Furthermore, it 
would go against U.S. policy and past precedent.65  
Even if the United States-Bermuda Tax Treaty is terminated or 
renegotiated, companies could still circumvent tax laws.  Tax planners 
could aid companies to set up insurance entities in such a way that the 
companies do not have a permanent establishment or carry on trade or 
business in the United States, thus avoiding net income taxation.66   
According to the Joint Committee on Taxation, terminating the treaty 
would have little practical effect on the industry because reinsurance 
companies can organize in such a manner that they do not engage in a trade 
or business in the United States.67  Thus, the United States should try to 
renegotiate the treaty.  United States should seek a stronger mutual 
assistance provision and a change of how business profits of Bermudian 
entities are taxed in the United States.  A stronger mutual assistance 
provision that allows the United States access to confidential information 
from Bermuda would aid United States to track down and prosecute those 
companies and individuals that avoid or evade taxes.    
The treaty could also allow the United States to tax income of 
Bermudian insurance entities that have a trade or business in the United 
States.  U.S. taxation of foreign entities whose resident country does not 
                                                                                                                 
63  STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 109TH CONG., OPTIONS TO IMPROVE TAX 
COMPLIANCE AND REFORM TAX EXPENDITURES 180 (Comm. Print 2005), 
http://www.house.gov/jct/s-2-05.pdf; John Kelly, Note, Haven or Hell:  Securities Exchange 
Listing Standards and Other Proposed Reforms as a Disincentive for Corporate Inversion 
Transactions, 14 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 199, 201 (2004).   
64  A captive insurance company is a closely held insurance company that is 
controlled by its insureds.  TOWERS PERRIN, TILLINGHAST, CAPTIVE INSURANCE COMPANY 
GLOSSARY 3, (2004) 
http://www.towersperrin.com/tp/getwebcachedoc?webc=TILL/USA/2004/200409/Captive_I
nsurance_Company_Glossary.pdf. 
65  Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, For Haven’s Sake: Reflections on Inversion Transactions, 
27 TAX NOTES INT’L 225, 229 (2002). 
66  STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 62, at 13. 
67  Id. 
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have a tax treaty with the United States is based on a U.S. trade or business 
threshold.  This threshold provides a greater tax base than provided under 
the current tax treaty.  Under the United States-Bermuda Tax Treaty, the 
United States can only tax profits attributable to permanent establishments 
of Bermudian insurance companies.  A permanent establishment requires a 
company to have a fixed place of business in the United States, which is a 
higher threshold than requiring a company to have a trade or business in the 
United States.68  Although there is a concern that tax planners could even 
circumvent the “trade or business” requirement due to the nature of the 
insurance industry,69 it would still capture more taxable income than under 
the current permanent establishment standard.  Another way the United 
States could increase taxable income would be to tax profits earned from 
insuring U.S. risks by Bermudian companies.  The treaty could define 
taxable income from a permanent establishment as any income earned that 
is attributable to insuring US-based risks.  Thus, both domestic and 
Bermudian insurance companies would be taxed at the same rate for 
insuring US-based risks.  Bermuda may not agree to such a provision 
because it would greatly increase the tax burden of Bermudian companies. 
 
PART II.  POST-BERMUDA TAX TREATY RATIFICATION:  THE 
REINSURANCE INDUSTRY 
 
A.  BERMUDA’S INSURANCE INDUSTRY:  AN OVERVIEW 
 
Bermuda’s insurance industry is divided into insurance, making up 
35% of the industry, and reinsurance, making up 65% of the industry.70  
Half of all risks insured are of American origin and one third of all risks are 
of European origin.71  More than half (about 60%) of the policies sold in 
Bermuda are for property insurance and reinsurance.72  Most importantly, 
Bermuda is a major global center for reinsurance.73 
                                                                                                                 
68  See supra Part I.A; U.S.-Bermuda Tax Treaty, supra note 1, art. 3. 
69  Especially in reinsurance, a substantial transaction can be carried out without 
having a business location in the U.S.  Reinsurance Association Supports Increase in Excise 
Tax on Reinsurance Ceded to Foreign Reinsurers, TAX NOTES TODAY, Feb. 22, 1990, 
available at LEXIS, 90 TNT 41-47. 
70  Donald Kremer, Reinsurance Company CEO Testifies on Impact of Increased 
Taxes, TAX NOTES TODAY, Sept 27, 2007,  available at LEXIS, 2007 TNT 188-35 
[hereinafter Reinsurance Company CEO Testifies]. 
71  Id.  
72  Id. 
73  The other global reinsurance centers are New York, London, and Zurich.  Id.  
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Reinsurance is a type of insurance arrangement that transfers risk from 
an insurer to a reinsurer.74  The relationship between the reinsurer and the 
original insurer, known as the cedent, is contractual.75   
 Policyholders pay premiums to their primary insurer, and that insurer, 
as the reinsured, in turn pays to the reinsurer a certain percentage of those 
premiums as consideration.  Since the reinsurer does not incur the normal 
cost of writing primary insurance, such as administrative expenses and 
commissions paid to agents, the reinsurer can profitably reinsure the risks 
for only a percentage of the premiums paid to the primary insurer.76 
Furthermore, the reinsurer pays the original insurer, known as the 
cedent, a commission.77  The commission compensates the ceding company 
for its acquisition and operating costs.78  It also reflects the anticipated 
profitability of the business.79  Through reinsurance, insurance companies 
can insure a greater amount of risk, including risk that is less desirable, 
providing insurance to a greater number of customers.  The transfer of risk 
also helps make the coverage more affordable.80  Numerous  U.S. insurers 
cede more than half of their business to reinsurers.  Most of these reinsurers 
are domiciled abroad.81   
The Bermuda regulatory system allows companies, to form, license and 
start underwriting insurance in a matter of a few months.82  In the United 
States however, it is very hard to start up an insurance company because 
insurance is regulated by states, and each state has its own licensing 
requirements.83  Rules between states are often contradictory, and it is 
                                                                                                                 
74  BARRY R. OSTRAGER & MARY KAY VYSKOCIL, MODERN REINSURANCE LAW AND 
PRACTICE 1-4 (2d ed. 2000). 
75  Id. 
76  Bluewater Ins. Ltd. v. Balzano, 823 P.2d 1365, 1367 (Colo. 1992), quoted in 
BARRY R. OSTRAGER, supra note 74 at 1-1, 1-5.  
77  Reinsurance Company CEO Testifies, supra note 70. 
78  Id.  
79  Id.  
80  Id.   
81  For certain lines of insurance the proportion between foreign-based reinsurers and 
domestic reinsurers is even greater.  For example, two-thirds of all hurricane and earthquake 
reinsurance purchased by U.S. insurers is from foreign reinsurance companies.  Id. 
82  Id.; Forming a company in Bermuda imposes very little limitations.  There is 
limited case law that interprets the meaning and application of the major aspects of Bermuda 
corporate law.  As of 2002, Bermuda had 12,000 companies, most of which had no assets, 
personnel, operations, or substantial economic ties with Bermuda.  Orsolya Kun, Corporate 
Inversions:  The Interplay of Tax, Corporate, and Economic Implications, 29 DEL. J. CORP. 
L. 313, 346 (2004). 
83  Reinsurance Company CEO Testifies, supra note 70. 
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almost impossible to be licensed in all 50 states.84  Bermuda and 
Bermudian reinsurers, on the other hand, have a special expertise in 
providing reinsurance.85  Bermuda, unlike the United States, is not subject 
to regulatory price controls or coverage mandates.86  Capital is not trapped 
in “red tape” that limits the insurer’s ability to enter or exit various 
markets.87  Thus, Bermuda is a popular choice to purchase reinsurance 
from or form reinsurance companies.   
Bermuda also provides an utmost favorable environment for 
responding to insurance crises, where timeliness is essential.88  For 
example, in the mid-1980s, U.S. businesses faced a shortfall in liability 
insurance coverage.  At the time, it was the biggest insurance industry 
crisis of the 20th century.89  In reaction to the crisis, investors tried to form 
a new U.S. liability company called the American Slip.90   After three years 
of trying to start up a new insurance company, the effort was abandoned 
because the company failed to secure enough state licenses to conduct 
business on a national level.91   Meanwhile, Bermuda’s flexible regulatory 
environment allowed insurance companies ACE and XL to form in a matter 
of few months to provide specially crafted, excess liability insurance 
products to fulfill the need for liability insurance.92  Since the mid-1980s 
liability insurance market crisis, there have been three more crises which 
provided a wave of insurance company formations – Hurricane Andrew 
and the property insurance crises of 1992-1994; the 9/11 tragedy and the 
ensuing financial market turmoil in 2001-2002; and the insurance market 
crunch following Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma in 2005.93   
Bermuda’s insurance industry is beneficial to the U.S. insurance 
industry because it provides a favorable and readily available marketplace 
from which to purchase insurance and reinsurance policies. Over the years 
however, the domestic insurance industry has shown concern over the 
favorable tax environment Bermuda provides.  U.S. reinsurers are subject 
to much higher taxes than Bermuda-based reinsurers.  U.S. reinsurers pay 
income taxes on their premium investment income, while Bermudian 
                                                                                                                 
84  Id. 
85  Id. 
86  Id.  
87  Id.  
88  Id. 
89  Reinsurance Company CEO Testifies, supra note 70. 
90  Id.  
91  Id. 
92  Id.  
93  Id. 
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reinsurers are only subject to U.S. income taxes when they have a 
permanent establishment in the United States.  Only the income attributable 
to the permanent establishment is subject to the U.S. income tax.  Unless 
there is a permanent establishment in the United States, Bermuda-based 
reinsurers are only subject to the 1% excise tax on reinsurance premiums of 
U.S.-based risks.  Another concern is the tax avoidance transactions 
between a Bermuda-based reinsurer and its U.S.-based cedent when the 
two parties are related entities.  Domestic insurers believe that there is an 
industry-wide problem of non-arm’s length premium pricing and tax 
avoidance transactions between related entities.94  U.S. companies 
complain that the favorable tax treatment for Bermudian companies and 
potential for tax avoidance makes it hard to compete with Bermudian 
reinsurers.95   
 
B. DOMESTIC CONCERN OVER THE REINSURANCE INDUSTRY IN 
BERMUDA:  UNITED STATES TAX BASE EROSION 
 
The U.S. insurance companies, such as The Hartford, have shown 
concern over the tax practices in the reinsurance industry in Bermuda.96  
The first concern is reinsurers overcharging when providing reinsurance to 
a related entity.  A related insurer agrees to pay above market price for 
reinsurance because it routes income from a high-tax jurisdiction, the 
United States, to a no-tax jurisdiction, Bermuda.  Because the insurer and 
reinsurer are related entities, the income remains under control in the same 
economic family, while decreasing the amount of income subject to U.S. 
taxation.  Another concern is that a Bermudian reinsurer and its U.S. 
affiliate-cedent can scheme together in a tax avoidance plan where the 
transaction shifts income from the United States, a high-tax jurisdiction, to 
Bermuda, a no-tax jurisdiction, with minimal risk transfer.  Both of these 
practices would provide greater tax savings for Bermuda reinsurers that 
could provide a competitive advantage over the U.S.-based reinsurers.97  
The Bermuda reinsurance industry asserts that such concerns are 
                                                                                                                 
94  Jon Almeras and Ryan J. Donmoyer, Insurers Approach U.S. Congress to Fix 
Bermuda, 20 TAX NOTES INT’L 1388, 1390 (2000). 
95  See id. 
96  Id. at 1388. 
97  Ben Seessel, Comment, The Bermuda Reinsurance “Loophole” A Case Study of 
Tax Shelter and Tax Havens in the Globalizing Economy, 32 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 
541, 559-61 (2001). 
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unfounded due to the requirement under I.R.C. § 482 and I.R.C. § 845(b) 
that premiums be charged at arm’s length prices.98   
I.R.C. § 482 allows the Secretary of the Treasury to reallocate funds 
including gross income, deductions, credits, or allowances between 
companies that are owned and controlled by the same parent.99   The 
purpose of § 482 is to ensure that integrated businesses properly reflect 
income attributable to controlled transactions and to prevent tax avoidance 
regarding such transactions.100  The principal behind § 482 is the arm’s 
length standard – “[i]n determining the true taxable income of a controlled 
taxpayer, the standard to be applied in every case is that of a taxpayer 
dealing arm’s length with an uncontrolled taxpayer.”101  Some analysts of 
the Bermuda reinsurance industry believe that § 482 is not applicable to the 
reinsurance industry because insurance regulators require reinsurance 
premiums to reflect an arm’s length price.102  Thus, even if the reinsurer 
and the insurer are both owned by the same parent, the insurer would pay a 
reinsurance premium at a market price, as if it was a transaction between 
unrelated entities.  Since the insurance regulators require that reinsurance 
premiums be set at market prices, the taxable income of related insurers 
and reinsurers escapes § 482 scrutiny.103  U.S. insurers and their supporters, 
however, assert that despite the arm’s length requirement, reinsurance is 
still sold at non-market rates to related entities.104  Furthermore, they claim 
that § 482 does not provide adequate audit techniques to effectively police 
an industry-wide problem of undercharging premiums to related entities.105  
Section 845 (b) provides the Treasury Department authority to 
“reallocate items and make adjustments in reinsurance transactions to 
                                                                                                                 
98  Reinsurance Company CEO Testifies, supra note 70. 
99  I.R.C. § 482 (2002). 
100  I.R.C. § 482 (2002); Bermuda Triangle: Tax Havens, Treaties and U.S. P&C 
Insurance Competitiveness, TAX NOTES TODAY, January 8, 2002, available at LEXIS, 2002 
TNT 5-24 (2002).   
101 Bermuda Triangle: Tax Havens, Treaties and U.S. P&C Insurance Competitiveness, 
supra note 100 (internal quotations omitted). 
102  Seessel, supra note 97, at 559.   
103  U.S. Steel Corp. v. Comm’r, 617 F.2d 942, 947 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that if a 
taxpayer can show that the price he was charged would have been the same in an 
independent transaction with an unrelated party, then the taxpayer is free from § 482 
allocation despite evidence that suggests that the transaction has shifted tax liability among 
related entities); Lee A. Sheppard, Would Imputed Income Prevent Escape to Bermuda, 86 
TAX  NOTES 1663, 1664 (2000) (“Reinsurers charge the same as an unrelated comparable 
price, which is a winning argument under section 482”). 
104  Almeras, supra note 94, at 1389-90. 
105  Id. 
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prevent tax avoidance or evasion.”106  Reallocation can occur as a result of 
transaction of either related or unrelated parties.  Tax avoidance may occur 
when the tax benefits received from a transaction is disproportionate to the 
risk transferred between parties.107  For example, a Bermuda company in 
comparison to its domestic affiliate enjoys greater tax benefits because it 
pays no income taxes.108  Tax avoidance may occur when a transaction 
between a domestic insurer and its related Bermudian reinsurer transfers 
minimal risk but large amounts of income, in the form of a reinsurance 
premium.109  The overpayment of premium is a scheme to shift income 
from a high-tax jurisdiction to a no-tax jurisdiction.110  “Long-tail” reserves 
– insurance policies that incur claims long after the premium is paid – can 
also support a finding of tax avoidance because there is a potential for the 
reinsurer to earn significantly higher income from the long-term premium 
investment while incurring a small amount of risk.111   
The Tax Court, however, limited Section 845(b) in Trans City Life 
Insurance Company v. Commissioner.112  In Trans City Life Insurance Co., 
Trans City Life entered into a reinsurance agreement with Guardian Life, an 
unrelated entity, which ceded some of its insurance policies to Trans City 
Life.  As a result of this reinsurance agreement, Trans City Life qualified for 
a “small life insurance company deduction” under I.R.C. §806.113  The IRS, 
however, denied Trans City Life the deduction, concluding that the tax 
benefit was disproportionate to the risk transferred under the reinsurance 
agreement, causing a tax avoidance effect.114  In its analysis, the IRS 
compared the small risk fees incurred by Trans City Life under the 
reinsurance agreement to the tax savings claimed under the small life 
insurance company deduction.115  The Tax Court disagreed with IRS’s 
analysis.  The Tax Court claimed that the appropriate comparison is between 
the exposure of loss, which Trans City Life acquired under the reinsurance 
agreement with Guardian Life and the tax savings claimed under the 
                                                                                                                 
106  I.R.C. § 845(b) (2002); STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 62, at 21. 
107  Seessel, supra note 97, at 554. 
108  Id. at 555; Insurance companies make their profit on investing premiums that are 
received many years prior to a claim payment. 
109  Id. at 555.   
110  Id. at 544-46.   
111  Id. at 544. 
112  Tran City Life Ins. Co. v. Comm’r, 106 T.C. 274 (1996).   
113  Id. at 278.   
114  Id. at 276.   
115  Id.   
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deduction.116  The exposure of loss was measured by the difference between 
the face value of the reinsurance agreement and the loss reserves (the 
investment income) backing the reinsurance agreement.  Under that 
comparison, the Tax Court claimed that the risk incurred was not 
disproportionate to the tax savings.117    
Due to the Tax Court’s decision in Trans City Life Insurance Co., 
market-priced reinsurance agreements generally will not be subject to 
§845(b) attack.118  However, the IRS has officially refused to follow the 
Tax Court’s decision in Trans City Life Insurance Co. 119  Its non-
acquiescence is due to its disagreement with the Tax Court on the 
definition of risk.120  The Tax Court concluded that risk transfers exist 
when there is a possibility of loss.121  In contrast, the IRS concluded that no 
real risk transfer for tax purposes occurred between parties in a reinsurance 
agreement when the possibility of loss is remote to the reinsurer.122  Due to 
the IRS’ non-acquiescence, reinsurers may still be subject to attack by the 
IRS under §845(b).   
The third concern domestic insurers have over the Bermuda insurance 
industry is that companies are domiciled in Bermuda in order to avoid 
paying U.S. taxes all together.  Specifically, they argue that the U.S. tax 
code contains a “loophole” that allows for U.S. tax base erosion.  The 
“loophole” refers to a transaction that restructures U.S.-based insurance 
companies into Bermuda-based entities in order to avoid U.S. taxation.  
The “loophole,” also referred to as a corporate expatriation, has existed in 
the tax code for a long time, but was never used until 1999.123  The U.S. 
insurers have appealed to Congress to fix the “loophole” because it allows 
companies to move to Bermuda to avoid paying U.S. taxes.124  Reinsurers, 
however argue that they are not in Bermuda to avoid taxes, pointing out 
that they are subject to the U.S. excise tax on gross premiums regardless of 
                                                                                                                 
116  Id. at 308-310.   
117  Id. at 309.   
118  Seessel, supra note 97, at 557. 
119  Action on Decision CC-1997-011. 
120  Non-acquiescence is “an agency’s policy of declining to be bound by lower-court 
precedent that is contrary to the agency’s interpretation of its organic statute, but only until 
the Supreme Court has ruled on the issue.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1076 (8th ed. 2004). 
121  Tran City Life Ins. Co., 106 T.C. at 308-10.   
122  Id. at 310-11 
123  Bermuda Triangle: Tax Havens, Treaties and U.S. P&C Insurance 
Competitiveness, supra note 100 (internal quotations omitted). 
124  Almeras, supra note 94, at 1388.   
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whether they incur a net profit or a loss.125  Even while paying the excise 
tax, a Bermuda-based reinsurer is at a greater advantage than the U.S.-
based reinsurer because a Bermuda-based company can avoid paying U.S. 
taxes on the investment income. 
The “loophole,” which facilitates the tax advantage, covers two types 
of transactions – expatriation/inversion and acquisition.  The inversion 
occurs when a U.S.-based insurer reorganizes itself as a U.S. subsidiary of 
a Bermuda-based holding company.  Shareholders of the former U.S. 
parent company (now the U.S. affiliate) receive shares in the Bermudian 
corporation in exchange for their old shares of stock.126  Companies such as 
PXRE, Folks America Re, and Everest Re, have restructured to become a 
subsidiary of a Bermuda-domiciled holding company.127  SEC filings of 
companies that re-domesticate in Bermuda make it clear that the tax 
advantage was a major benefit.128   
There are three forms of inversions – stock inversions, asset inversions, 
and drop down inversions.129  Stock inversion transactions occur when a 
newly-formed foreign holding company purchases stock of the U.S.-based 
parent company and the U.S. parent becomes the subsidiary of the new 
foreign parent.130  The shareholders exchange their U.S. parent stock for 
new foreign parent stock.131  Asset inversion transaction occurs when a 
U.S. parent transfers its assets to a new foreign parent before being 
                                                                                                                 
125  Reinsurance Company CEO Testifies, supra note 70.  
126  Hale E. Sheppard, Fight or Flight of U.S.-Based Multinational Businesses:  
Analyzing the Causes for, Effects of, and Solutions to the Corporate Inversion Trend, 23 
NW. J. INT’L  L. & BUS. 551, 553 (2003).   
127  Bermuda-domiciled holding companies have been compared to “banks” with 
subsidiaries, where each subsidiary borrows from its “bank.” Reinsurance Company CEO 
Testifies, supra note 70. Under a bank-subsidiary scenario, there is a potential for earning 
stripping. Earning stripping is the practice of moving income from a high tax jurisdiction to 
a low or no-tax jurisdiction to avoid paying high taxes. It is achieved when a U.S. company 
makes a deductible interest payment to a foreign company. The net tax benefit will be the 
difference between the foreign tax imposed on the interest income and the U.S. tax saved by 
obtaining the deduction for interest expense. Kun, supra note 82, 338-9. Unlike earning 
stripping, reinsurance requires a true transfer of risk and an arm’s length premium price. 
Reinsurance Company CEO Testifies, supra note 70. Therefore, under a reinsurance 
agreement, a Bermuda-based holding reinsurance company does not engage in earning 
stripping. 
128  Bermuda Triangle:  Tax Havens, Treaties and U.S. P&C Insurance 
Competitiveness, supra note 100 (internal quotations omitted). 
129  Kelly, supra note 63, at 201.   
130  Id.   
131  Id.     
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liquidated.132  Shareholders exchange their stock of the U.S. parent for 
stock of the new foreign parent.133  The drop down transaction is a 
combination of stock inversion and asset inversion transactions.134 
An inversion is not a tax-free transaction.  Under I.R.C. §357, the 
offshore move is treated as a sale or exchange.135  Thus companies that are 
restructuring via a corporate inversion must recognize an unrealized gain 
on their assets.  The offshore move can be very costly, but that depends on 
the fair market value of the assets and the company’s adjusted basis in the 
assets.136  The inversion is most beneficial for smaller or new U.S. 
companies which want to reorganize under Bermuda law.137  U.S.-based 
long standing insurance companies cannot invert to Bermuda because they 
would be liable for billions of dollars in capital gains taxes.138   
The second aspect of the loophole is acquisition.  Acquisition works 
when a Bermuda based company buys a U.S. insurer.139  For example, 
ACE, a Bermuda-based company acquired Capital Re, a U.S. company.  If 
a U.S. company becomes a domestic subsidiary of a foreign company, by 
either inversion or acquisition, it is no longer subject to direct U.S. taxation 
on a residence basis.  Instead, direct investment income in the U.S. is 
subject to a 30% tax at the source, insurance premiums are subject to a 4% 
tax, and reinsurance premiums are subject to a 1%  tax.140  Tax avoidance 
occurs when a domestic affiliate reinsures a premium sold in this country to 
their off-shore parent.141  A foreign parent, unlike a U.S. parent, will not 
pay taxes on its investment income.  The Hartford, and other U.S.-based 
insurers are concerned about the unlevel playing field.142 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
132  Id.   
133  Id.   
134  Id. at 201-202. 
135  I.R.C. §357 (2002). 
136  Almeras, supra note 94, at 1388. 
137  Seessel, supra note 97, at 544.   
138  David Cay Johnston & Joseph B. Treaster, Insurers Want U.S. to Curb 
Competitors’ Fund Transfers to Bermuda, N.Y. TIMES (East Coast Late Edition), Sep 26, 
2007, at C4. 
139  Almeras, supra note 94, at 1388. 
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ILLUSTRATIONS OF CORPORATE INVERSIONS AND ACQUISITIONS 
 
 
INVERSION   
Country Scenario 1 Scenario 2a Scenario 2b 
United 
States 
U.S. Insurance Parent 
Company,  “ABC Co” 
U.S. Insurance Parent 
Company, “ABC Co” 
ABC RE Subsidiary, 
“ABC Co” 
Bermuda 
Unrelated Reinsurance 
Company, “Bermuda RE” 
ABC Co Subsidiary, 
“ABC RE” 
Bermuda Parent 
Company, “ABC 
RE” 
 
In Scenario 1, a U.S.-based insurance company contracts with an 
unrelated reinsurance company domiciled in Bermuda.  ABC Co pays 
Bermuda RE insurance premiums in exchange for Bermuda RE insuring 
part of ABC Co risks.  Because Bermuda RE is insuring risks located in the 
United States but does not have a trade or business in the United States, it 
does not pay the U.S. taxes on the investment income earned from the 
insurance premiums on a net basis.  Instead, it pays a 1% excise tax on the 
reinsurance premium received.   
In Scenario 2a, a U.S.-based insurance company sets up a reinsurance 
subsidiary in Bermuda.  ABC Co pays its own subsidiary ABC RE 
insurance premiums in exchange for reinsuring part of its risks. ABC Co 
forms a subsidiary in Bermuda for the sole purpose of facilitated the 
corporate inversion transaction.  Then ABC Co inverts itself (Scenario 2b) 
– ABC RE becomes the parent company and ABC Co becomes its 
subsidiary.  The corporate structure turns upside down - the foreign 
subsidiary becomes the parent and the parent becomes the subsidiary.  This 
results in the reinsurer being subject to only a 1% tax on the reinsurance 
premiums via the excise tax.   
 
 
 
ACQUISITION  
Country Scenario 1 Scenario 2 
United States 
U.S. Reinsurance Parent 
Company, “ABC RE” 
“Bermuda Insurance-ABC RE”  
(now with a Bermuda parent) 
Bermuda 
Unrelated Insurance Company, 
“Bermuda Insurance” 
Parent Insurance Company,  
“Bermuda Insurance” 
 
In an acquisition, a Bermuda insurance company which insures U.S.-
based risks contracts with a U.S. company to reinsurer part of its risk 
(scenario 1).  The U.S. reinsurance company pays a 30% direct tax on 
reinsurance premiums received for risks located in the United States.  In the 
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second scenario, the unrelated insurance company, purchases the U.S. 
reinsurance company.  The newly acquired U.S. reinsurance company is 
structured so that it is not a permanent establishment and thus completely 
escapes U.S. direct taxation.143  Similar to the inversion example above, the 
Bermuda-based company is only subject to the 1% excise tax on 
reinsurance premiums. 
Corporate inversions have been criticized as being “unpatriotic.”144  In 
response to criticism of corporate expatriations, as part of the Homeland 
Security Act of 2002, Congress forbade the Department of Homeland 
Security to contract with companies that have expatriated through a 
corporate inversion.145  The contract ban, however, generally does not 
extend to domestic subsidies of newly inverted entities.146  Thus, the 
Department of Homeland Security can still contract with an expatriated 
company as long as it contracts with the company’s domestic subsidiary.  
Furthermore, the statute is limited by three exceptions.  The statute allows a 
waiver of the contract ban if the waiver is required for the interest of 
security, if the waiver prevents the loss of jobs, or if the waiver prevents 
the Government from incurring additional costs. 147  After much criticism 
that the exceptions made the statute ineffective, Congress amended the 
statute by eliminating the “loss of jobs” and “additional costs” 
exceptions.148  The “interest in homeland security” exception remains in the 
statute. 149  Even with the amendment, the legislation has been criticized as 
primarily symbolic – a way for Congress to appear doing something 
without actually changing anything. 150  The Homeland Security Act has 
little, if any effect on an expatriated corporation’s ability to enter into 
government contracts because the Department of Homeland Security can 
                                                                                                                 
143  See discussion supra, Part I.A - business profits of a Bermudian company are 
exempted from U.S. taxation unless the Bermuda company has a Permanent Establishment 
in the U.S.  If there is a U.S.-based permanent establishment, the Bermuda Company will be 
taxed only on the business profits attributable to the permanent establishment (source-basis 
taxation). U.S.-Bermuda Tax Treaty, supra note 1, arts. 3-4. 
144  Michael S. Kirsch, The Congressional Response to Corporate Expatriations:  The 
Tension Between Symbols and Substance in the Taxation of Multinational Corporations, 24 
VA. TAX REV. 475, 482 (2005). 
145  Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 835, 116 Stat. 2135, 2227 
(2002) (codified as amended at 6 U.S.C. 395 (2003)), amended by Homeland Security Act 
Amendments of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-7, 101(2), 117 Stat. 526, 628 (2003). 
146  Kirsch, supra note 144, at 512-13. 
147  Id.  at 498. 
148  Id. 
149  Id. 
150  Id. at 511-12. 
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still contract with an expatriated company by either hiring a domestic 
subsidiary of the company or ruling the contract is in the best interest of 
homeland security.151   
Corporate inversions may also alter the brand image of a company.152  
For example a Connecticut based toolmaker, Stanley Works, rejected 
reincorporating in Bermuda because of public disapproval.153  Brand image 
concerns are unlikely, however, in the reinsurance industry because 
reinsurers do not directly deal with the end consumer, the policy holder.  
Most policy holders will never know if and by whom their policy has been 
reinsured.   
 
C. “LEVELING THE PLAYING FIELD” BETWEEN UNITED STATES 
AND BERMUDA INSURERS OR COMBATING THE UNITED 
STATES TAX BASE EROSION 
 
According to U.S. insurers, the favorable tax treatment in Bermuda 
makes it difficult for U.S.-based insurers to compete with Bermuda 
companies.  The Tax Reform Act of 1986 increased significantly the U.S. 
tax burden of domestic property and casualty reinsurers by requiring 
insurance companies to discount their loss reserve deductions.154  The 
legislation had no effect on foreign reinsurers, who continued to be subject 
to a 1% excise tax on premiums paid to reinsure U.S. risks.155  The problem 
was temporarily compounded by the United States-Bermuda treaty which 
for a short period of time waived the excise tax.156   
A more significant change since the Tax Reform Act of 1986 is the 
increase in corporate inversions – U.S. insurance companies becoming 
Bermuda-based companies and the formation of new Bermuda-based 
insurance companies which directly compete with U.S.-based insurers.  
Thus, the difference in tax treatment provides a great disadvantage for U.S. 
insurers, especially U.S.-based property and casualty insurers.  
Furthermore, U.S.-based companies are concerned about “sham” 
                                                                                                                 
151  Id. 
152  Victor Fleischer, Brand New Deal:  The Branding Effect of Corporate Deal 
Structures, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1581, 1582 (2006). 
153  Id. at 1582. 
154  Reinsurance Association of America’s Testimony at Ways and Means Hearing on 
Foreign Income Tax Bill, TAX NOTES TODAY, Jul. 23, 1992, available at LEXIS, 92 TNT 
150-102.  
155  Id.  
156  See supra Part I. 
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reinsurance companies, where transactions occur on a non-arm’s length 
price.   
Congress has debated how to level the playing field between domestic 
and foreign insurance companies.  The three major proposals are (1) to 
increase the excise tax, which is the only tax imposed on foreign reinsurers, 
(2) to subject reinsurance transactions between related entities to a greater 
tax, or (3) to tax the newly expatriated company as if it were still a 
domestic company. 
Proposed bill, H.R. 5270, which is supported by the domestic 
reinsurers and the RAA increases the excise tax of reinsurance 
premiums.157  Foreign companies which (re)insure risk located in the 
United States, but do not have a trade or business in the United States are 
subject to a 4% excise tax on insurance premiums and a 1% excise tax on 
reinsurance premiums.  The proposed bill would increase the reinsurance 
excise tax to 4% from 1%, to bring it up to par to the insurance premium 
excise tax.158  The RAA argues that the Tax Reform Act of 1986 
substantially increased taxes on domestic reinsurers, effectively creating a 
tax preference for non-resident foreign companies selling reinsurance to the 
U.S. market.159  Thus, the RAA concludes, an increase in the excise tax 
would neither disadvantage foreign competitors nor interfere with the 
international flow of reinsurance corporations.160  The Treasury Excise Tax 
Study,161 however, found that raising the excise tax from 1% to 4% would 
give U.S. companies a significant advantage over foreign companies that 
were located in high-tax jurisdictions, such as the United Kingdom and 
Germany.162  However increasing the excise tax to 4% would not offset the 
competitive advantage enjoyed by tax-haven-based reinsurers for long-tail 
lines of business.163   
                                                                                                                 
157  H.R. 5270, 102d Cong. (1992); Reinsurance Association of America’s Testimony 
at Ways and Means Hearing on Foreign Income Tax Bill, supra note 154. 
158  Reinsurance Association of America’s Testimony at Ways and Means Hearing on 
Foreign Income Tax Bill, supra note 154.  
159  Reinsurance Association Supports Increase in Excise Tax on Reinsurance Ceded 
to Foreign Reinsurers, supra note 69. 
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162  Treasury Excise Tax Study, supra note 27, at 3; Bermuda Triangle:  Tax Havens, 
Treaties and U.S. P&C Insurance Competitiveness, supra note 100 (internal quotations 
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163  Treasury Excise Tax Study, supra note 27, at 13-14; Bermuda Triangle:  Tax 
Havens, Treaties and U.S. P&C Insurance Competitiveness, supra note 100, 80-81 (internal 
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Unsurprisingly, foreign reinsurers oppose H.R. 5270.  An increase in 
the excise tax raises concerns over the diminishing economic stability in 
the Caribbean insurance industry.164  The Government of Barbados testified 
before the Ways and Means Committee during the hearing on H.R. 5270 
that a provision that increases the excise tax would hinder the U.S. 
domestic insurance market because the tax would make increase the cost of 
insurance in the United States and in turn make it more costly for U.S. 
firms to enter into alternative reinsurance markets.165  Barbados further 
argued that the excise tax provision is barred by the United States-Barbados 
treaty (and tax treaties with most other foreign countries) because it 
discriminates against premiums paid to persons in a foreign country as 
opposed to those paid to persons based in the United States.166  Not all 
differences in tax treatment between foreign and domestic entities, 
however, amount to improper discrimination.167  Discrimination only 
occurs when similarly situated entities are taxed differently.168  If two 
entities are not similarly situated, a difference in taxation does not result in 
discrimination.169  In this case, foreign reinsurers and domestic reinsurers 
are not similarly situated because domestic reinsurers are taxed on a world-
wide basis, while foreign reinsurers are not.170  Foreign reinsurers that have 
a U.S. trade or business are taxed on a source-basis, while foreign 
reinsurers that do not have a U.S. trade or business are taxed via the excise 
tax.171  As the tax base between domestic reinsurers and foreign reinsurers 
is different, a difference in taxation does not result in discrimination. 
Other proposed bills include H.R. 4192 and H.R. 1755.  These bills 
modify the tax code so that transactions between related entities are taxed 
higher than transactions between unrelated entities.  The 106th Congress 
                                                                                                                          
quotations omitted). A long-tail line of business refers to insurance coverage for a risk that 
is not realized until a significant time has passed.  An example of long-tail line of business is 
liability coverage for a company, which used asbestos in its product in the 1970s, but didn’t 
receive any claims until 1990s.  Another example is life insurance, where policy holders 
purchase insurance years prior to their death. 
164  Government of Barbados’ Testimony at Ways and Means Hearing on Foreign 
Income Tax Bill, TAX NOTES TODAY, Jul. 23, 1992, available at LEXIS, 92 TNT 150-103.   
165  Id.   
166  Id.   
167  Bermuda Triangle:  Tax Havens, Treaties and U.S. P&C Insurance 
Competitiveness, supra note 100 (internal quotations omitted). 
168  Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37, 56 (1920). 
169  Id. at 56, 57. 
170  Treasury Excise Tax Study, supra note 27, at 7. 
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proposed H.R. 4192, that provided for an amendment to §845.172  The bill 
proposed altering the treatment of a related-party reinsurer.  Thus, if a 
domestic person directly or indirectly reinsures a U.S. risk with a related 
foreign reinsurer (as opposed to an unrelated entity), then the investment 
income of the domestic insurer shall be increased and the domestic 
company will be subject to a greater tax.173  The proposed plan would not 
affect reinsurance arrangements between unrelated parties.174  This will 
impede an affiliated transaction whose purpose is to effectively move 
money from one entity to another within the same economic family.  The 
107th Congress proposed the Reinsurance Tax Equity Act of 2001 (H.R. 
1755).175   The proposed bill was an amendment to §832(b)(4).  The U.S. 
tax code allows a property and casualty insurance company to deduct 
reinsurance premiums paid from gross premiums written on insurance 
contracts during the taxable year.176   The amendment provides under 
certain circumstances a denial for the deduction of reinsurance premiums 
paid for direct or indirect reinsurance of U.S. risks with “related 
insurers.”177   Thus if an insurer pays a reinsurer which is also its 
subsidiary, the reinsurance premium, the insurer cannot deduct the amount 
when calculating its gross premium amount for tax purposes.    
The latest proposed bill is H.R. 3884, which amends §7701 in its 
treatment of foreign holding companies.178  If a domestic company through 
a corporate inversion becomes a foreign holding company, it will still be 
treated as a domestic company for tax purposes provided that after an 
inversion more than 80% of the company is still owned by former 
shareholders.179 
Although Congress has tried to level the playing field between U.S.-
based and Bermuda-based reinsurers, none of the proposed bills have 
become statute.  U.S. reinsurers should continue to lobby Congress for a 
legislative fix of tax avoidance in the reinsurance industry.  However, the 
                                                                                                                 
172  H.R. 4192, 106th Cong. (2000); STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 
62, at 56. 
173  H.R. 4192, 106th Cong. (2000); STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 
62, at 56. 
174  Almeras, supra note 94, at 1390.   
175  STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION,  supra note 62, at 56. 
176  H.R. 1755, 107th Cong. (2001); STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION,  supra note 
62 at 56.  
177  STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 62, at 56. 
178  H.R. 3884, 107th Cong. (2002); Preventing Corporate Inversions, TAX NOTES 
TODAY, Apr. 2, 2002, available at LEXIS, 2002 TNT 63-2. 
179  Preventing Corporate Inversions, supra note 178. 
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fix may be worse than the problem of tax avoidance because tax legislation 
may provide unintended tax disadvantages to legitimate reinsurance 
transactions.  Furthermore, legislation that impedes tax benefits enjoyed in 
other countries may send a negative message that more powerful countries 
such as the U.S. can dictate the tax policy of smaller and less powerful 
foreign jurisdictions.  
Another approach is for the U.S. reinsurance industry to pressure 
insurance regulators to ensure that reinsurance transactions are made under 
an arm’s length standard.  Furthermore, stricter insurance regulation 
practices may decrease the potential for “shell corporations” that try to 
operate as reinsurers.  An additional approach to limit “shell corporations” 
is for the Treasury Department to renegotiate the United States-Bermuda 
Tax Treaty to increase greater exchange of information (specifically access 
to confidential information from Bermuda).   
Lastly, U.S. reinsurers should try to form a favorable regulatory system 
domestically for reinsurance companies.  As insurance is regulated 
individually by each state, U.S. reinsurers may appeal to individual states 
to pass legislation favorable to reinsurance companies in exchange for an 
increase in economic activity in that state.   This is the best approach 
because states are always looking to bring in more business.  Moreover it 
would decrease the domestic insurers’ reliance on the reinsurance market in 
Bermuda. 
 
 
 
 
AFRICAN AMERICAN HOMEOWNERSHIP AND THE 
DREAM DEFERRED: A DISPARATE IMPACT ARGUMENT 
AGAINST THE USE OF CREDIT SCORES IN 
HOMEOWNERSHIP INSURANCE UNDERWRITING 
 
Latonia Williams* 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This casenote argues that African-American homeownership is 
disparately impacted by the discriminatory use of credit scores in 
homeowner insurance underwriting, asserting a violation of § 3604 of the 
Fair Housing Act and advocating Congressional action banning this 
practice. The history of the “American Dream” of homeownership has 
historically been denied to African-Americans as a result of discriminatory 
Federal Housing Administration (FHA) policies through homeowner’s 
insurance underwriting. While the 1950’s and 1960’s revised such blatantly 
racist policies, modern insurance underwriting practices have de facto 
replaced official policy, with similar disparate and disenfranchising results. 
Risk classification and methods of credit scoring used by insurance 
underwriters reinforce historically vulnerable positions of African-
Americans in society by denying them opportunities to become 
homeowners, a disparate discriminatory impact under the Fair Housing 
Act. Congressional action is therefore necessary to correct this impact and 
free African-Americans to achieve homeownership.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
“Housing is more than shelter; housing helps determine access 
to job networks, educational opportunities, and to the extent that 
homes are the largest assets most people have, financial security.”1 
                                                                                                                 
*  J.D. Candidate, University of Connecticut School of Law, 2009.  I am grateful to 
Professors Tom Baker, Karen Demeola, Bethany Berger, and Jon Bauer for their invaluable 
guidance and contributions to this Note.  I am also grateful to my family for their love and 
support.  
1  National Urban League Policy Institute, Fair Housing Fact Sheet, Apr. 30, 2007, 
http://www.nul.org/publications/policyinstitute/factsheet/2007-Fair-Housing-Fact-Sheet.pdf. 
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Many say homeownership is the key to the American Dream.  It 
represents what many work for in hopes of reaching a certain level of 
prosperity in their lives.  Probably more importantly, 
homeownership/landownership has always represented a level of power 
and prestige only held by few in the United States.  The importance of 
protecting private property has constantly been at the forefront of the 
discussion regarding rights of the citizens and the powers of government. 
The Fifth Amendment provides that no person shall, “be deprived of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. . . .”2  Thus, the 
resulting philosophy of property that supports the United States democratic 
system rests largely on the importance of individual liberties, limits on 
government power, and the right of the people to own property.  This broad 
notion of property has gone beyond tangible ownership of private property 
to include liberty interests and the limits on government intrusion on these 
interests.3  Effectively, property ownership creates, “a bundle of rights and 
relationships which give rise to entitlements….”4  However, along with 
creating rights, property ownership has also created a method of limiting 
the rights of minorities, specifically African Americans.   
Despite the end of legally-imposed segregation and the expansion of 
opportunities for African Americans, there continues to be discrimination 
in a broad range of social settings for Blacks.5  Given the history of slavery 
and segregation based on law and custom, research has documented that 
race-based discrimination has affected and continues to affect a broad 
range of social outcomes for African Americans.6   
Discrimination against Blacks in America originated with chattel 
slavery.  Specifically, for two and a half centuries, millions of Blacks were 
stripped of their lands, religions, cultural heritage and property to become 
the property of white slaveholders.7  Though slavery was formally 
abolished through the Civil War and the Reconstruction Amendments, the 
abolition “failed to eliminate the legal vestiges of racial oppression or 
redress the devastating consequences of slavery on those who had suffered 
                                                                                                                 
2  U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
3  Bruce A. Reznik, Property Rights in a Market Economy, ECONOMIC REFORM 
TODAY, 29-30 (1996), available at http://www.cipe.org/publications/ert/e19/E19_11.pdf. 
4  Id. 
5  A COMMON DESTINY: BLACKS AND AMERICAN SOCIETY (Gerald D. Jaynes & Robin 
M. Williams eds., 1989). 
6  Id.  
7  Kim Forde-Mazrui, Taking Conservatives Seriously: A Moral Justification for 
Affirmative Action and Reparations, 92 CAL. L. REV. 683, 742 (2004). 
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under its regime.”8  Instead, a system of laws was established that accorded 
Blacks very few rights.9  
In regards to housing, Black Americans were residentially segregated.  
Freedom for emancipated Blacks was severely restricted by “laws which 
imposed upon the colored race onerous disabilities and burdens, and 
curtailed their rights in the pursuit of life, liberty, and property to such an 
extent that their freedom was of little value.”10  
It was not until 1968 that Congress passed the Fair Housing Act, 
barring racial discrimination in the sale, rental, or financing of housing.11  
The effect of the Fair Housing Act should have been to end discrimination 
and unfair pricing in the housing market.  “However, despite the enactment 
of national antidiscrimination laws in the 1960s, Black Americans continue 
to experience social and economic disadvantage in significant 
disproportion to their numbers.”12  In fact, the social and economic 
condition of many poor Blacks is considered to have worsened in many 
respects as the twentieth century came to a close.13   
The question thus presents itself: how is it possible that African 
Americans continue to face disadvantages in housing when federal law 
prevents disparate treatment of Blacks in regards to housing?  The answer 
is clear.  Although there are many aspects of the law preventing the 
disparate and discriminatory treatment of African Americans, there is very 
little legal control over those things that have a disparate impact on African 
American homeownership.14   
This Note aims look into this issue.  Specifically, this note will focus 
on homeowners insurance and how risk-based pricing has created a 
disparate impact that effectively lessens African American homeownership.  
Whereas prior works have focused primarily on measuring racial disparities 
in pricing of homeowners insurance policies, here, I seek to demonstrate 
                                                                                                                 
8  Id. at 699.  Forde-Mazrui also notes that “[h]ad America prohibited all 
discrimination and provided the necessary resources and opportunities for the four million 
impoverished and illiterate former slaves to uplift their condition, the effects of slavery 
might well have dissipated by now.”  Id.  I disagree with this argument.  The effects of 
slavery are far reaching and are unlikely—in my opinion—to have been remedied by now, 
even with all possible resources. 
9  Id. at 700. 
10  Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 390 (1978) (quoting 
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872)). 
11  42 U.S.C. § 3601-3619. 
12  Forde-Mazrui, supra note 7, at 695. 
13  Id. at 703-04. 
14  The disparities relating to this issue will be discussed in more detail infra Part III. 
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how such pricing has structurally prevented African Americans from 
reaching the American Dream of homeownership. 
Because of the importance of the home to individual net worth, 
discrimination involving homeownership is one of the most damaging 
forms of inequity.15  “[M]ost conservatives accept or are willing to assume 
a causal connection between black disadvantage and past 
discrimination…”16  but fail to recognize the role that present disadvantage 
plays a role in the failure of the African American to reach the American 
Dream.  This Note seeks to show the ways that contemporary risk-based 
home insurance pricing feeds off this history to continue to impede African 
American homeownership.   
Part I examines the American Dream and its significance.  Part I will 
conclude with why housing is the single strongest representation of the 
Dream.  Part II will look at the African American fight to attain the Dream.  
The section will look at the history of housing discrimination in the United 
States and how the effect of such discrimination has withstood time.   
Part III will evaluate how risk based pricing—although not overtly 
discriminatory—has a disparate discriminatory effect on African 
Americans.  This section will look more in depth into what exactly are the 
standards for homeowner’s premium pricing and how statistics show that 
credit based pricing has a disparate impact on African Americans.  Part IV 
addresses the standards of a disparate impact argument under the Fair 
Housing Act.  Part IV will also argue that disparate impact claims against 
the use of credit scores in insurance underwriting can affectively be 
brought under § 3604 of the Fair Housing Act.  Lastly, Part V will argue 
that there should be Congressional action banning the use of credit scoring 
in insurance pricing. 
 
BACKGROUND 
 
A HISTORY OF THE DREAM IN THE UNITED STATES 
 
The concept of the American Dream is one that encompasses an ideal 
of success and achievement.  The term itself was coined in 1931 by James 
                                                                                                                 
15  National Urban League Policy Institute, supra note 1. 
16   Forde-Mazrui, supra note 7, at 706. 
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Truslow Adams.17  In his text, The Epic of America, Adams defines the 
American Dream as:  
 
that dream of a land in which life should be better and richer 
and fuller for everyone, with opportunity for each according to 
ability or achievement. It is a difficult dream for the European 
upper classes to interpret adequately, and too many of us ourselves 
have grown weary and mistrustful of it. It is not a dream of motor 
cars and high wages merely, but a dream of social order in which 
each man and each woman shall be able to attain to the fullest 
stature of which they are innately capable, and be recognized by 
others for what they are, regardless of the fortuitous circumstances 
of birth or position.18  
 
As Adams notes, the idea of attaining the Dream is based on an ideal of 
merit and achievement.  It focuses on the ideology that individuals are able 
to attain success in their lives through hard work and dedication.     
 
DEFINING THE AMERICAN DREAM 
 
Notwithstanding the fact that the term “American Dream” was coined 
in the early1930’s, the idea of the Dream had a much earlier beginning.  
The American Dream dates back to the European settlers of the sixteenth 
century and is historically rooted in the idea of the United States as a “new 
nation of immigrants.”19  With the colonial settlements came the dream of 
fulfillment, individual freedom, and the chance to succeed in the New 
World.20   
Historical documents show a clear history of the pursuit of the Dream.  
The Declaration of Independence states that: 
 
[w]hen in the Course of human events it becomes necessary for 
one people to dissolve the political bands which have connected 
them with another and to assume among the powers of the earth, 
the separate and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and of 
                                                                                                                 
17 LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, What is the American Dream?, 
http://memory.loc.gov/learn/lessons/97/dream/thedream.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2008). 
18  JAMES TRUSLOW ADAMS, THE EPIC OF AMERICA 214-15 (1931). 
19  STEPHEN J. MCNAMEE & ROBERT K. MILLER JR., THE MERITOCRACY MYTH 2 
(2004). 
20  Id. 
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Nature’s God entitle them, a decent respect to the opinions of 
mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel 
them to the separation.  We hold these truths to be self-evident, that 
all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator 
with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty 
and the pursuit of Happiness.21 
 
The phrase “pursuit of happiness” has become synonymous with the 
American Dream,22 and the idea of immigrating to the United States in 
hopes of having an equal chance to succeed as determined by individual 
merit and hard work. 23  However, the idea of the American Dream has 
since been broadened by some to include native-born Americans in its 
definition.24   
Although the origin of the American Dream is clear, there has never 
been one set definition as to what it really means to obtain the Dream.  In 
fact, the Dream is much more clearly understood as a set of ideals that have 
been able to shift with the times.  Obtaining the American Dream has 
transformed from being defined generally through success and achievement 
to a more precise definition that involves the attainment of specific 
representations of achievement.25  It has even been argued that when most 
speak of the American Dream today, they mean “buying a big house, 
driving an expensive automobile, and making a lot of money.”26 
The strongest example of the transformation of the perception of 
achievement is the connection of the American Dream to obtaining wealth.  
Wealth is defined as an individual’s economic value in the form of material 
possessions and resources.  Differing from income, wealth represents 
                                                                                                                 
21  THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1-2 (U.S. 1776) (emphasis added). 
22  See JIM CULLEN, THE AMERICAN DREAM: A SHORT HISTORY OF AN IDEA THAT 
SHAPED A NATION 38 (2003). 
23  See MCNAMEE & MILLER, supra note 19, at 4. 
24  There are some who believe that the concept of achieving the American Dream 
only fits into the context of immigrating to America.  This Note does not take this 
standpoint and instead looks at the American Dream as something that is pursued by both 
immigrants to the United States and native born Americans.   
25  “Whereas the American Dream was once equated with certain principles of 
freedom, it is now equated with things. The American Dream has undergone a 
metamorphosis from principles to materialism.”  Today’s American Dream, 2007, available 
at http://www.todaysamericandream.com. (quoting JOHN E. NESTLER, THE AMERICAN 
DREAM (1973)). 
26  Id. 
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financial resources and the ownership and control of those resources.27  
Because wealth entertains the elements of ownership and control and it 
serves as a form of social mobility,28  it is understandable why wealth 
would be a representation of achieving the American Dream.  “[W]ealth 
allows families to secure advantages….” 29   
 
THE DREAM AND HOMEOWNERSHIP 
 
It is the law of property that controls the distribution of wealth 
in society; consequently, there must be the most intimate relation 
between that society’s economic and social characteristics and the 
rules, practices and institutions of its property law.30 
 
To many, the United States is “a nation of homeowners.”31  The quote 
above illustrates that fitting squarely with the concept of wealth as a 
representation of achieving the American Dream is the concept of property 
ownership; specifically homeownership.  Property and the ideals of 
property ownership—one of the strongest identifiers of wealth32—have had 
a long history in the United States.  Home equity represents the largest 
reservoir of wealth among America’s middle class.33  However, the 
                                                                                                                 
27  Thomas M. Shapiro, Race, Homeownership and Wealth, 20 WASH. U. J.L. & 
POL’Y 53, 53-54 (2006). 
28  Id. at 56. 
29    “Like the American Dream broadly construed, 
this one of the good life exists in a series of variations.  The 
most common form was cast in the form of commercial 
success.  For hundreds of years, American readers and 
writers have had tireless appetites for tales of poor boys 
(and, later, girls) who, with nothing but pluck and 
ingenuity, created financial empires that towered over the 
national imagination….”. 
 Id. at 55.  See also, CULLEN, supra note 22, at 59-60.   
30  JOHN CHRISTMAN, THE MYTH OF PROPERTY: TOWARD EGALITARIAN THEORY OF 
OWNERSHIP 28 (1994) (quoting John Henry Merryman). 
31  Florence Wagman Roisman, Teaching About Inequality, Race, and Property, 46 
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 665, 668-69 (2002). 
32  Shapiro, supra note 27, at 54. 
33  See id. at 59 (noting that “home wealth accounts for 60% of the total wealth 
among America’s middleclass.”).  See also U.N. COMM. ON THE ELIMINATION OF RACIAL 
DISCRIMINATION [CERD], Residential Segregation and Housing Discrimination in the 
United States: Violation of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination, ¶ 34, (Dec. 2007) (prepared by Micheal B. de Leeuw, et al.) (available at 
ww2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cerd/docs/ngos/usa/USHRN27.pdf). 
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connection of the American Dream with homeownership did not come 
about until the mid twentieth century.34  In fact, it is said that the 
correlation of homeownership with achieving the American Dream and 
social success was promoted by realtors.35  Whether or not this association 
was something that was created by realtors, it is clear that it has stuck in the 
minds of Americans.   
The creation of this “nation of homeowners” was very highly promoted 
by government policy.36  In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, barely 
forty-five percent of the United States housing units were owner-
occupied.37   During this period, owning a home was something primarily 
for the “relatively well-to-do.”38  It was not until the 1930’s and the New 
Deal that agencies such as the Home Owners Loan Corporation (“HOLC”), 
39 the Federal Housing Association (“FHA”),40 and the Veteran’s 
Administration (“VA”)41 began to facilitate and encourage broader 
homeownership.    
These programs opened doors for more White individuals to own 
homes in the United States and helped to create the middle class.42  
Unfortunately, “these same policies and practices left the African-
American community behind at the starting gate.”43  This had the effect of 
freezing many African Americans out of “the greatest wealth building 
opportunities in American history.”44   
 
                                                                                                                 
34  JEFFREY M. HORNSTEIN, A NATION OF REALTORS: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF THE 
TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICAN MIDDLE CLASS 202-03 (2005). 
35  Id. at 203.   
36  Wagman Roisman, supra note 31, at 675-76. 
37  Id. at 676. 
38  Id.  
39  HOLC’s primary purpose was to refinance homes to prevent foreclosure.  It was 
usually used to extend loans from shorter, expensive payments of 15 year loans to lower 
payments of 30 year loans.  See generally,  Alan S. Binder, From the New Deal,A Way Out A 
Mess, N.Y. Times, Feb. 24,2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/24/business/ 
24view.html?pagewanted=print (last visted November 22, 2008). 
40  FHA is a federal agency formed as part of the National Housing Act of 1934. Its 
goals were to improve housing standards and conditions; to provide an adequate home 
financing system through insurance of mortgage loans; and to stabilize the mortgage market.  
See generally U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, What is the Federal 
Housing Adminsitration?, http://www.hud.gov/offices/hsg/fhahistory.cfm (last visited 
November 22, 2008). 
41  Wagman Roisman, supra note 31, at 676. 
42  Shapiro, supra note 27, at 67-68. 
43  Id. at 68. 
44  Id. at 67. 
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THE AFRICAN AMERICAN FIGHT FOR THE DREAM  
 
THE ISSUE: HOUSING POLICIES WITH CLEAR DISCRIMINATORY 
TREATMENT 
 
FHA and “Racial Homogeneity” 
 
As was expected, many of these governmental policies to increase 
homeownership were very color restricted; especially that of the FHA.45  In 
fact, the FHA’s Underwriting Manual specifically instructed that the 
presence of “inharmonious racial or nationality groups” made a 
neighborhood’s housing undesirable for insurance and explicitly 
recommended racially restrictive covenants.46  One portion of the manual 
notes that, “‘if a neighborhood is to retain stability, it is necessary that 
properties shall continue to be occupied by the same social and racial 
classes . . . .”‘47  Policies such as this made it clear that racial minorities 
were not the groups aimed at gaining a benefit from the newly created 
federal programs.  As Florence Wagman Roisman notes in her article 
Teaching About Inequality, Race and Property, 
FHA adopted a racial policy that could well have been culled from the 
Nuremberg laws.  From its inception FHA set itself up as the protector of 
the all white neighborhood. It sent its agents into the field to keep Negroes 
and other minorities from buying houses in white neighborhoods.  FHA 
“not only insisted on social and racial ‘homogeneity’ in all of its projects as 
the price of insurance but became the vanguard of white supremacy and 
racial purity--in the North as well as the South.48 
The federal policies put into place to assist potential buyers in 
obtaining homeownership can be contrasted with public housing program 
that came just a few years later.  In 1937, the United States Housing Act of 
1937 was enacted.49  This represented the origins of what is now know as 
public housing.50  The purpose of the U.S. Housing Act was to provide 
                                                                                                                 
45  See U.N. COMM. ON THE ELIMINATION OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION [CERD], supra 
note 33, at ¶ 5. 
46  Wagman Roisman, supra note 31, at 677 (quoting KENNETH T. JACKSON, 
CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBORDINATION OF THE UNITED STATES 208 (1985)). 
47  Id. at 677-78. 
48  Id. at 678 (footnotes omitted). 
49  Codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1437 to 1437bbb-8 (2000). 
50  Paul R. Lusignan, Public Housing in the United States,1933-1949 1 CULTURAL 
RESOURCE MGMT. 36, 37, available at http://crm.cr.nps.gov/archive/25-01/25-01-16.pdf.  
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affordable housing to the urban poor.51  However, in effect, the government 
created a two-tiered housing policy that held very strong racial 
correlations.52  Blacks were kept out of homeownership and thus forced 
into public housing.  As Wagman Roisman notes, “the two ‘tiers held racial 
significance; the upper tier nourished a growing, virtually all-white 
constituency while public housing struggled to support primarily a 
fragment of the minority community with which it became identified.’” 53 
 
Homeowners Insurance Underwriters and “ the Immoral Blacks” 
 
Along with the FHA’s discriminatory practices and the birth of public 
housing, the push to deny housing to African Americans was also prevalent 
in regards to homeowners insurance.  Insurance in America dates back as 
far as the 1790s.54  Discriminatory underwriting unfortunately also dates 
back this far. 55  As noted by Brian Glenn in his article Shifting the Rhetoric 
of Insurance Denial, 
 
[o]ne insurance textbook noted that the underwriter’s job was 
made easier by the risk report that contained information “as to the 
applicant’s racial descent . . . and it must be specifically stated 
whether he is Anglo-Saxon, Greek, Hebrew, Italian, Negro, or of 
other racial or national origin.”  Knowing the applicant’s 
nationality, one can only suppose, provided the underwriter with 
useful information about whether or not the applicant was a good 
                                                                                                                 
51  Id. 
[L]ocal public housing authorities were given primary 
responsibility for initiating, designing, building, and 
operating their own housing projects, while the newly 
created United States Housing Authority (USHA) provided 
program direction, financial support, and technical and 
design assistance. With these new federal funding 
mechanisms and policies in place, the USHA spurred local 
public housing authorities to construct more than 370 
projects, which housed nearly 120,000 families at a cost of 
approximately $540 million.   
.  
52  Wagman Roisman, supra note 31, at 676.  See also U.N. COMM. ON THE 
ELIMINATION OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION [CERD], supra note 33, at ¶¶ 8-9. 
53  Wagman Roisman, supra note 31, at 676. 
54  See Brian J. Glenn, The Shifting Rhetoric of Insurance Denial, 34 LAW & SOC’Y 
REV. 779, 781 (2000).   
55  See id. at 789-90. 
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risk . . . . Data on lynchings was used to show that immorality [of 
Blacks] was on the increase, and since immorality led to increase 
in illness, it was clear that slavery was much better for the health of 
the black man than freedom.  With blacks, attempts at education 
were a waste of time, since decades of freedom had only proved 
that the race was incorrigible. 56 
 
Such texts—many of which were available at the time—had a goal of 
proving that African Americans were uninsurable and could not be insured 
under the risk pools of Whites.57 
 
THE RESOLUTION: ANTI-DISCRIMINATORY TREATMENT LAWS 
 
It took a great deal of advocating to gain even simple strides in the 
direction of equal opportunity in homeownership for African Americans.58   
In 1949, it was announced that FHA would refuse to issue mortgage 
insurance on properties “bound by racially restrictive covenants recorded 
after February 15, 1950.”59   However, the FHA took many actions that 
showed a contrasting intent.  For example, FHA’s executive board made 
sure to note that “it should be made entirely clear that violation [of the new 
rules] would not invalidate insurance.”60  Along with FHA’s refusal was 
refusal by some administrations to help facilitate the reduction of housing 
disparities between Blacks and Whites.  “President Truman rejected a 
request that he ‘bar FHA aid to any segregated housing . . . .’  [Similarly,] 
the Eisenhower Administration . . . reject[ed] . . . demands that FHA 
require open occupancy in its insured projects . . . .”61   
These discriminatory practices in housing were seen until President 
Kennedy’s Executive Order 11063 in 1962 and the 1968 Fair Housing 
Act.62  Nevertheless, by the early 1970s, a large gap was already visible.  
Eleven million Americans had purchased dwellings because of FHA and 
VA financing.63  Almost all of those millions of loans went to Whites and 
                                                                                                                 
56  See id. at 789-90 (citations omitted).   
57  Id. at 791.   
58  See Wagman Roisman, supra note 31, at 679-681. 
59  Id. at 679. 
60  Id. at 679-80.   
61  Id. at 680 (internal citation omitted).   
62  Id. at 680-81; See Exec. Order No. 11,063, 27 Fed. Reg. 11527 (Nov. 20, 1962); 
See also 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq.   
63  Id. at 681. 
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were only available to Whites.64   It is estimated that less than two percent 
of the housing financed with federal mortgage assistance was available to 
African Americans.65 
In regards to insurance, by the late 19th century, many states had made 
it illegal to charge higher rates based on race.66  With the illegality of risk 
classifications based on race, insurers had to find other ways to classify 
groups.  Thus began the “actuarial science” of risk classification that is said 
to statistically prove a person’s insurance risk.  
Even with the change in FHA models and insurance risk classifying, 
the effect of the years of discriminatory treatment was apparent.  Whites 
continued to climb the social ladder in regards to wealth and African 
Americans were forced to stay behind, effectively depriving them of the 
advantages of particular homes and property appreciation and excluding 
them from suburban areas.67  Contrastingly, the public support provided by 
the FHA and VA allowed “whites who previously lacked the means to 
remove themselves to racially homogeneous communities to do so.”68  
Moreover, the homes purchased by Whites with this FHA and VA helped 
to provide an invaluable opportunity for wealth appreciation. 69 
Whites witnessed the values of their homes increase considerably, 
especially during the 1970s when housing prices tripled.70  Correlatively, 
those African Americans who had been barred from the housing market by 
FHA policies and later sought to become first-time homebuyers faced 
rising housing costs that curtailed their ability to purchase the kind of home 
they desired. 71  The effects of this can still be seen today.  Although the 
African American homeownership rates have increased, the disparities 
continue to show the effects of the past.  
Along with the clear economic and homeownership effects, there have 
also been damaging social effects tied to these housing disparities.  The 
African American identity has effectively become a reflection of stigma 
regarding dense and overcrowded urban areas.  Research on implicit bias 
and cultural stereotyping suggests that Americans hold persistent beliefs 
linking African Americans and other disadvantaged minority groups to 
                                                                                                                 
64  Id.  
65  Id.  
66  Glenn, supra note 54, at 791.   
67  Wagman Roisman, supra note 31, at 681. 
68  Id. 
69  Id. at 682. 
70  Id. 
71  Id. 
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many social images, including but not limited to crime, violence, disorder, 
welfare, and undesirability as neighbors.72  The identity of the urban city 
and public housing has been transformed into a collective stigma affecting 
the Blacks living in these cities.  This negative cultural stereotyping has 
been shown to account for White Americans’ widespread unwillingness to 
share residential space with Blacks and other minority groups.73  Somehow, 
crime, poverty, and welfare have become equated more so with the 
minority groups negatively affected by them than with the public housing 
system that perpetuated them in the first place.   
 
A NEW FORM OF DISCRIMINATION: INSURANCE 
UNDERWRITING AND THE DISPARATE IMPACT ARGUMENT 
 
The below 2007 report of homeownership by race created by the 
National Urban League illustrates that homeownership rates in the African 
American community are extremely low as compared to that of Whites.   
74 
                                                                                                                 
72  Robert J. Sampson & Stephen W. Raudenbush, Seeing Disorder: Neighborhood 
Stigma and the Social Construction of “Broken Windows”, 67 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 319, 320 
(2004). 
73  Id. at 321. 
74  Nat’l Urban League Pol’y Inst., supra note 1.  In 2006, the national 
homeownership rate was 68.8%. However, the homeownership rate of Blacks was 47.9%, 
which is staggeringly low as compared to that of Whites who have a homeownership rate of 
75.8%.  Id.  What may be even more notable is that as of the time this data was collected, 
Blacks have the lowest homeownership rate of all races within the United States. See U.S. 
CENSUS BUREAU, HOMEOWNERSHIP RATES BY RACE AND ETHNICITY OF HOUSEHOLDER: 1994 to 
2006 (2006), available at http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/hvs/annual06/ 
ann06t20.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2008). 
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Despite Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 ( the Fair Housing 
Act),75 Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 76  Executive Order 
11063,77 and many other state and federal laws that prevent housing 
discrimination, there is still a clear racial inequality in regards to 
homeownership.78  In 2006, the African American homeownership rate was 
47.9% while the White homeownership rate continued to be above 75%.79  
This staggering disparity cannot and should not be solely attributed to past 
discrimination. 
In looking to closing the homeownership gap with the intent of closing 
the wealth gap between African Americans and Whites, discriminatory 
institutional patterns must also be considered.80  One such clear pattern 
concerns insurance underwriting.   Because of the role insurance plays in 
an individual’s ability to obtain a mortgage—thus, the ability to obtain a 
home—insurance is strongly connected with racial homeownership 
disparities.   
As noted above,81 it is illegal to price insurance based on racial 
classifications.82   However, insurance companies—through their 
underwriting process—have created a process of risk classification of 
individuals that has a disparate impact on African American 
homeownership.   Disparate impact results when a business’s policy or 
practice, although neutral on its face, has a disproportionate negative 
                                                                                                                 
75  The Fair Housing Act prohibits discrimination in the sale, rental, and financing of 
dwellings, and in other housing-related transactions, based on race, color, national origin, 
religion, sex, familial status and handicap.  See 42 U.S.C.A. § 3604 (2008). 
76  Title VI prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, or national origin in 
programs and activities receiving federal financial assistance.  See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000(d) 
(2008). 
77  Executive Order 11,063 prohibits discrimination in the sale, leasing, rental, or 
other disposition of properties and facilities owned or operated by the federal government or 
provided with federal funds.  See Exec. Order No. 11,063, 27 Fed. Reg. 11,527 (Nov. 20, 
1962). 
78  Dana L. Kaersvang, The Fair Housing Act and Disparate Impact in Homeowners 
Insurance, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1993, 1995 (2006). 
79  Nat’l Urban League Pol’y Inst., supra note 1. 
80  Shapiro, supra note 27, at 66. 
81  See supra Part II. 
82  Note that although race based pricing is illegal, there have been recent instances of 
such blatant behavior within insurance companies.  See, e.g., Louisiana v. Guidry, 489 F.3d 
692 (2007).  However, this Note will not deal with such pricing behavior.  This Note 
focuses specifically on risk based pricing that is labeled as non-discriminatory but has a 
discriminatory effect.   
2008] AFRICAN AMERICAN HOMEOWNERSHIP 309 
 
impact on a protected group.83  Under this theory, the business’s motive in 
treating applicants differently may or may not be about race or another 
prohibited basis, however the effect is that the protected class is adversely 
impacted. 84  To understand this argument, the process of insurance 
underwriting must first be explained. 
Underwriting is a process by which the insurer determines what 
applicants should be accepted by the company and which programs such 
applicants fit under.85  This system is classified as one based on risks.  
Because insurance companies desire certain groups more than others in 
order to keep their risk pool down, those who do not fit the underwriter’s 
vision of the ideal member of society have a difficult time obtaining 
desired coverage.86  Blacks seem to fit squarely into this category of the 
undesired group.  As Brian Glenn notes:  
 
[t]he idea of judging an applicant by her or his race or standing 
in society appears to have been replaced by mathematically 
justified matrices that rate individuals according to their risks and 
charge them the appropriate premium. But even though the 
stereotypes have formally disappeared from the rating systems, 
they still exist and are used to exclude certain groups from 
coverage.  Rather than replacing these stories about undesired 
groups, the numbers, data, and forms merely hide the fact that 
applicants are still judged according to their standing in society. 
The difference between the old era of underwriting and the current 
one is that the appearance of subjectivity has been hidden behind a 
process that appears objective, mitigating the denied applicants the 
opportunity to develop awareness that they have been excluded on 
the basis of subjective opinions about their lifestyles.87 
 
Thus, the process of risk selection has allowed a great deal of 
discrimination to continue.  Outwardly, risk based pricing resembles a 
game of numbers, statistics, and objectivity.  However, when one considers 
                                                                                                                 
83  CHI CHI WU, NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, CREDIT SCORING AND 
INSURANCE: COSTING CONSUMERS BILLIONS AND PERPETUATING THE ECONOMIC AND RACIAL 
DIVIDE, 18, (2007), http://www.consumerlaw.org/reports/content/InsuranceScoring.pdf. 
84  Id. 
85  Glenn, supra note 54, at 780. 
86  Id. 
87  Id. at 792-93. 
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the effect that many of these pricing criteria have on minorities, it is clear 
that the objective test has many subjective levels of discrimination.   
To explain, underwriting guidelines are hardly ever illustrated as 
prejudiced or based on stereotypes.88   However, if one considers the wide 
range of practices used, the reason for the pricing differential between 
African Americans and Whites is evident.89  For example, homeowners 
insurance becomes more costly—and eventually unavailable—depending 
on the age of a home.  Insurers are less likely to insurer older homes.90  
When looking at the ratio of individuals who live in older homes, African 
Americans are disproportionately more likely to own older homes than 
Whites.91  Next, looking at the market value of homes, insurance 
companies usually create a minimum value threshold under which 
insurance will not be available.  Again, African Americans are more likely 
to buy inexpensive homes and because insurance is necessary to secure a 
mortgage, a cyclical effect preventing homeownership is created.92   
Insurance companies also adjust premiums by geographical area.  Although 
blatant redlining is now illegal, this same effect of drawing lines around 
certain neighborhoods is created when insurance companies price 
homeowner’s insurance premiums based on crime rates, vacant buildings 
and the percentage of owner-occupied dwellings in a neighborhood.93   
Moreover, insurance companies never completely abandoned their 
subjective pricing methods.  Insurance agents have the opportunity to use 
their own biases when these subjective criteria are in play.94  Consider the 
language insurance companies use such as “‘requiring that the insured ‘be a 
person of integrity and financial stability who takes pride in his 
property.’”95  Such subjectivity leaves much room for bias; a bias that 
should not be present within an arguably objective standard.  
 
                                                                                                                 
88  Id. at 801. 
89  “When insurance is available, blacks pay more per dollar of insurance than do 
Whites, even when controlling for income.”  Kaersvang, supra note 78, at 1995-96 
(footnotes omitted). 
90  Id. at 1996. 
91  Id. 
92  Id. 
93  Id. 
94  Kaersvang, supra note 78 at 1997. 
95  Id. at 1997 (footnotes omitted). 
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THE PRIMA FACIE CASE: CREDIT SCORING AND THE 
DISPARATE IMPACT ARGUMENT  
 
The use of credit scores in insurance pricing can be challenged under § 
3604 of the Fair Housing Act.  The Fair Housing Act (“the Act”) was 
passed as Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968.  Although the Supreme 
Court has not authoritatively stated that disparate impact claims are 
covered under the Act, there is a consensus amongst the circuit courts that 
disparate impact does apply.96  
Section 3604(a) of the Act makes it unlawful “[t]o refuse to sell or rent 
after the making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or 
rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person 
because of race. . . .”97  Whereas, § 3604(b) states that it is unlawful “[t]o 
discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of 
sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in 
connection therewith, because of race. . . .”98  Courts have found that 
property insurers are covered under both of these provisions,99 and the US 
Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) supports this 
position.  In regulations published in 1989, HUD notes that prohibited 
activities related to dwellings include “[r]efusing to provide municipal 
services or property or hazard insurance for dwellings or providing such 
services or insurance differently because of race. . . .”100 
 
                                                                                                                 
96  See, e.g., Edwards v. Johnston County Health Dept., 885 F.2d 1215, 1223 (4th 
Cir. 1989); Nat’l Ass’n. for the Advancement of Colored People v. Huntington, 844 F.2d 
926 (2d Cir. 1988); Keith v. Volpe, 858 F.2d 467, 482–84 (9th Cir. 1988); Hanson v. 
Veterans Admin., 800 F.2d 1381, 1386 (5th Cir. 1986); Arthur v. City of Toledo, 782 F.2d 
565, 574–75 (6th Cir. 1986); Betsey v. Turtle Creek Assoc., 736 F.2d 983, 986–88 (4th Cir. 
1984); Smith v. Clarkton, 682 F.2d 1055, 1065 (4th Cir. 1982);  Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. 
Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1290 (7th Cir. 1977). 
97  42 U.S.C.S. § 3604(a) (2000) (emphasis added). 
98  42 U.S.C.S. § 3604(b) (2000) (emphasis added). 
99  See, e.g., Nat’l. Ass’n. for the Advancement of Colored People v. Am. Fam. Mut. 
Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 287, 301 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that “[s]ection 3604 applies to 
discriminatory denials of insurance, and discriminatory pricing, that effectively preclude 
ownership of housing because of the race of the applicant.”). 
100  24 C.F.R. §§ 100.70(b), 100.70(d)(4) (2008).  See also ROBERT G. SCHWEMM, 
HOUSING DISCRIMINATION LAW AND LITIGATION § 10:4 (2008). 
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ARTICULATING THE STANDARD 
 
The first step in making a prima facie case for disparate impact is to 
identify a rule or policy that, while neutral on its face, has an adverse effect 
on members of a protected class.  This Note will focus on the use of credit 
scores in insurance pricing as the identified policy.   
Although the courts agree that a plaintiff must make a prima facie case, 
there is a split amongst the circuits regarding the standard applied for 
outlining a prima facie claim under the Fair Housing Act.  The First, 
Second, Third, Fifth, Eighth and Fourth Circuits have employed what is 
referred to as a “pure effects” or “effects only” test.101  Under this standard, 
the plaintiff must first identify a policy attributable to the defendant that 
has a “substantially greater adverse impact” on minorities.102  The burden 
then shifts to the defendant to “prove a business necessity sufficiently 
compelling to justify the challenged practice.”103   
There is debate as to whether the inquiry stops here, however.  In the 
1989 decision of Wards Cove Packing Co. Inc., v. Atonio,104 the Supreme 
Court held that the burden of persuasion remains with the plaintiff.  The 
Court noted that in discriminatory impact cases under Title VII,105 the 
employee must prove not only a disparate impact, but also that the 
employer has no reasonable business justification for its discriminatory 
practices.106  Thus, the defendant need only prove that its business practice 
serves a legitimate business goal.107  After this, the plaintiff has the burden 
“to show that other tests or selection devices, without a similarly 
undesirable racial effect, would also serve the [defendant’s] legitimate 
interest . . . Such a showing would be evidence that the employer was using 
                                                                                                                 
101  See, e.g., Wadley v. Park at Landmark LP, 264 Fed. Appx. 279, 281 (4th Cir. Va. 
2008); Casa Marie, Inc. v. Super. Ct. of P.R. Dist. of Arebcibo, 988 F.2d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 
1993); Familystyle of St. Paul, Inc. v. St. Paul, 923 F.2d 91, 94 (8th Cir. 1991); United 
States v. Mitchell, 580 F.2d 789, 791 (5th Cir. 1978); Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 
F.2d 126, 149 (3d Cir. 1977). 
102  Betsey v. Turtle Creek Assocs., 736 F.2d 983, 988 (4th Cir. 1984). 
103  Id.  See also Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 148-49 (3d Cir. 
1977); JOHN P. RELMAN, HOUSING DISCRIMINATION PRACTICE MANUAL DATABASE § 2:25 
(2007).   
104  Wards Cove Packing Co. Inc., v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 659-60 (1989). 
105  42 U.S.C.S. § 2000e-2 (1999). 
106  Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 659-60.  
107  Id. 
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its tests merely as a ‘pretext’ for discrimination.”108  These twin burdens of 
production and persuasion are extremely difficult for a plaintiff to meet. 
The Wards Cove standard should not apply to claims brought under the 
Fair Housing Act.  Congress expressly overruled the Wards Cove standard, 
as it related to Title VII, in the Civil Rights Act of 1991.109  However, the 
standard was upheld, as it related to the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act (“ADEA”), in Smith v. City of Jackson.110  Nonetheless, 
in upholding the Wards Cove standard in Smith, the Supreme Court noted 
that, “textual differences between the ADEA and Title VII make it clear 
that even though both statutes authorize recovery on a disparate-impact 
theory, the scope of disparate-impact liability under the ADEA is narrower 
than under Title VII.”111  The Court also noted that “Congress’ decision to 
limit the coverage of the ADEA by including the RFOA provision is 
consistent with the fact that age, unlike race or other classifications 
protected by Title VII, not uncommonly has relevance to an individual’s 
capacity to engage in certain types of employment.”112  In contrast to the 
ADEA, the language of the Fair Housing Act is quite similar to that of Title 
VII and contains no narrowing provisions.113  Because the Fair Housing 
                                                                                                                 
108  Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975) (citations omitted).  See 
also Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 660. 
109  See Pub.L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1991) note (stating 
that “the decision of the Supreme Court in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 
(1989) has weakened the scope and effectiveness of Federal civil rights protections.”). 
110  Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 241 (2005).   
111  Id. at 240.  ADEA contains a provision “permitting any ‘otherwise prohibited’ 
action ‘where the differentiation is based on reasonable factors other than age.’” Id. at 233. 
112  Id. at 240.   
113  Compare 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000e-2(a) (1999) stating: 
 
[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an 
employer: (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any 
individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any 
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such 
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or 
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or 
applicants for employment in any way which would deprive 
or tend to deprive any individual of employment 
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an 
employee, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, 
sex, or national origin, 
 
with 42 U.S.C.S. § 3604 (2000) stating: 
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Act is more like Title VII, the distinction the Supreme Court found between 
ADEA and Title VII should not be applicable to cases brought under the 
Fair Housing Act.  Accordingly, I argue that the standard that will apply in 
cases brought under the Fair Housing Act will place the burden on the 
defendant to prove a business necessity for its acts or policies.   
In contrast to the “effects only” test, the Seventh Circuit has created a 
four factor test for disparate impact claims brought under the Fair Housing 
Act.  The test was enunciated in Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. 
v. Village of Arlington Heights.114  Similar to the Betsey standard, the 
plaintiff has the burden of producing evidence that the challenged act or 
policy has a disparate racial effect.  However, instead of formally shifting 
the burden to the defendant, the court engages in a balancing test that looks 
at (1) the strength of the plaintiff’s showing of discriminatory effect; (2) 
whether there exists some evidence of discriminatory intent; (3) the 
defendant’s interest in taking the allegedly discriminatory action; and (4) 
whether the plaintiff seeks to compel the defendant affirmatively to provide 
housing or merely to refrain from interfering with others who wish to 
provide housing.115  The Arlington Heights standard, which exhibits a need 
to balance the plaintiff’s interests with that of the defendant, has been most 
commonly used in municipal zoning cases.116   
The Sixth and Tenth Circuits have adopted a standard similar to the one 
announced in Arlington Heights.  These circuits have enumerated a three-
factor test, which includes all but the second Arlington Heights factor 
regarding discriminatory intent;117 thus, relieving some of the burden 
placed on the plaintiff. 
 
                                                                                                                          
it shall be unlawful (a) [t]o refuse to sell or rent after 
the making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for 
the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, 
a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, 
sex, familial status, or national origin [; or] (b) [t]o 
discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or 
privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision 
of services or facilities in connection therewith, because of 
race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin. 
114  Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. Of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1290 (7th 
Cir. 1977). 
115  Id.  
116  RELMAN, supra note 103, § 2:25. See, e.g., Potomac Group Home Corp. v. 
Montgomery County, 823 F. Supp. 1285, 1295-96 (D. Md. 1993). 
117  See, e.g., Arthur v. City of Toledo, 782 F.2d 565, 575 (6th Cir. 1986). 
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APPLYING THE STANDARD 
 
The Prima Facie Case 
 
Although the four-factor Arlington Heights test, the modified three-
factor test, and the “effects only” tests are different in theory, in practice, 
all tests “require the plaintiff to demonstrate a discriminatory effect and, if 
that is shown, require the defendant to justify its practices.”118  It has been 
noted that it is unlikely that the different methods will produce substantially 
different results.119  Therefore, for consistency and because it has been 
adopted in more circuits, the following analysis will focus on applying the 
“effects only” test to a disparate impact claim against the use of credit 
scoring in insurance underwriting. 
A claimant may allege, under § 3604, that the use of credit scores in 
insurance pricing discriminates against African Americans.120  The 
statistical disparities between homeownership rates of Whites and African 
Americans evidence this disparate impact.121  Low credit scores tend to be 
correlated with low-income neighborhoods and certain minority 
communities;122 thus leading to the likelihood that those with lower credit 
scores will have higher insurance rates or not be able to procure insurance 
at all.  One noteworthy study regarding credit scoring is diagramed below: 
                                                                                                                 
118  John F. Stanton, The Fair Housing Act and Insurance: An Update and the 
Question of Disability Discrimination, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 141, 186 (2002). 
119  Id.  See also SCHWEMM, supra note 100, at § 10:7. 
120  The key to proving a disparate impact claim is “statistical evidence showing that 
the defendant’s policy or practice has a greater impact on protected class members than on 
others.”  SCHWEMM, supra note 100, § 10:6.  See, e.g., Keith v. Volpe, 858 F.2d 467, 484 
(9th Cir. 1988) (finding disparate impact where defendant’s action “had twice the adverse 
impact on minorities as it had on whites”); Betsey v. Turtle Creek Assocs., 736 F.2d 983, 
988 (4th Cir. 1984) (noting that a prima facie case of disparate impact was established 
where 74.90% of the minorities were affected, while only 26.40% of the whites were 
affected); Smith v. Town of Clarkton, 682 F.2d 1055, 1064-65 (4th Cir. 1982) (noting that a 
decision that “fell 2.65 times more harshly on [the] black population than on the white 
[population]” left “no doubt” of adverse impact).  
121  See supra text accompanying footnotes 75-82. 
122  NORMA P. GARCIA, SCORE WARS: CONSUMERS CAUGHT IN THE CROSSFIRE. THE 
CASE FOR BANNING THE USE OF CREDIT INFORMATION IN INSURANCE 3 (2006) (available at 
http://www.consumersunion.org/pdf/ScoreWars.pdf). 
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123 
This diagram reflects data that was compiled during a study conducted 
in 2004 by the Joint Center for Housing Studies at Harvard University.124   
This study was based on a simulation of credit scores using 200,000 credit 
files purchased by the Federal Reserve Board, matched with data from the 
triennial Survey of Consumer Finances.  
The cut-off for what is considered “good credit” is a score of 660 or 
above.125  Research indicated that, for the period of 1989 to 2001, although 
the median credit score had increased for the general population, 
tremendous divergence in credit scores also took place during this time.126   
Credit scores for Whites increased significantly during the 1990s, from 727 
to 738, while the median credit scores for African Americans dropped from 
693 to 676 and for Latinos from 695 to 670.127  More staggeringly, “[t]he 
percentage of African Americans with credit scores under 660 . . . grew 
from 27% to 42% and for Latinos it grew from 29% to 49%; while among 
whites it rose only slightly from 17% to 19%.”128  These facts show clear 
evidence of credit score differentials based on race. 
Moreover, a 2006 study conducted regarding this issue was produced 
by the Brookings Institution.129  An examination of quarterly samples of 25 
million anonymous consumer credit reports and scores for every U.S. 
County between 1999 and 2004 found that, “counties with relatively high 
                                                                                                                 
123  WU, supra note 83, at 14. 
124  See id. at 13. 
125  See id. 
126  See id. 
127  See id. 
128  WU, supra note 83, at 13. 
129  Id. at 14. 
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proportions of racial and ethnic minorities are more likely to have lower 
average credit scores.”130  The report noted that:   
 
this association reflects the numerous, historical disparities 
between races in the access to the availability of high quality 
education, well-paying jobs, and access to loans, among other 
factors. But the presence of this relationship does raise important 
questions that should be explored through further research, 
particularly in instances where information in reports are being 
used in nontraditional, under-researched market application, like 
screening job applicants and pricing insurance.131 
 
Blacks have become the undesired group in regards to obtaining 
insurance and have had a difficult time in search of coverage.132  The 
outward numbers game played by insurers has created an effect of 
lessening the number of African Americans that have been able to obtain 
homeowner’s insurance coverage.133  As noted by the Seventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals, “[n]o insurance, no loan; no loan, no house; lack of 
insurance thus makes housing unavailable.” 134  Thus, statistical proof 
shows racial disparities created by insurance scoring in homeowner’s 
insurance.  This impact can and should be challenged under the Fair 
Housing Act.135   
 
SHIFTING THE BURDEN TO FIND BUSINESS NECESSITY 
 
Under the “effects only” standard, the burden will shift to the insurer to 
defend its policy by showing a “business necessity.”136  However, an 
insurance company will not be able to prove a business necessity for the 
use of credit scores.137  The insurance industry is known for using credit 
                                                                                                                 
130  GARCIA, supra note 122, at 7. 
131  Id.   
132  See supra text accompanying notes 81-94. 
133  Id.  
134  Nat’l Ass’n for the Advancement of Colored People v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 
978 F.2d 287, 297 (1992). 
135  See WU, supra note 83, at 20.  
136  Resident Advisory Board v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 148 (3d Cir. 1977). 
137  This argument makes the assumption that the Wards Cove decision will not apply 
to a claim brought under the Fair Housing Act; thus, the burden of persuasion will not shift 
back to the plaintiff.  See supra text accompanying notes 104-112. 
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information in determining insurance risk classifications.138  Although 
insurance companies claim that this provides speed and efficiency, credit 
scores also have racial connections.139  As was noted in a report by the 
Consumers Union of the U.S., Inc. titled Score Wars: Consumers Caught in 
the Crossfire. The Case for Banning the Use of Credit Information in 
Insurance, “[e]ven though credit information can be ‘race and income 
neutral’ on its face, credit information can function as a proxy for race and 
income. Whether discrimination results from intentional conduct or is 
inadvertent, its impact must be carefully considered and addressed.”140 
The use of credit scores in the underwriting process is based on three 
“intuitive” claims.141  First, the insurance industry claims that credit scores 
are indicative of personal responsibility because “it is intuitive and 
reasonable to believe that the responsibility required to prudently manage 
one’s finances is associated with other types of responsible and prudent 
behaviors, for example proper maintenance of homes and automobiles and 
safe operation of cars.”142  Second, “it is intuitive and reasonable to believe 
that financially stable individuals are likely to exhibit stability in other 
areas of their lives.”143  Finally, credit scores are claimed to be indicative of 
“financial stress [that] could lead to stress, distractions or other behaviors 
that produce more losses, such as deferral of car or home maintenance.”144   
Despite these allegedly “intuitive” claims it is unlikely, that an insurer 
will meet the burden of persuasion in arguing that the use of credit scores is 
essential to the business of insurance.  “[T]he defendant insurer should be 
held to a significant burden of demonstrating some relationship between its 
underwriting criteria and protection of the interests it urges as matters of 
business necessity.”145   
Greater regulation will not endanger the insurance marketplace.146  In 
fact, some states have already made efforts to regulate the use of credit 
                                                                                                                 
138  GARCIA, supra note 122, at 1. 
139  Id. at 3. 
140  Id. at 6-7. 
141  Ian O’Neil, Disparate Impact, Federal/State Tension, and the Use of Credit 
Scores by Insurance Companies, 19 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 151, 155-56 (2007). 
142  Id. at 155. 
143  Id. 
144  Id. at 155-56. 
145  Christopher P. McCormack, Note, Business Necessity in Title VIII: Importing An 
Employment Discrimination Doctrine into the Fair Housing Act, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 563, 
601 (1986). 
146  GARCIA, supra note 122, at 23. 
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scores in insurance pricing.147  These states continue to have healthy 
insurance markets.148  Thus, the argument of protecting the marketplace can 
be countered.149   
Hawaii was one of the first to pass a law banning the use of credit 
information.150  In 1973, Hawaii made any use of credit information illegal 
in all automobile insurance policies.151  In 2002, Maryland’s homeowner 
insurance statute was amended to establish limitations on the use of credit 
history.152  Under Maryland’s statute, there are “prohibitions on particular 
payment plans, or refusal to underwrite, renew or cancel policies based in 
whole or in part on credit information.”153   
Similar to Maryland, in 2004, Oregon enacted a statute regulating the 
use of credit scores in insurance pricing.154  Oregon’s law prohibits insurers 
from being able to cancel or refuse to renew existing policies “based in 
whole or in part on credit information.”155  Washington also has a similar 
provision to that of the formerly mentioned laws.156  Also, Utah and 
Georgia have enacted prohibitions against the use of credit scores in the 
process of insurance underwriting.157   
Additionally, although California has only enacted laws restricting the 
use of credit scores in regards to automobile insurance, the California 
Department of Insurance has taken a strong stance in opposition of its use 
in homeowner’s insurance underwriting as well.158  In an August 2004 
report, the Department noted that it, “does not allow use of credit or 
insurance scores in underwriting homeowner’s insurance.  This is because 
the insurance companies have failed to demonstrate that credit scores are 
not discriminatory toward protected classes such as women, the elderly, the 
poor, and racial/ethnic groups.”159  In fact, in June of 2005, the Department 
and Allstate entered into a $30 Million settlement to refund $30 million in 
policy credits and premium returns to eligible California policyholders who 
                                                                                                                 
147  Id. at 18.  See also WU, supra note 83, at 18. 
148  GARCIA, supra note 122, at 23. 
149  See id. 
150  Id. at 18. 
151  Id. 
152  Id. 
153  GARCIA, supra note 122, at 18. 
154  Id. 
155  Id. 
156  Id. 
157  O’Neil, supra note 141, at 163. 
158  GARCIA, supra note 122, at 18. 
159  Id. 
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had been affected by several of Allstate’s practices, including the “use of 
‘Financial Stability’ criteria, a form of credit scoring, to underwrite 
property coverage, resulting in the placement of some consumers in a 
program with higher rates.”160  
Disparate impact challenges to the use of credit scores by insurers are 
proper under the Fair Housing Act.  The purpose of the Act is to ensure 
housing opportunities to groups that face discrimination in the market.  
Bringing disparate impact claims against use of credit scores serves this 
purpose and should be upheld by the Supreme Court.  
 
THE MCCARRAN-FERGUSON ACT AND STATE PREEMPTION 
 
The McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. 1012, is a United States 
federal law passed by Congress in 1945 in response to and overruling the 
Supreme Court in U.S. v. South-Eastern Underwriters, 322 U.S. 533 
(1944).161  The McCarran-Ferguson Act does not itself regulate insurance, 
                                                                                                                 
160  Id. 
161  See U.S. v. South-Eastern Underwriters, 322 U.S. 533 (1944) (holding that 
insurance can be regulated by the federal government via the Commerce Clause).  
Delivering the opinion of the court, Justice Hand noted: 
 
This business [of insurance] is not separated into 48 
distinct territorial compartments which function in isolation 
from each other. Interrelationship, interdependence, and 
integration of activities in all the states in which they 
operate are practical aspects of the insurance companies’ 
methods of doing business. A large share of the insurance 
business is concentrated in a comparatively few companies 
located, for the most part, in the financial centers of the 
East.  Premiums collected from policyholders in every part 
of the United States flow into these companies for 
investment. As policies become payable, checks and drafts 
flow back to the many states where the policyholders 
reside. The result is a continuous and indivisible stream of 
intercourse among the states composed of collections of 
premiums, payments of policy obligations, and the 
countless documents and communications which are 
essential to the negotiation and execution of policy 
contracts. Individual policyholders living in many different 
states who own policies in a single company have their 
separate interests blended in one assembled fund of assets 
upon which all are equally dependent for payment of their 
policies. The decisions which that company makes at its 
home office -- the risks it insures, the premiums it charges, 
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nor does it mandate that states regulate insurance.162  However, it does 
empower Congress to pass laws that will have the effect of regulating the 
“business of insurance.”163    
The most significant provision of the McCarran-Ferguson Act states 
that, “[n]o Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or 
supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the 
business of insurance, or which imposes a fee or tax upon such business, 
unless such Act specifically relates to the business of insurance.”164  The 
relevant issue here becomes whether the use of the Fair Housing Act to 
preempt credit based underwriting would violate the McCarran Ferguson 
Act.   
This question was answered by the Fifth Circuit in the renowned 
Dehoyos case.  In Dehoyos v. Allstate Corp., 345 F.3d 290 (5th Cir. 2003), 
the court noted that homeowners insurance is covered by the Fair Housing 
Act.165  Moreover, the court held that the McCarran-Ferguson Act did not 
preempt a claim that the use of credit scores by the Allstate Indemnity 
Company violated the anti-discrimination measures of the Fair Housing 
Act.166  As the court noted, while the Fair Housing Act is not directly 
related to the business of insurance, application of the Act’s provisions did 
not frustrate or conflict with any articulated state policy or law.167  Thus, 
under the Dehoyos decision, the issue of federal preemption is nonexistent. 
                                                                                                                          
the investments it makes, the losses it pays -- concern not 
just the people of the state where the home office happens  
to be located. They concern people living far beyond the 
boundaries of that state.  
 
 Id. at 541-42.  
162  See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1012.  
163  15 U.S.C.A. § 1011 (declaring “that the continued regulation and taxation by the 
several States of the business of insurance is in the public interest, and that silence on the 
part of the Congress shall not be construed to impose any barrier to the regulation or 
taxation of such business by the several States.”).   
164  See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1012(b). 
165  O’Neil, supra note 141, at 169.  See also WU, supra note 83, at 20. 
166  O’Neil, supra note 141, at 169. 
167  WU, supra note 83, at 20. See also Humana Inc. v. Forsyth, 525 U.S. 299, 313-14 
(1999)(noting that when a federal law does not directly conflict with a state regulation, and 
when application of the federal law would not frustrate any declared state policy or interfere 
with a state’s administrative regime, the McCarran-Ferguson Act does not preclude its 
application).  The court noted that because the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations Act (RICO) advances the interest of the state of Nevada in combating 
insurance fraud, and does not frustrate any articulated Nevada policy, the McCarran-
Ferguson Act does not block the respondent policy beneficiaries’ recourse to RICO.  Id. 
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One main argument regarding the Dehoyos decision is that it is only 
applicable when there is no state law or regulation in place to contradict 
that of the federal law and thus would be ineffective.168  However, thirty-
five states have created regulations requiring that the insurance departments 
have a filing of the insurer’s insurance scoring methodologies. 169  These 
regulatory measures can be considered evidence of the pursuit to control 
and lessen the negative use of credit scores in the process of insurance 
underwriting.   
When following the decision in Dehoyos, the Fair Housing Act in no 
way invalidates, impairs, or supersedes any law enacted by any state for the 
purpose of regulating the business of insurance.  The Supreme Court has 
defined the terms invalidate and supersede as follows: “the term 
‘invalidate’ ordinarily means ‘to render ineffective, generally without 
providing a replacement rule or law.’ .… And the term ‘supersede’ 
ordinarily means ‘to displace (and thus render ineffective) while providing 
a substitute rule.’”170  If the assumption is correct that these thirty-five 
states which have regulatory measures do so to prevent the negative use of 
credit scores in insurance pricing, then the Fair Housing Act will not and 
cannot displace nor render such laws ineffective.  Instead, the Fair Housing 
Act serves alongside each state’s regulatory policy to advance similar 
interests.    
 
A CALL TO ACTION: THERE SHOULD BE CONGRESSIONAL 
ACTION LIMITING THE USE OF CREDIT SCORES IN 
INSURANCE UNDERWRITING 
 
In addition to arguing in support of a disparate impact argument against 
the use of credit scores in insurance underwriting, this Note also makes a 
Congressional call to action.  Homeownership is of critical importance.  By 
early 2009, homeownership in the United States is set to decline.171  
Although this issue seems to be an important topic to the current 
                                                                                                                 
168  See, e.g., William Goddard, Swimming in the Wake of Dehoyos: When Federal 
Courts Sail into Disparate Impact Waters, Will State Regulation of Insurance Remain Above 
the Waves?, 10 CONN. INS. L.J. 369, 390 (2006) (noting Judge Edith Jones’ dissent in 
Dehoyos “that carefully points out that at the time the action was commenced, Texas and 
Florida had not adopted statutes regulating credit scoring in insurance, but have done so 
since.”).    
169  Id. 
170  Humana Inc., 525 U.S. at 307 (citations omitted). 
171  Editorial, The American Dream in Reverse, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2007 available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/08/opinion/08mon1.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2008).   
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administration, mortgaging practices and foreclosure relief have become 
the focal point.172  President Bush noted in August of 2007 that the FHA 
would soon be proposing a new program called FHA-Secure that would 
allow American homeowners who have good credit history but cannot 
afford their current payments to refinance into FHA-insured mortgages.173  
The guideline went into effect July 2008.  However, the program will only 
serve as temporary assistance to the problems of the current housing 
market.  Also, in December of 2007, President Bush signed into law H.R. 
3648, the Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act of 2007, to help 
homeowners who are struggling with rising mortgage payments.174   
However, the focus should not only be on decreasing the foreclosure 
rates within the United States.  There must also be governmental action to 
increase homeownership opportunities.  In its December 2007 report, the 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (“CERD”) called 
to attention the United State government’s inability to resolve race based 
housing disparities.175  According to the treaty signed by the United State at 
the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination (“ICERD”), the United States government has an obligation 
to eliminate all discriminatory actions in housing, “including those that are 
discriminatory in effect regardless of intent….”176 
The courts cannot and should not have to maintain the full burden of 
remedying the discriminatory effects of the use of credit scoring.  
Therefore, to effectuate the government’s obligation under ICERD, this 
Note proposes that Congress adopt the model law created by the 
Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. and the United States Public Interest 
Research Group.  The Model Law Regulating the Use of Credit-Based 
Information in Insurance Underwriting and Pricing (“the Model Law”) was 
adapted from the Maryland Insurance Code § 27-501.177  The applicable 
language of the Model Law states that “an insurer may not require a 
                                                                                                                 
172   Id. 
173  George W. Bush, President Bush Discusses Homeownership Financing (August 
31, 2007), available at  http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/08/20070831-
5.html. 
174  Press Release, George W. Bush, President Bush Signs H.R. 3648, the Mortgage 
Forgiveness Debt Relief Act of 2007 available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/ 
2007/12/20071220-6.html (creating a “three-year window for homeowners to refinance their 
mortgage and pay no taxes on any debt forgiveness that they receive”). 
175  See de Leeuw, supra note 33, at ii. 
176  Id. at 1-2 (citing International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination art. 5 §§ (d)(v), (e)(iii)). 
177  GARCIA, supra note 122, at 24.  
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particular payment plan for an insured for coverage under a private 
passenger or homeowner’s insurance policy based on the credit history of 
the insured.” 178  Moreover, with respect to residential property, and other 
personal lines of insurance, an insurer may not: 
 
(i) refuse to underwrite, cancel, refuse to renew a risk, or 
increase the renewal premium based, in whole or in part, on the 
credit history of an applicant or insured;  
(ii) rate a risk based, in whole or in part, on the credit history of 
an applicant or insured in any manner, including: the provision or 
removal of a discount and assigning the insured or applicant to a 
rating tier; placing an insured or applicant with an affiliated 
company;  
(iii) require a particular payment plan based, in whole or in 
part, on the credit history of the insured or applicant; or  
(iv) use, in whole or in part, insurance scores or consumer 
reports, as a basis to make a written or oral solicitation of insurance 
that is not initiated by the consumer.”179 
 
Federal legislative action is the most valuable method to counter the 
effect that the use of credit scoring has on African American 
homeownership.  The states mentioned in Part III.B.2 seem to be 
progressive in understanding and taking steps to counter the disparate 
impact of insurance credit scoring.180  Many states have taken some stride 
towards monitoring or limiting the use of credit scores in insurance 
pricing.181  Also, as noted above, thirty-five states have created regulations 
regarding insurance scoring methodologies. 182  This could be viewed as a 
consensus that something must be done.  Regulatory monitoring alone is 
not a large enough step towards resolving the issue.  Moreover, a federal 
law banning the use of credit scores will eliminate the need to bring 
disparate impact claims under the Fair Housing Act and create uniformity 
amongst the courts.  When there are issues regarding discrimination, there 
is a need for uniformity.  Otherwise, the fundamental concerns about the 
                                                                                                                 
178  Id. 
179  Id. at 24-25. 
180  Cf. id. at 19.  
181  O’Neil, supra note 141, at 162-63. 
182  Id. 
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use of credit information in insurance decisions will continue to be largely 
unaddressed and African American consumers will remain unprotected.183  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
There is a large gap between the net worth of homeowner’s and renters 
in the United States.184  Data calculated from the Federal Reserve’s Survey 
of Consumer Finances shows that as of January of 2006 for individuals 
with a net income of $80,000 and up,  homeowners averaged net worth is 
$451,200 while renters only averaged a net worth of $87,400.185  In regards 
to income of $50,000 to $79,999, owners averaged a net worth of $194,610 
while renters averaged $25,000.186  Similarly, for an income level of 
$30,000 to $49,999 the average net worth was $126,500 for owners and 
$10,600 for renters.187  For individuals with income of $16,000 to $29,999, 
owners had an average net worth of $112,600 and renters averaged 
$4,240.188  Even within the lowest income level of individuals taking in 
under $16,000 annually, homeowners averaged a net worth of $73,000 
while renters averaged a $500 net worth.189  This data makes it clear that 
homeownership has a very significant effect on net worth and wealth.  With 
the lowest homeownership rate in the nation,190 these statistics are very 
critical to the African American community’s inability to obtain wealth.   
The use of credit scores in insurance pricing has a very substantial 
effect on African American homeownership rates.  Without laws 
preventing the use of credit scores in insurance underwriting (currently) in 
place, African Americans will continue to fight a losing battle.  It is time to 
note this effect, acknowledge disparate impact and extend protection 
beyond that of prohibiting discriminatory treatment.   
The African American identity is plagued by the inability to realize the 
American Dream.  If disparate impact is not acknowledged, African 
Americans will continue to be prisoners of a dream forever deferred.  
Homeownership should not be a dream for some races while it is a reality 
                                                                                                                 
183  See GARCIA, supra note 122, at 23. 
184   Why It’s Smarter to Buy than Rent, FREE MONEY FINANCE, Jan. 16, 2006, 
available at http://www.freemoneyfinance.com/2006/01/why_its_smarter.html (last visited 
Nov. 18, 2008).  
185  Id. 
186  Id. 
187  Id. 
188  Id. 
189  Id. 
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326 CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 15:1 
 
for others; especially not when it is so significant in creating opportunities, 
and securing a standard of living.191   
 
 
                                                                                                                 
191  THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, THE HIDDEN COST OF BEING AFRICAN AMERICAN: HOW 
WEALTH PERPETUATES INEQUALITY 34 (2004).  
 
COGSWELL V. AMERICAN TRANSIT INSURANCE COMPANY 
 
Maggie Flanagan 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This casenote examines the 2007 case of Cogswell v. American Transit 
Insurance Company, which involves a clash between Connecticut 
insurance claims and a New York insurance company that was not licensed 
to do business in Connecticut. Under the precedent of International Shoe, 
constitutional rights of the New York company and the court’s declination 
to accept jurisdiction are discussed. The note focuses on some of the major 
questions of American civil procedure, exemplified by this recent 
Connecticut case, and it addresses the major subjects of personal 
jurisdiction, its burdens on the defendant, the State’s and plaintiff’s interest 
in the matter, and the Connecticut Supreme Court’s rulings on the various 
issues. The note also examines the Court’s citation of other decisions from 
varying jurisdictions on similar cases. Finally, the note concludes by 
viewing the broader policy implications of the denial of jurisdiction in this 
case.  
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Mickey Reavis, a Connecticut resident, was involved in an auto 
accident on a Connecticut highway.  The driver of the other vehicle 
involved in the accident, a New York livery driver, was insured by an 
insurance company registered to do business only in the State of New 
York.  When Mr. Reavis made his claim against the New York insurance 
company, the company sent an appraiser licensed in the State of 
Connecticut to assess the damage.  The insurance company then sent a 
letter from New York to Connecticut offering to settle the claim.  Mr. 
Reavis and a representative of the New York insurance company then 
spoke on the phone about his claim.  Mr. Reavis was unhappy with how his 
claim was handled, and filed a complaint with the Connecticut Department 
of Insurance.   
When the Insurance Commissioner investigated the New York 
Insurance Company’s licensing, she found that neither the insurance 
company nor its internal claims adjusters were licensed to do business in 
the State of Connecticut.  It also came to light that this insurance company 
had been settling claims in Connecticut for some time.  In order to further 
her investigation, the Commissioner served the New York insurance 
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company with a subpoena, with the Connecticut Secretary of State acting 
as agent per the Connecticut long-arm statute.  The New York insurance 
company argues that the Commissioner does not have personal jurisdiction 
over the company, as the company does not solicit or transact business in 
Connecticut.1  Can the New York Insurance company be held accountable 
in Connecticut courts? 
This set of facts seems concocted to strike fear into the hearts of first-
year law students preparing to take a Civil Procedure exam.  However, the 
Connecticut Supreme Court recently decided this very case, determining 
that while the Commissioner’s subpoena satisfied the requirements of the 
Connecticut long-arm statute,2 the insurance company had not established 
the minimum contacts necessary to satisfy the constitutional due process 
requirement set out in the United States Supreme Court decision 
International Shoe3.   
The trial court had held that the insurance company should have 
expected to be haled into court due to its “purposeful communications” 
with Mr. Reavis and the fact that the insurance industry is highly regulated, 
thus creating the expectation that insurance companies will engage in 
litigation.4  The trial court also cited Connecticut’s “strong policy” of 
protecting Connecticut residents from unfair business practices.5   
The questions that remain for students of Civil Procedure and observers 
of the insurance industry are the following:  (1) Did the Commissioner’s 
subpoena violate the company’s Constitutional rights, and (2) What are the 
consequences of declining to exercise jurisdiction?  Both of these questions 
will be addressed in this paper.   
 
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
After Ms. Cogswell (the Commissioner in the fact pattern above) 
served a subpoena pursuant to Connecticut statute6 on the Connecticut 
                                                                                                                 
1  Cogswell v. Am. Trans. Ins. Co., 923 A.2d 638, 642-44 (Conn. 2007).   
2  CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-273(a) (2007) (“[a]ny act of doing an insurance business, 
as set forth in subsection (a) of section 38a-271, by any authorized person or insurer” 
confers personal jurisdiction over the party).   
3  Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).   
4  Cogswell v. Am. Trans. Ins. Co., No. CV040832164S, 2004 Conn. Super. LEXIS 
2167 at *13 (Conn. Super. Aug. 6, 2004). 
5  Id.  
6  See § 38(a)-16(a) (authorizing the insurance commissioner to conduct 
investigations and hearings to investigate insurance matters, including the power to issue 
subpoenas).   
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Secretary of State as agent for American Transit (the insurance company), 
American Transit mailed a letter to Ms. Cogswell contesting jurisdiction 
and requesting a hearing on the issue.  Ms. Cogswell replied by letter that 
she did have the authority to issue such an investigative subpoena and 
directed American Transit to comply with the subpoena and provide the 
requested information.7   
When American Transit refused to comply, Ms. Cogswell filed suit in 
Connecticut Superior Court to enforce the subpoena.  American Transit 
then filed both a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and a 
motion to quash the subpoena.  As outlined above, the trial court found that 
American Transit had sufficient minimum contacts with the State of 
Connecticut and that its actions fulfilled the state long arm statute, and thus 
denied both of American Transit’s motions.8  This denial was accompanied 
by findings that American Transit is licensed with its principal place of 
business in New York, it has no places of business or property in 
Connecticut, does not solicit business in Connecticut, does not insure 
Connecticut residents, and did not execute Mr. Reavis’s contract in 
Connecticut.9   
In response to Ms. Cogswell’s enforcement action, American Transit 
filed an answer asserting nine special defenses.  The defense argued that 
American Transit did not conduct insurance business in the state of 
Connecticut as defined by Connecticut law; therefore, Ms. Cogswell had no 
authority to serve process on the Secretary of State as agent.10  Ms. 
Cogswell then filed a motion to strike four of the nine special defenses, and 
the trial court granted the motion to strike the defense that American 
Transit did not conduct business in Connecticut on the grounds that the 
judge who decided the previous motion to dismiss had already decided the 
question.11  American Transit then filed an appeal to the Appellate Court, 
which was removed to the Supreme Court.12   
                                                                                                                 
7  Cogswell v. Am. Trans. Ins. Co., 923 A.2d 638, 644 (Conn. 2007). 
8  Cogswell, 2004 Conn. Super. 2167, at *2. 
9  Id. at *2-3. 
10  See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38(a)-271 (6) (2007) (defining doing insurance business 
as, inter alia, “directly or indirectly acting as an agent for or otherwise representing or aiding 
on behalf of another any person or insurer in [the]…investigation or adjustment of claims or 
losses…or in any other manner representing or assisting a person or insurer in the 
transaction of insurance with respect to subjects of insurance resident, located, or to be 
performed in this state”).   
11  Cogswell v. Am. Trust [sic] Ins. Co., 2005 WL 758051 at *1 (Conn. Super. Feb. 
28, 2005).    
12  See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-199(c) (2007).   
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III. PERSONAL JURISDICTION 
 
The inquiry into whether a state court may obtain personal jurisdiction 
over an out-of-state defendant can be a tortuous undertaking.  In each case, 
two requirements must be fulfilled: first, the court must determine if the 
state’s long-arm statute reaches the conduct of the defendant corporation,13 
and second, the defendant must have established enough contact with the 
state to meet the Constitutional due process requirement that it is not 
unreasonably and unexpectedly “haled into court”.14  
In this case, both the trial court and the Supreme Court concluded that 
American Transit acted in a manner that satisfied the state long arm statute.  
In general, a long arm statute is “[a]”a statute providing for jurisdiction 
over a nonresident defendant who has had contacts with the territory where 
the statute is in effect.”15  In other words, the statute is the means by which 
the state legislature tells the state courts whom they may pull in as 
defendants from out of state.  The long-arm statute is a way for the 
legislature to control the number and nature of cases that are litigated in a 
state’s courts, keeping in mind respect for the sovereign rights of other 
states to regulate the conduct of their own citizens.  Another important 
function of long-arm statutes is predictability for out-of-state actors, who 
may look to a state’s long-arm statute to determine whether their conduct 
could lead to litigation in the state in question.   
The Connecticut long-arm statute states that if the defendant has done 
insurance business in Connecticut, then it is deemed to have appointed the 
Secretary of State as its attorney, who in turn may be served all legal 
process.16  Once a defendant has a statutorily appointed attorney in a state, 
it has an official presence in that state and is considered present for the 
purpose of obtaining personal jurisdiction.  “Doing insurance business” is 
defined as, inter alia, adjusting claims or mailing correspondence to a 
Connecticut resident involved in an insurance claim.17  This is a far 
reaching statute, as even the simplest communication will suffice for 
enactment.  The fact that the Connecticut legislature drafted such an all-
encompassing statute may lend credence to the trial court judge’s assertion 
                                                                                                                 
13  See generally Thomason v. Chem. Bank, 661 A.2d 595 (Conn. 1995), for a 
treatment of Connecticut law surrounding long-arm statutes.    
14  See Int’l Shoe v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945).   
15  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 786 (8th ed..2005).   
16  CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-273(a) (2007).   
17  CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-271(a) (2007). 
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that out-of-state based insurance companies should expect to litigate, on 
occasion, in the state of Connecticut, subsequent to dealings with its 
residents.   
What the trial court and the Supreme Court did not agree on, however, 
was whether American Transit’s conduct established enough contacts in 
Connecticut to satisfy the second requirement of personal jurisdiction -- the 
minimum contacts requirement.  This is a federally established 
constitutional baseline requirement that binds state courts, even if their 
state long-arm statute allows for less contact with a state.18   The state long-
arm statute may require more contacts with the state than are 
constitutionally required, but it may not allow personal jurisdiction on the 
basis of fewer contacts.19  This requirement is based on the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s guarantee of due process.20   
Included in the guarantee of due process is the guarantee that 
defendants will not be subjected to unexpected and unfair litigation in a 
jurisdiction with which they have very limited or no contacts.21  Due 
process of law, then, may be interpreted in the context of personal 
jurisdiction to mean that a defendant may be properly served with notice 
and obligated to defend a suit in that jurisdiction only if a defendant has 
committed some positive action in a given jurisdiction,.  This concept is 
perhaps best illustrated in the following example:  a car dealership sells a 
car in jurisdiction A.  The dealership does not advertise in any other 
jurisdiction, makes no sales outside of jurisdiction A, and has otherwise no 
contacts with any other jurisdiction.  The family then drives the car to 
jurisdiction B and is involved in an accident.  Subsequently, the family sues 
the dealership, attempting to force the dealership to defend the suit in 
jurisdiction B?  The United States Supreme Court has held that this tactic 
would be unfair to the defendant.22  Forcing a defendant to appear and 
defend a suit in a jurisdiction to which it is totally unrelated is akin to other 
violations of the due process clause, such as, for example, imposing a 
penalty on a defendant without affording the defendant a chance to be 
                                                                                                                 
18  Bensmiller v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 47 F.3d 79, 82-84 (2d Cir. 1995) 
(no personal jurisdiction where foreign corporation’s sole contact with Connecticut was 
involvement in a joint venture).   
19  Aftanase v. Econ. Baler Co., 343 F.2d 187, 190 (8th Cir. 1965).   
20  Ins. Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 
712-13 (1982) (Powell, J., concurring). 
21  Id. 
22  Worldwide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295 (1980); See Bernhard v. 
Harrah’s Club, 546 P.2d 719 (Cal. 1976). 
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heard.23  Both circumstances involve unfair surprise and lack of notice to a 
defendant.  The Constitution acts as a safeguard against such abuses by the 
judiciary.   
There are two types of personal jurisdiction over out-of-state 
defendants.  First, a court may have general jurisdiction.   General 
jurisdiction is defined as the proper assertion of jurisdiction over an out-of-
state defendant when the defendant has had “systematic and continuous” 
contacts with the jurisdiction; so that it is fair to bring the defendant into 
court on any action.24  The defendant, if subject to general jurisdiction in a 
forum, has a sufficient presence in a forum so that it will not be surprised to 
find itself litigating in that forum’s courts, and thus due process will be 
satisfied.  For example, suppose a small businessman based in Jurisdiction 
A services computers in Jurisdiction B.  He has several clients in 
Jurisdiction B and advertises there.  If he makes a slanderous remark about 
someone in Jurisdiction B, completely separate from his work as a 
computer serviceman, he may be sued for slander in Jurisdiction B because 
he has established enough of a presence in Jurisdiction B to be fairly 
subject to suit in that jurisdiction for any action at all.   
The other type of personal jurisdiction that a court may exercise over 
an out-of-state defendant is specific jurisdiction.  Specific jurisdiction is 
defined as the jurisdiction that a court has when the transaction that is the 
subject of the suit “arises out of” or is related to the defendant’s contacts 
with the forum.25  Now suppose that our computer serviceman went only 
once from his base in Jurisdiction A to service a computer in Jurisdiction 
B.  He could probably not be sued in Jurisdiction B for a slanderous remark 
made in Jurisdiction A, but he could be sued in Jurisdiction B for, say, 
negligently ruining the computer belonging to the customer in Jurisdiction 
B.  In that case, the court in Jurisdiction B would be exercising specific 
jurisdiction because the cause of action, negligently ruining a computer, 
arises out of the contact that the defendant had with the jurisdiction 
conducting his business there.   The trial court in Cogswell pointed to the 
U.S. Supreme Court finding that one purposeful letter sent to a resident of 
another state may serve to establish a purposeful contact and justify 
specific jurisdiction.26  Another aspect of this specific jurisdiction is the 
concept that the defendant availed himself of the privilege of conducting 
                                                                                                                 
23  Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972).   
24  Helicopteros Nactionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 415 (1984).   
25  See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977).   
26  Cogswell, 2004 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2167 at *12, citing McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. 
Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957). 
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business in the state, invoking the benefits and protections of the state and 
thereby creating obligations to follow the state’s laws.27 
Thus, in order for a Connecticut court to exercise jurisdiction over an 
out-of-state defendant, both the state’s long-arm statute and the 
requirements of due process must be satisfied.28   
 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT’S CASE FOR PERSONAL 
JURISDICTION IN COGSWELL  
 
The trial court judge in Cogswell29 ruled that there was proper personal 
jurisdiction to pull American Transit into court in Connecticut.30  American 
Transit argued that Connecticut did not have jurisdiction, because, inter 
alia, it has its principal place of business in New York, it has no place of 
business or facilities in Connecticut, and does not own property in 
Connecticut.31  Its only actions in Connecticut, claimed American Transit, 
were sending a letter to the claimant in Connecticut and making at least one 
phone call to Connecticut in the course of adjusting the claim.32  The trial 
court asserted that the clear language of the statute justified the long arm 
jurisdiction.33  Additionally, the court opined,34  that American Transit had 
done enough in Connecticut to satisfy the constitutional due process 
requirements, arguing, in part, that the regulated nature of the insurance 
industry created a condition that satisfied the due process requirement.35  
The constitutional due process assertion of jurisdiction in this case is one of 
specific jurisdiction; that is, that the claim arose specifically out of the 
defendant’s actions in the state.36  Specifically, the trial court held that due 
to the fact that insurance companies are subject to complicated and specific 
                                                                                                                 
27  Burger King Corp. v. Rudewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472-76 (1985).   
28  Knipple v. Viking Communications, Ltd., 674 A.2d 426, 428-29 (Conn. 1996). 
29  In the interest of full disclosure, the trial court judge, Judge Beach (now of the 
Connecticut Appellate Court) is the father of the author of this article.  The views expressed 
are entirely my own. 
30  Cogswell, 2004 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2167 at *14. 
31  Id. at *2-3. 
32  Id. at *3. 
33  Id. at *6. (“The clear language of the statute refers to singular acts, and, in light of 
the highly regulated nature of the insurance industry, is not surprising.”)Id. at *2 (“The clear 
language of the statute refers to singular acts, and, in light of the highly regulated nature of 
the insurance industry, is not surprising.”) 
34  Id.  
35  Id. at *13. 
36  Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. at 414 (also includes 
a discussion of personal jurisdiction).supra note 24.   
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regulations in many states, it is not an unfair surprise that an insurance 
company will have to defend an action in a jurisdiction other than that in 
which it is based.37   
To support its assertion of jurisdiction, the trial court cited the interests 
that the U.S. Supreme Court considered when deciding its canon of 
personal jurisdiction cases, which include “the interests of the forum, the 
defendant, and the litigation.”38  More specifically, the Court laid out 
factors to be evaluated when determining whether the minimum contacts 
are “reasonable” for the purposes of determining personal jurisdiction: the 
burden on the defendant of answering in the forum, the forum’s interest in 
exerting jurisdiction, the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining relief, the interstate 
judicial system’s interest in efficient regulation, and states’ shared interest 
in furthering substantive social policies.39  While the trial court did not 
specifically cite all five factors, relying instead on the more general three -  
the defendant, the forum, and the litigation - it is relevant to assess the 
reasonableness of personal jurisdiction according to the factors laid out in 
Burger King and World-Wide Volkswagen that are relevant to this case - 
the burden on the defendant, the forum’s interest in exercising personal 
jurisdiction, and the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining relief.   
 
A. THE BURDEN ON THE DEFENDANT 
  
The trial court in this case reasoned that this element of the evaluation 
of personal jurisdiction was satisfied: “[t]he burden of a New York 
insurer’s answering in Connecticut is minimal; thousands of Connecticut 
residents work in New York every day and Hartford is hundreds of miles 
closer to New York City than is Buffalo.”40  In a case which in some ways 
mirrors this case, the District of Connecticut court reasoned that a New 
York defendant’s burden of having to litigate in Connecticut was 
outweighed by the state’s interest in “adjudicating a dispute involving 
                                                                                                                 
37  Cogswell, 2004 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2167 at *4.   
38  Cogswell, 2004. Super. LEXIS 2167 at *7, citing Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, 
Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 775-776.(1984). 
39  Burger King v. Rudewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985); World-Wide Volkswagen 
Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980).  See also Panganiban v. Panganiban, 54 Conn. 
App. 634, 639 (1999) (citing Metropolitan Life Ins. v. Robertson-CECO Corp., 84 F.3d 560, 
567-568 (2d Cir. 1996)).   
40  Cosgwell, 2004 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2167 at *13. 
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services provided by unlicensed out-of-state accountants to a Connecticut 
resident.”41   
The First Circuit has a particularly well developed line of case law on 
this question.  The court has held that, unless the burden of litigating in the 
forum would be “onerous in a special, unusual, or other constitutionally 
significant way,” this is not a factor that will prevent the proper assertion of 
personal jurisdiction.42  As long as the other elements of the Burger King 
test are satisfied, some inconvenience on the part of the defendant is not 
sufficient to block the court from exercising personal jurisdiction.43  In fact, 
the court has held that there was not an undue burden on a defendant who 
was forced to travel from Hong Kong to Massachusetts: this was 
outweighed by the fact that much of the relevant evidence was to be found 
in Massachusetts.44  
It may certainly be true that the closer the case, the more important this 
factor becomes.  If the court is basing its personal jurisdiction on the 
minimum contacts of one letter and one phone call, augmented by the fact 
that the insurance industry is heavily regulated and therefore state interests 
are greater,45 the burden on the defendant becomes weightier.   
 
B. THE INTEREST OF THE FORUM 
 
Generally, every state has an interest in protecting its citizens, and may 
choose to assert its jurisdiction over a defendant to ensure that the 
defendant is subject to its regulations when acting within the forum state’s 
borders.46   The interest analysis that courts in most jurisdictions apply to 
conflicts of law cases is relevant to the analysis that the court in this case 
had to apply to determine whether minimum contacts were present: the 
factors as enumerated by the Supreme Court and the Second Circuit for 
evaluating the reasonableness of personal jurisdiction47 track the factors 
enumerated by the courts for evaluating states’ interests in conflicts of laws 
                                                                                                                 
41  Gerber Trade Finance, Inc. v. Davis, Sita & Co., 128 F. Supp. 2d 86, 93 (D. Conn. 
2001).   
42  Nowak v. Tak How Investments, Ltd., 94 F.3d 708, 718 (1st Cir. 1996).   
43  Id. (explaining that this factor may “tip the balance” in close cases, but alone is 
not a particularly significant factor).   
44  Id. at 717. 
45  See infra Part B.   
46  See Hall v. Nevada, 503 P.2d 1363, 1364 (1972) (holding that the state of 
Nevada’s interest in staying out of court in California under the doctrine of sovereign 
immunity is outweighed by California’s policy of compensating its residents in tort cases).   
47  See supra notes 32, 33, and 37. 
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cases, as illustrated by the Second Restatement.48   The U.S. Supreme Court 
has held that a state’s interest in protecting its citizens can outweigh 
contrary contractual provisions in a conflicts of law situation, showing a 
strong federal policy towards allowing states to act affirmatively to create a 
regulatory scheme that will protect its residents from out-of-state business 
interests in the face of a due process challenge.49  The Second Circuit also 
held in one case that the District Court of Connecticut was justified in 
refusing to decide a question of state insurance law, explaining, “the fact 
that the insurance industry is heavily regulated makes it all the more 
important that we stay our hand in favor of a definitive and uniform 
interpretation from state courts.”50  This assertion by a federal court 
accustomed to interpreting Connecticut law shows that Connecticut has a 
strong interest in regulating insurance contracts within the state.   
In this case, Connecticut has a “strong policy regarding the fair 
handling of claims and seeks to ensure fair practices”51, and, in support of 
this assertion,, the trial court cited Conn. Gen. Stat. § 38a-816(6), which 
lists unfair claim settlement practices in the context of the Connecticut 
Unfair Insurance Practices Act.52  The legislation shows that Connecticut 
has an interest in protecting its citizens from unfair or unscrupulous 
insurance practices.  American Transit was “doing insurance business” in 
                                                                                                                 
48  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (2) (1969) (“When there is no 
such directive [a statutory provision], the factors relevant to the choice of the applicable rule 
of law include (a) the needs of the interstate and international systems, (b) the relevant 
policies of the forum, (c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative 
interest of those states in the determination of the particular issue, (d) the protection of 
justified expectations, (e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law, (f) 
certainty, predictability, and uniformity of result, and (g) ease in the determination and 
application of the law to be applied.”) Compare the factors cited by the Courts in Burger 
King (see supra note 33) for evaluating personal jurisdiction, i.e. the burden on the 
defendant of answering in the forum, the forum’s interest in exerting jurisdiction, the 
plaintiff’s interest in obtaining relief, the interstate judicial system’s interest in efficient 
regulation, and states’ shared interest in furthering substantive social policies. The 
Metropolitan Life factors are designed to balance the state’s interest with those of the 
individual litigants, the state’s interests being largely those expounded by the Second 
Restatement. Thus, decisions evaluating a state’s interest in a conflicts of law context are 
relevant to a determination of a state’s interest in a personal jurisdiction context.   
49  Watson v. Employer’s Liab.Ass’n Corp., 348 U.S. 66, 72 (1954); for an excellent 
analysis of state interests in regulation see QSP Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 1998 WL 
892997, at *7 n.14 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 8, 1998) (Levin, J.).  
50  Smith v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Co., 629 F.2d 757, 761 (2d Cir. 1980).   
51  Cogswell v. Am. Trans. Ins. Co., No. CV040832164S, 2004 Conn. Super. LEXIS 
2167 at *13 (Conn. Super. Aug. 6, 2004).  
52  Id. 
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Connecticut as defined by Connecticut statute.53  Therefore, the second 
element of the test as expounded by the U.S. Supreme Court in Burger 
King and World-Wide Volkswagen, that of the interest of the forum, is 
clearly satisfied by the facts of the case.   
 
C. THE PLAINTIFF’S INTEREST  
 
The trial court did not address this point expressly, but in this case the 
factor is closely connected to the concept of state interest as discussed 
above.  Because the plaintiff is the Connecticut Insurance Commissioner, 
she is carrying out the state’s interest in regulating companies that do 
business within Connecticut, and thus this factor weighs in favor of 
allowing Connecticut to take personal jurisdiction.   
The latter two factors point towards Connecticut having a strong state 
interest in exercising personal jurisdiction, which, according to Burger 
King, makes such exercise more reasonable.54  Having established that it 
appears reasonable to exercise jurisdiction over this defendant, the 
Supreme Court’s objections must now be examined.   
 
V. THE CONNECTICUT SUPREME COURT’S OBJECTIONS TO 
THE EXERCISE OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION AND 
CRITIQUE OF THOSE OBJECTIONS 
 
The Connecticut Supreme Court objected to the exercise of personal 
jurisdiction on the grounds that American Transit had not “purposely 
availed” itself of the forum.55  Purposeful availment means that the 
defendant has, of his own volition, made use of the benefits of the state so 
as to create obligations to the state, including being subject to that state’s 
personal jurisdiction.56  This consideration prevents a plaintiff from 
                                                                                                                 
53  See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 38(a)-271 (6) (defining doing insurance business as, inter 
alia, “directly or indirectly acting as an agent for or otherwise representing or aiding on 
behalf of another any person or insurer in [the]…investigation or adjustment of claims or 
losses…or in any other manner representing or assisting a person or insurer in the 
transaction of insurance with respect to subjects of insurance resident, located, or to be 
performed in this state”).   
54  Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 473-76 (1985) (“A State generally has a 
‘manifest interest’ in providing its residents with a convenient forum for redressing injuries 
inflicted by out-of-state actors.”).  
55  Cogswell v. Am. Transit Ins. Co., 923 A.2d 638, 654-55 (2007).   
56  Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 92-93 (1978).    
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unilaterally claiming a relationship based on the plaintiff’s own actions.57  
In this case, the Supreme Court held that American Transit had not, in fact, 
satisfied this element of specific personal jurisdiction because all of 
American Transit’s actions were taken in response to the claimant’s actions 
and American Transit had never reached into the state to take advantage of 
Connecticut’s market or other benefit: “before receiving the claim from 
Reavis, defendant had [not] engaged in any behavior so as to invoke the 
benefits and privileges of Connecticut law.  It did not solicit business, 
maintain offices, own property, or otherwise seek to conduct its insurance 
business in Connecticut.”58   
The purpose of the requirement of purposeful availment is to ensure 
that the defendant will not be haled into court unexpectedly.59  I believe 
that this requirement is based on two theories.  First, courts reason that 
when a defendant acts, he will realize that he is incurring obligations 
through his action.  Therefore, there is no surprise when he is haled into 
court in the jurisdiction in which he acted.60  Second, courts justify this 
exercise of personal jurisdiction on the idea that once a defendant has taken 
advantage of the benefits if a jurisdiction (e.g., marketed his products 
there), he owes the jurisdiction something: the obligation to abide by its 
laws.61   
These bases are simplistic and can lead to unfortunate results, as in the 
Connecticut Supreme Court decision in this case.  While the defendant 
insurance company may not have purposely availed itself of business in 
Connecticut through the traditional means of advertising, there is no doubt 
but that it secured the business of New York drivers entering Connecticut.  
The trial court has a valid point in suggesting that, given the close ties 
between the two states, there is no doubt that these drivers would enter 
Connecticut.62  American Transit would have undoubtedly lost business 
had it specified that its clients would lose coverage if they enter 
Connecticut.  In this manner, the insurance company  availed itself of 
Connecticut’s laws.  Under this analysis, American Transit should be 
subject to Connecticut’s personal jurisdiction.   
                                                                                                                 
57  Hanson v.,Denckla. 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).   
58  Cogswell, 923 A.2d at 655.   
59  Burger King, 471 U.S. at 474-75. 
60  Id.  
61  Kulko, 436 U.S. at 92-93.   
62  Cogswell v. Am. Trans. Ins. Co., No. CV040832164S, 2004 Conn. Super. 
LEXIS 2167 at *13 (Conn. Super. Aug. 6, 2004). 
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There is an argument to be made that the simple act of sending a 
Connecticut-licensed appraiser to examine the damage to Mr. Reavis’s 
vehicle is enough to establish minimum contacts with the state of 
Connecticut.  In Home Impressions, Inc. v. Director, Division of Taxation, 
the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that the actions of independent 
contractors acting as salespeople was enough to create the minimum 
contacts between the wholesale seller of mailboxes and the forum state of 
New Jersey.63  It did not matter that the defendant itself did not directly 
conduct business in the state, but the simple fact of sending its contractors 
to do business there was enough to justify extending the New Jersey tax 
jurisdiction over the corporation.  As in Cogswell, the tax director had 
statutory authority to investigate possible abuses of New Jersey tax law.64  
The mere fact that American Transit sent an appraiser to investigate Mr. 
Reavis’s claim, regardless of the fact that the appraiser was licensed to do 
business in Connecticut, should be enough to justify jurisdiction of the 
court over American Transit.  It is indicative of an underlying transaction 
between a Connecticut resident and American Transit, and therefore the 
insurance commissioner should have the power to investigate the 
transaction.  This activity satisfies the legislature’s definition of “doing 
insurance business” in the state.65   
The trial court also suggested that the regulated nature of the insurance 
business decreases the defendant’s surprise at having to defend an action in 
the forum state.  As every reader of this journal is aware, the insurance 
industry is fraught with litigation.  There is a reason why insurance 
companies employ herds of lawyers for their own defense as well as the 
defense of insureds.  There is no reason that American Transit could not 
have foreseen the possibility of litigation from the state of Connecticut, 
given the fact that (a) it knew that it insured drivers in metropolitan New 
York, and given the close business relationship between New York and 
Connecticut, could guess  that these drivers would enter Connecticut, (b) it 
could certainly predict that some of these drivers would get into accidents, 
and (c) it knew that the insurance business in Connecticut was closely 
regulated.  Thus, it should certainly come as no surprise that it would be 
adjusting and settling claims in Connecticut.  Any insurance company that 
knows that it will be settling claims in a state should be aware of the fact 
that it might have to answer for those deeds in the courts of that state.   
                                                                                                                 
63  Home Impressions, Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 21 N.J. Tax 448, 456 (2004).   
64  Id.  
65  CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-273(a) (2007).   
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Therefore, any assumption on the part of the court that American 
Transit would be surprised by having to defend an action in a Connecticut 
court is naïve.  Insurance companies should, and do, know better.  The trial 
court was correct in finding personal jurisdiction appropriate.   
 
VI. OTHER JURISDICTIONS’ DECISIONS ON THE ISSUE 
 
The Connecticut Supreme Court cites the decisions of other 
jurisdictions to support its finding that there was no personal jurisdiction 
over the defendant.66  For example, in Hunt v. Erie Insurance Group67, the 
ninth circuit held that a defendant insurance company, licensed and 
practicing business on the East Coast only, was not required to defend a 
suit in California when the only contact the company had with California 
was a failure to pay contested medical costs arising out of an accident in 
Colorado.68  This is a better case for declining to exercise jurisdiction, 
because the only contact is a failure to act.  The element of taking 
advantage of the forum present in Cogswell is, in fact, notably absent.  In 
Hunt, the plaintiff was seeking a more satisfactory settlement from the 
defendant insurance company. In contrast, the Insurance Commissioner 
was looking to investigate the practices of an insurance company that had 
adjusted a claim in Connecticut.  These fact patterns are clearly different, 
and the Connecticut Supreme Court misplaced its reliance on this case.   
Next, the Court cited Batton v. Tennessee Farmers’ Mutual Insurance 
Co.69  In Batton, the Arizona Supreme Court held that an insured who was 
injured in a car accident in Arizona was not entitled to jurisdiction over 
Tennessee Farmers’, since the action by which Tennessee Farmers’ was 
drawn into Arizona was purely unilateral.70  Tennessee Farmers’ had no 
offices or insureds in Arizona, and did not solicit business there; its only 
contact with Arizona was to communicate with the plaintiff regarding his 
claim for benefits under his insurance policy, which provided coverage in 
all 50 states.71   
The problem that the court had with extending jurisdiction to the 
plaintiff in Arizona was that it found that the defendant insurance company 
                                                                                                                 
66  Cogswell v. Am. Trans. Ins. Co., 923 A.2d at 655-56 (Conn. 2007). 
67  728 F.2d 1244 (9th Cir. 1984).   
68  Id. at 1247.   
69  153 Ariz. 268 (1987).   
70  Id. at 273.   
71  Id. at 269-70.   
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had not “purposely availed” itself of the Arizona forum.72  There are two 
reasons why this is not applicable to the Cogswell case: (1) the reasoning 
itself is flawed, and (2) the facts of Batton are distinguishable from the 
facts of Cogswell.   
To address the first problem, if it is true that the defendant insurance 
company did not purposely avail itself of the Arizona forum, then what is 
the point of selling a policy that allows coverage in all 50 states?  A buyer 
purchases a policy stating that he is “covered” in all 50 states.  The court 
pointed out that the agreement in this case was to defend and indemnify 
and that this agreement did not imply that the insured is allowed to bring 
suit in any state he wishes.73  However, this seems contrary to basic 
principles of consumer protection and jurisdiction.  The court itself stated 
that one reason for the existence of specific jurisdiction is so that an injured 
plaintiff need not travel to a foreign jurisdiction to redress wrongs.74  Why 
should an insured, who has been sold a policy that purports to cover him in 
all 50 states, have to travel to a foreign jurisdiction to get compensation?  It 
is clear that the insurance company benefited from the fact that it sells its 
policies as providing coverage in every state. If so, shouldn’t this mearured 
action constitute purposeful availment?  It seems unfair to ask an injured 
plaintiff to travel back to the jurisdiction in which the policy was bought 
and the defendant resides to claim coverage for an accident that was 
supposedly covered by a policy that covered accidents in all 50 states.   
Secondly, the facts of Batton and the facts of Cogswell are 
distinguishable.  In Batton, the plaintiff was seeking to get medical benefits 
that had been denied by his insurance company after his accident in 
Arizona.75  In Cogswell, the Insurance Commissioner was simply seeking 
more information about the handling of a claim in Connecticut.76  There is 
no question but that the inconvenience of the litigation to the defendant 
affects the propriety of the exercise of jurisdiction.77  Even if a court is 
justified in denying jurisdiction over a defendant who has sold a policy 
covering all 50 states to a plaintiff seeking to litigate for recovery of 
                                                                                                                 
72  Id. at 273, for a discussion of this concept see Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 
253 (1958).   
73  Id. at 272-73.   
74  Batton v. Tenn. Farmers’ Mut. Ins. Co., 153 Ariz. 268, 274 (1987).   
75  Id. at 269.   
76  Cogswell v. Am. Trans. Ins. Co., 923 A.2d 638, 643 (Conn. 2007).   
77  See, e.g., 63B Am. Jur. 2d Products Liability § 1677 (2008) (“[I]n determining 
whether an exercise of in personam jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant comports 
with due process requirements, the court must consider the defendant’s…relative 
inconvenience.”).   
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medical expenses in a foreign jurisdiction, it is less reasonable to deny a 
state’s insurance commissioner a subpoena to gather more information.  In 
Cogswell, American Transit was merely requested to provide information, 
which does not involve much inconvenience at all.  Modern methods of 
communication and travel have affected the exercise of personal 
jurisdiction as well,78 and it is difficult to believe that the defendant would 
have been very inconvenienced by sending a few documents to Ms. 
Cogswell.   
Because the reasoning of the Batton court is flawed, and even if a court 
were to accept its holding the facts of Cogswell are distinguishable.  Batton 
does not provide support for the Connecticut Supreme Court’s denial of 
jurisdiction in Cogswell. 
 
VII. SUPPORT FOR FINDING JURISDICTION OVER  
 AMERICAN TRANSIT  
 
There is a significant body of legislation and case law supporting a 
finding of personal jurisdiction over American Transit from both 
Connecticut and other jurisdictions.  As the trial court pointed out, there is 
a strong policy in Connecticut of regulating the insurance business and 
protecting consumers of insurance products.79  For example, in Nationwide 
Mutual Insurance Company v. Pasion, the Connecticut Supreme Court 
examined the legislative history of § 38-175c (a) (2) to find that the 
legislature had determined that this protection of the consumer in the 
insurance business was a high priority for the legislature.80  Connecticut 
also has enacted the Connecticut Unfair Insurance Practices Act (CUIPA) 
for the very purpose of regulating insurance businesses within the state.81  
These pieces of legislation indicate a strong policy in the state that should 
be respected by the state’s courts.   
Further, there is persuasive case law from other jurisdictions to support 
a finding of jurisdiction over American Transit.  In a case similar to 
Cogswell, Florida Department of Insurance and Treasurer v. Bankers 
Insurance Company, the Florida Court of Appeals reasoned that an 
                                                                                                                 
78  See State ex rel. Hydraulic Servocontrols Corp. v. Dale, 657 P.2d 211, 214 (Or. 
1982).   
79  Cogswell v. Am. Trans. Ins. Co., No. CV040832164S, 2004 Conn. Super. 
LEXIS 2167 at *13 (Conn. Super. Aug. 6, 2004). 
80  Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Pasion, 594 A.2d 468, 471-72 (Conn. 1991).   
81   Conn. Gen. Stat. § 38a-815 (2007).   
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administrative agency may take steps that may or may not be proper for the 
judiciary to take.   
The…power involved here is the power to get information from those 
who can best give it….Because judicial power is reluctant if not unable to 
summon evidence until it is shown to be relevant to issues in litigation, it 
does not follow that an administrative agency charged with seeing that the 
laws are enforced may not have and exercise powers of original 
inquiry….When investigative and accusatory duties are delegated by 
statute to an administrative body, it, too, may take steps to inform itself as 
to whether there is probable violation of the law.82 
The Supreme Court of New Jersey has held that the New Jersey Bureau 
of Securities was justified in issuing an investigative subpoena to an out-of-
state defendant in a securities action who engaged in purposeful conduct in 
New Jersey.  The court specifically reasoned that “to allow [the defendant] 
to reside in New York, do business in New Jersey more than minimally, 
and affect a well-regulated industry in New Jersey, without fear of 
investigation or subpoena, is offensive to traditional notions of fair play 
and substantial justice.”83  The court did hold that the defendant must have 
purposefully availed himself of the advantages of doing business in the 
forum,84 but as explained above, in this case, American Transit did in fact 
take advantage of doing business in Connecticut.85   
Other jurisdictions have not hesitated to find jurisdiction over out-of-
state defendants in similar circumstances, particularly where the policy 
interests of the state in regulating industries such as securities and 
insurance are concerned.  There is no reason why, in light of the important 
interests at stake, the Connecticut Supreme Court should not have followed 
suit.   
 
VIII. POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF DENYING JURISDICTION 
 
One fact surrounding the Cogswell litigation that has not received 
mention in this Note so far is the fact that Ms. Cogswell received notice 
that American Transit had adjusted more claims than simply that of Mickey 
Reavis.86  Ms. Cogswell alleged that she had discovered that twenty-one 
claims had been handled by appraisers licensed by the state of Connecticut 
                                                                                                                 
82  Florida Dept. of Ins. v. Bankers Ins. Co., 694 So. 2d 70, 71-72 (Fl. App. 1997).   
83  Silverman v. Berkson, 661 A.2d 1266, 1267 (N.J. 1995).   
84  Id. at 1276.   
85  See Part V, supra.   
86  Cogswell v. Am. Trans. Ins. Co., 923 A.2d 638, 642-43, 653 (Conn. 2007).   
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but adjusted by adjusters not licensed by the state of Connecticut, which 
practice may violate Connecticut law.87  Therefore, her investigation is 
even more significant than the investigation of a single claim; if an 
insurance company has been regularly conducting insurance business in 
Connecticut without proper licensing, the insurance commissioner has a 
right to know and to investigate.  Ms. Cogswell was simply seeking 
enforcement of an investigative subpoena to determine what actions might 
be taken against the out-of-state defendants in pursuance of Connecticut 
law.  By denying jurisdiction over the matter, the Connecticut Supreme 
Court has hobbled the commissioner and allowed an insurance company 
who may be dealing regularly with Connecticut residents to escape without 
scrutiny of its compliance with Connecticut law.   
There is a larger policy concern to be contended with in this case, 
which is the cooperation between states.  It is manifestly unfair to leave Mr. 
Reavis without recourse in this matter.  He is reliant on the officials of the 
state of Connecticut, who have been appointed or elected to protect his 
interests.  He is not a citizen of New York, and is therefore not entitled to 
rely on the New York regulatory system to protect his rights.  While there 
may be some courts that hold that this exercise of jurisdiction is a violation 
of due process, is it not a violation of Mr. Reavis’s due process to be left 
without the ability to complain of his treatment?  To whom is he to turn to 
express his displeasure, and possibly unlawful treatment, if not to the 
insurance commissioner of the state in which he resides, the state in which 
the accident occurred, and the state in which his claim was appraised and 
adjusted?  As the New Jersey Supreme Court reasoned in Silverman, “a 
form of horizontal federalism, one in which states cooperate in the 
discharge of their governmental duties, is both timely and reasonable.”88 
As the trial court pointed out, Connecticut has a strong policy in favor 
of regulating insurance companies and protecting consumers’ rights.89  The 
strength of the policy in favor of allowing the insurance commissioner to 
investigate compliance with Connecticut law and the relatively 
insignificant inconvenience of providing such information points in favor 
of granting jurisdiction.   
                                                                                                                 
87  Id. at 526-27, n. 13 (discussing the application of CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-271(a)).   
88  Silverman v. Berkson, 661 A.2d 1266, 1275 (N.J. (1995).   
89  Cogswell, 2004 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2167 at *13. 
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